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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
The reconciliation of patents within the Taiwanese Law of Things has received 
negligible attention from legal scholars. The primary reason for this is the hesitation, by 
courts and scholars alike, to construct a new property paradigm, referring instead to 
treat patents under the existing rules on physical things. This dominating stance has had 
an impact on the manner in which Taiwanese courts adjudicate on the nature of patents, 
and dealings therewith. The aim of the thesis is to show that this stance is theoretically 
illogical. 
 
The underlying issue is the different classification of patents within the civil and 
common law systems. The study employs a historical and comparative law 
methodology in order to inform an intra-law solution to the problem of how to 
overcome the classification dilemma. It does this by critically analysing the evolution of 
patent categorisation as personal property in common law and, by employing this 
foundation, seeks to distinguish the substantial differences in the concept of property 
between the common and civil law traditions. In light of these differences, and to 
establish a consolidated way of reconciling patents into the current Taiwanese legal 
framework, the thesis further analyses the similarity of the property notion under 
English common law and Taiwanese customary law, both of which are shaped by 
exclusion rules. 
 
The hypothesis is that ownership of land within these two systems, in similar with that 
of patents, was not an absolute and outright ownership of land governed by inclusion 
rules, but was instead a freehold which granted intangible rights that could be divided 
by the duration of the holding. It is suggested that a theoretically more coherent 
property model can be achieved by adopting this approach, and analogising patents to 
the tenure systems that existed within both English common law and Taiwanese 
customary law. 
 
To this end, the thesis proposes to contextually rebuild the property model for patents 
within Taiwanese law by the insertion of five new reform clauses into the Patent Act 
and the Civil Code. 
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Terminologies 
 
The terms used in this research require clear definitions. This glossary gives brief, but 
not necessarily exhaustive, definitions of technical, foreign, and unusual terms in the 
sense in which they are used in the text. It is not a substitute for a law lexicon or an 
ordinary dictionary but is intended to provide a ready reference for the convenience of 
readers who may not be familiar with these terms, particularly with the specialized 
meaning they sometimes have in this research. Unless otherwise specified, terms used in 
this research are based on civil law terminology, however, both civil law and common 
law terminologies are utilized in this research, depending on the context. 
 
assignment: If this word is used in the civil law concept with a Chinese translation 
rang-yu (讓與) , this word means the disposition of a physical thing. If this word is used 
in English common law, assignment means transfer of rights
1
 but not necessarily a 
physical thing disposition.
2
 
 
bundle of rights: This term follows Honoré’s definition3 that a bundle of rights 
                                                 
1
 In a general sense, ‘transfer’ is a larger concept that covers tangible thing disposition and intangible 
rights conveyance, with the word ‘conveyance’ referring only to intangible rights’ transfer. See Gerg 
Tolhurst, The Assignment of Contractual Rights (Hart 2006) 35-36. ‘The word “transfer” is capable of 
wide meaning. In its day-to-day use it is employed to describe the situation where a person parts with 
something in circumstances where the transferee obtains the exact same thing as that once held by the 
transferor’. ‘In law, “transfer is also used to describe a conveyance of property. In the context of a 
conveyance, the law’s focus is not merely on the transfer of tangible things but on the transfer of property 
rights’. ‘An “assignment”, in legal discourse, is said to involve a transfer’. 
2
 See ibid 40. Gerg explains chose in action assignment well. She says that ‘assignment’ is a term that 
involves a transfer without a physical thing disposition, so this term is suitable for describing an intangible 
things’ transfer. Originally, this word is an English term which derived from the Latin assignare means to 
appoint, distribute, or assign. See Walter Ross, Lectures on the History and Practice of the Law of 
Scotland Relative to Conveyancing and Legal Diligence  (2nd edn, Bell & Bradfute 1822) Ross further 
cited Britton, the origin of this word was used to the transfer of property between a father and his bastard 
son. He said, ‘Britton (one of the oldest English writers) mentions that this word was first brought into use 
for the favour of bastards, because they cannot pass under the name of heirs, and therefore were and are 
provided under the name of assignees’. Today, there is no such implication anymore. 
3
 Honoré identified 11 elements, and Backer identified 13. See A M Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in Carl 
Wellman (ed), Rights and Duties:Property Rights and Duties of Redistribution, vol 6 (Routledge 2002) 
25-65 , and Lawrence C Becker, ‘The Moral Basis of Property Rights’ in J Rowland Pennock and John W 
Chapman (eds), Property: Nomos XXII (New York University Press 1980) 190-191. 
 13 
including: 1) the right to possess, 2) the right to use, 3) the right to manage, 4) the right 
to income, 5) the right to the capital, 6) the right to security, 7) the incident of 
transmissibility, 8) the incident of absence of term, 9) the prohibition of harmful use, 10) 
liability to execution, and 11) residuary rules.  
 
chose: 〔French〕refers to a thing,4 whether tangible or intangible; a personal article; or 
a chattel.
5
 In this research refers to any asset other than land.
6
  
 
chose in action: a legal expression used to describe a proprietary right in personam, 
which can only be claimed or enforced through legal or court action, and is not in one’s 
physical possession.
7
 
 
civil law: This study uses this term in a broader sense that the law that has been 
permeated by Roman law in continental Europe;
8
 by contrast, the failure of Roman law 
to permeate is called ‘common law’. 
 
common law: The term ‘common law’ used in this research, in contrast to the term 
‘civil law’, refers to English law or Anglo-American law particularly. Common law of 
English in this thesis is refined to the common law of England and Wales, not including 
                                                 
4
 Elizabeth A Martin and Jonathan Law, A Dictionary of Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 90. 
Also in Bryan A Garner (ed) Black's Law Dictionary (9th edn, West 2009) 275. 
5
 Garner (n 4) 275.  
6
 J E Penner, The Law Student's Dictionary (Oxford University Press 2008) 45. Also in J E Penner, 
Herbert Newman Mozley and George Crispe Whiteley, Mozley and Whiteley's Law Dictionary (12th edn, 
Butterworths 2001) 53. 
7
 The term in the dictionary means: 1) a proprietary right in personam, such as a debt owned by another 
person, a share in a joint-stock company, or a claim for damages in tort, or 2) the right to bring an action to 
recover a debt, money or thing, or 3) personal property owned by one person but possessed by another, 
with the owner being able to regain possession through a lawsuit. See Garner (n4) 275. From the definition 
it reveals, in the common law sense, this term covers intangible rights to real things and obligations. 
8
 JM Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory (Clarendon 1992) 179. The great division of western 
legal civilised legal world is to divide it into two families: one is the civil law family and the other is the 
common law family. According to Kelly, the essential basis of the division was ‘the permeation of 
continental Europe’s jurisdictions by Roman law, the ius civile in the Romans; own language; and, by 
contrast, the failure of Roman law permanently to penetrate the English legal profession, which persisted 
in the native traditional rules’. 
 14 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. Common law of the United State of America in this 
thesis refers to the American states where common law is implemented and does not 
include the state of Louisiana. In this research, this term was not used in the concept of 
ius commune that refers to a commonly thought of legal principles which formed the 
basis of a common system in Western Europe as civil jurists usually mean. 
 
conveyance: In this study, conveyance is a disposition of estate in land when the grantor 
and grantee are alive,
9
 usually used for intangible right transfer. 
 
debt: This research uses this word in two senses: a monetary or non-monetary thing one 
person owes another,
10
 or a personal liability that describes the abovementioned owing 
situation. 
 
fee simple absolute in possession: This term originally means an estate is inheritable, 
indefeasible and capable of passing to the general heirs, with a guarantee of the receipt 
of rent and profit. The word ‘fee’ originally meant that ‘the estate was inheritable’ in the 
fifteenth century during Littleton’s time.11 ‘Simple’ meant that the fee was ‘capable of 
passing to the heirs general and was not restricted to passing to a particular class of 
heirs’.12 ‘Absolute’ denoted that it clearly ‘excludes an estate that is defeasible either by 
the breach of a condition or by the possibility that it may pass to some new owner upon 
                                                 
9
 Peter Butt, Land law (5th edn, Lawbook 2006) 7. Butt defines conveyance as an assurance of land inter 
vivos, more particularly of land under common law system title. The phase inter vivos means when 
disponor and disponee are alive. 
10
 Garner(n4) 462. According to Black’s law dictionary, debt has four meanings: ‘1. Liability on a claim; a 
specific sum of money due by agreement or otherwise. 2. The aggregate of all existing claims against a 
person, entity, or state. 3. A nonmonetary thing that one person owes another, such as goods or services. 4. 
A common-law writ by which a court adjudicates claims involving fixed sums of money’. 
11
 E H Burn and J Cartwright, Cheshire and Burn's Modern Law of Real Property (18th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2011) 151. Also in A J Oakley, Megarry's Manual of The Law of Real Property (8th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2002) 32. 
12
 Burn and Cartwright (n 11) 151. The word ‘simple’ is used to distinguished a fee simple that used to be 
called a fee tail (is now called entailed interest) whereas the owner can only pass on to a particular class of 
lineal descendants. 
 15 
the happening of a specified event’.13 The phrase ‘in possession’ meant that the estate is 
a present estate and not in remainder or in reversion. This research follows the original 
meaning of the term. 
 
grant: used as a noun in this research means: 1) an agreement which creates a right of 
any description other than the one held by the grantor. For example, when this thesis 
uses a term such as a leases grant, a patent grant, a franchise grant or a licence grant.
14
 2) 
a freehold interest so transferred,
15
 depends on the context. The verb ‘to grant’, as used 
in this research, means ‘to permit or agree to’.16 
 
immovable (thing): a thing which cannot be moved like a piece of land, or an object so 
firmly attached to land that it is regarded as being part of land, such as a building.
17
 
 
in personam:〔Latin ‘against a person’〕This term has two meanings in this study: 1) the 
personal rights and obligations of parties; and 2) a legal action brought against a person 
rather than property.
18
 The context adopts the first meaning when using ‘rights in 
                                                 
13
 ibid 152. Also in Oakley (n 11) 79-80. 
14
 Garner (n4) 768. Simonds defines a patent grant as ‘an instrument in writing, conveying an exclusive 
territorial right under a patent’. See William Edgar Simonds, Practical Suggestions on the Sale of Patents 
with Forms of Assignment, License, Contract, Power of Attorney to Sell Rights, &c., Many of Them 
Original, and Instructions Relative thereto, with Hints upon Invention and the United States Census 
(William Edgar Simonds 1871) 43. 
15
 Originally this word applied to the creation of smaller interest (normally intangible interest in land) out 
of another larger one, rather than to the disposition of an interest already created, but there is no significant 
difference now. See Butt (n 9) 7. ‘Grant originally applied to the creation of an interest out of another 
(larger) one, rather than to the assurance of an interest already created. Thus, we speak of the “grant” of a 
lease, or of a life estate, or of an easement. But the word is also used nowadays in the more general sense 
of “assurance”. “Grant” was originally the correct word when creating and intangible (“incorporeal”) 
interest in land, such as an easement; but it is now also apt for conveying a freehold interest already held 
by the granter’. The word ‘assurance’, according to Butt, has a similar meaning to ‘disposition’ and 
‘alienation’. 
16
 Garner (n4) 769. 
17
 ‘Immovable’ is also termed as an ‘immovable thing’ in Black’s law dictionary. See Garner (n4) 817. 
18
 Adopted from Garner (n4) 862. In Roman law, rights are classified as two types, one is in personam 
rights and the other is in rem rights. The expressions in rem and in personam are opposed to each another. 
In ancient Rome, ius referred to actions rather than rights. See Boudewijn Bouckaert, ‘What is Property?’ 
(1990) 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 775, 784 
 16 
personam’. When using ‘action in personam’, the second meaning applies.19 Rights in 
personam means an interest protected solely from specific individuals.
20
 
 
in rem:〔Latin ‘against a thing’〕 used in this research has two meanings: 1) the status of 
a thing, so rights in rem means the rights that a person has with respect to a thing;
21
 and 
2) a legal action brought against a thing.
22
 This context adopts the first meaning when 
stating jural relations of rights in rem; when referring to action in rem, the second 
meaning applies.  
 
intangible (property/thing): This word is used in a general sense for an object which is 
incorporeal and lacks a physical existence, such as responsibility, stock options and 
business goodwill,
23
 or an asset which is not corporeal, such as intellectual property.
24
  
 
intellectual property: This term is used in a general sense which refers to an ethereal, 
intangible property without a corporeal existence, including, but not limited to, the 
                                                 
19
 The 2004 version of Black’s law dictionary adopted R H Graveson, Conflict of laws and defined action 
in personam as: ‘an action is said to be in personam when its object is to determine the rights and interests 
of the parties themselves in the subject-matter of the action, however the action may arise, and the effect 
of a judgment in such an action is merely to bind the parties to it. A normal action brought by one person 
against another for breach of contract is a common example of an action in personam’. However, the 2009 
version refined the definition: 1. An action brought against a person rather than property. An in personam 
judgment is binding on the judgment-debtor and can be enforced against all the property of the judgment- 
debtor. 2. An action in which the named defendant is a natural or legal person. See Garner (n4) 33. 
20
 Black’s law dictionary also terms right in personam as personal right or jus in personam. ibid 1438. 
21
 ibid 864. 
22
 Definition of ‘action in rem’ is more refined in the 2009 version than in the 2004 version. In the 2004 
version, Black’s law dictionary cites R H Graveson, Conflict of laws (7th edn 1974) 98 and defines action 
in rem as ‘the one in which the judgment of the court determines the title to property and the rights of the 
parties, not merely as between themselves, but also as against all persons at any time dealing with them or 
with the property upon which the court had adjudicated’. Further in the 2009 version, Black’s law 
dictionary specifically defines ‘action in rem’ as: 1. An action determining the title to property and the 
rights of the parties, not merely among themselves, but also against all persons at any time claiming an 
interest in that property; a real action. 2. Louisiana law. An action brought for the protection of possession, 
ownership, or other real rights in immovable property. 3. Louisiana law. An action for the recovery of 
possession of immovable property. 4. An action in which the named defendant is real or personal property. 
See ibid 34. 
23
 ibid 879. ‘Something that lacks a physical form, an asset that is not corporeal, such as intellectual 
property’. Also in ibid 1336. Under the word ‘property’, intangible property is defined as ‘Property that 
lacks a physical existence’. 
24
 ibid 879. Penner defines intangible rights as a kind of property opposed to tangible rights. Intangible 
rights or incorporeal property includes, but is not limited to, bank balances, patents, copyrights, 
advowsons, and rents. Penner, The Law Student's Dictionary (n 6) 287. 
 17 
notion of a patent, copyright, and trade mark.
25
 Although the terms ‘intellectual property’ 
and ‘intellectual property rights’ are often used interchangeably as they are in the WIPO 
definition,
26
 to be precise in this research, when ‘intellectual property’ is used, it refers 
to the actual results of the concept of intellectual endeavour. When the term ‘intellectual 
property rights’ is used, it refers to the concept of legal protection that the law grants to 
the legal owner of his intellectual endeavour.  
 
landlord: In this research, landlord means the one who can dispose of his/her 
immovable thing or transfer his/her estate to another.
 27
 This research does not refer 
landlord to feudal lord unless otherwise stated. 
 
lease/leasehold: used in the common law sense in this research means a grant of 
proprietary interest,
28
 however, when it is used in the civil law sense, it means a 
contractual commitment without creating an encumbrance to the ownership.
29
 Unless 
otherwise stated, this word used in this research normally refers to the civil law meaning, 
that a lease/leasehold is a contract by which a rightful owner/possessor of a physical 
thing conveys the right of use to a person wanting temporary enjoyment in exchange for 
a rent.
30
 
                                                 
25
 Penner defines ‘intellectual property’ as ‘Any patent, trademark, copyright, design right, registered 
design, technical or commercial information or other intellectual property’. Penner, Mozley and Whiteley, 
Mozley and Whiteley's Law Dictionary, 184. Also in Penner, The Law Student's Dictionary (n 6)151. 
26
 Thomas E Hays and Claire C Milne, Intellectual Property Law in Practice (Thomson/W Green 2004) 2. 
27
 In English common law, landlord also means the feudal lord who retained the fee of the land, and is 
sometimes shortened to lord or termed lessor. ibid 957. Unless otherwise stated, this research does not 
refer landlords as the feudal lords. 
28
 In English law, the notion of a lease emanates from ownership and is imposed on ownership, while in 
Roman law, a lease does not emanate from ownership—a lease does not entail the modification of 
ownership in Roman law. Fritz B Schulz, Classical Roman Law (Clarendon 1951) 334. ‘The right of the 
Roman lessee, in sharp contrast to the English, does not emanate from ownership and it is immaterial 
whether the lessor is or is not the owner of the land. If the lessor is owner, the right of the lessee does not 
modify ownership; it is not, like usufruct, a charge imposed upon ownership’. 
29
 Lease/leasehold is an encumbrance of ownership in English law, but not in Roman law. See Graham 
Beynon and John Hughes, Jurisprudence (Butterworth & Co 1955) 391- 392. ‘By the encumbrance of a 
right is meant “some adverse, dominant, and limiting right in respect of it”. So where A owns property 
which is leased and mortgaged, A will be the owner, and the lessee and mortgagee the encumbrancers’. 
30
 According to Garner (n4) 970, a lease is ‘a contract by which a rightful possessor of “real property” 
conveys the right to use and occupy the property in exchange for consideration, usually rent’. Here, ‘real 
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licence: has two meanings in this research: 1) a permission to perform some act which, 
without such permission, could not lawfully be performed,
31
 or 2) the certificate or 
document evidencing such permission.
32
  
 
movable thing: refers to a thing which is not attached to an immovable thing, which can 
be carried from place to place. In this study, a movable thing is not synonymous with 
personal property
33
 because of a different categorical classification of English personal 
property and civil law personal obligations as stated in details in 5.6.3. 
 
mutatis mutandis: meaning with the necessary modifications. 
 
numerus clausus: This research uses this term as real rights that are limited to a small 
number of well-defined types.
34
  
 
                                                                                                                                                
property’ in the common law covers tangible aspects (such as soil and buildings) and intangible aspects 
(such as easements). However, in the Taiwanese code, an easement cannot be leased. Therefore, in this 
research, the object of a lease is limited to tangible property only. 
31
 See Penner, The Law Student's Dictionary (n 6) 173. Clarke has a better explanation to the word 
‘licence’. She said that ‘… “licence” is a broad term covering any permission to make any kind of use of 
any thing…it covers not only the grant of a personal right to occupy the land but also the grant of any right 
to make use of the land in any other way which is purely personal and not proprietary’. Alison Clarke and 
Paul Kohler, Property Law: commentary and materials (Cambridge University Press 2005) 273. This 
research uses the word ‘licence’ in this broad sense. 
32
 Adopted from Garner (n4) 1002. 
33
 Penner, Mozley and Whiteley, Mozley and Whiteley's Law Dictionary (n 6) 294. Also in Penner, The 
Law Student's Dictionary (n 6) 243. Also in Rahmatian (n 92) 15 note 90. This author agrees with the first 
half of Rahmatian’s comment that personal property and moveable property are not identical terms. 
However, this author disagrees with the second half of the comment that these terms can be used 
interchangeably in the present context of copyright. 
34
 See H Hansmann and R Kraakman, ‘Property, Contract, and Verification: the numerus clausus problem 
and the divisibility of rights’ (2002) 31(2) J Legal Stud S373 at S374. See also Jan Smits, ‘How to Mix 
Legal Systems in a Fruitful Way? Some Remarks on the Development of a Ius Commune Europaeum 
through Competition of Legal Rules’ (Towards a European Private Law by Competition of Legal Rules, 
Maastricht, November 19th, 1998) 2 ‘One common feature of many European private law systems, at least 
of the continental ones, is—in property law—the existence of a numerus clausus of real rights. From the 
North Cap to Palermo and from Porto to Odessa, rights in rem are part of a closed system; other rights 
than the (essentially) seven that have been recognized in law, cannot be accepted. This is, e.g., the case in 
France (art. 543 CC) in Belgium (idem), in Germany and in The Netherlands (art.3:81 lid 1 BW and art. 
584 BW(oud))’. 
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ownership: (suo-you-quan 所有權 in Chinese, shoyuhken in Japanese) In this study, 
ownership is normally used in the civil law sense that ownership is a comprehensive 
right over a thing (no matter it is movable or immovable) which, in principle, endows its 
holder with full power over it.
35
 In some literature, the word ‘property’ is used as a 
synonym for the notion of ownership,
36
 but in this thesis, property and ownership have 
their own separate definitions. Ownership is a concept which cannot be fragmented in 
substance in the Taiwanese Civil Code;
37
 it cannot be divided by different time 
durations and to different persons.
38
 When this word is used in association with 
Taiwanese Civil Code, this word contains a relatively narrow meaning compared with 
that in classical Roman law,
39
 and is termed suo-you-quan hereunder. 
 
When ‘ownership’ is used in the common law sense, it is not regarded as being a single 
all embracing right but rather a complexity of different rights.
40
 As this thesis will 
                                                 
35
 Schulz (n 28) 338. Barry Nicholas defines it as ‘the unrestricted right of control over a physical thing, 
and whosoever has this right can claim the thing he owns wherever it is and no matter who posseses it’. 
See H F Jolowicz and Barry Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (3rd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 1972) 140. According to Maine, ownership is a larger concept than 
possession because ownership involves three elements: possession, adverseness of possession and 
prescription in Roman law. Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: its connection with the early history of 
society and its relation to modern ideas; with introduction and notes by Sir Frederick Pollock, Bart (John 
Murray 1918) 277. Holland made a ranking between possession and ownership, saying that the lowest 
form of right is possession and the highest form is right of ownership. See Thomas Erskine Holland, The 
Elements of Jurisprudence (13th edn, Clarendon 1924) 193. 
36
 Examples like Bouckaret, ‘…Roman lawyers did not have a clear-cut definition of property (dominium) 
as a legal right’. Bouckaert 781. Or Munzer, ‘property as social relations’. Stephen R Munzer, New Essays 
in the Legal and Political Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press 2001) 36. 
37
 However, this is not the case in ancient Roman law. See Hans Ankum and Eric Pool, ‘Traces of the 
Development of Roman Double Ownership’ in Hans Ankum and Eric Pool, ‘Rem in bonis meis esse and 
rem in bonis mean esse: trace of the development of Roman double ownership’ in Peter Birks (ed), New 
Perspectives in the Roman Law of Property: essays for Barry Nicholas (Clarendon 1989) 5. 
38
 ‘Contrary to English Law, which permits the separate ownership of horizontal strata (as in Lincoln’s Inn, 
where a set of chambers on the ground floor may be owned by one tenant in fee while the floor above is 
owned by another tenant in fee), the Roman Law admits no departure from the principle cujus est solum 
ejus est usque ad sidera et ad inferos and the allied rule superficies solo cedit. Therefore, no one could 
own the surface except as owning the land’. RW Lee, The Elements of Roman Law: with a translation of 
the institutes of Justinian (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1956) 174. 
39
 Schulz (n 28) 336. Although it is evident that, under classical Roman law, the bounds of ownership 
were very wide, especially when compared with medieval Germanic ownership. 
40
Ross perceived that the central concern of Blackstone was the individual’s relationship with the ‘thing’, 
and it was not until this century when the emphasis was changed by Hohfeld. Historically, property and 
ownership in the common law world were conceived in terms of rights, to or in things. See Ross Grantham, 
‘Doctrinal Bases for the Recognition of Proprietary Rights’ (1996) 16(4) Oxford Journal Legal Studies  
561, 566-567. Clarke had a different opinion, citing Blackstone’s commentaries and Whelan’s annotation, 
concluding, ‘From this perspective, it is clear that Blackstone did not regard ownership as a single 
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further explain, ownership in common law has been regarded as a two-ended 
relationship with both sides being persons,
41
 while Roman law views ownership as a 
right emanating from a person to a thing.
42
 
 
possession: is defined as the detention of a physical thing with the intent to hold it as 
one’s own in this research. This carries the meaning of the right to exclude and excludes 
the rights to use and capital.
43
 When it is referred back to the Taiwanese Civil Code, 
possession is a fact 
44
 of having or holding things in one’s power.45 
 
property: an object which belongs to someone, whether it is a physical or intangible 
thing. ‘Property’ in this study has a broader meaning than ‘things’ in civil law, but when 
the term ‘real property’ is used, it refers to immovable things, or interests in immovable 
things only. In this research, the term ‘property’ is not used as a synonym of ‘ownership’ 
(which has the meaning of a comprehensive collection of legal rights over an object; see 
                                                                                                                                                
all-embracing right but, as Whelan again notes, rather “a complex of different rights” not accounted for by 
the simple notion of “sole and despotic dominion”’. Clarke and Kohler (n 31) 184. Hughes further 
explained why there is a different understanding between common law and civil law. ‘The reason for the 
vagueness of English jurists on this concept of ownership is not difficult to discover….English legal 
remedies are not in their form concerned with the protection of ownership but with possession and the 
right to possess’. ‘The plain conclusion is that ownership is not a legal concept in the English system, but 
rather a social concept’. See Hughes (n 29) 395. 
41
 ‘Ownership is manifestly a relation, rather than a property of things’. See Henry C Mitchell, The 
Intellectual Commons: toward an ecology of intellectual property (Lexington Books 2005) 196. 
42
 This is because, since English lawyers became familiarised with the Roman concept of ownership in the 
legal renaissance of the 12
th
 and 13
th
 centuries, the concept of ownership has been modified by common 
law lawyers to fit in with the common law estate structure. See Charles Reinold Noyes, The Institution of 
Property: a study of the development, substance and arrangement of the system of property in modern 
Anglo-American law (Longmans & Co 1936) 296, note 31. ‘It is true, as Holdsworth says, that the 
common law structure of estates has been modified by the Roman concept of dominium’. In note 31, ‘The 
Roman concept of ownership,….as we have seen, that conception has never been completely acclimatised 
in the common law, yet common law has acquired a conception of ownership which is different from that 
better right to possess which was the dominant theory’. A similar saying can be found in Hughes (n 29) 
391. ‘English law has never evolved a theory of ownership with the precision which the Romans brought 
to that fullest form of ownership in Roman law, dominium’. ‘English law evolved its protection of 
property through the doctrines of seisin and possession, and was not in its early stages much concerned 
with ownership’. 
43
 Wang Ze-jian(王澤鑑), Minfa Wuquan(民法物權)=The Law of Things in The Civil Code (San Min 
2009) 10. ‘Ownership has the right to exclude others and the right to use and capital, while possession has 
the right to exclude but lacks the rights to use and capital’. ‘Possession is not the “rights” which Article 
184 refers to, it needs be combined with obligations (such as a lease) in that the obligations provides the 
basis for the right to use and capital’. 
44
 However, some jurists argue that it is a right. See ibid 517 note 2 of his book. 
45
 Adopted from Garner (n4)1281. 
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also ‘ownership’ below).46 
 
property rights: In this study, this term is used in a general sense refers to rights to a 
specific property, whether tangible or intangible.
47
 
 
quasi: 〔Latin ‘as if’〕seemingly but not actually; resembling; nearly. 48This is a Latin 
word ‘frequently used in the civil law, and often prefixed to English words’.49 When 
this word is used in this thesis it implies a strong superficial analogy, and points out that 
the conceptions are sufficiently similar.  
 
quasi-possession: Although in traditional Roman law, intangible things cannot be 
possessed,
50
 however in Japanese and Taiwanese possession theory,
 
intangible things 
can be possessed.
51
 Therefore, in this research, quasi-possession means possession over 
real rights.
52
 
 
real property: land and anything growing on, attached to, or erected on it. 
 
                                                 
46
 According to Black’s law dictionary, property is defined as ‘1. The right to possess, use, and enjoy a 
determinate thing (either a tract of land or a chattel); the right of ownership, also termed bundle of rights. 2. 
Any external thing over which the rights of possession, use, and enjoyment are exercised’. The first 
definition is a synonym of ‘ownership’, but this research does not adopt the first definition. Rather, it 
adopts the second definition. Garner (n4)1335-36. 
47
 Adopted from ibid 1338 and 1437 under 'right'. 
48
 Adopted from ibid 1363. 
49
 The word quasi ‘marks the resemblance, and supposes a little difference, between two objects, and in 
legal phraseology the term is used to indicate that one subject resembles another, with which it is 
compared, in certain characteristics, but that there are also intrinsic and material differences between 
them’. Adopted from 74 C.J.S. Quasi, at 2 (1951) in ibid. 
50
 Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman law (Clarendon 1975) 106. ‘Incorporeal things cannot be 
possessed, since possession essentially requires a physical holding. Therefore, they cannot be acquired or 
transferred by any method with involves the transfer or acquisition of a possession’. Also in Lee (n38) 
181. 
51
 The German and Swiss codes reject the Roman law possession theory. The French law substantially 
adopts the Roman law possession theory. Since the German and Swiss codes reject the Roman theory of 
possession, Germanic law in this respect is nearer to English law than Roman law. See Lee (n 38) 184. 
52
 This term ‘quasi-possession’ is widely used in Taiwanese legal scholarship. See Wang (n 43) 698, and 
also [1953] Zuigao Fayuan Taishang Zi number 288 (最高法院台上字第 288 號) Zuigao Fayuan 
Precedent (Supreme Court). 
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real rights: a civil law term where a right is connected between a person with a movable 
or immovable thing, rather than a person with another person. Real rights in the civil law 
concept include ownership, use, habitation, usufruct, predial servitude, pledge and real 
mortgage, and is also a term that can be used interchangeable with ‘rights in rem’.53 In 
this research, if this term is used under the concept of civil law, it refers to the meaning 
stated above; if this term is used under the concept of common law, it refers to rights in 
relation to land. 
 
register: When used as a noun, it means the registry, or the registration system of land 
or patents.
54
 This study uses ‘registration’ as its synonym, especially referring to a 
certain principle like the ‘principle of registration’. 
 
right: (quanli 權利 in Chinese) used in this study means a way to protect a person’s 
legal interests, but it is not identical to interests. It is a legal power to maintain one’s 
legal interest.
55
  
 
rights in rem: This term generally means rights that a person has in relation to a thing. 
This thesis provides a detailed analysis in 4.2.2 regarding a different understanding of 
this term between Anglo-American law writers and Taiwanese law writers. Put simply 
here, ‘rights in rem’ in Hohfeld’s lexicon meaning rights against many people,56 whilst 
in Taiwanese civil law, rights in rem signifies the real rights an owner has over his/her 
                                                 
53
 Adopted from Garner (n4) 1437 under 'right'. 
54
 Adopted from Stephen F Jones and Paul Cole, CIPA Guide to the Patents Acts (7th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2011) 467. 
55
 Taking reference from Joseph Ernest De Becker, The Principles and Practice of the Civil Code of 
Japan (Butterworth & Co 1921) at introduction XXII-XXIII. The Taiwanese Civil Code defines it the 
same as the Japanese Civil Code. 
56Hohfeld defines ‘rights in rem’ as ‘one of a large class of fundamentally similar yet separate rights, 
actual and potential, residing in a single person (or single group of persons) but availing respectively 
against persons constituting a very large and indefinite class of people’. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1917) 26(8) Yale L J 718. Kocourek 
criticises on this definition. See Albert Kocourek, Jural relations (2d edn, The Bobbs-Merrill company 
1928) 198. 
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thing,
57
 and is normally used interchangeably with real rights. 
 
tangible things: used in this research refers to both movable and immovable things, 
including water and electricity, but excluding responsibility, stock options, business 
goodwill and intellectual property. 
 
tenure: is derived from the Latin tenere meaning ‘to hold’, with a ‘tenant’ being the 
simple ‘one who holds’. Therefore, a ‘tenure system’ used in this study means a 
landholding system in a society, with the relationship between landlords and tenants not 
necessarily associated with a lease.
58
 
 
thing: a subject matter of a right, limited to a tangible object.
59
  
 
the law of obligations: This research uses ‘the law of obligations’ in the civil law sense. 
In the civil law world, the law of obligations includes the law of torts, the law of 
restitution (such as unjust enrichment), and the law of contract.
60
 A contract is regarded 
as one of, but not the only, source of legal duties (obligations), with this concept of 
‘obligations’ (zhai 債 in Chinese) being the fundamental notion in all civil law countries 
that is not found in the common law world.
61
  
 
the law of things: This research uses ‘the law of things’ in the civil law sense. The law 
                                                 
57
 In Taiwanese Civil Code, ‘rights in rem’ equals to ‘wu quan（物權）’or real rights. The notion of rights 
in rem (wu quan 物權) is a larger concept than ownership (suo-you-quan 所有權). In addition to 
ownership, rights in rem can also refer to a mortgage right on a ship (also named ‘real securities’ in Roman 
law), a usufruct on a piece of land and any other rights admitted by law. See Wang ( n 43) 10. 
58
 Adopted from S Rowton Simpson, Land Law and Registration (Cambridge University Press 1976) 27. 
59
 Black’s law dictionary defines a ‘thing’ as ‘the subject matter of a right, whether it is a material object 
or not; any subject matter of ownership within the sphere of proprietary or valuable rights’. In common 
law, a ‘thing’ has a broader meaning than its definition in the Taiwanese Civil Code. This research does not 
adopt the dictionary meaning, for the reason that, in the Germanic-Japanese style of law, a thing is limited 
to tangible objects only. See Garner (n4)1617. 
60
 Rene David, English law and French law: a comparison in substance (Stevens & Sons 1980) 101. 
61
 ibid 101. 
 24 
of things under the civil law system is different from the ‘property law’ in the common 
law system. The law of things deals with the jural relationship between a person and a 
physical thing, while ‘property law’ in common law covers the jural relationship arising 
from property rights, whether the objects are physical or not. Here, in this study, the law 
of things refers to the civil law deals with relationship of a person and a physical thing. 
 
transfer: When used as a noun, it is a general term which embraces every mode of 
disposing of, or parting with, an asset or an interest in an asset.
62
 When used as a verb, 
transfer means to change the possession or control.
63
  
 
usucapio: meaning a positive right to gain title to a property, no matter whether it is 
movable or immovable, by someone who has remained in possession of another person’s 
property for a given period of time.
64
  
 
usufruct: meaning a right to use and enjoy another’s immovable thing for a period of 
time without damaging or diminishing it,
65
 a right less than ownership. Usufruct used in 
this research follows the definition in the Taiwanese Civil Code, which may refers to the 
                                                 
62
 Garner (n4) 1636. For a further supplement from case law, see David Hay, Words and Phrases Legally 
Defined (4th edn, LexisNexis 2006) 851. Adopted from Australian case Coles Myer Ltd v Commissioner of 
State Revenue (1998) ‘Although the word “transfer” is not a term of art and is a word with wide 
connotation, to my way of thinking it is the passing of rights to another, so as to vest them in that other 
person, which is essential for a transfer, properly understood. It is not a mere disposition, a ridding oneself 
of the right or interest; it is the vesting in the transferee of that right or interest, precisely or substantially, 
which is necessary to affect a transfer, as ordinarily understood in the law’. According to this opinion, 
‘transfer’ is not merely a mode of disposition, but also clothes the transferee with legal rights. 
63
 Garner (n4) 1636. 
64
 See Damien Abbott, Encyclopedia of Real Estate Terms: based on American and English practice, with 
terms from the Commonwealth as well as the civil law, Scots and French law (3rd edn, Delta Alpha 2008) 
1287. Abbott defines ‘usucapio’ as ‘In Roman law, a positive right to gain title to property (real or personal, 
movable or immovable) by someone who has remained in possession of another’s property for a given 
period of time’. Also in Wang (n 43) 167. 
65
 Black’s law dictionary defines ‘usufruct’ as ‘a right to use and enjoy the fruit of another’s “property”’. 
Garner (n4)1684. Here, ‘property’ which includes tangible and intangible aspects has a broader meaning 
than immovable. However, in the Taiwanese Civil Code, the object of a ‘usufruct’ is limited to immovable 
things only. See Wang (n 43) 341. ‘The object of the usufruct in this code is limited to immovable things. 
A usufruct cannot be created over a movable thing’. Therefore, Black’s law dictionary’s definition changed 
to ‘immovable’ by this author. Besides, quasi-usufruct is not recognised in the Taiwanese code, unlike the 
Roman law. A right to use movable things can be fulfilled by means of the law of obligations, better than 
creating a quasi-usufruct. See ibid 341. 
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following four types of right: surface rights,
66
 agricultural tenancies, easement and diăn
（典）, depends on the context.67  
  
                                                 
66
 Surface rights, originating from Roman law superficies, were adopted by German and Swiss civil codes 
as well as by the civil code of Taiwan. See Wang (n 43) 352. Originally, superficies mean all things built 
upon or attached to the ground, such as houses and buildings, but also trees and other plants. As long as 
the one who built on another’s land or cultivated it acted with the consent of the landowner, either a 
servitus or an emphythesus could apply. See Alexander P Kazhdan, The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium 
(Oxford University Press 1991) vol 3, 1977. Regarding the definition of emphythesus, see ibid vol 1, 693. 
‘In the 4th C., the term referring to a set of administrative regulations whereby estates belonging to the 
crown were transferred to private cultivators. By the late 5
th
 C. emphythesus had developed into a specific 
type of written contract governing long-term, usually perpetual leases of real property applicable not only 
to crown lands but to holdings of private and ecclesiastical landlords. Emp. Zeno defined emphythesus as a 
right distinct from lease or sale, although possessing certain qualities of both’. 
67
 Under numerous clausus principles, the creation of a usufruct is limited to the recognition of statutory 
law and customary law, therefore, under Taiwanese Civil Code, there are only four types of usufruct as 
stated. Usufruct is majorly comprised of two of the rights—the right of use and the right of enjoyment, but 
does not include the right of disposition. See Abbott (n 64) 1287. ‘Usufruct comprises two of the rights to 
property as recognized in Roman law, the right of use (usus) as the right of enjoyment (fructus), but does 
not include the right to destroy or ‘abuse’ the property (abusus); this latter right is only available to the 
nu-propriétaire (absolute owner)’. In Roman law, a usufruct emanates from ownership, and is independent 
of ownership, but constitutes a restriction to ownership. See Schulz (n 28) 334. 
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1.1 Overview of the problem 
 
How to correctly classify patents in the taxonomy of Taiwanese property institutions is a 
topic that has received insufficient discussion by the Taiwanese legal scholarship. An 
overriding number of jurists
68
 believe that rights in rem from the law of things in 
                                                 
68
 For example, reputable professor Tsai Ming-cheng (蔡明誠) states, ‘…according to the prevailing 
opinions in Germany, the character of “things” should be Zuordnungsrecht (to whom it belongs to). Rights 
in rem could be named recht der Verömegenszuordnung von Sachen, such as patents, utility models, design 
patents, trade marks, copyrights and alike, are rights in rem (dingliche Rechte).’ [translation by this author] 
See Tsai Ming-cheng, Wuquanfa Yanjiu (物權法研究)=A Study on The Law of Things (Xue Lin 2003) 6. 
Another reputable professor Shieh Zai-quan (謝在全) highlights, ‘Rights in rem have moved from a single 
thing to a combination of things: including movables and immovable things, even covering intangible 
things such as trade mark rights, patent rights, [rights in rem] being a combination of things for a specific 
economic purpose that have more and more in common.’ [translation by this author] Shieh Zai-quan 
conceives that rights in a trade mark and patent are a collective concept of things, and can therefore be 
applied to the law of things. See Shieh Zai-quan, Minfa Wuquan Lun-shang (民法物權論-上)=On The 
Law of Things vol I (3rd edn, San Min 三民 1989, 2004 reprint) 25. A similar saying can be also found in 
Shieh Ming-yan(謝銘洋), Zhihui Caicanquan Fa(智慧財產權法)=Intellectual Property Law (Yuan Zhao 
2008) 43-72. Chapter 4 of Shieh’s book discusses whether Articles 768, 801, 948, 966 apply to intellectual 
property. Also in Rui Mu(芮沐), Minfa Faluxingwei Lilun Zhi Quanbu(民法法律行為理論之全部)=An 
Overall Theory of Legal Acts in the Civil Code (San Min 2002) 7-8. Rui Mu classifies intellectual property 
rights as absolute rights like real rights. Lin Ko-ching(林克敬), Minfa Shang Quanli Zhixing Shi (民法上
權利之行使)=Exercise of Rights in the Civil Law (San Min 2009), 9. Lin Ko-ching suggests that the right 
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Taiwanese Civil Code explain the nature of a patent well, so there is no need for further 
discussion. In fact, court decisions that have adopted jurists’ opinions sometimes 
successfully explain the law, but sometimes they do not. Judges are persuaded by jurists 
that the principles arising from the law of things support the property nature of a patent, 
even though no article in the law of things supports such a premise. Both the court and 
academia have failed to develop a deeper comparative study between real rights in the 
Taiwanese law structure and the estate concept used in patents in common law England. 
The theoretical gap between these three systems has created a significant obstacle in 
Taiwan’s international patent transaction business. 
 
There are many historical antecedents that have caused this misconception. Taiwanese 
academia are more imbued by Japanese and German law thinking than by the common 
law of England or the common law of the United States of America because 
Japanese/German law reception in Taiwan began early in the 1920s, with legal science 
arising from it and dominating the Taiwanese academia since then. It was not until the 
second half of the 20
th
 century that Anglo-American law started to influence the 
development of Taiwanese intellectual property law.
69
 Compared to the strong influence 
of Japan during the first half of the 20
th
 century, the reception of Anglo-American 
                                                                                                                                                
to dominate a thing applies to intellectual property. Chuang Sheng-jung, Min Fa—Wu Quan (民法—物
權)=The Civil Code—Rights in rem (Shu Quan 2003) 6. Chuang Sheng-jung (莊勝榮) conceived rights in 
rem in the law of things encompassing copyrights and trade mark rights. Qin Hong-ji (秦宏濟) used the 
‘lease’ concept in the law of things to understand the concept of a ‘licence’. His commentary on the 1944 
Patent Act was the work closest to the time when this Patent Act was made. See Qin Hong-ji, Zhuanli 
Zhidu Gailun (專利制度概論)=On the Patent Law System (Shang Wu Publisher 1946) 99. Not only did 
Qin Hong-ji use the ‘lease’ concept in the law of things to understand the concept of a ‘licence’ but the 
Supreme Court also set the precedent ruling that a civil law leasehold is applicable to be adopted in a 
patent licence, meaning that patents have been seen as things or rights in rem that are available to lease. 
See [1970] Zuigao Fayuan Taishangzi number 4297 (最高法院台上字第 4297 號) Zuigao Fayuan 
Precedent (Civil Supreme Court). ‘It is hard for this court to say that Article 423 of the Civil Code does 
not apply to a patent leasehold.’ [translation by this author] The original clause of Article 423 reads, ‘The 
lessor shall be bound to deliver to the lessee the thing leased in a condition fit for the stipulated use or for 
the collection of profits as agreed upon. He shall be also liable to keep it up in such a condition as to be fit 
for such use or collection of profits during the continuance of the lease.’ [translation by Lawbank] 
69
 According to Justice Yang Ren-shou (楊仁壽), Taiwanese Civil Code is more influenced by the 
principles of German, Swiss and Japanese laws, while commercial law is more penetrated by 
Anglo-American law. See Yang Ren-shou, Faxue Fangfa Lun (法學方法論)=On the Jurisprudential 
Methodology (San Min 1986) 151-152. 
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intellectual property law was rather ostensible. Judges and jurists still used their past 
legal training in real rights to interpret the nature of a patent, being especially perplexed 
by the word ‘property’ in intellectual property law. Many paradoxical statements have 
been made because of this belief by not only jurists but also the courts and the 
Intellectual Property Office authority being misled, with the premise of the decisions 
making the risk of international patent licence business difficult to manage. 
 
The risks associated with licencing appear in two ways: firstly, inconsistency in court 
decisions make outcomes unpredictable and further reduce the willingness for 
transactions (sale and licence) in Taiwan; and secondly, according to this author’s 
personal experience, civil law ownership invites resentment by researchers in seeking 
patent protection, especially those researchers in the agricultural field. The first risk 
emerges when courts apply the same rule to different types of intellectual property cases. 
For example, in a copyright case, the court decides a copyright cannot be possessed and 
owned by the lapse of time, like possession for a movable thing.
70
 However, in a 
trademark case, the court adjudicates that a trademark can be possessed by the lapse of 
time providing that the complainant files a new registration.
71
 More inconsistent court 
decisions are presented in Chapter 2. Resentment by agricultural researchers seeking 
patent protection was attributed to civil law ownership, to patent rights being primary 
and absolute. This primary and absolute ownership of a patent contradicts researchers’ 
moral beliefs about fraternity to all mankind because the nature of agricultural 
knowledge is highly related to famine prevention. To occupy knowledge that benefits all 
people has been considered immoral and thus seeking patent protection has been 
detained. 
                                                 
70
 See [2009] Zhihui Caichan Fayuan Xingzhishangsuzi number 44 (智慧財產法院刑智上訴字第 44號) 
Lawbank (Intellectual Property Court). 
71
 See [1997] Zuigao Fayuan Taishangzi number 2996 (最高法院台上字第 2996 號) Lawbank (Supreme 
Court). 
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Indeed, the ‘property’ nature of intellectual property is not as clearly stated in statutory 
laws as a physical object in the law of things. Despite the interpretation made by the 
Justice of the Constitutional Court that covers all intellectual property under the 
constitutional protection of private property,
72
 neither the Patent Act specifically stating 
that a patent owner has the right to use or sell, nor Taiwanese Civil Code, expressly 
supporting the owner’s rights arising from the Patent Act, are deemed property rights. 
Consequently, when these rights are transferred, the court provides different 
explanations because of this vagueness. The court and jurists fail to distinguish the 
underlying understanding of the term ‘property’ used in a patent for inventions and 
‘property’ used in physical things, making the issue more complicated and confusing.73 
How far the existing property laws operate in the arena of intellectual property 
transactions remains unclear. 
 
As this study further demonstrates tumultuous results associated with vagueness in 
Chapter 2, a profound issue lies in the problem of a different taxonomy on property in 
civil law and common law jurisdictions. The underlying issue is apparently a different 
classification of things holding. A basic analysis of property holding and an advanced 
analysis of patent holding are crucial to this research. The hierarchy of interpretation in 
laws (intra-laws, customary law and foreign jurisprudence) set forth in Article 1 of 
                                                 
72
 [1987] Shizi number 213 (釋字第 213號) Lawbank (Council of Grand Justices: Constitutional Court) 
199, [1995] Shizi number 370 (釋字第 370號) Lawbank (Council of Grand Justices: Constitutional Court), 
and [2005] Shizi number 594 (釋字第 594號) Lawbank (Council of Grand Justices: Constitutional Court). 
One piece of literature disagrees with the Constitutional Court. See Chen Zhen-he (陳正和), ‘'Zhihui' shi 
Xianfa Baozhang de Caichanquanma? Yi Zhuzuoquanfa wei Chungxin lun Zhihui Caichanquan zhi Xianfa 
Jichu(『智慧』是憲法保障的財產權嗎?以著作權法為中心論智慧財產權之憲法基礎)=A Constitutional 
Protected Property? On the Constitutional Ground of Intellectual Property from the Copyright Perspective’ 
(MPhil, Chengchi University 2005) 
73
 Most authors, whether from Taiwan or China, merely point out that these two laws are different. Such 
as Li Chen (李琛), Lun Zhishi Canquanfa de Tixihua (論知識產權法的體系化)=On the Systematization 
of Intellectual Property Law (Peking University Press 2006) 78-80. Li Chen only inquires about 
insufficient communication between intellectual property law and civil law professors. However, Li Chen 
does not go deep enough to analyse how far the doctrines in civil law should be applied to intellectual 
property law. Concerning judicial decisions, see the analysis in Chapter 2 of this research. 
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Taiwanese Civil Code is followed. This research will discuss the intra-law explanation 
initially before moving onto discuss Taiwanese customary law, with English common 
law (the foreign jurisprudence) serving as the source of comparison. English common 
law is chosen because historically the current Taiwanese Patent Act 2011 originated from 
Patent Act 1944 made in China, when China was required to grant use and ownership to 
patents in a unilateral treaty with the United States of America (hereunder ‘U.S.’) in 
1903.
74
 English common law is chosen as the source of comparison because the patent 
use and ownership notion was introduced to China, and then Taiwan, by 
Anglo-American law. This concept of Anglo-American use and ownership originated 
from English common law, thus this study begins by introducing English common law. 
An advanced focus is centred on patents because patent transactions have suffered the 
most from this vagueness. Patent transfer (including licence and sale) is a US$1.75 
billion business in Taiwan each year, with the scale of the licensing business increasing 
by at least 10% per annum.
75
 Taking the Industrial Technology Research Institute of 
Taiwan as an example, they have a body of 6000 researchers, with each researcher 
having at least 1.5 patents on average transferred to companies/institutions outside 
Taiwan;
76
 nearly every researcher has to face an international transfer once. The 
researchers and the staff at the technology transfer office need the laws to play the role 
of a safety net for their transactional risks. Unfortunately, the statutory laws have not 
kept up with this rapid development during the past 60 years. Despite the connection 
between domestic innovation and the international market becoming more inseparable 
than it was in the past, a more harmonised concept of owning, selling and licencing a 
patent in line with a global consensus remains scant. 
                                                 
74
 For a full analysis of the historical evolution of Patent Act 1944 under the influence of the 1903 treaty 
with the U.S., see this author’s Master’s thesis, Chung Shang-pei (鍾尚倍), ‘The Origins, Evolution and 
Impact of the Development of a Patent Law in Taiwan’ (MPhil thesis, Soochow Law School 2009) 84-103.  
75
 See Central Bank of the Republic of China, Taiwan, ‘Balance of Payment Standard Presentation (by 
Year)’ <http://www.cbc.gov.tw/public/data/economic/statistics/bop/cSY.xls> accessed July 27, 2010. 
76
 For more information about Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) licence business, see 
Industrial Technology Research Institute, ‘Technology Transfer & IP Business’   
<http://www.itri.org.tw/eng/econtent/business/business02.aspx?sid=6> accessed 15 June 2012 
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Under pressure from the U.S. using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 against Taiwan 
in 1989-1999,
77
 and self-motivation for joining the World Trade Organization in 2002,
78
 
the Taiwanese government endeavoured to keep patent law in line with the international 
trend. The most recent effort was the latest amendment to the Taiwanese Patent Act in 
2011, with the government consulting English Patents Act 1977,
79
 and in particular the 
definition of the word ‘exclusive licence’,80 and adopting it into the newly added section 
3 of Article 64.
81
 The English language has a significant influence on Taiwanese patent 
law making, which is why this research explores the position of a patent in property 
classifications and the meaning of licence in that classification. 
                                                 
77
 For legislative records see Legislative Yuan, Lifayuan Gongbao 立法院公報 (Legislation 
Communique):Yuanhui Jilu 院會紀錄(Meeting Minutes) (Folio 82, Issue 32, Number 2631, vol.1, 1993) 
54-64. For more background information about the US using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 against 
Taiwan in order to influence the policy and law making of intellectual property law, see Huang Chen-ling 
(黃貞綾), ‘Meiguo dui Zhongguo (gong) Yu Taiwan ZhihuiCaichanquan Tanpan Zhi Bijiao (美國對中國
（共）與台灣智慧財產權談判之比較)=On the U.S. Intellectual Property Right Negotiations with Taiwan 
and China:1989~1999’ (MPhil, National Chung Cheng University 2000). 
78
 For legislative records see Legislative Yuan, Lifayuan Gongbao 立法院公報 (Legislation 
Communique):Weiyuanhui Jilu 委員會紀錄 (Committee Meeting Minutes) (Folio 86, Issue 6, Number 
2898, vol.2, 1997) 235-262, Legislative Yuan, Lifayuan Gongbao 立法院公報(Legislation Communique): 
Weiyuanhui Jilu委員會紀錄(Committee Meeting Minutes) (Folio 89, Issue 40, Number 3099, vol.2, 2000) 
159-200, and Legislative Yuan, Lifayuan Gongbao 立法院公報(Legislation Communique):Weiyuanhui 
Jilu 委員會紀錄(Committee Meeting Minutes) (Folio 92, Issue 4, Number 3278,vol.1, 2002) 203.  
79
 For legislative records see Legislative Yuan, Lifayuan Gongbao 立法院公報 (Legislation 
Communique):Yuanhui Jilu 院會紀錄(Meeting Minutes) (Folio 100, Issue 81, Number 3933, vol. 1, 2011) 
167. Under the column of ‘[Lifa 立法] Shuo Ming (說明)’ [Legislation reasoning], the statement says, 
‘Adding section 3. The current section 2 of Article 84 allows an exclusive licencee to demand a person 
who infringes to stop such infringement. However, the law did not explicitly state the legal effect of an 
exclusive licence granting. Taking references from section (1) of Article 130 of English Patents Act 
[1977]…If a patentee has a need to exercise the innovation him/herself, (s)he may exercise such an 
innovation after the consent of his/her exclusive licencee.’ [translation by this author] 
80
 Section (1) of Article 130 of English Patents Act 1977 reads, ‘“exclusive licence” means a licence from 
the proprietor of or applicant for a patent conferring on the licensee, or on him and persons authorised by 
him, to the exclusion of all other persons(including the proprietor or applicant), any right in respect of the 
invention to which the patent or application relates, and “exclusive licensee’ and “non-exclusive licence” 
shall be construed accordingly;’ See legislation .gov.uk, ‘Patents Act 1977’ 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1977/37/section/130> accessed 27 March 2013. 
81
 The new added section 3 of Article 64 of Taiwanese Patent Act 2011 reads, ‘An exclusive licencee may, 
within the licensed scope, exclude the patentee and any other third party from exercising such an 
innovation.’ [translation by this author] Before this new added section, no one knew whether an exclusive 
licencee may exercise his/her right to exclude upon the patentee in real practice. This is the reason why the 
2011 amendment consulted the definition of ‘exclusive licence’ in section (1) of Article 130 of English 
Patents Act 1977, with the statement of ‘exclusive licence means a licence from the proprietor… to the 
exclusion of all other persons, including the proprietor or applicant’ to formulate the wording for section 3 
of Article 64 in the Taiwanese Patent Act 2011.  
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1.2 Previous research 
 
The main issue concerns the taxonomy and classification of the notion of holding a 
property. With such a notion being used to interpret the holding of patents, the literature 
review focuses on works that directly comment on it, or have misinterpreted it by 
misdelineating patents with movable/immovable things. This study excludes literature 
justifying property from the perspective of natural law, labour theory and other 
philosophical justifications because this study discusses taxonomy and classification. 
This work is not a philosophical justification study, so focuses mainly on a discussion of 
legal science in taxonomy and the achievements of a chosen taxonomy being used in 
interpretation. Another reason why legal philosophy is excluded is that judges in Taiwan 
favour using legal methodology as a legal basis and reasoning rather than using legal 
philosophy in court decisions (more in 6.2.3). A study like this has more referential value 
to judges. This study is an analysis of taxonomy; a further use of taxonomy in the 
interpretation of law. For the purpose of demonstrating the applicability of this studying 
being accepted by Taiwanese society, a historical and sociocultural description in this 
study is inevitable. The areas of previous research cover Taiwan and Japan only because 
both jurisdictions have the same problem due to a similar evolutionary route. This study 
excludes literature from other jurisdictions that have no substantial ruling and law 
enactment in Taiwan. English literature on this matter is occasionally consulted when 
this study further comments on them. 
 
Previous researches from Taiwanese jurists directly on positioning patents in property 
taxonomy are few and unsatisfactory. Only two intellectual property law professors Zhen 
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Zhong-ren (鄭中人)82 and Shieh Ming-yan (謝銘洋)83 mention that real rights in 
Taiwanese Civil Code are inapplicable to handle all situations created by intellectual 
property transactions (including patent transfer), but none of them provide a successful 
suggestion to fill the void.  
 
Japanese jurists like Masaakira Tomii (富井政章),84 Sakae Wagatsuma (我妻榮) 85 and 
Shouichi Iwara(井藁正一),86 even favour using the ‘property’ concept originating from 
the law of things to persistently explain intellectual property transfers (including patent 
transfers), except for Ichiro Kiyose (清瀨一郎), who suggests that patents should be 
isolated from the Japanese Civil Code and applied to its own law.
87
 However, to what 
content of law patents should be applied to, Ichiro Kiyose fails to provide an answer. 
Modern scholars, like Nobuhiro Nakayama (中山信弘), acknowledge the differences 
between real rights and patent rights,
88
 but without providing a detailed analysis about 
                                                 
82
 Wang Wen-yu (王文宇)and Zhen Zhong-ren (鄭中人), ‘Cong Jingji Guandian Lun Zhihui Caichan 
Quan de Dingwei Yu Baozhang Fangshi(從經濟觀點論智慧財產權的定位與保障方式)=On The Nature 
and The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights From An Economic Perspective’ (2007) 147 The 
Taiwan Law Review 199. 
83
 Shieh Ming-yan (謝銘洋), ‘Cong Xiangguan Anli Tantao Zhihui Caichanquan yu Minfa zhi Guanxi 
(從相關案例探討智慧財產權與民法之關係)=A Discussion on the Relationship of Intellectual Property 
Rights with the Civil Law through Relevant Cases’ (2004) 33(2) National Taiwan University Law Journal 
208. 
84
 Tomii has a vague view about this issue, stating that ‘patent rights are not “purely property rights”, but 
in a mortgage relationship, a patent can be treated as an object’. Masaakira Tomii, Minpoh Genron (民法
原論)=The Principles of Civil Law (Yuhikaku 1903) 512. 
85
 Wagatsuma favoured intellectual property being applied to the law of things, stating that, ‘intangible 
property rights including copyright, patent right and trade mark right function well in quasi-possession 
theory in the law of things’. Sakae Wagatsuma(我妻榮), Minpoh: Bukken Hou (民法:物權法)=Civil 
Code: Rights in rem 387-388. 
86
 Shouichi Iwara(井藁正一), Tokubetsu Hou Gai Ron (特許法概論)=Introduction to Patent Law (Gan 
Shou Dou 1928) 128. Iwara states that the substantive rights in Article 35 of the 1921 Japanese Patent Act 
(the right to manufacture, use and sell etc.) share the same meaning with those in the law of things (Article 
206 of the Japanese Civil Code). 
87
 Ichiro Kiyose(清瀨一郎), Kougyou Shoyuhken(工業所有權)=Ownership to Industrial Property 
(Sanshorou 1936) 24-30. Ichiro Kiyose suggests that because of the unique character of a patent having all 
the characteristics of the law of things, the law of obligations and moral rights, it is improper to categorise 
a patent into each one alone. He suggests that Japan should take the Germany’s experience under 
consideration because prevailing thought in Germany suggests that patents should be isolated from the 
Japanese Civil Code and applied to its own law, but not applied back to the Civil Code.  
88
 See Nobuhiro Nakayama (中山信弘), Industrial Property Law. Volume 1, Patent Law. 2nd Revised and 
Enlarged edn (Koubundou 2000) 3. Page numbers refer to the English translation of the manuscript, and 
this English translation is done by Institute of Intellectual Property of Japan. Nakayama states that, 
‘Although patent rights are similar to rights in rem, the two rights are different in terms of historical 
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how real rights differ from patent rights, leaving this area of research unexplored. Most 
jurists still believe that ‘property’ in real rights is sufficient enough to be a supplement 
for the ‘property’ status of a patent.89 Few jurists allude to differences in the substance 
of these two rights, and none of them further analyse how different the meaning of 
‘property’ in real rights and patent rights are.90 The appropriate positioning of patent 
rights in the system of property law remains obscure. 
 
Previous research on English literature provides some insight into this issue. Intellectual 
property law comparatists Helen Gubby
91
 and Andreas Rahmatian
92
 acknowledge that 
civil law categorises property differently than common law, with this difference 
potentially impacting on copyright or a patent’s role as a property. This study however, 
challenges Rahmatian’s assertion that Hohfeld’s bundle of rights theory echoes Roman 
law rights in rem for Hohfeld has a unique way of understanding rights in rem to civil 
law lawyers,
93
 as will be explained later. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
background, objectives, nature of subject matter and content of right’. 
89
 Example such as Mitsue Toyosaki (豊崎光衛 ) stated that ‘Provisions in the Civil Code are 
supplementary to a patent law’ and that ‘in many occasions, patent law did not limit itself to the 
application of the Civil Code especially when rights in rem claims arise from patent infringement disputes’. 
Mitsue Toyosaki, Kougyou Shoyuuken Hou工業所有權法=Industrial Property Law (Yuhikaku Publishing 
1980) 120. Sugimoto（杉本）uses the same statement in Yumi Gaku (萼優美), Tokkyo Jitsu Shinan Isyou 
Syouhyou Gakusetsu Hanketsu Soran Zokkan (特許實用新案意匠商標學說判決總攬)=Statement of 
Judicial Decisions and Doctrinal Commentaries on Patent, Utility Models, Design, and Trademark (Bun 
Sei Sha 1933) 779-780.  
90
 Iwara states that it is a pity that no Japanese jurist has explored the nature of a patent under the 
framework of the Japanese Civil Code. See Iwara (n 86) 126. 
91
 Helen Gubby, Developing a Legal Paradigm for Patents (Eleven International Publishing 2012) 
258-293 
92
 Andreas Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity: the making of property rights in creative works (Edward 
Elgar 2011) 5-9, 25. 
93
 Despite Rahmatian conducting a comparative study on Roman law rights in rem and Hohfeld’s bundle 
of rights throughout pages 5 to 9 in Rahmatian, however, at page 25, he states, ‘This in reality, intellectual 
property protection principles are conceptually practically the same in Civil law and Common law 
countries, despite their different ownership (protection) conception’. Rahmatian believes that copyrights 
have positive internal rights, stating ‘The prominence of the external aspect of real rights with intellectual 
property rights has led some commentators to define intellectual property rights as merely “negative 
rights”: rights to stop others doing certain things. Copyright shows well that such a definition neglects the 
internal side of real rights and is incomplete. This internal aspect, the right to use, manifests itself 
especially in the right to assign or license and is the principal economic pillar of the copyright industries’. 
This author disagrees with this conclusion by providing a deeper comparative study of the right to use in 
the common law and civil law systems (see 4.3.1 and Figure 4-2). 
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This study also disagrees with Rahmatian’s conclusion that intellectual property 
protection principles are conceptually the same in the civil law and common law systems. 
Chapter 4 in this study shows that the civil law and common law systems are 
substantially different in property classification. This study also suggests that Gubby’s 
analysis is only partial because she began from eighteenth century England when choses 
in action had already extended to real rights action in the sixteenth century (see the 
analysis by this author in 4.1.5) and the word ‘property’ already spanned from personal 
to real in the seventeenth century (see 4.1.6). Her conclusion is unpersuasive because she 
uses judges’ opinions in copyright cases and equally applies it to patents94 without 
looking into the history of patents. Her doubt concerning categorising patents as 
personal property does not help this research harmonise the gap between civil law and 
common law. Asian jurists like civil law lawyer Chang Zhe-lun, Taiwanese civil law 
professor Li Shu-ming and Chinese intellectual property law professor Wu Hangdong 
disagree with using real rights to understand intellectual property,
95
 but without 
                                                 
94
 Gubby uses judges’ opinions in copyright cases to answer her patent questions. She states, ‘The 
question was: had an inventor ever been able to protect his invention from piracy without a patent granted 
by the crown?’ Gubby cites Lord Camden’s opinion on copyright case Donaldson v Beckett, ‘If there be 
such a right at common law, the crown is an usurper; but there is no such right at common law…’ and also 
Justice Yates’ opinion on Millar v Taylor 1769, stating ‘This kind of property has always the additional 
distinction of prerogative property. The right is ground upon another foundation; and is founded on a 
distinction that can not exist in common property’. She believes that a patent is also a royal prerogative 
grant so that the judges’ comments in copyright cases equally applies to patent cases, but we think this 
assertion has no solid evidence supporting it.
 She states, ‘A patent for a new invention was also a grant of 
the royal prerogative. As the king’s property was “ground upon another foundation”, it would seem from 
Yates’ comment on prerogative patents for printing that a patent grant made by the crown for a new 
invention equally could not be seen as having the common law as its source’. See Gubby (n 91) 274-75. 
95
 Chang Zhe-lun (張哲倫), ‘Zhihui Caichan Quan Fa Diyi Jiang: Zhihui Caichan Quan Gailun: Yi Quanli 
Zhi Xingzhi Wei Zhongxin(智慧財產權法第一講：智慧財產權概論：以權利之性質為中心)=Intellectual 
Property Law Lecture One: the concept of intellectual property rights: on the nature of intellectual 
property rights’ (2009) 78 Taiwan Jurist 91. Chang Zhe-lun (張哲倫) states that, ‘Some commentators said 
patent rights are one kind of property right, therefore the right to exclude others is the same as a real 
property owner, but this point of view clearly misunderstands the character of “the right to exclude” in the 
Patent Act. For instance, the owner of a basic patent could assert his right against the owner of an 
improved patent. But a house owner cannot assert his right against another legitimate owner. In the world 
of real property, two houses are unlikely to overlap, but in the world of patents, it usually happens’. And 
see also Li Shu-ming (李淑明), Min Fa Wu Quan (民法物權)=Rights in rem of the Civil Code (Yuan 
Zhao 2006) 13. Li Shu-ming (李淑明) states in Article 421 that this Civil Code cannot be applied to 
intellectual property, which means that a licensee cannot rent a patent from a patentee. The object in a 
transaction is a thing according to Article 421, and is not intellectual property. Also in Wu Hangdong (吳
漢東 ),‘Zhishi Chanquan Lifatili yu Mingfadian Bianzuan (知識產權立法体例與民法典編
纂)=Intellectual Property Law from the Legislative Perspective and its Relationship to the Civil Code’ in 
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providing any constructional advice, their complaints are more querulous than helpful. 
 
1.3 Objective and scope of this study 
 
This study is legal methodology research that abides by the legal science of law 
interpretation, deploying the analysis from the perspective of history and society on a 
comparative basis. English and Taiwanese social anthropologists’ work is occasionally 
consulted in the study in order to strengthen a certain perspective, even though this study 
mainly concerns the legal taxonomy of property being adopted in a patent’s position. 
The main objective of this study is to provide a persuasive law interpretation of patent 
rights being classified as property in accord with Taiwanese property institution. As such, 
this research follows the hierarchy of interpretation in laws set forth in Article 1 of 
Taiwanese Civil Code. An intra-law interpretation is looked into, with Taiwanese 
customary law also explored. Foreign jurisprudence is only looked into when Taiwanese 
customary law cannot provide adequate explanations about laws. Common law of 
England is chosen as the comparative counterpart because the taxonomy of property in 
English common law is similar to that in Taiwanese customary law. This study excludes 
models from civil law jurisdiction from use for comparison because civil law jurisdiction 
shares the same absolute, unitary, primary ownership notion with Taiwanese statutory 
civil law that cannot provide a solution (as presented in Chapter 2). Another reason for 
the common law of England being chosen concerns the many licencing activities that are 
highly active between Taiwan and the U.S., with Anglo-American common law 
originating from English common law. The Taiwanese Patent Act was deeply influenced 
by the 1903 US treaty, making tracing back to the root of English common law crucial to 
this study. Considering the joining of the global technology licence market currently 
                                                                                                                                                
Wu Hangdong and Chen Xiaojun 陳小君(eds), Sifa Yanjiu 私法研究=Private Law Review (2003) 3 China 
University of Political Science and Law Press 68-71. 
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dominated by U.S., selecting common law to serve as the source of comparison in this 
study will benefit Taiwan’s entering of this global licencing market.  
 
This study begins by analysing intra-law interpretations. The court, jurists and the 
Intellectual Property Office in Taiwan favour using rules and doctrines arising from the 
law of things, to provide a complete and satisfactory answer to a patents position in 
property taxonomy. As this study will show, an intra-law explanation is not only 
confusing but also self-contradicting.  
 
Chapter 3 provides a historical explanation of a misconceived intra-law interpretation 
widely accepted by Taiwanese legal society. The goal of Chapter 3 is to manifest 
quasi-possession theory, a theory that has constructed the whole misconception of 
applying rules and doctrines from the law of things to patents, and that originated from 
the selective adoption of Joseph Kohler’s scholarship. The paradoxical view is further 
strengthened by court decisions (and considering that Chapter 2 demonstrates that the 
intra-law explanation does not work for patents). According to the hierarchy of 
Taiwanese Civil Code Article 1, the next step is a discussion of customary law. However, 
before a further discussion of customary law in Chapter 5, a deeper understanding of 
how a patent is positioned in English common law’s property taxonomy is essential too. 
As such, Chapter 4 provides a historical exploration of patents being classified as 
property in English common law taxonomy. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate 
that in medieval times patents were granted in fee simple where holding rights were not 
perpetual. By utilising the history as foundation, this study distinguishes the taxonomic 
differences of a property notion in civil and common law. With a clear distinction, this 
study seeks an explanation why civil law real rights cannot explain the property nature 
of patents, and therefore the jurisprudence elsewhere, such as rules in Taiwanese 
customary law needs to be looked into. Chapter 5 investigated the classification in 
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Taiwanese customary law, with a comparison of that in common law. This research 
searches for the similarity of these two classifications, and aim to build an explanation 
for patents based on Taiwanese customary law. 
 
This study seeks to:  
Examine the hazards caused by the linkage of civil law of things and patents. 
Explore the evolution of a patent being property in common law jurisdiction (limited 
to England and the United States of America).  
Gain a taxonomy basis from English common law to further establish the property 
nature of patents in Taiwanese customary law.  
Establish an explanation, based on Taiwanese customary law, for the property nature 
of patents and reconciling that into Taiwanese civil law framework.  
 
To achieve the above purposes, this chapter sets out the following six questions that will 
be answered:  
 
1. What are the underlying reasons to explain patents by way of the law of things? 
2. What has happened in the past that has led jurists and judges to use principles arising 
from the law of things to explain the nature of a patent? 
3. What are the substantial differences of real rights between English common law of 
and Taiwanese civil law? 
4. Insofar as the statutory laws do not solve the problem completely, is there any 
customary law in Taiwan that can help replenish the abovementioned gap? 
5. How similar is this customary law to that in English common law? 
6. Is this similarity applicable to work under the framework of Article 1 in the 
Taiwanese Civil Code? 
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Chapter 2 answers question 1 above, whilst Chapter 3 answers the second question. 
Chapter 4 explores the history and evolution of how patents have been categorised as 
property, and provides answers to the third question in 4.3. Chapter 5 tackles questions 4 
and 5, with the last question answered in Chapter 6. 
 
1.4 Hypothesis 
 
The hypothesis of this study is that, the Taiwanese customary law on property, just like 
English tenure, was built on exclusion rules. Ownership of land, just like that of patents, 
was not an outright civil law ownership governed by inclusion rules but a freehold for 
intangible rights that could be divided by the duration of the holding. Taiwanese 
customary law shares the same characteristic as the common law of England, thus it is 
possible to rebuild a property model for patents by way of analogising patents to a tenure 
system in Taiwan. 
 
1.5 Research methodology 
 
In developing the arguments and recommendations set out in this thesis, the chosen 
methodology is a historical and comparative analysis on the classification of property 
rights between civil law and common law system. The ambit of a historical discussion of 
civil law is limited to Japanese and Chinese civil law before 1945 as these two laws had 
most impact on the formation of Taiwanese civil law during that time. The common law 
is English, on account of the common law patent system arising from England, and also 
Anglo-American common law, because the introduction of common law notions to 
Taiwan was via Anglo-American common law post-1945. The historical analysis follows 
a traditional historical research approach covering time, place, and event analysis. 
Insights gained from these historical and comparative law analyses will inform an 
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intra-law solution to the legal problem of how to bridge the gap previously unsolved by 
the Taiwanese legal and scholarly communities to reconcile patents within the Taiwanese 
Civil Code. 
 
In order to conduct the above stated tasks, this study relies on the analysis of three main 
sources: 
 
1. Reported judicial decisions, legislative reports, legal literatures, consultation gazettes 
and administrative missives. 
 
Regarding court decisions, the author mainly relies on the professional database 
Lawbank.
96
 The Supreme Court’s meeting minutes for civil case disputes and Judicial 
Yuan’s restatement of court decisions 97 are used as supplements when necessary. 
Concerning court decisions in Japan, the author relies on the database Lexis Nexis Japan, 
and also the cases and precedents collection edited by Fujirou Miyake (山宅富士郎) 
and Yumi Gaku (萼優美).98  
 
Regarding the analysis of legislators’ original legal language and reasoning, the author 
                                                 
96
 Lawbank,   <http://www.lawbank.com.tw/> accessed 28 September 2012 
97
 For more details of the Supreme Court’s meeting minutes, see Supreme Court, Zui Gao Fa Yuan Min 
Xing Shi Ting Hui Yi Yue Yi Lu Quan Wen Hui Bian (最高法院民刑事庭會議決議錄全文彙編)=A 
Compilation of Supreme Court Meeting Minutes of Civil and Criminal cases (Supreme Court 1928-1984). 
Concerning the Judicial Yuan’s restatement, see the following four books: 1) Judicial Yuan (Ministry of 
Justice) Department of Judicial Administration, Sifa Yanjiu Nianbao(司法研究年報)=Annuals of 
Judiciary Decisions, vol 6 (Judicial Yuan 1986); 2) Judicial Yuan (Ministry of Justice) Department of 
Judicial Administration, Sifa Yanjiu Nianbao(司法研究年報)=Annuals of Judiciary Decisions, vol 9 
(Judicial Yuan 1989); 3) Judicial Yuan (Ministry of Justice) Department of Judicial Administration, Sifa 
Yanjiu Nianbao(司法研究年報)=Annuals of Judiciary Decisions, vol 11 (Judicial Yuan 1991); 4) Judicial 
Yuan(Ministry of Justice) Department of Judicial Administration, Sifa Yanjiu Nianbao(司法研究年
報)=Annuals of Judiciary Decisions, vol 16 (Judicial Yuan 1996). 
98
 Fujirou Miyake, Tokubetsu Hou Hanketsu Soran (特別法判例總攬)=Statement of Judicial Decisions 
on the Patent Cases (Imperial Law and Precedent Publishing House 1943) and Yumi Gaku, Tokkyo Jitsu 
Shinan Isyou Syouhyou Gakusetsu Hanketsu Soran Zokkan(特許實用新案意匠商標學說判決總
攬)=Statement of Judicial Decisions and Doctrinal Commentaries on Patent, Utility Models, Design, and 
Trademark (Bun Sei Sha 1933). 
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relies on legislative reports, literature, consultation gazettes and administrative missives 
preserved in the Academia Historica archive room at National Taiwan University, 
National Central Library, Fu Si-nian Library at the Institute of History and Philology, 
Kou Ting-yee Library at the Institute of Modern History in Academia Sinica and the 
staff library at the Intellectual Property Office. All Taiwanese historical references used 
by this author are primarily from archival sources, with the copies held by this author. 
 
2. Court Archives and Oral History 
 
In order to state how Taiwanese people understand the patent as a property in 3.3.2, the 
Taiwan Colonial Court Archives database
99
 is heavily relied on. This database contains 
legal case documents from 1895 to 1945, originating from the courts of Taipei, Hsinchu, 
Taichung and Chiayi, with the records including official court decisions on civil cases, 
notarial documents, non-contentious matters, criminal cases and files on law 
enforcement. The supporting evidence cited by this author used notarial licence contracts 
filed in the relevant courts. Paragraph 3.3.2 also cites patent agency Mr. Sun Jiang-huai’s 
oral history to reflect the fact. 
 
3. Academic investigation reports 
 
For those paragraphs stating traditional Taiwanese real property law, the author relies on 
the academic investigation report ‘Taiwanese Private Law’ created by the ‘Temporary 
Investigation Committee of Taiwanese Customary Law’ established in 1901-1919. As 
this committee is hosted by law school professor Santarou Okamatsu from Tokyo 
Imperial University, the investigative content concerning the property law is important to 
                                                 
99
 Taiwan Colonial Court Archives, http://tccra.lib.ntu.edu.tw/tccra_develop/ (1895-1945), accessed July 
31, 2010. 
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reference. This study also double checks information using a monthly journal called the 
‘Taiwanese Customary Law Investigation Report’, produced by the Taiwan Customary 
Law Study Group, which was established by officers from the Government of Formosa 
at that time.
100
 
 
4. Textbooks, treatises and commentaries 
 
Textbooks, treatises and commentaries have been widely consulted in this study. This 
author uses materials preserved at National Taiwan University (which used to be a 
division of Tokyo Imperial University), and textbooks and treatises preserved at the staff 
library at the Intellectual Property Office. Commentaries were acquired from the 
National Central Library in Taiwan, the British Library, the British Library of Political 
and Economic Science, the Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, the 
Institution of Advanced Legal Studies Library, UCL Library and Queen Mary Library 
and IP Archive.  
 
1.6 Limitations 
 
The width of coverage of this comparative study, whether it is due to a long time scale or 
the diversity of different jurisdictions, will necessarily and inevitably result in the 
sacrifice of detailed analysis of particular law issues. This research does not cover a 
history of patent novelty, utility, or originality-inventorship, which is beyond the scope 
of this study. The study focuses on Taiwanese civil law, English and Anglo-American 
common law, excluding a wider discussion of common law and civil law comparisons. 
                                                 
100
 For more detailed information on the committee and study group see Chung Shu-min (鍾淑敏), ‘Riju 
Chuqi Taiwan Zongdufu Tongzhi Quan de Queli(日據初期台灣總督府統治權的確立)=To establish a 
regime in the early domination of Formosa Government’ (MPhil thesis, National Taiwan University 1989) 
118. 
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This study also excludes a philosophical discussion from the perspective of natural law, 
labour theory and other philosophical theories because this study discusses legal 
taxonomy on the notion of holding a property, as well as explaining patent licencing in 
this taxonomy. Models from other civil law jurisdiction are also excluded from this study 
because civil law jurisdiction all share the same ownership notion that leads to a similar 
legal taxonomy on property that cannot provide adequate explanations using Taiwanese 
statutory law.  
 
The cause and effect discussion in the history chapter, namely Chapter 3 inevitably 
sacrifices some trivial details that are less relevant to the Taiwanese Civil Code. Some 
insufficiencies in historical statements are directly caused by incomplete database 
collections,
101
 or unrecognisable handwriting in the original documents due to 
deterioration and/or poor preservation. Regardless of the insufficiencies, the author 
endeavours to present a logical statement with applicable archives that is still readable 
and attempts to summarise the systematic cause of the issues.  
 
This study is limited to publications available in English, Chinese (both traditional and 
simplified) and Japanese languages (both ancient and modern) that the author collected 
in Taiwan and England. Unless otherwise specified, all authors and the titles of their 
publications are translated into English; some selected contents are also included in the 
footnotes for the reader’s further reference. 
 
1.7 Study outline  
 
                                                 
101
 The Taiwan Colonial Court Archives database does not collect court decisions made by Tainan(台南) 
district court, Kaohsiung(高雄)district court and Yilan(宜蘭) and Hualian (花蓮)district courts. The reason 
why these courts decisions are not collected in the database is due to either the court staff reporting 
missing files (Tainan, Yilan) or an incomplete collection (Kaohsiung, Hualian). 
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Chapter 1 introduces and sets out the goal and purpose of this study. This chapter set out 
the following six questions that will be answered: Why does popular opinion explain 
patents using the law of things? What has happened in the past? What are the substantial 
differences between English common law taxonomy and Taiwanese civil law taxonomy 
on property? Is there any customary law in Taiwan that can help replenish the 
abovementioned gap? How similar is this customary law to that in English common law? 
Is this similarity applicable to work under the hierarchy of Article 1 in the Taiwanese 
Civil Code? These questions will be answered in the following chapters in seriatim. 
 
Chapter 2 begins with a statement of problems, including the fallacy of Taiwanese jurists’ 
opinions and court decisions. This chapter points out which part of their consensus is 
unsound and contradictory. The purpose is to provide background knowledge about 
issues that happened in real practice.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the formulation of the above stated misconception. This chapter 
provides an historical explanation of the issues and includes a cause and effect analysis 
and traditional historical descriptions. The author uses many primary resources to show 
the institutional, legal and ideological development of this misconception.  
 
Chapter 4 reviews the evolution of English patents: how franchises were associated with 
the doctrine of estates in the thirteenth century and eventually grew into a property 
concept in the seventeenth century. This chapter uses history as a way to ask 
fundamental questions about what kind of property a patent should be. A comparative 
study of real rights in the common law of England and Taiwanese civil law is also 
included in this chapter. This chapter manifests that it is fallacious to directly apply civil 
law real rights into explanations about the nature of a patent. Put simply, the real rights 
structure in the civil law of Taiwan lacks two significant characteristics: the 
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segmentation of fee simple by different duration and the incorporation of leasehold and 
tenancy into real rights. How these two characteristics influence the explanation of a 
patent as property will be further stated in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 5 builds a property model for patents based on the similarities between the 
tenure concept in the common law of England and Taiwanese customary law. This 
chapter presents six suggestions to the current law, including 1) the law of yeh(業)being 
more feasible than the law of things; 2) the yeh-zhu-quan(業主權)concept is superior to 
Taiwanese civil law ownership suo-you-quan(所有權); 3) the principle of registration 
shall not be adopted into the patent register; 4) patent ‘assignment’ should not be 
translated into zhuan-rang (轉讓) to prevent any confusion with the existing usage of 
outright ownership alienation for physical things; 5) ‘patent assignment’ shall be 
translated as ‘zhuan-li-zhuan-rang’( 專 利 轉 讓 )rather than a civil law term 
‘zhuan-li-rang-yu’ (專利讓與); and 6) a licence is similar to the concept of pacht (贌), 
thus licences can be envisaged as personal obligations made by the grantors and grantees 
in relation to real rights. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the applicability of reconciling the common law estate concept by 
way of its similarity to Taiwanese customary law within the scheme of Article 1 in the 
Taiwanese Civil Code. According to Article 1, local customary laws and foreign 
jurisprudences will be adopted in civil cases. This chapter proves that the customary 
legal term and concept proffered in the previous chapters are confined to the definition 
of ‘customs’ in Article 1, and the legal methodology—the three steps analysis used by 
this research—satisfies the requirement of ‘jurisprudence’ in the Taiwanese Civil Code. 
As with statutory law, this author suggests patents should be separated from the law of 
things that prevents patents from being deemed physical things. The direct analogy for 
real rights in the law of things is proven inappropriate by this author; a more suitable 
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analogy for Taiwanese customary law, which corresponds to the doctrine of estate in the 
common law, is a better path to create a robust and successful patent transactional 
environment. This study concludes that Articles 66 and 67 in the Civil Code and Articles 
6(1), 62(1) and 84 need to be significantly amended. The term ‘rang-yu’ (讓與) used in 
Articles 6(1), 13 (1) and (2), 62(1), 64, 65(1), 84, 88 and 138 need to be modified into 
‘zhuan-rang’（轉讓）and Articles 57, 59, 62, 63, 64, 69, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 96, 97, 
138 and 140 in relation to the terms ‘licences’, ‘licensees’ and ‘compulsory licences’ 
need to be changed into ‘xu-ke’ (許可, meaning permission) accordingly. 
 
1.8 Note on translation and terminology definitions 
 
In this research, Chinese authors’ names appear with their family name preceding their 
given name, with Japanese names appearing with their given name preceding their 
family name. The Hanyu pinyin (漢語拼音)system is used for Chinese names, book 
titles and relevant concepts, unless the author has Tongyong pinyin (通用拼音)otherwise 
noted in the referenced document. Kanji (漢字) was pronounced in Japanese reading, 
with both Hiragana and Katakana translated into the Romantic alphabetic system. All 
Chinese and Japanese texts have been translated by the author when no English version 
could be found. 
 
A definition of terminology is presented in page 12, and a comparison character list is 
attached in Appendix Two. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE PROBLEMS OF APPLYING THE TAIWANESE CIVIL CODE TO 
PATENT TRANSACTIONS 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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associated with patent transactions 
50 
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2.5 Placing the delivery requirement by registration: is it applicable or not 73 
2.6 Conclusion 78 
 
This chapter aims to answer the first question—why popular opinion explains patents 
using the law of things? To answer this question, this chapter involves a structural 
discussion and a discussion on the substance of law. Section 2.1 and 2.2 reveal the 
structural flaw and the vagueness of the word ‘things’, with section 2.3 presenting the 
results of this combination. Section 2.4 challenges popular opinion by presenting 
inconsistencies in these opinions. Section 2.5 provides a solution to overcome the 
structural flaw; however, as this section will demonstrate, placing a requirement 
(delivery) with another requirement (registration) only creates new issues, with the 
results being unsatisfactory. This chapter concludes that the intra-law explanation 
cannot provide a satisfactory answer to overcome the flaw that patents were not clearly 
positioned in the property classification; as such, Chapter’s 4 and 5 will discuss 
customary law. 
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2.1 Overview of the Taiwanese Patent Act in the Civil Code structure and the 
problems caused by real practice 
 
Taiwanese legal system combines commercial law and civil law together. Taiwanese 
Civil Code 2012 (‘Civil Code’ in this paragraph) is equipped with general rules for 
private jural relationships, addresses legal effects arising from one person against 
another person, and a person to his/her thing. Taiwanese Patent Act 2011 (‘Patent Act’ in 
this paragraph) is a part of this private law, a neighbouring field of civil law.
102
 Due to 
this lack of separation, some basic legal doctrines arising from the code are inevitably 
used in patents. Civil law ownership,
103
 co-ownership
104
 and the possession concept
105
 
are basic concepts that have been used to explain holding status. Principles of 
registration, separability and abstraction, and acquisition by prescription have been 
discussed by law school professors concerning whether they are appropriate for 
patents.
106
 It is not an uncommon phenomenon for civil law rules and principles to be 
                                                 
102
 Yang Chong-sen(楊崇森), Zhuanlifa:Lilun Yu Yingyong (專利法:理論與應用)=Patent Law:Theory 
and Application (San Min 2003) 19. 
103
 A typical example is the civil court stating that ‘Section 1 of Article 56 of the Patent Act…is the same 
with Article 765 of the Civil Code, regulates the scope of ownership. The legislative purpose of these two 
laws is to create, to set the boundaries of ownership and the scope of patent rights.’ See [2007] Difang 
Fayuan Zhizi number 28 (地方法院智字第 28號) Lawbank (Taipei Civil District Court). The original 
clause of section 1 of Article 56 of the Patent Act states, ‘Unless otherwise provided for in this Act, the 
patentee of an invention patent has an exclusive right to prevent others from exploiting the invention 
without the patentee’s consent.’ Article 765 of the Civil Code stating, ‘The owner of a thing has the right, 
within the limits of the Acts and regulations, to use it, to profit from it, and to dispose of it freely, and to 
exclude the interference from others.’ [translation by Lawbank] The court apparently used civil law 
ownership to understand patent rights’ holdings. 
104
 Using the co-ownership concept from tangible (movable and immovable) things to patents, see 
Legislative Yuan, Lifayuan Gongbao 立法院公報 (Legislation Communique):Weiyuanhui Jilu 委員會紀
錄(Committee Meeting Minutes) (Folio 99, Issue 22, Number 3987, 2010) 511. The Director of 
Intellectual Property Office Mrs. Wang Mei-hua (王美花) replied to the legislator Mr. Pan Men-an’s (潘
孟安)query, regarding whether a waiver to co-ownership and co-ownership to a movable and immovable 
thing under the Taiwanese Civil Code equally applies to a patent co-ownership, with Director Wang 
Mei-hua answering ‘Yes’. Also in Yang (n 102) 299. ‘The patent co-ownership…may apply to Article 831 
of the Civil Code with mutatis mutandis.’ [translation by this author] 
105
 A typical example is civil law jurist Wang Ze-jian (王澤鑑) stating, ‘The object of quasi-possession 
limits to property rights…and property rights included real rights, personal debts and rights over 
intellectual property’. See Wang (n 43) 696-697. 
106
 An example is Professor Shieh commenting that ‘acquisition by prescription’ and ‘quasi-possession’ 
has been wrongfully applied in intellectual property transactions. See Shieh (n 68) 52-53. Not every 
professor agrees with Professor Shieh. Professor Wang believes that the quasi-possession concept is 
appropriate. Professor Cheng conceives that both ‘acquisition by prescription’ and ‘quasi-possession’ are 
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adopted to explain various legal effects arising from patent transactional activities.  
 
Some adoptions successfully explain certain legal effects, whilst others fail. As more 
issues will be addressed later, the core issue appears to be patents in the property 
taxonomy being unclear. As a separate law does not otherwise address this issue, any 
dispute arising from commercial activities is governed by the general principles in the 
Civil Code. According to the general principles in the Civil Code, a patent sale contract 
is made when parties reach a mutual consensus.
107
 The transfer of ownership only 
arises when a patent is delivered.
108
 Some inquiries then arise, such as ‘How to fulfil 
delivery requirements by handing over a patent specification?’ and ‘Does a patent fit in 
the meaning of rights in rem of personal property set forth in section 1 of Article 761?’ 
To what extent do the rights a patentee owns are not well elaborated in the Civil Code. 
 
In real practice, this lack of clarity creates ambiguity in law applications. In a situation 
where a patent portfolio is in auction, the bidder often asks ‘When will the interests and 
risks pass to the bidder?’ This question touches upon when a patentee has done with 
his/her transfer of ownership, and according to section 1 of Article 761, it means when a 
patentee finishes his/her delivery process. The same inquiries then arise again: ‘How to 
fulfil the delivery requirements, and is a patent right in rem of personal property 
anyway?’ This inquiry also happens when an insolvent patentee sells his/her patents to a 
buyer. The timing of a successful transfer decides who carries the burden of loss, and 
without a clear position for patents in the property taxonomy, it is difficult to answer the 
above questions from the ground up. The above questions all point to one 
                                                                                                                                               
applicable. See Wang (n 43) 696, 697 and Zhen Yu-po(鄭玉波), Min Fa Wu Quan(民法物權)=The Law 
of Things (San Min 1958, 8
th
 edn 1980) 414,415. 
107
 Section 1 of Article 153 of Taiwanese Civil Code 2012 states, ‘When the parties have reciprocally 
declared their concordant intent, either expressly or impliedly, a contract shall be constituted.’ [translation 
by Lawbank] 
108
 Section 1 of Article 761 of Taiwanese Civil Code 2012 stating, ‘The transfer of rights in rem of 
personal property will not be affected until the personal property has been delivered.’ 
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direction—why a discussion of delivery requirements is important in the first place? Is 
there an underlying legal structure issue in the Civil Code? 
 
As a matter of fact, there is. The underlying legal structure is governed by the principle 
of separation and abstraction. The following section begins by explaining the principle 
of separation and abstraction, how much variation there is between them, and why it is a 
problem for a patent transaction to be covered under the Taiwanese Civil Code 
structure. 
 
2.2 The principle of separation and abstraction and the dilemmas associated with 
patent transactions 
 
2.2.1 What are the principles of separation and abstraction? 
 
Civil law families in the world have roughly two different attitudes to the arrangement 
of property transfers. One is the principle of combination (‘Einheitsprinzip’ in German) 
and the other is the principle of separation (‘Trennungsprinzip’ 109 in German).110 The 
principle of combination concerns when the owner has the intention to sell his thing and 
the other party agrees to accept his thing, with the ownership of such a thing being thus 
transferred to the other party. 1804 French Civil Code,
111
 1942 Italian Civil Code,
112
 
                                                 
109
 According to the Oxford-Duden German dictionary, the German word ‘trennung’ is translated as 
‘separation’ in English. See Werner Scholze-Stubenrecht and J B Sykes, The Oxford-Duden German 
Dictionary: German-English/English-German (Clarendon 1997) 716. ‘Prinzip’ is translated as ‘principle’. 
ibid 577.  
110
Chen Tian-hui(陳添輝), ‘Wuquan Wuyinxing Yuanze (物權無因性原則)=The Abstract Nature 
Alternation of the Act of Real Right’ (2005) 88(6) Chengchi Law Review 67. 
111
 See French Civil Code Article 1583. Chinese translation see Lin Yi-dian (林易典), ‘Yong Bijiaofa 
Tanxun Minfadian de Xinfanfxiang: Xi Wuquan Xingwei zhi Youying Xing wei Zhongxin (用比較法探
尋民法典的新方向：以物權行為之有因性為中心)=Using The Comparative Law in Search of A New 
Way for The Civil Code: focus on the causative juristic act’ (2004) 1207 Judicial Weekly 3 note 7. 
112
 See Italian Civil Code Article 1376. See ibid 3 in his note 9. 
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1964 Polish Civil Code,
113
 1966 Portuguese Civil Code
114
 and the inactive 1794 
General State Laws for Prussian States ‘Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen 
Staaten’, ALR) take this approach.115 The advantages of the principle of combination 
are that ownership is transferred when the parties have made a deal and the transaction 
progresses fast and efficiently. However, it also has some disadvantages. If the buyer 
does not receive the thing after the agreement is made, he bears a great risk of loss. In 
French civil law particularly, it is not an essential requirement for the seller to transfer 
his ownership to the buyer by delivery and the thing could fail to reach the buyer after 
the agreement is made. If the thing being lost is not attributed to being the seller’s fault 
or destroyed by force majeure before it reaches the buyer, the loss belongs to the buyer. 
The buyer still has to pay the purchasing price. The principle of combination sometimes 
results in an unfair circumstance. 
 
The principle of separation, on the other hand, means a separation of legal relationships 
between persons and things. Such a separation leads to two separate legal categories: the 
law of obligations and the law of things. Each requires the expression of ‘will’ from the 
seller and ‘acceptance’ from the buyer. From the seller’s side, it requires the will to sell 
in the law of obligations and the will to transfer ownership in the law of things. 
Likewise, from the buyer’s side, it requires the will to accept the buyer’s sale in the law 
of obligations and the will to receive ownership in the law of things. Unlike a singular 
contractual relationship (ownership is transferred upon the agreement being made) is 
involved in the principle of combination, there are two contractual relationships 
occupying the principle of separation: the sale contract and ownership transfer contract. 
                                                 
113
 See Polish Civil Code Article 155 section1. See ibid 3 in his note12. 
114
 See Portuguese Civil Code Article 408 section1. See ibid 3 in his note 13. 
115
 Chen (n 110) 67. Although French and Austrian civil codes are roughly categorised as being the same 
principle, there is some nuance between these two codes. For example, French code does not require 
‘delivery’ as the requirement of ownership transfer, whilst the Austrian code requires ‘delivery’ [in 
movable] and ‘registration’ [in immovable] as the essential requirement of an effective transfer.  
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German Civil Code and the Swiss Code take this approach.
116
  
 
The German law model however, is slightly different from the Swiss law model. The 
Swiss law model conceives that the two contractual relationships are causative and 
related, and thus the invalidity of the sales contract leads to the ineffectiveness of the 
ownership transfer contract.
117
 However, the German law model regards these two 
contracts as two separate, mutually independent contracts. The German law model is 
thus called ‘das Abstraktionsprinzip’ (translated as ‘the principle of abstraction’)118 by 
scholars. It means, in contrast to the Swiss law model, that the ineffectiveness of the 
sale contract does not invalidate the ownership transfer contract, and vice versa. The 
ownership transfer contract remains valid, despite the sale contract being invalid or 
void. 
 
Taking a daily transaction as an example, assume this author wants to buy a box of 
strawberries. In the German law model, the vendor and I have two separate agreements. 
The first contract is the sales contract that the vendor wants to sell a box of strawberries 
to me for a pound, and I agree to pay a pound to buy that box of strawberries. This sale 
contract is governed by the law of obligations. The ownership of that box of 
strawberries has not been transferred because it is not enough to have only one contract. 
Conceptually, there is another contract where the vendor agrees to transfer ownership to 
me and I agree to receive the transfer. The second contract—the ownership transfer 
contract, is governed by the law of things.  
 
The above example can be modified slightly to present why some Taiwanese jurists 
                                                 
116
 ibid 67. 
117
 ibid 82-84. 
118
 The German word ‘Abstraktion’ is translated as ‘abstraction’ in English. See Scholze-Stubenrecht and 
Sykes 47. ‘Prinzip’ is translated as ‘principle’ in English. See ibid 577. 
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think the German law model is superior to the French law model, and the principle of 
abstraction should be used for every property transaction. 
 
Assume I want to buy a box of strawberries. The vendor misunderstood what I wanted 
as raspberries and bags the raspberries for me. Without checking the bag I took the 
raspberries with me after payment. When I reached home and found the mistake, I went 
back to the vendor and prepared to rescind my contract with him.  
 
According to the principle of combination, the sale contract is void when I rescind the 
contract caused by a mistake. The transfer of the ownership of raspberries and money is 
thus invalid. The vendor remains the owner of his raspberries and the pound I paid is 
still mine, we then need to return each other’s thing to each other.  
 
However, if the principle of separation and abstraction are employed, the sales contract 
is void but the transfer of ownership remains valid. His raspberries are still mine and my 
money remains his. Technically, I am the true owner of the raspberries. Differing 
slightly from the principle of combination where we need to return each other’s thing, 
the reason for returning is different. Under the principle of separation and abstraction 
neither he nor I can demand a return based on that thing being mine. Instead, we can ask 
each other for a return based on, not an action ground on real rights, but a weaker claim 
based on the ‘unjust enrichment’ principle governed by the law of obligations.119 I need 
to return the raspberries not because it is his but because the raspberries are the interest 
without any legal grounds. Therefore, at the level of the law of things, I do not need to 
return them, but at the level of obligations, I do. 
 
                                                 
119
 Article 179 of Taiwanese Civil Code, ‘A person who acquires interests without any legal ground and 
prejudice to the other shall be bound to return it. The same rule shall be applied if a legal ground existed 
originally but disappeared subsequently’. [translation by Lawbank] 
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The advantage of the principle of separation and abstraction begins to emerge when the 
vendor goes bankrupt. If I rescind the sales contract by mistake, in the French law 
model (the principle of combination) the transfer of ownership is therefore invalid as 
well. The raspberries then become his, not mine. According to the law of things (rei 
vindicatio) the vendor can demand that I return his raspberries back to him, but he 
cannot return me my money because he is bankrupt. The inferior customer suffers this 
disadvantageous position under the principle of combination. 
 
Such an unfair situation will not happen if the principle of separation and abstraction 
has been adopted. As the invalidity of the sale contract does not influence the validity of 
the ownership transfer contract, I am still the true owner of that box of raspberries. As 
the true owner of the raspberries, I have the right to resell them to someone else, 
regardless of the vendor’s opinion. Although the German law model’s ‘two mutual 
independent contracts’ concept has often been criticised by some Taiwanese jurists for 
being too hypothetical and strange to daily life experience,
120
 it no doubt protects the 
inferior buyer when the seller is bankrupt.
121
 
 
                                                 
120
 Chen (n 110) 81. Also in Yin Zhang-hua (尹章華), ‘Zhaiquan Xingwei Yu Wuquan Xingwei Zhi Fali 
Jiegou (債權行為與物權行為之法律架構)=The Legal Structure of The Act of Real Rights and The Act 
of Obligations’ (1990) 57(3) Falu Pinglun(法律評論)=The Law Review 351-352. 
121
 The principle of abstraction however, has a drawback if the vendor sells the same thing twice to a 
different individual. Assume I want to buy a box of strawberries and there is only one box left. The 
vendor and I agree that I will pay a pound to him first and that he will keep that box of strawberries for 
me until I come back to get them later. When I come back, the vendor has already sold it to another client. 
Under the French law model (the principle of combination), I have the right to demand that that client (if I 
know who he/she is) returns my strawberries because I am the true owner.  
However, the same scenario happens differently when the principle of separation and abstraction are 
employed. Under the German law model, a successful delivery from the seller to the buyer is an essential 
requirement of a valid transfer, so in the above scenario, the strawberries belongs to the person whom the 
vendor handed them over to. Despite in the above situation, I made the sale contract with the vendor first 
and the box of strawberries was not handed over to me, ownership is not successfully transferred to me. 
Instead, they go to the subsequent buyer in that scenario.  
With the principle of separation and abstraction, the invalidity of the sales contract does not influence the 
validity of the transfer contract and I have no right to demand that the second buyer returns the box to 
because he is the true owner of the strawberries. If the thing I purchase is not a box of strawberries, but 
something unique in the world like an antique, the buyer’s situation in the German law model is worse 
than that in the French law model. 
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Despite the popular opinion agreeing that the advantage of principle of separation and 
abstraction equally benefits the patent transaction, this author however, has a different 
perspective. There is no obvious advantage for the buyer because once the sales contract 
is signed, ownership is transferred to the buyer before the buyer makes any payment. 
This is because, in a patent transaction, it is beyond imagination to deliver a patent to 
the buyer, so ownership transfer to the buyer is faster than for a physical thing 
transaction. Once the buyer learns the seller has gone bankrupt after the contract is 
signed, the buyer will choose not to make the payment.  
 
The buyer is not in an inferior situation as in a physical thing transaction; on the 
contrary, the buyer is the party that benefits from the patent transaction because 
ownership has been transferred to the buyer, with the buyer not paying the seller under 
bankruptcy, so the buyer may own the patent without any legal grounds. According to 
the unjust enrichment principle, the buyer needs to return the patent to the seller. No one 
benefits from the principle of abstraction and separation. As argued later in 2.2.4, if the 
buyer goes bankrupt instead of the seller, the seller becomes the victim of this 
transaction because the seller suffers loss of ownership. Unlike a physical thing 
transaction, the seller can control whether the thing is delivered before the seller gets the 
money; in a patent transaction, the ownership transfers to the buyer once the sales 
contract is signed. The principle of separation and abstraction benefits neither the buyer, 
nor the seller. There is no strong reason to support the principle of separation and 
abstraction being applied to patent transactions. 
 
2.2.2 Various model of principle of separation and abstraction 
 
There are more models due to different combinations than the German law and French 
law models in the civil law family. Technical speaking, the combination takes place 
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between two different approaches (the principle of combination or the principle of 
separation) and four separate requirements (with the principle of abstraction, or not, 
with delivery/register as an essential requirement, or not), there might be at least six 
possible combinations. One possibility is the principle of combination being adopted 
with no requirements; France and Poland take this approach. Another possibility is the 
principle of combination being adopted, with a requirement of delivery/register being an 
essential element of a valid transfer. Countries like the Czech Republic
122
 and Spain
123
 
belong to this kind. There is another possibility that the principle of separation is 
adopted without having the principle of abstraction, but it is required to fulfil the due 
delivery/register process. Countries such as Switzerland and the Netherlands have this 
combination.
124
 There is also when all requirements being considered. A country like 
Germany adopts the principle of separation and abstraction, with the requirement of due 
delivery/register process if a valid ownership transfer proceeds.  
 
There are also some other combinations different from the above stated models. The 
1940 Greek Civil Code adopts the principle of separation but treats movable things and 
immovable things differently. If the transactional object is a movable thing, the principle 
of abstraction is adopted; if it is an immovable thing, the principle of abstraction is 
excluded.
125
 Japanese civil code is another type of combination. The majority of 
Japanese jurists conceive that the Japanese Civil Code has the principle of combination 
and the principle of abstraction.
126
 If the majority’s opinion has been widely 
                                                 
122
 See 1964 Czech Republic Civil Code Article 132 section 1 and 133 section 1. See Lin ( n 111) 3 note 
27. 
123
 See 1888 Spanish Civil Code Article 609 section 2 in ibid 3 in his note 25. See also Su Yeong-chin 
(蘇永清), Guyou Fazhi Yu Dangdai Minshi Faxue(固有法制與當代民事法學)=Ancient Law and 
Contemporary Civil Law (San Min 1998) 312. 
124
 Swiss Civil Code see Chen (n 110) 83. Chapter 3 Article 84 section 1of the1992 Dutch Civil Code see 
Lin (n 111) 3 note 24. 
125
 See 1940 Greek Civil Code. Article 1034 states the legal effect the movable thing transactions, Article 
1033 regulates the real estates. See Lin (n 111) 2,3 note 30. 
126
 See Shi Shang-kuan (史尚寬), ‘Lun Wuquan Xingwei Zhi Dulixing Yu Wuyinxing(論物權行為之獨
立性與無因性)=On the Principle of Separation and Abstraction’ (1956) 1(1) Faxue Congkan 法學叢刊
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accepted,
127
 then the Japanese Civil Code is truly another unique type of combination. 
 
2.2.3 The principle of separation and abstraction in the Taiwanese Civil Code 
 
Taiwanese Civil Code separates the law into the law of obligations and the law of things, 
therefore most jurists agree that the Taiwanese Civil Code adopts the principle of 
separation.
128
 The majority of Taiwanese jurists conceive that Taiwanese Civil Code 
follows the German style.
129
 They think the code has the principle of separation and 
abstraction, with the delivery/register requirement being an essential requirement of a 
valid transfer. 
130
 Some say that the Taiwanese Civil Code is different from the German 
law model. In fact, it is a conditional principle of abstraction rather than a genuine 
principle of abstraction.
131
 The other school of professors conceives that the Taiwanese 
Civil Code inclines to the Swiss style more than the German style. They think the Code 
has the principle of separation and the delivery/register requirement, but does not have 
the principle of abstraction.
 132
  
 
They have a good reason to believe so. In the German law model, there is an essential 
                                                                                                                                               
=China Law Journal 63,65-66. Regarding Japanese Civil Code Article 176, see Qu Tau (渠濤), Zuixi 
Riben Minfa (最新日本民法)=The Latest Japanese Civil Code (Law Press China 2006) 42. Also in Chen 
(n 110) 72 and Lin ( n111) 3 note 11. 
127
 Some Japanese jurists believe that the Japanese Civil Code has no principle of abstraction. See Yao 
Rui-guang (姚瑞光), Minfa Zongze Lun (民法總則論)=On the General Principles of the Civil Code 
(Dazhongguo 大中國 2002) 267. Also in Chen (n 110) 72. 
128
 Shi (n 126) 63, 67. Also in Wang Ze-jian(王澤鑑), ‘Minfa Zongzebian Guanyu Faluxingwei Zhi 
Guiding Dui Wuquan Xingwei Shiyong Zhi Jiben Wenti(民法總則篇關於法律行為之規定對物權行為
適用之基本問題)=Some Basic Issues of A Juristic Act in The Gerneral Principles Applies to The Law of 
Things’ (1986) 31(3) Faxue Congkan 法學叢刊=China Law Journal 27, 28.  
129
 Including Wang, ‘Minfa Zongzebian Guanyu Faluxingwei Zhi Guiding Dui Wuquan Xingwei 
Shiyong Zhi Jiben Wenti(民法總則篇關於法律行為之規定對物權行為適用之基本問題)=Some Basic 
Issues of A Juristic Act in The Gerneral Principles Applies to The Law of Things’ (n 128) 28, Zheng 
Guan-yu(鄭冠宇), ‘Wuquan Xingwei Wuyinxing Zhi Tupo(物權行為無因性之突破)=A Breakthrough 
of the Principle of Abstraction’ (1998) 43(4) Faxue Congkan(法學叢刊)=China Law Journal 59,68. 
130
 Wang, Minfa Wuquan(民法物權)=The Law of Things in The Civil Code (n 43) 68, 83. 
131
 Zheng (n 129) 68 , Shi (n 126) 67. 
132
 Xie Zhe-sheng(謝哲勝), ‘Wuquan Xingwei Dulixing Zhi Jiantao(物權行為獨立性之檢討)=A 
Rethinking of the Principle of Abstraction’ (1994) 52 Chengchi Law Review 351-352 and Yin (n 120) 25. 
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element for the parties to ‘consent’ to the ownership transfer, whilst in the Swiss law 
model, there is not. Taiwanese Civil Code has no article that regulates ‘consent’ being 
essential; therefore, the minority has grounds for thinking that the Taiwanese Civil Code 
is closer to the Swiss law model. However, those who support the German law model 
also have a good reason as well. One of the legislators of the Taiwanese Civil Code 
specified that the Code follows the German law style.
133
 The German law model 
supporters cite the legislators’ opinion and base their reasoning on it. Whether the 
Taiwanese Civil Code is closer to the Swiss law model or German law model remains 
unsolved by the academia, with Taiwanese courts favouring the German model more 
than the Swiss model. Almost all court decisions are more inclined towards the German 
than the Swiss law model.
134
  
 
As a matter of fact, not only was the German Civil Code consulted in the Taiwanese 
Civil Code, the Japanese Civil Code and the Swiss Civil Code were also consulted.
135
 It 
has the principle of separation, a conditional principle of abstraction
136
 and the 
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 Shi (n 126) 63, 67. 
134
 Wang, Minfa Wuquan(民法物權)=The Law of Things in The Civil Code (n 43) 69,70. ‘The overriding 
consensus is our Civil Code adopted the second model [German model], and that is, apart from a sale 
contract, we have an independent ownership transfer contract with the principle of abstraction… It is 
conclusive that the court admits the existence of such an ownership transfer contract.’ Professor Wang 
Ze-jian (王澤鑑) illustrated two Supreme Court precedents, six Supreme Court decisions and one 
constitutional court decision to support this, including precedents [1941] Zuigao Fayuan Taishangzi 
number 411(最高法院台上字第 441號) Zuigao Fayuan Precedent (Civil Supreme Court) ‘The seller of 
an immovable thing is obligated to sustain a legitimate ownership transfer contract after a valid sale 
contract is made.’ [translation by this author]; and the Supreme Court decision [2000] Zuigao Fayuan 
Taishangzi number 961 (最高法院台上字第 961號) Lawbank (Civil Supreme Court) ‘An ownership 
transfer contract has its independency and abstraction, and will not be invalidated by a sale contract that is 
void or revocable.’ [translation by this author]; and also a constitutional court decision [1994] Shizi 
number 349 (釋字第 349號) Lawbank (Council of Grand Justices: Constitutional Court) ‘The judicial 
acts in the Civil Code are separated into, the act in relation to obligations and the act in relation to things.’ 
[translation by this author] This author found another Supreme Court decision that directly mentioned the 
principles of separation and abstraction. See [2006] Zuigao Fayuan Taishangzi number 1859 (最高法院
台上字第 1859號) Lawbank (Civil Supreme Court) ‘The so called separation and abstraction of an act in 
relation to things, means this act is not affected by the invalidity, voiding or withdrawal of the sales 
contract.’ [translation by this author] 
135
 Su (n 123) 281. 
136
 ‘Conditional’ here means that under certain circumstances the seller and the buyer can ignore the 
principle of abstraction. For further information about what the certain circumstances are, see ibid 
307-310. Also in Wang, Minfa Wuquan(民法物權)=The Law of Things in The Civil Code (n 43) 84, and 
Zheng (n 129) 61-68.  
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delivery/register requirement. Without the ‘consent’ requirement from the parties for the 
ownership transfer, like in the German law model, the Taiwanese Civil Code is actually 
a sui generis type. This sui generis structure has a significant impact on patent 
transactions because when a physical thing is replaced with a patent, obstacles might 
emerge in this sui generis structure whilst the same obstacles may not appear in other 
civil law models, such as in the French model. The next section will discuss this impact. 
 
2.2.4 How do these principles influence intellectual property transactions? 
 
Assume I want to buy a patent instead of strawberries. As stated above, Taiwanese Civil 
Code is a sui generis type of civil law that has the principle of separation and 
conditional principle of abstraction. Successful delivery of the product sold is an 
essential requirement of a valid ownership transfer; without it, the ownership transfer 
contract is void. The biggest question then emerges in a patent transaction is how can 
the seller ‘deliver’ a patent to the buyer because a patent is intangible? Are the rules 
arising from physical things feasible for intellectual property transactions? 
 
Germany solved this problem by citing section 413 and 398 of German Civil Code, 
wherein section 413 in the law states, ‘The provisions relating to transfer of claims are 
applied with the necessary modifications to the transfer of other rights unless otherwise 
provided by law.’ Section 398 further indicates that ‘A claim may be transferred by the 
obligee to another person by contract with that person (assignment). When the contract 
is entered into, the new obligee steps into the shoes of the previous obligee.’ 137 The 
sale of a patent is confined to ‘the transfer of other rights’ in section 413; therefore the 
law allows the sale of a patent to be treated as a sale of a claim, subject to the rules of 
                                                 
137
 Available at Bundesministerium der Justiz, German Civil Code BGB (English translation), 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html, accessed 19 March, 2013. 
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contract law.
138
 In accord with section 398, a claim is transferred when a contract is 
made, with no requirement of delivery or registration being fulfilled in this respect.  
 
Taiwanese Civil Code does not have the same provision as German Civil Code section 
413. Due to this deficiency, Taiwanese copyright professor Tsai Ming-cheng believes 
that, if Taiwanese Civil Code adopts German Civil Code section 413, the unsound 
delivery requirement will be avoided.
139
 This author, however, is not convinced that 
having a clause like German Civil Code section 413 is enough, because it only dodges 
the unsound delivery requirement, without giving a clear answer to a patent’s nature. Is 
a patent proprietary or not remains unclear. Moreover, when contract law is applied in a 
patent transaction, the patent is then forced to be confined to the law of obligations 
where a claim is the object of that transaction. However, a claim is an assertion made 
between an obligee and an obligor, without any proprietary nature (a right to exclude). 
The assignee cannot assert the patentee’s right against infringers based on the claim 
(s)he purchases. Some may argue a patent sale can be regarded as a real rights sale, 
however, a real right is attached to something immovable/movable, so when a real right 
is sold, the immovable/movable thing remains held by an owner, with the real right 
transferred to another assignee. However, in the case of a patent sale, the patent is 
attached to nothing tangible. A patentee loses his/her ownership when a patent is 
transferred; there is nothing tangible a patentee can hold as an owner. Patent rights are 
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 See Friedrich-Karl Beier, Gerhard Schricker and Wolfgang Fikentscher, German Industrial Property, 
Copyright and Antitrust Laws:legal texts with introduction (3
rd
 edn, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and 
International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law 1996),I/A/4. ‘Industrial property law is a 
neighbouring field to that of civil law, regulated primarily by the Civil Code (BGB). Industrial property 
rights, together with the judicially developed right to an established business, are absolute rights protected 
by Sec. 823 I of the German Civil Code…The exploitation of industrial property rights by transfer and 
licensing is subject to the rules of contract law…’ 
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 See Tsai Ming-cheng(蔡明誠), ‘Zhuzhuo Caichanquan Rangyu Qiyue yu Minfa Shiyong Wenti: 
zuigaofayuan bashiliu niandu Taishangzi diyilingsanjiuhao pinxi (著作財產權讓與契約與民法適用問
題：最高法院八十六年度台上字第一 0三九號評析)=The Assignment of Copyright and Application of 
Civil Code:Comments on a Supreme Court Decision in Taiwan:1997 Taishan Zi Number1039’ in Li 
Jian-liang (李建良)(ed), Lun Quanli Baohu Zhi Liluan yu Shijian (論權利保護之理論與實踐)(Angle 元
照 2006) 506, 507. 
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not the same as real rights. 
 
Another reason why the German model is not an ideal approach is this model has been 
largely influenced by Joseph Kohler.
140
Bausch states that patents are deemed 
quasi-in-rem rights when they are granted by way of an exclusive licence,
141
 this author 
sees no difference between the German approach and Taiwanese/Japanese approach. As 
this research further demonstrates in 3.2.2 and 3.4, Joseph Kohler’s quasi-possession 
hypothesis provided little help in solving the taxonomy issue for Japan and Taiwan. As 
this study shows in 3.2.2, there is still an unexplainable jural relationship between the 
patentee and the infringers which highlights that Joseph Kohler’s quasi-possession 
hypothesis is not enough. In the case of patent infringement, the legal basis of a 
patentee’s assertion is the law of delict.142 The subjects that the law of delict protects 
are either moral rights or civil law rights in rem.
143
 Without an explicit clause stating 
patents are rights in rem, it is difficult for patentee to assert his/her claim directly. 
Besides, Joseph Kohler’s hypothesis does not explain why a tenant has a right to use, 
while a non-exclusive licencee does not. The German approach is not an appropriate 
model for comparison. 
 
According to the above analysis, Taiwan’s unique legal structure in the Civil Code 
                                                 
140
 Substantiated by German professors, when it comes to industrial property, ‘German legal doctrine 
take an interest in the new subject and attempt to integrate it, together with the simultaneously-developing 
and associated field of copyright, in the system of German private law, and to clarify its basic principles. 
The greatest influence still traceable today was exerted by Joseph Kohler through his concept of 
intangible property rights (Immaterialgüterrechte)…’ See Beier, Schricker and Fikentscher, I/A/1. 
141
 Rainer Bausch, ‘Patentlizenz und Insolvenz des Lizenzgebers’ (2005) 8. Jg. NZI-Neue Zeitschrift für 
das Recht der Insolvenz und Sanierung 289-295. In the abstract, it says, ‘Der nachfolgende Beitrag 
behandelt die exklusive Patentlizenz in der Insolvenz des Lizenzgebers, ihre Rechtsnatur als 
quasi-dingliches Recht.’ In English, ‘The following contribution treats the exclusive patent licence in the 
event of licensor’s insolvency, its nature being a quasi-in-rem right.’ [translation by this author] 
142
 Section 1 of Article 184 of Taiwanese Civil Code 2011 stating, ‘A person who, intentionally or 
negligently, has wrongfully damaged the rights of another is bound to compensate him for any injury is 
done intentionally in a manner against the rules of morals.’ [translation by Lawbank] 
143
 Professor Wang however, classified patents into civil law rights in rem in his book on the law of delict. 
See Wang Ze-jian(王澤鑑), Qinquan Xingwei Fa (侵權行為法)=The Law of Delict, vol 1 (San Min 
1998) 192-196. This author challenges this classification by analysing the differences between rights in 
rem in common law jurisdiction and civil law jurisdiction stated in 4.2.2. 
 62 
 
makes a patent sale an inevitable encounter with the delivery requirement if the patent is 
deemed proprietary. However, without any law in the Patent Act supporting patents as 
proprietary, the next question is whether the Civil Code defines a patent’s proprietary. 
There is a need to understand the meaning of ‘things’ in the Civil Code and whether 
they cover patents, so the definition of ‘things’ in the Taiwanese Civil Code requires 
further exploration. If there is room for interpretation for intangible things in the 
Taiwanese Civil Code, there might be a chance to analogise these principles in a patent 
transaction. If there is not, then apparently, the patent transaction needs its own rules 
apart from the above stated principles.  
 
Unfortunately, the legislative record of the Taiwanese Civil Code did not answer this 
question. According to records from legislators, the meaning of things is ‘deliberately’ 
not clearly defined in the code.
144
 The legislators allow much room when interpreting 
the word ‘things’. This vagueness is considered an issue for judges when future 
unforeseeable objects are created. Therefore, simply relying on legislative records does 
not answer the question. 
 
It is not only a choice between an analogy of principles when considering a patent 
transaction, or the creation of new set of rules, it also involves a delicate allocation of 
responsibility between seller and buyer. Under Taiwanese Civil Code, the requirement 
of selling a physical thing is different from that of selling an intangible claim, such as 
                                                 
144
 Tsai Dun-ming (蔡墩銘), Minfa: Lifaliyou Linghan Shishi Panjie Juyi Shiwu Wenti: Huibian (民法：
立法理由令函釋示判解決議實務問題彙編 )=Civil Code: Consultative Documents, Gazattes, 
Explainations, Decisions, Meeting Minutes and Practical Issues: Compilation (Wu-nan五南 1983 reprint ) 
82. ‘Rights in the law of things refer to claims the owner has towards his things. Every country defines 
things differently. For example, in French Civil Code, things cover tangible and intangible things. 
Germany and Japan limit things to physical things. Thailand defines things as tangible things in the 
General Principles but extends the definition in other laws. Some jurisdictions like the Swiss 
Confederation and the Soviet Union do not define things expressly. No matter how things have been 
defined, it can be either too broad or ambiguous, with both of them being improper. This code adopted the 
legislative principle of the Swiss Confederation and Soviet Union law. Therefore, the word “things” is not 
defined intentionally’. [translation by the author] 
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the right to collect a debt. If a patent is regarded as a physical ‘thing’, according to 
Section 1 of Article 348 in the Taiwanese Civil Code, the seller needs to deliver such a 
patent to the buyer.
145
 If the patent is regarded as a claim, or a real right, the seller does 
not need to perform the delivery requirement. Instead, it is enough if the buyer 
‘conceptually’ accepts this patent.146 Apparently, the latter (conceptually acceptance) is 
easier than the former (delivery). 
 
The law also regulates warranty differently if an object is physical or not. If it is a 
transaction involving a physical thing, the seller carries a general warranty to assure that 
no one will assert any right to this thing in the future.
147
 If the transactional object is a 
claim or an intangible right, the seller bears a limited warranty. The law merely requires 
the seller to assure the existence of this claim/intangible right when the contract is 
signed.
148
 If we take the former approach to allocate more liability on the side of the 
seller, then we have the difficulty of fulfilling the delivery requirement in the law, 
especially in the case of methodology patents. If we take the latter approach to avoid the 
delivery requirement, what happens if the patent is invalidated by the third party after 
the contract is signed? Insofar as the seller only provided assurance about the existence 
of this patent at the moment when the contract was signed, can the buyer have their 
money back since the patent has become non-existent? The legislators’ records do not 
provide solutions in detail and we need to search elsewhere for an answer. 
 
Suppose we temporarily neglect the delivery requirement in the law, how do the 
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 Article 348, Section 1, ‘The seller of a thing is bound to deliver the thing to the buyer and to make 
him acquire its ownership’. [translation by Lawbank] 
146
 Article 348, Section 2, ‘The seller of a claim is bound to make the buyer acquire the right sold. If, by 
virtue of such claim, the seller can possess a certain thing, he is also bound to deliver the thing’. 
[translation by Lawbank] 
147
 Article 349, ‘The seller shall warrant that the thing sold is free from any right enforceable by third 
parties against the buyer’. [translation by Lawbank] 
148
 Article 350, ‘The seller of a claim to a debt, or any other claim, shall warrant the actual existence of 
such claim’. [translation by Lawbank] 
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principle of separation and abstraction impact on a patent transaction? 
 
The delivery requirement might be controversial, but most legal practitioners agree that 
the principle of separation and abstraction has no difficulty being adopted in a patent 
transaction.
149
 This author argues that such an assertion is hazardous in the case when 
the buyer goes bankrupt. In a normal situation, the sale contract is the first stage of any 
transaction, so if anything goes wrong during the first stage, the seller and the buyer can 
cease with the transaction in the second stage (like refusing to proceed with the 
delivery/register process) to prevent ownership from transferring. However, this does 
not happen in a patent transaction.  
 
With the Taiwanese Civil Code being a sui generis type, the ownership of a patent 
passes to the buyer faster and stays with the buyer firmer than the normal situation. 
Ownership is transferred when the sale contract is signed, insofar as delivery is 
unimaginable, in practice this delivery stage is normally skipped. However, in theory, 
because the principle of separation and abstraction impacts on a patent transaction 
worse than under French law model when something goes wrong in the first stage there 
will be no second stage, or worse than the Swiss law model when the first stage fails 
then the second stage fails, the Taiwanese law model allows the second stage to be 
sustained. Not only is it sustained, but for the principle of abstraction, the transfer of 
ownership is not influenced by the invalidity of the first stage. Therefore, if something 
goes wrong in the middle of the first and/or the second stages, like the buyer going 
bankrupt after signing the sale contract, the seller will not receive their money and lose 
ownership. The principle of separation and abstraction break the equal allocation of 
transactional risk between the buyer and seller. In a patent transaction, the seller bears 
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 For example, Justice Su Yeong-chi who is also a law professor, agrees that the principle of separation 
and abstraction applies to intellectual property transactions. See Su (n 123) 302. 
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more risk in the Taiwanese law model than in the French or Swiss law models. 
 
The Taiwanese Civil Code, as a sui generis law model, has a negative impact on patent 
transactions. The principles and requirements from a physical things transaction cannot 
be directly applied to patent transactions; moreover, many aspects prove to be 
problematic. It is unimaginable to perform the delivery requirement stated in the law, as 
well as the principle of separation and abstraction breaking the risk management 
balance for the seller and buyer. The legislator’s records again do not answer our 
particular questions, so the next section will look into court decisions and the opinions 
of Taiwanese academia. 
 
2.3 Popular opinions of the Taiwanese academia and courts 
 
2.3.1 The principle of separation and abstraction equally applies to the intellectual 
property transactions 
 
The most popular opinion held by Taiwanese academia concern the rules from the law 
of things, the principle of separation and abstraction, applying to intellectual property 
transactions. Nearly all scholars in Taiwan favour patents being regarded as rights in 
rem, whereby the law of things equally applies. Law professors such as Shieh 
Ming-yan,
150
 Rui Mu,
151
 Shieh Zai-quan,
152
 Lin Ko-ching,
153
 Tsai Ming-cheng,
154
 
Chuang Sheng-jung,
155
 and many others
156
 expressly support for this popular view in 
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 Shieh, Zhihui Caicanquan Fa (智慧財產權法)=Intellectual Property Law (n 68) 43-72. Chapter 4 of 
Shieh’s book discusses whether Articles 768, 801, 948, 966 apply to intellectual property.  
151
 Rui (n 68) 7-8. Rui Mu classifies intellectual property rights as absolute rights like real rights. 
152
 Shieh, Minfa Wuquan Lun-shang(民法物權論-上)=On The Law of Things vol I (n 68) 25. Shieh 
Zai-quan conceives that rights in a trade mark and patent are a collective concept of ‘things’, and can 
therefore be applied to the law of things. 
153
 Lin (n 68) 9. Lin Ko-ching suggests that the right to dominate a thing applies to intellectual property. 
154
 Tsai,Wuquanfa Yanjiu(物權法研究)=A Study on The Law of Things (n 68) 6. 
155
 Chuang (n 68) 6. Chuang Sheng-jung conceived rights in rem in the law of things encompassing 
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their publications.  
 
The reason for supporting this popular view are because the law of things (civil law real 
rights) regulates the ‘belongings’ status of a thing to a person and legislators taking a 
vague stand on the definition of that ‘thing’, meaning that there is no reason to exclude 
intellectual property from the law of things. According to their view, the law of things 
also regulates the belongings status of a patent to a person, and thus the principles 
arising can be mutatis mutandis applied to a patent transaction.  
 
2.3.2 The reason for challenging this popular view 
 
This author challenges this popular view by proving that the fundamental jurisprudence 
of civil law ‘things’ is totally different from common law’s 157 property concept in 
Chapter 4. Before that, the author also disagrees with the popular view by simply 
pointing out that there is an inherent logical error in this popular view that is seemingly 
absent from academia discourse. 
 
According to Article 757 of the Taiwanese Civil Code, unless otherwise provided by the 
law or custom, no rights for things shall be created.
158
 In other words, the law does not 
allow any rights in relation to things to be created by anyone’s will; it has to be created 
by law. If the patentee’s rights to his/her patent can be regarded as real rights to his/her 
patent, this has to be found somewhere in the law. Unfortunately, neither in the law of 
things in the Taiwanese Civil Code, nor in the Taiwanese Patent Act, can any article be 
                                                                                                                                               
copyrights and trade mark rights. 
156
 Such as a Chinese patent jurist Qin Hong-ji, who used the ‘lease’ concept in the law of things to 
understand the concept of a ‘licence’. His commentary on the 1944 Patent Act was the work closest to the 
time when this Patent Act was made. See Qin (n 68) 99. 
157
 ‘Common law’ here refers to the common law of England and the common law jurisdiction of the 
United States of America.  
158
 Article 757 of the Civil Code, ‘No rights in rem shall be created unless otherwise provided by the 
statutes or customs’. [translation by Lawbank] 
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found to grant the patentee a property right for his/her patent. The Patent Act merely 
grants a negative claim ‘to exclude the infringers from enjoyment’ to the patentee,159 
without expressly granting the patentee those rights to use, capital and disposition, and 
leaving the patentee with no positive rights for his/her patents. The mutatis mutandis 
application to the real rights held by the popular view is not grounded on any laws. So 
far, the example of a mutatis mutandis application can only be found in the Fisheries 
Act 2008
160
 and the Mining Act 2003
161
, with none in the intellectual property laws 
including the Patent Act, the Copyright Act and the Trade Mark Act. This author 
concludes that the popular view has no legal grounds for their assertions. 
 
Nonetheless, this popular view remains dominant in the Taiwanese academia. In the 
following we not only see the academia but also the courts holding the same opinion 
without giving due consideration. The next section highlights courts’ misinterpretation, 
by citing various decisions widely distributed in patent, copyright and trade mark cases. 
 
2.3.3 The courts’ and the Intellectual Property Office’s attitudes towards this 
popular view  
 
After looking into all the decisions mentioning the property nature of intellectual 
property, which covers all fields including patent, copyright and trade mark cases, the 
judges rarely make decisions other than supporting the above popular view. Surprisingly, 
                                                 
159
 Section 1 of Article 56 in the Patent Act, ‘Unless otherwise provided for in this Act, the patentee of a 
patented article shall have the exclusive right to preclude other persons from manufacturing, making an 
offer for sale, selling, using, or importing for above purposes the patented article without his/her prior 
consent’. [translation by Lawbank] 
160
 Article 20 of the Fisheries Act, ‘The fishery right shall be considered as the rights over things. Except 
as this Act otherwise provides, the provisions of the Civil Code governing immovables of the right over 
things shall, mutatis mutandis, apply’. [translation by Lawbank] 
161
 Article 8 of the Mining Act, ‘The mining right shall be considered as the rights over things. Except as 
this Act otherwise provides, the provisions of the Civil Code governing immovables of the right over 
things shall, mutatis mutandis, apply’. [translation by Lawbank] 
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the popular scholarly view is widely supported by judges in the District Court,
162
 High 
Court
163
 and Supreme Court
164
 of Taiwan without any appearance of dissenting 
opinion. Some judges even stretch this popular view further, making a creative link 
between the principle of registration in the land register system and the patent register 
system.
165
 This will be discussed further in 2.5.2. 
 
The Taiwanese Intellectual Property Office also stretches the popular view further by 
segregating licensing activities into an exclusive licence and non-exclusive licence. 
According to the Intellectual Property Office, an exclusive licence is an act relating to 
things, while a non-exclusive licence is an act relating to obligations.
166
 The office 
concluded this based on the consequences of licence activities. The Intellectual Property 
Office believes that since the exclusive licensee obtains a ‘right to exclude’, it must be 
the result arising from the law of things and not the law of obligations. Moreover, the 
non-exclusive licensee does not have a right to exclude, with the Intellectual Property 
Office concluding that a non-exclusive licence shall be governed by the law of 
obligations. The Civil High Court supports the Intellectual Property Office opinion.
167
 
The court classified the patent licence into an exclusive licence and non-exclusive 
licence
 
with two separate arrangements. When an exclusive licence issue is involved, 
the law of things is applied to the issue; when a non-exclusive licence issue is involved, 
                                                 
162
[2002] Difang Fayuan Suzi number 613 (地方法院訴字第 613 號) Lawbank (Civil District Court 
Banciao Division), and [2007] Difang Fayuan Zhizi number 28 (地方法院智字第28號) Lawbank (Taipei 
Civil District Court) 
163
 [2000] Gaodeng Fayuan Shangyizi number 222 (高等法院上易字第 222號) Lawbank (Civil High 
Court), and [2000] Gaodeng Fayuan Shangyizi number 381 (高等法院上易字第 381 號) Lawbank 
(Kaohsiung Panel High Court) 
164
 [1997] Zuigao Fayuan Taishangzi number 1039 (最高法院台上字第 1039號) Lawbank (Civil 
Supreme Court), and [2006] Xing Zheng Fayuan Panzi number 285 (最高行政法院判字第 285號) 
Lawbank (Administrative Supreme Court) 
165
 [2005] Difang Fayuan Zhiyizi number 43 (地方法院智一字第 43 號) Lawbank (Banciao Civil 
District Court) ‘Any third party who replies to the title on the register shall be protected by this court’. 
[translation by the author] 
166
 [1999] Zhifazi number 88007117 (智法字第 88007117 號) Lawbank (Taiwan Intellectual Property 
Office) 
167
 [2006] Zhi Shangyizi number18 (智上易字第 18 號) Lawbank (Taichung Civil High Court) 
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the law of obligations is employed. As a matter of fact, a licence is not a grant of 
positive rights, with this fallacy originating from a different perception of allocating 
rights in property, particularly a right to use. Civil law lawyers and judges incline to use 
civil law inclusionary rules by thinking of common law exclusionary design, but this 
approach is inappropriate. This point will be further stated in 4.3.1. Before that, a simple 
example in the following section will show the error of this view. 
 
2.3.4 The fallacy of the Intellectual Property Office and courts’ opinions 
 
A simple example is as follows. Consider patentee ‘X’ licences his patent to licensee 
‘Y’. In the licence contract, both parties agree that Y exclusively enjoys the rights X 
grants for 5 years. When the licence contract ends, Y requires a non-exclusive licence 
for another 3 years. If the explanation provided by the Intellectual Property Office is 
true, then the opinion given by the Intellectual Property Office is confusing to both the 
licensee and licensor. According to the Intellectual Property Office, an exclusive licence 
applies to the law of things, while a non-exclusive licence applies to the law of 
obligations. In the first 5 years, licensor X and licensee Y’s relationship is governed by 
the law of things, with the patent is regarded as a physical thing. However, in the 
coming 3 years, the parties’ relationship will be changed to the law of obligations just 
because it is a non-exclusive licence. The patent is now regarded as a personal debt. If 
the Intellectual Property Office and the court are correct, the essence of the patent shall 
be the same, whether the parties’ relationship in the first 5 years is an exclusive licence 
or non-exclusive licence in the coming 3 years. Intellectual Property Office and court 
presumptions must be wrong.  
 
Moreover, the Civil Court of Taiwan, as stated above in 2.3.3, has more mercurial and 
interesting positions regarding different types of intellectual property licence. The Civil 
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High Court, like the Intellectual Property Office, separates the patent licence into an 
exclusive licence and non-exclusive licence.
168
 However, it did not equally do so in the 
copyright licence case.
169
 In copyright licence cases, the Panel High Court decided that 
no matter whether it is an exclusive or non-exclusive licence, the claims arising from 
the licence should be governed by the law of obligations.
170
 As argued before, the 
nature of intellectual property shall be the same at any occasion. The inconsistency in 
the High Court itself shows something goes very wrong in intrinsic legal thinking 
concerning the property nature of an intellectual property, something which will be 
further explored in Chapter 4. 
 
2.3.5 Is the delivery requirement feasible in an intellectual property transaction? 
 
The popular view can be attested from a different angle. The popular view suggests that 
the principles and rules arising from things can be equally used in a patent transaction, 
with the delivery requirement equally applying to the patent transaction. Under this 
logic, Professor Shieh believes that the delivery of copyrighted work is possible.
171
 
Shieh argues that ownership of copyright is transferred at the time when the work is 
‘delivered’ to the assignee, rather than when the sales contract is signed. His legal basis 
is on Article 151-1 of the Taiwanese Civil Code,
172
 insomuch as the law says that the 
right of publication cedes to the editor when the owner delivers his/her writing to the 
editor. From his perspective, the principle of separation equally applies to this 
                                                 
168
 ibid. 
169
 [1996] Gaodeng Fayuan Shangyizi number 3316 (高等法院上易字第 3316號)Lawbank (Penal High 
Court), [1996] Gaodeng Fayuan Shangsuzi number 1012 (高等法院上訴字第 1012號)Lawbank (Panel 
High Court), and [2001] Gaodeng Fayuan Shang-geng er zi number 391(高等法院上更二字第 391 號) 
Lawbank (Panel High Court). 
170
 ibid. 
171
 Shieh, ‘Cong Xiangguan Anli Tantao ZhihuiCaichanquan yu Minfa zhi Guanxi (從相關案例探討智
慧財產權與民法之關係)=A Discussion on the Relationship of Intellectual Property Rights with the Civil 
Law through Relevant Cases’ (n 83 )220. 
172
 Article 151-1 states, ‘The right of publication cedes to the editor when the person ceding the right of 
publication according to the contract for publication delivers the writing to the editor’. [translation by 
Lawbank] 
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transaction.
173
 In his opinion, the two stages (the law of obligations and then the law of 
things) employ the copyright transaction; it is not until the author hands over his work 
to the publisher that the copyright ownership is transferred, which is somewhat bizarre. 
 
The Supreme Civil Court makes its decisions based on the same logic above: delivery is 
possible and the principle of separation equally applies to the copyright transaction. In 
the Xu Yi-jin v. Linkingbooks case (number1039)
174
, the court rejected Xu Yan-pian’s 
(the deceased writer in the case) daughter’s (the applicant, Xu Yi-jin) appeal because the 
writer Xu Yan-pian did not deliver his work to his daughter. Instead, the author Xu 
Yan-pian delivered his work to the publisher (the respondent, Linkingbooks) after he 
signed an assignment contract with his divorced wife stating that his copyright is 
assigned to their daughter. Both of the assignment agreements, the one with his divorced 
wife and the one with the publisher, were valid and binding under the law of obligations. 
The court reasoned, for Xu Yan-pian failed to deliver his manuscripts to his daughter, 
that ownership of his copyright was not transferred to his daughter. Instead, his 
publisher had the copyright. The court concluded that ownership of the copyright 
belonged to the publisher, in spite of the writer agreeing to assign his copyright to his 
daughter first.
175
 
 
2.3.6 The impractical part of the requirement of delivery 
 
The court’s views above are however problematic. If delivery is feasible in an 
intellectual property transaction, it must be applicable in every type of intellectual 
property transaction, including a patent transaction. However, this is not true. A 
methodology patent for example, is in nature ethereal, intangible and without a 
                                                 
173
 Shieh (n 83) 220. 
174
 See [1997] Zuigao Fayuan Taishangzi number 1039 (n 164). 
175
 ibid. 
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corporeal existence, so how can it possibly be delivered? Unlike rights in the copyright 
attached to a physical manuscript, a ‘methodology patent’ is attached to nothing 
physical. 
 
Besides, the courts do not all agree with the Supreme Civil Court. The Panel High Court 
made three decisions, number 3316, number 1012 and number 391, declaring that the 
Panel High Court’s position is that a ‘copyright assignment is an act relating to the law 
of obligations’.176 The Panel High Court does not think that the delivery process is 
essential or required in a copyright assignment; ownership is transferred when a sale 
contract is signed. Unfortunately, the Panel High Court is in the minority. The Supreme 
Civil Court supports the delivery requirements, as do the majority of the civil courts.  
 
2.4 The major flaw in the popular view 
 
The popular view begins with their reasoning by directing the principle of separation 
into a patent transaction. This is not supported by any laws but by purely analogical 
work done by the academia. Academia, in order to perfectly explain the principle of 
separation and abstraction work equally well in a patent transaction, forced the patent to 
be confined to the restricted classification of a physical thing and a debt. However, this 
classification is not tailor-made for intellectual property because intellectual property is 
neither a physical thing nor a personal debt. 
 
The law of things under the principle of separation in particular was designed for 
physical things. All the rules in the law of things were designed to deal with the 
movement of such a physical thing, with no intellectual property rights considered 
                                                 
176
 See [1996] Gaodeng Fayuan Shangyizi number 3316; [1996] Gaodeng Fayuan Shangsuzi number 
1012; and [2001] Gaodeng Fayuan Shang-geng er zi number 391(n 169). 
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during that original design.  
 
That is a problem for patents. Ostensibly, a patent seems to be closer to a physical thing 
than a personal debt. However, when it comes to total application, it cannot be delivered 
like a physical thing. Some characteristics of a patent puzzle scholars because the right 
to exclude others in patents is similar to the right to exclude others in owning a physical 
thing. The law of things looks more promising than the law of obligations. 
 
On the other hand, if patents are viewed as personal debts governed by the law of 
obligations, it looks less promising than being viewed as physical things because the 
personal debt relationship is a relative concept. By saying relative, it means the law of 
obligations deals with a one (person) to one (another person) relationship. A patentee’s 
right to exclude cannot be explained by this one to one relationship, because the right to 
exclude others empowers the owner to fight against many others instead of only one, 
with the law of obligations not able to explain the notion of many others. The law of 
obligations does not result in exclusivity either. Neither does the law of things totally 
apply to patents, nor can the law of obligations explain the exclusivity of patents; 
patents have no room neither in the law of things nor in the law of obligations. 
 
The patent is forced to be confined to the restricted classification of physical things or 
personal debts under the framework of the popular view. The major flaw in this popular 
view is that by directing the principle of separation to the patent transaction, it does not 
naturally answer what the nature of a patent is. Instead, it swings between the law of 
things and the law of obligations because neither was designed for it. The popular 
view’s stand point, as will be proved by this author later, is fundamentally erroneous. 
 
2.5 Placing the delivery requirement by registration: is it applicable or not? 
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2.5.1 What is the principle of registration? 
 
If there is difficulty in adopting the delivery requirement in a patent transaction as stated 
in 2.3.6, could we replace the delivery requirement with registration? 
 
Registration has a unique meaning in German law and also in legal systems adopting a 
German law structure, like Taiwanese Civil Codes.
177
 The title of real property (an 
immovable thing such as land or a house) shows who the owner of that real property is. 
Moreover, the register also creates absolute ownership for the title owner. In other 
words, by granting the title to the owner, it also means a creation of absolute ownership 
by the government. The registered title becomes reliable ground to the public, with any 
access or change of ownership being traceable. This whole concept is called 
‘Publizitätsprinzip’ (translated as the ‘principle of registration’ hereinafter) in 
German.
178
 For those who hold the title deed but fail to register on the public register, 
they cannot claim ownership over that property. The supremacy of the register is a 
significant characteristic of the principle of registration. Japanese scholars prefer to call 
this supremacy registration of land ownership ‘hassei-yoken’ [requisite for creation] 
instead of ‘taiko-yoken’ [requisite for opposition, like in France].179 Taiwanese Civil 
Code adopted this supremacy registration since 1905. 
 
                                                 
177
 For a detailed comparative study of registration of real property, see Zhu Po-song(朱柏松), Minshifa 
Wenti Yanjiu: Wuquanfa Lun(民事法問題研究：物權法論)=A Study of the Civil Law Issues: on the Law 
of Things (Angle 元照 2010) 18-27. Zhu Po-song compares the registration system in France, Germany, 
Australia, England and the United States of America.  
178
 Trevor Jones, The Oxford-Harrap Standard German-English Dictionary (Clarendon 1977) 88. 
‘Publizitätsprinzip’ according to the dictionary, it means (i) principle that entries in the Land Register, 
Commercial Register, etc., of interest to a third party should be available for scrutiny; (ii) principle that 
certain registers and entries are worthy of being recognised by law. 
179
 Suzuki Mitsuo, ‘Creation and Development of Modern Land Ownership under the Japanese Colonial 
Government of Taiwan: the Case of Aolan Plateau, Puli’ in Chen Chiu K and Hsu Hsueh-chi (eds), The 
Land Issues in Taiwan History: Symposium Series No1 (Taiwan History Field Research Office, Academia 
Sinica 1992) 289. The Japanese-English translation follows the same as Suzuki Mitsuo. 
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The principle of registration in Taiwanese Civil Code means that any creation or change 
to real rights must be recorded on the register so that the public know who the true 
owner is.
180
 To all Taiwanese jurists, the principle of registration is the underpinning of 
true ownership to the owner.
181
 The person recorded on the register is presumed to own 
the real rights legitimately, so any bona fide third party who trusts in the false 
recordation is protected by the law.
182
 If the holder fails to process the registration, any 
future assignment or disposition of this real property will be invalidated by the law.
183
 
 
It is theoretically possible to replace the delivery requirement by registration. If 
registration could possibly replace the delivery requirement, then the direct analogy of 
the rules in the law of things looks more promising than ever. However, registration for 
the real rights has an inherent supremacy notion; it represents absolute ownership of the 
title owner. In other words, the register, represented by the authority, creates absolute 
ownership for the owner. The inherent notion of this supremacy is the other side of the 
coin, namely ownership in the law of things. 
 
2.5.2 The court’s improper connection between the register for real property and 
the patent register 
 
The supremacy notion of the register represents the creation and existence of ownership. 
                                                 
180
 Article 758 of Taiwanese Civil Code says, ‘The acquirement, creation, loss and alternation of rights in 
rem of real property through the juridical act will not effect until the recordation has been made’. Article 
759 states, ‘A person, who has acquired rights in rem of real property by succession, compulsory 
execution, taking, a judgment of the court or other non juridical act before recordation, shall only dispose 
of such rights until recordation has been made’. [translation by Lawbank] 
181
 See Wang, Minfa Wuquan(民法物權)=The Law of Things in The Civil Code (n 43) 86, also Li (n 95) 
6 and Zhen (n 106) 28. 
182
 Section 1 of Article 759-1 states, ‘If a right in rem of real property has been recorded, the right-holder 
recorded in the register is presumed to own the rights legitimately’. Section 2 states, ‘If a bona fide third 
party in reliance of the real property recordation has recorded an alternation to the right in rem of real 
property pursuant to a juridical act, the validity of the alternation shall not be affected by the original false 
recordation of a right in rem’. [translation by Lawbank] 
183
 Li (n 95) 6. Also in Shieh, Minfa Wuquan Lun-shang(民法物權論-上)=On The Law of Things vol I 
(n 68) 58. 
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As the matter of fact, it is a principle only exists under immovable things. However, as 
stated above, the popular view believes that the rules in the law of things can be equally 
applied to intellectual property transactions. In order to fulfil its theory, the popular 
view further stretches this supremacy notion to any intellectual property with a register 
system, despite the fact that no law expressly states that the register for land is 
connected to the register system for intellectual property. 
 
The Civil High Court in Taiwan firstly connected the register for land to the trade mark 
register system.
184
 However, during the same year, the Civil Supreme Court did not 
make the same assertion in copyright cases.
185
 Unlike the Civil High Court, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that the registration of copyright is ‘merely management by 
the administrative office’.186 Apparently, justices have different opinions on this matter, 
and although the Civil High Court has no cases regarding patents, this void was fulfilled 
by the Judicial Yuan who connects the register for real property with the patent register. 
Judicial Yuan is a place where all justices unify their disagreements with a voting 
system. Concerning patent cases, they conclude that the principle of registration also 
applies to patents, with 21 judges out of 29 voting in favour.
187
 Henceforward, the 
principle of registration in land registration was officially recognised by the court as 
                                                 
184
 [1997] Gaodeng Fayuan Taishangzi number 2996 (高等法院台上字第 2996號)Lawbank (Civil High 
Court). The court said, ‘The transfer of a trade mark right should be registered to the authority, and the 
trade mark owner shall have no locus standi against any third party unless the transfer is recorded with the 
authority. The transfer of a movable thing is not required to be registered, therefore a trade mark right is 
apparently related to Article 758 and 759 of the Civil Code, and similar to the nature of land registration.’ 
[translation by this author] 
185
 [1997] Zuigao Fayuan Taishangzi number 1039 (n 164). The court said, ‘The registry for copyright is 
merely management by the administrative office, it does not have the legal effort to assume ownership.’ 
[translation by this author] 
186
 ibid. 
187
 [2009]Zhaihui Caichan Falu Zuotanhui Tian Ji Yantao Jieguo Minshi Susong Lei number 9(智慧財產
法律座談會提案及研討結果民事訴訟類第 9 號)The meeting minutes of the Intellectual Property Law 
Symposium Civil Judgment) Lawbank (Judicial Yuan) Judicial Yuan said, ‘Patent rights are intangible 
and have the nature of quasi-in-rem rights, so they cannot be delivered like movable things. For this 
reason, [patent registration] adopts the principle of registration from land registration, with the requisite 
for opposition. The meaning of opposition is, in a case when various rights conflict, inconsistency or the 
situation balance each other out, ‘registration’ is the basis of judging belongings.’ [translation by this 
author] 
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being equally applicable to patent cases, with this misconnection jointly made by the 
Civil High Court and the Judicial Yuan. Bizarrely, it is recognised by the court as being 
applicable to a patent and trade mark case but not to a copyright case, which further 
leads to another of inquiry concerning why Judicial Yuan tolerates such an 
inconsistency in the same area as intellectual property laws. 
 
2.5.3 The significant defect in the court’s opinion 
 
The court’s opinion however reverses the cause and effect. Although copyright does not 
have a register system, the existence of ownership of a copyright is unaffected by 
whether it has a register system or not. On the other hand, although patent rights and 
trade mark rights have a registration system, to register or not register does not 
influence the validity of a patent or trade mark rights transfer.
188
 There is no clear 
evidence showing that the register for real property has something to do with the 
intellectual property register, let alone the supremacy notion in land register having 
anything to do with the patent register. The court improperly linking the principle of 
registration with land registration and patent registration is particularly problematic. 
 
The courts opinion is attested wrongly from a different angle. The supremacy notion of 
the register represents the creation and existence of ownership. The ownership that this 
supremacy notion creates is perpetual ownership. To have a patent registered in the 
register means owning a patent perpetually, even though it is impossible to have a patent 
forever because it contradicts the current notion that we now have. The linkage between 
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 Article 59 of the Taiwanese Patent Act, ‘The assignment, trust or licensing made by the patentee of the 
patent right of an invention to another person to practice the invention, or the pledge created on the patent 
by the patentee shall not be asserted against any third party, unless it has been registered with the Patent 
Authority’. Article 35 of Taiwanese Trade Mark Act, ‘An assignment of trade mark right(s) shall be 
entered and recorded by the Registrar Office. An unrecorded entry shall have no locus standi against any 
third party’. [translation by Lawbank] 
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the creation of ownership and patent register system is apparently wrong. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
The crux of the paradoxical view held by academia and the court lies in the dilemma 
that a patent has a proprietary nature, whilst at the same time should be transferred by 
contractual rules without the civil law requirement of ownership transfer. Under the 
taxonomy of claims and things separation, patents are difficult to place either in the 
claims category or the things category. To classify patents in the things category based 
on a patents proprietary nature lures the problem of delivery/registration requirement 
being applicable in patent transfer activities. To classify patents in the claims category, 
based on the convenience of patent transfer, entices another question concerning not 
having proprietary rights transferred to the assignee. Being placed in either category 
creates an unexplainable part in the interpretation of laws.  
 
The things/claims classification works well on things when they are physical and 
tangible, but it is inappropriate for patents. This paradoxical view held by academia and 
the court demonstrates that it is a slippery slope when considering patents as physical 
things. This misconception originated from the insufficient definition of the word 
‘things’; nevertheless, this misconception dominates Taiwanese academia and the court 
at present. 
 
The intra-law explanation does not provide a satisfactory answer about a patent’s 
position in property taxonomy. In accord with Article 1 of Taiwanese Civil Code, this 
study moves onto a customary law discussion. However, before venturing into 
customary law, it is necessary to understand the formation of this misconception. The 
next chapter proves that there is an underlying theory, quasi-possession theory that 
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supports patents being viewed as civil law things. It was not created by a single incident; 
instead, it was a presentation of accumulated effects. The next chapter looks into the 
historical making of this paradoxical view, showing that it is not a unique phenomenon 
existing only in Taiwan but that the same problem also arises in Japan.
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This chapter answers the second question—what has happened in the past that has led 
jurists and judges to use principles arising from the law of things to explain the nature 
of a patent? As this chapter will present, it is an accumulation of a series of incidents 
occurring throughout recent history when both the civil code and the law of patent were 
reformed. Section 3.1 displays the fact that Taiwanese academia was significantly 
influenced by German and Japanese law before 1945. Section 3.2 presents that a 
structural flaw existed in Japanese law leads the Japanese academia to overcome it by 
adopting Joseph Kohler’s scholarship into law interpretation. Section 3.3 shows the 
same flaw existing in Taiwanese law, with the same approach adopted by Taiwanese 
academia. Section 3.5 concludes that Joseph Kohler’s scholarship created a 
misconception that the law of things is enough for a patent transaction, and Taiwanese 
academia follows this trend by accepting this assertion without further challenge. 
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3.1 The influence of Japanese law in Taiwan before 1945 
 
The first incident concerns the influence of German and Japanese law on Taiwanese 
academia. The tendency of using Japanese or German legal thinking in most legal 
interpretations is certainly a creation of history. This tendency can be traced back to 
Taiwan’s colonial past when it was ruled by Japan for 50 years (1895-1945). Japanese 
laws and German law had a significant influence on Taiwanese academia thereafter 
because the Japanese Civil Code in particular transplanted most of the structure from 
the German Civil Code. 
 
Taiwanese legal professions learnt European civil laws from Japanese law.
189
 Many 
translations and commentaries were imported to Taiwan during that time. During 
Japanese rule, Taiwan was a society different from Japan in both local custom and 
language, with Japanese Civil Code not completely fitting Taiwanese society. In order 
to rule Taiwan smoothly, the Japanese government allowed many Taiwanese local 
customs to survive alongside Japanese statutory laws, especially concerning family and 
succession institutions. Over the years, these traditional institutions were gradually 
dissolved and westernization took hold. In order to present the reform, it is necessary to 
begin with the formation of Japanese Civil Code and the Patent Act back in the 
nineteenth century.  
 
3.1.1 A brief history of Japanese Civil Code: from the French style to the German 
style 
 
The first European Civil Code that Japanese people translated was the 1804 French 
                                                 
189
 Wang Tay-sheng(王泰升), Taiwan Falushi Gailun(台灣法律史概論)=Concise Taiwanese Legal 
History (Angle 元照 2004) 119. 
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Civil Code. Right after the Meiji Restoration,
190
 Dajokan’s famous officer, Shimpei Eto, 
appointed Kuri Mitu to translate the 1804 French Civil Code into Japanese in 1869.
191
 
The French style of law was the first European Civil Code that Japanese people ever 
encountered.
192
 Later in 1873, after Mitu’s translation, the Japanese government hired a 
French scholar, Dr. Gustave Emile Boissonade (1825-1910), to help Japan draft its own 
Civil Code. From 1879 onwards, Boissonade made a great contribution to the 
codification work.
193
 He separated articles into five chapters, handling three chapters 
(general provisions, the law of things and the law of obligations) himself. He left 
Family law and Succession chapters to Japanese scholars, having considered that these 
two chapters were close to Japanese local customs and conventions.
194
 Dr. 
Boissonade’s version was honoured as the ‘Boissonade Civil Code’ and also named the 
‘Old Civil Code’ in the history of Japanese law. 
 
The Boissonade Civil Code was deeply influenced by the French Civil Code and Roman 
law. In the definition of ‘things’ in Article 2, patent rights and copyrights were 
identified as things.
195
 In accordance with the legal structure of the Boissonade Civil 
Code, patent rights and copyrights were classified as ‘movable things’ in Article 6, 
covered by the ownership claim in Article 30, and with the owner able to assert his/her 
right over infringers according to Article 36.
196
  
                                                 
190
 The modernisation of Japan began after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 when, in the name of 
modernisation, Japan transplanted legal principles en masse from European civil laws, with the exception 
of family and succession laws. The Dajokan political structure, which was learned from the western 
separation of powers, was first established during the Meiji Restoration. See Xu Jie-lin(許介鱗)and Yang 
Jin-chi(楊鈞池), Riben Zhengzhi Zhidu(日本政治制度)=Japanese Political System (San Min 2006) 6-7. 
191
 Qu (n 126) 361. 
192
 This translation was recognised as a pre-modern code in Japanese Civil Code history. ibid 366. 
193
 ibid 367. 
194
 ibid 366-367. 
195
 For more details of the analysis, see Tetsuo Tomita (富田徹男), ‘Zyunnbukkenn Toshiteno 
Titekisyoyuukenn: Kougyousyoyuukenn to Tyosakukenn Niokeru Sashitome Seikyuu no Rekishi (準物権
としての知的所有権－工業所有権と著作権における差止請求の歴史)=Intellectual Property Rights 
as Quasi-in-rem Right: A History of the Injunction of Industrial Property Rights and Copyright’ (1995) 86 
Social Science Review, Saitama University 95-126. 
196
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Unlike the German law style, the French-Roman law style had no rigid principle for 
separation and abstraction. No further explanation concerning the nature of a patent was 
considered to be necessary in the Boissonade Civil Code, with all kinds of new property 
types finding their own place in the French-Roman style of law. Due to the flexibility of 
the French-Roman style, patent transactions fit into the Boissonade Civil Code. 
Unfortunately, the Boissonade Civil Code has never truly been enacted in Japan.  
 
The Boissonade Civil Code was boycotted by Japanese scholars because of nationalism 
and ideological arguments.
 197
 Yatsuka Hozumi, Kenjiro Ume and Massakira Tomii 
redrafted the code so that it was more inclined towards the German style. It is said that, 
when the code was re-drafted in 1888, two foreign codes were included as its major 
references, namely, the 1804 French Civil Code and the first draft of the 1900 German 
Civil Code, coupled with some British common law principles as minor references.
198
 
It was substantiated by the legislator, Tomii, that this newly redrafted code (hereinafter 
the ‘Japanese Civil Code’) was mostly influenced by German law,199 whether in the 
structure or the wording of the code used.
200
 Since then, German legal thinking 
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 The promulgated articles of Boissonade Civil Code were provisions on property, the acquisition of 
property, security of obligations, evidence and personal matters. These articles were promulgated in April 
and October, 1890. However, although the announcement set a condition that all these articles should be 
enacted as from January 1893, the enactment was postponed by the Imperial Congress (Diet) until the end 
of 1896. Strictly speaking, the Boissonade Civil Code was not enacted by the Japanese government. An 
Investigation Committee was established in March 1893, comprising of Japanese scholars. This 
committee re-drafted the General Principles, the law of things, and the law of obligations in 1895 which 
were passed by the Imperial Congress and promulgated on the 28
 
April 1896. See JE Becker (n 55) at 
introduction v. 
198
 For a detailed analysis of the impact of these three foreign laws on the Japanese code, see Qu (n 126) 
392.  
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influenced more by the German Civil Code than the French Civil Code. ibid 392-393. Professor 
Masanobu Kato’s assertion is substantiated by the Japanese civil code legislator Masaakira Tomii, who 
stated: ‘The German Civil Code is the ‘most perfect code’ of all modern Civil Codes; therefore it is not to 
be doubted that Japan should take the German Code as its major reference during legislation’. See ibid 
393. 
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 For example, Article 85 of the Japanese Civil Code declares, ‘“Things” in the sense of this Code 
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gradually became the dominant trend in the Japanese and Taiwanese academia. 
 
3.1.2 A brief history of Japanese Patent Act 1885: patent law was meant to cling to 
the French style of Civil Code but the code was then changed to the German style 
 
The first Japanese Patent Act was enacted on April 18, 1885, and modelled on the 1877 
German Patent Act.
201
 When the Japanese Patent Act was drafted, Dr. Boissonade was 
drafting the French-Roman style Old Civil Code. The Japanese Patent Act was enacted 
before Boissonade Civil Code changed to the newly developed German style,
202
 with it 
being clear that the Japanese Patent Act currently in use is grounded in the French law 
style (Old Civil Code) but not the German law style (Japanese Civil Code now).
203
 As 
there is no principle of separation and abstraction in the Old Civil Code like the German 
law style has, patent transactions are treated the same as other types of transaction in 
this flexible structure. It makes sense for a patent transaction to use transactional rules 
out of movable things because none of the patent sellers or buyers suffered an extra risk 
from transactions in the Old Civil Code. However, it did become a problem when the 
Old Civil Code changed its style to the German law style, which will be discussed in 
detail later. 
 
For the reason that the Japanese Patent Act hooks onto the French law style, the 
legislators were confident to claim the patent represents a new type of property. The key 
                                                                                                                                               
refers to corporeal things’. This sentence is translated by William Joseph Sebald, The Civil Code of Japan 
(Butterworth & Co 1934) 21. The same as BGB § 90. Fritz Baur/Rolg Stürner and Chang Shuang-gen 
張双根(trans), Sachenrecht=Dekuo Wuquan Fa (德國物權法)=German Rights in Rem (Law Press China 
2006) 22.  
201
 April 18 has been Japanese National Innovation Day since 1877. The German Patent Law 
(Patentgesetz v.25.5.1877) was also a reference source of the Austrian Patent Law. The German Patent 
Law influenced at least two countries at that time, namely, Austria and Japan. Tawara Shizuo (俵静夫), 
Kougyou Shoyuuken Hou: Doitsu Kougyou Shoyuuken Hou (1)(工業所有權法：獨逸工業所有權法
(1))=Industrial Property Law: Germany Industrial Property Law (1) (Yuhikaku Publishing 有斐閣
1938) 5-7. 
202
 Qu (n 126) 369. 
203
 Tomita (n 195) para I(2)ff below. 
 85 
 
legislator, Korekiyo Takahashi (who later became the first comptroller of the Japan 
Patent Office), said in his posthumous manuscript that, 
 
[B]y means of the enactment of the Patents Act, a [new] type of property is 
created. Everyone needs to acquire the prior consent of the inventor to obtain 
his innovation. Otherwise, within a certain period of time, no one can 
manufacture or sell his innovation. This is the right owned by the first inventor, 
i.e., the patentee. Shouldn’t this liberal right enjoy the freedom to be pledged, 
mortgaged, and sold? For the above reason, a new type of property which this 
nation has never had before is created.
 204
 
 
Concerning the Old Civil Code, it is clear that the patent concerns a new type of 
property, but for the Old Civil Code later changed to the German style, the answer is 
trickier. The Japanese Civil Code adopted the German law definition of ‘things’, in 
which things were limited to physical things only,
205
 expressly excludes patents from 
the meaning of ‘things’. Henceforward, the code was split into the law of things and the 
law of obligations, which represents physical things and personal debt respectively. It 
becomes a problem for the patent transaction using transactional rules out of physical 
things because the code was not in the French style anymore and the newly developed 
German style of code offers no room for a patent at all. 
 
3.2 Japanese jurists’ efforts to bridge the gap using quasi-possession theory 
 
                                                 
204
 Korekiyo Takahashi, ‘Posthumous Works of Korekiyo Takahashi (6)’ (Industrial Property Training 
Institute Research Office Japan Patent Office, 2000)  <http://www.iip.or.jp/chizaishi/pdf/korekiyo4.pdf> 
accessed 8 June 2012 in p.3-4 [translation by the author] 
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 Many translations of Article 85 can be found. Gubbins translates ‘The term “things” in this Code 
signifies material things’. See John Harington Gubbins, The Civil Code of Japan: with the Japanese text 
(Maruya & Co 1897) 34. Sebald’s translation runs, ‘“Things” in the sense of this Code refers to corporeal 
things’. See Sebald (n 200) 21. 
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3.2.1 Before 1916: quasi-possession theory 
 
In order to find room for a patent in the code, the Japanese academia began to develop a 
doctrinal supplement based on quasi-possession theory. According to the 
quasi-possession theory, intellectual property rights can be equated with ‘rights over a 
thing’. By means of this equation, it is possible to dispose of patents like physical things. 
Scholars, such as Sakae Wagatsuma,
206
 Massakira Tomii
207
 and Kenjiroh Ume
208
 who 
published their work before 1916 all used this quasi-possession theory to bridge the gap 
between intellectual property law and the civil law but did not notice the fundamental 
difference between physical things and patents. The author will come back to this point 
in Chapter 4. 
 
Why is possession theory important in justifying property status for intellectual property? 
It has something to do with the legal science in civil law being different to common law.  
 
Civil laws are laws penetrated by Roman law. Roman law requires special reasons to 
justify the ‘granting’ of such protection. However, contrary to Roman law, English law 
requires special reasons for the ‘refusal’ of protection to possessors.209 This nuance 
generates a different attitude towards the justification of property status for patents: the 
law must specifically support a patent as a property in the possession section under a 
civil law structure. If the law has no such supports expressly, the void can be 
supplemented by a court decision or by common consensus by scholars. This is the 
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 Wagatsuma states that ‘Intangible property rights include copyrights, patents and trade marks which 
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reason why Japanese scholars began their arguments by explaining why a patent needs 
to be protected and started their justification of extending the meaning of possession in 
the laws by scholarship. With an expectation that one day it would influence court 
decisions,
210
 they wish their scholarly consensus to supplement the void in the code. 
 
3.2.2 After 1916: translating Joseph Kohler’s work and its influence 
 
There is still an unexplainable jural relationship between the patentee and the infringers 
that highlights that the quasi-possession hypothesis is not enough. In the legal science of 
the Japanese Civil Code, there were two ways that claims on infringers are laid: one is 
based on rei vindicatio (a claim that requires the illicit possessor to return the thing one 
possessed to the true owner) governed by the law of things, and the other is based on the 
law of delict. The provision to claim monetary compensation from infringers (based on 
the breach of duty of care) were in the law of delict, with the subjects that the law 
protected referring back to moral rights or rights in rem. Under the structure of Japanese 
law of things, ‘things’ refer to physical things. The patentee could not directly assert 
his/her claim based on the provisions provided in the Japanese Civil Code because an 
injunction arising from rei vindicatio was granted to the owner of a physical thing. 
Monetary compensation was either granted to the owner of a physical thing, or a 
debtor/creditor. The patent had to find a room to fit in.  
 
Japanese scholars searched for a solution. After Mao Konishi translated the work of the 
German scholar, Joseph Kohler, into Japanese in 1916,
211
 Japanese scholars found their 
answer. Kohler’s work was welcomed and fully discussed by Japanese scholars insofar 
                                                 
210
 According to Justice Yang, both Japan and Taiwan have a phenomenon where the scholarship of a 
reputable jurist can have a significant influence on court decisions. See Yang (n 69) 263. 
211
 Joseph Kohler and Mao Konishi(小西真雄)(trans), Tokyyohou Genron(特許法原論)=Patent Law 
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as his assertions shed some light on resolving the aforementioned dilemma.  
 
Kohler equated the ownership of patent rights with the ownership of physical things, 
since both of these rights had ‘exclusivity’, and infringing such rights was an invasion 
of the owner’s ‘absolute right’. 212  His work swept among Japanese scholars, 
particularly after the Patent Act was amended in 1921 (as Law No. 96).
213
 Kohler’s 
influence can be seen in many commentaries during that time, such as Ichiro Kiyose 
stating ‘the dominant saying among German scholars’, which referred to Joseph Kohler. 
The whole context reads, 
 
[T]oday, the dominant saying among German scholars is to view a patent as 
being an intangible property. I think that if we only provide protection to 
physical things in our society that will be too insufficient. Suppose we 
consider that a human being’s idea exists objectively outside the human body 
and between this human being and his idea, there are interests need to be 
protected like him and his physical things, these interests will be protected. As 
for patent rights, they exist objectively. Despite the fact that they are 
intangible, they benefit human beings. These rights deserve to be treated as 
rights.
214
 [translated by this author] 
 
Commentaries by Shouichi Iwara,
215
 Yumi Gaku
216
 and Hane Iizuka
217
 followed the 
same statement. Generally speaking, the trend to adopt the legal approach using the law 
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of things and German jurists’ doctrinal hypothesis as its explanation based on patent 
rights had already taken shape before the Second World War.  
 
This assertion was subsequently strengthened by young intellectuals, enchanted by the 
highly similar wording used in the Japanese Patent Act and in the Japanese Civil 
Code.
218
 Put simply, in the Japanese Patent Act, the patentee had the exclusive right to 
‘manufacture, use, sell and distribute’ his/her invention.219 While in the Japanese Civil 
Code, the owner had the right to ‘use, gain profit from, and dispose of’ the things he/she 
owned.
220
 This similarity provided a hope for patent rights transfers to be applied back 
to the Japanese Civil Code, where the Patent Act has no rules for it. Combined with the 
quasi-possession theory developed before 1916, the rules and principles in physical 
things seem as if they can be equally applied to patent transactions. 
 
3.2.3 An extension to licence after 1945 in Japan 
 
In the first half of the twentieth century, we see Japanese scholars trying to find a place 
for the patent in the law of things. They mainly focus on justifying the property nature 
of a patent by way of the ready-made rules they had at hand. It was not until the Second 
World War ended that scholars began to stretch their ideas further to licence. The reason 
for this late development is attributed to the 1921 Patent Act (and also its amendment in 
1929) that merged the concept of licensing and assignment together.
 221
 Licensing 
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activity was not prosperous before 1945.  
 
It was not until the Japanese Patent Act saw a significant amendment in 1959 (as Law 
No. 121) regarding patent licences that patent transactions caught the attention of 
academia. Nakayama stated, 
  
[W]hile the old Law (Law of 1921) had a system to transfer a patent right 
within limits (section 44 (1)), its legal nature was not quite clear, and the 
system was hardly used. Thus, under the current law, the system was revised 
from the form of transfer to the form of licence, having an exclusive nature. 
Since transfer with limitations under the old Law was often considered as 
being analogous to a usufructuary real right, it can be regarded as being almost 
identical to the system under the current law. 
222
 
 
Basically, most professors welcomed these ready-made rules being applied to patent 
transactions. Writers like Tetsu Tanabe and Harold Wegner’s even used Roman law 
terms to support the popular view without knowing that the term ‘rights in rem’ used by 
a common law writer is different from a civil law writer. They stated, 
 
[T]he senyo licence may be an exclusive licence for all of Japan, or the licence 
may be divided time-wise, geographically, or by field of use. Just as a piece of 
land may be split into two discrete units, so also may the in rem right of the 
patent be split in such a manner.
223
 
 
This study will come back to the differences between common law and civil law writers’ 
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 Nakayama (n 88) 32. [translation by the Institution of Intellectual Property] 
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 Tetsu Tanabe and Harold C Wegner, Japanese patent law (AIPPI Japan 1979), 199. They provide a 
detailed ideological clarification between a ‘senyo licence’ and an ‘exclusive licence’.  
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understanding of ‘rights in rem’ in 4.2.2. 
 
3.2.4 The Japanese court’s opinion—the same as Japanese academia 
 
The court also adopted the academia’s opinion. The Japanese Supreme Court sustained 
the Japanese High Court’s reasoning, whereby it analogised an exclusive licence to a 
surface right of land. In 2005, the Japanese Supreme Court stated,  
 
〔T〕he issue of this case is like a real property owner granting his surface 
right to others. The superficiary has the right to exclude intruders, generally 
speaking, and the owner’s in-rem rights (to the intruders) are not limited by 
the granting of the surface right.
224
  
 
The Japanese Supreme Court decided that a patent owner had a right to exclude others 
based on real rights, and this right was not exhausted when an exclusive licence was 
granted, just as surface rights were granted. This case became the precedent for 
subsequent decisions. Despite the real rights concept being particularly different from 
the property notion of a patent, as will be shown in 4.3.1, this misconception has 
unfortunately become a supplement to the void in Japanese Civil Code today. 
 
In sum, Japanese professors tried to find a place for the patent in the law of things. 
Before 1916, scholars developed quasi-possession theory to justify the property nature 
of a patent; after 1916, the scholars used Joseph Kohler’s scholarship to strengthen their 
theory. The ready-made principles in the law of things were then used for patent 
licences after 1945. The Japanese Supreme Court further consolidated this direct 
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analogy in 2005. 
 
3.3 Japanese scholarship starts to influence Taiwanese academia 
 
3.3.1 Before 1945: statutory laws came in and the practitioners’ legal backgrounds 
 
Taiwan was ruled by Japan for 50 years (1895-1945), with most judges and prosecutors 
coming from Japan. According to a 1943 record, out of 66 judges in Taiwan, only one 
in ten was Taiwanese, with none of the 33 prosecutors being Taiwanese.
225
 According 
to a 1945 record, there were 46 Taiwanese lawyers, with most of them educated in 
Japan.
226
 Japanese law and scholarship have deeply influenced Taiwanese legal 
practitioners since 1896. 
 
The 1899 Japanese Patent Act was directly enacted from Japan to Taiwan through the 
shixingcelin 施行敇令(No. 290) on 1 July, 1899.227 However, the law of things in 
Japanese Civil Code, especially the sections of immovable things, was enacted tardily 
after 1923.
 228
 Prior to 1923, civil cases regarding real estate were decided by 
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this author] In other words, the Japanese 1896 Civil Code would be applied to subject matter other than 
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Taiwanese customary law. No evidence shows the Taiwanese academia using Japanese 
quasi-possession theory to understand patents before 1945, nor is there any record that 
manifests that this theory equally influenced Taiwanese academia. Part of the reason is 
that patents owned by Taiwanese inventors were insignificant and did not catch 
academia’s attention for discussing whether it is better to use Taiwanese customary law 
to understand the property nature of a patent or not. Another part of the reason concerns 
Taiwan no longer being under Japanese rule when the 1921 Japanese Patent Act was 
significantly amended in 1959. The prosperous licensing activities happening in Japan 
after the Second Would War did not equally impact on the Taiwanese academia. 
 
3.3.2 Before 1945: understanding by the people of Taiwan 
 
Despite there being no evidence showing that the Taiwanese academia were influenced 
by Japanese scholars in the first half of twentieth century, there were still a small 
number of licensing activities that happened in Taiwan between 1929 and 1930.  
 
The first evidence is three licence contracts made in 1929 between two Japanese 
individuals who lived in Taiwan: Yoichi Hosono (細野又市) and Tousiro Maeda(前田
藤四郎).229 Yoichi Hosono owned a valuable charcoal manufacturing patent and 
transferred it to Tousiro Maeda, who permitted Mr. Maeda to use his invention within 7 
                                                                                                                                               
real estate from 1898. See ibid 169. In 1908, Lulin (律令)No.11 (substituted No. 8), maintained the same 
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Syousyo Genpon(特許發明實施權讓渡契約證書原本 3123 號)=Patent Right Transfer Agreement 
number 3123’ (22 July 1929)  
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different districts: Yamaguchi Prefecture, Shikoku and Okayama Prefecture in Japan, 3 
districts in Korea and one district in Taiwan.  
 
So far, there is no evidence showing that Taiwanese inventors licenced patents to 
Taiwanese people, but there is one case where a Japanese individual co-owned a patent 
with a Taiwanese citizen. Masatoshi Toyama (富山正敏) jointly owned his patent with 
Liang Xi-quan (梁溪泉). In their co-ownership contract, we see co-ownership through 
the sharing concept originating from the law of things being used in the patent.
230
 Even 
the Taiwanese patent agent used the word ‘lease’ to describe ‘licence’. The only 
surviving patent agent, Mr. Sun Jiang-huai (孫江淮 ), states in his memoir that 
‘Taiwanese people preferred to lease the designs to others rather than to assign to 
them’.231 Using loanwords and concepts arising from physical things to understand a 
new concept seems spontaneous, a phenomenon that even last until today.
232
  
 
3.3.3 Taiwanese Civil Code was influenced by Japanese scholarship: the same 
problem as Japan’s Civil Code 
 
Japan lost the Second World War and renounced its right, title and claim to Taiwan.
233
 
                                                 
230
 Patentee Masatoshi Toyama (富山正敏)transferred half of his patent rights to Taiwanese citizen, 
Liang Xi-quan (梁溪泉). Mr. Toyama also transferred half of his patent rights to another patent still in the 
application stage to Mr. Liang on 31 January, 1930. Transferee Liang paid 4000 Japanese Yen on the same 
day, and Mr. Toyama assented that he received the transfer fee as per the agreement. As per the 
registration requirement (for countering third parties) in the 1921 Patent Act (and its amendment in 1929), 
Article 45, Mr. Toyama agreed to file this transfer in the Imperial Patent Office on the same day as they 
signed the agreement. See Taiwan Colonial Court Archives, ‘Tokkyoken Mochibun Zyouto Keiyaku 
Syousyo Genpon(特許權持分讓渡契約證書原本 3077 號)=The Original Script of Patent Proprietary 
Rights Transfer Agreement number 3077’ (31 January 1930)  
<http://tccra.lib.ntu.edu.tw/tccra_develop/record.php?searchClass=all&id=tu104010012663> accessed 1 
September 2011. 
231
 Wang Tay-sheng (王泰升)and Lin Yu-ru(林玉茹), ‘Daishubi Shangrenfeng: Baisui Renrui Sun 
Jiang-huai Xiansheng Fangwen Jilu(代書筆、商人風：百歲人瑞孫江淮先生訪問紀錄)=Escrow Agent in 
Business: an oral history of Mr. Sun Jiang-huai in his age of 100’ in Lin Yu-ru (ed), Local and the World 
Oral History vol 4 (Yuan-liu 2008) 63. 
232
 See Liu Cheng-yu (劉承愚) and Lai Wen-zhi (賴文智), Jishu Shouquan Qiyue Rumen (技術授權契
約入門)= Understanding Technology Licensing (Zhi-sheng 智勝 2005) 15. 
233
 On 8 September, 1951, the Allied Powers signed the Treaty of Peace (the ‘San Francisco Peace 
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After the Second War World, the government of the Republic of China, who lost power 
in China, took over the rule vacated by the Japanese government in Taiwan. The current 
Taiwanese Civil Code, which has been in effect in Taiwan since October 25
th
 1946, was 
in fact first drafted in 1911 in China for the social and economic conditions there.  
 
When this Civil Code was drafted (it was Chinese Civil Code, but is now known as 
‘Taiwanese Civil Code’), it was heavily influenced by Japanese scholarship. The general 
principles, the law of obligations and the law of things were handled by Japanese 
scholar, Yashimasa Matsuka.
234
 Confirmed by scholar He Qin-hua, the first draft of the 
1911 Civil Code took the 1896 Japanese Civil Code as its major reference. Therefore, 
the overall structure of the first draft was close to the German law style.
235
 The second 
draft was not changed much.
236
 However, in the third amendment, because the 
legislators consulted German law, Swiss law and Japanese law when drafting, the code 
became a sui generis type of civil law structure, as stated in 2.2.3. 
 
In the third amendment (the 1929 Civil Code), the legislators did not make this sui 
generis type more harmonious, and instead the definition of the word ‘things’ was 
changed from limited physical things (Japanese law style), to a vague definition. To 
                                                                                                                                               
Treaty’) with Japan after Japan surrendered. In Chapter II, Article 2, section (b) of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, it states, ‘Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores’. See 
United Nations, Treaty Series: treaties and international agreements registered or filed and recorded with 
the secretariat of the United Nations (1952) number 1832, 45-164. 
As the treaty used the word ‘renounces’ not the word ‘recede’ or ‘return’, it became an unsettled dispute 
about Taiwan’s international status. 
234
 Huang Yuan-sheng(黃源盛), Minchu Falu Bianqian yu Caipan 1912-1928(民初法律變遷與裁判
1912-1928)=The Law Reform and Judiciary Decisions at the beginning of the 20th Century 1912-1928 
(Huang Yuan-sheng 2000) 373. 
235
 He Qin-hua (何勤華)and Li Xiu-qing(李秀清), Waigoufa yu Zhongguofa: 20 Shiji Zhongguo Yizhi 
Waiguofa Fansi (外國法與中國法：20世紀中國移植外國法反思)=Foreign Laws and Chinese Laws: a 
rethinking of a transplantation of foreign laws in the 20th century (China University of Political Science 
and Law 2003) 233-235. 
236
The second draft was modified based on the first draft during 1925-1926. See Li Xiandong(李顯冬), 
Chong Daqing Luli Dao Minkou Minfa Dian de Zhuanxing: Jianlun Zhongguo Gudai Guyou Minfa de 
Kaifangxing Tixi (從大清律例到民國民法典的轉型：兼論中國古代固有民法的開放性體系)=From 
Daqing code to Minkou Civil Code: on the flexibility of Chinese traditional civil laws (Chinese People's 
Public Security University Press 2003) 200. 
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make the word ‘thing’ vague did not solve the problem of there being no place for 
patents in the law. This problem continued and was not solved even when Taiwan 
changed the Japanese Civil Code to this 1929 Civil Code. 
 
Unlike the 1929 Civil Code being inclined towards the German and Japanese style, the 
Patent Act from China (known as the ‘Taiwanese Patent Act’) has less inclination to one 
specific jurisdiction. It was hurriedly drafted and took references from fourteen 
countries during the Second World War in China.
237
 The Chong Qing National 
government promulgated this Act on May 19
th
 1944 (the 1944 Patent Act), but it was 
never actually enacted in China.
238
 This Act, in turn, was enacted in Taiwan to replace 
the total repeal of Japanese laws and regulations on the 10
th
 of February
 
1947.
239
  
 
Like Japan, when both the 1929 Civil Code and 1944 Patent Act were enacted in Taiwan 
after 1947, there was no place for patents in the 1929 Civil Code. The following section 
will look into the development of Taiwanese scholarship after 1945.  
 
3.4 The reaction of Taiwanese academia to Japanese influences: Joseph Kohler’s 
influence and quasi-possession theory being imported into Taiwan 
 
Taiwanese patent law jurists are normally civil law lawyers who do not specialise in 
comparative law study. Therefore, without having knowledge about distinguishing the 
property concept of patents with a real right concept in the law of things, they welcome 
Joseph Kohler’s paradoxical statement in academia, and even stretched Kohler’s 
                                                 
237
 Qin (n 68)117. 
238
 National Government, Guominzhengfu Dangan:zhuanlifa gongbu (國民政府檔案:專利法公佈)= 
Promulgation of Patent Act (Academia Historica 1944) (Folio 001012640A006). 
239
 Taiwanese Administrative Offices, Taiwasheng Zingzheng Zhangguan Gongshu Daidianshiyou:wei 
qixian feizhi riben shidai falinXi fenbie xiuding huo feizhi (臺灣省行政長官公署代電事由：為期限廢止
日本時代法令希分別修訂或廢止)=Taiwan Administrative Offices: Repeal of all Japanese Laws (1947) 
Taiwasheng Zingzheng Zhangguan Gongshu Gongbao (臺灣省行政長官公署公報) Spring (34) 540. 
 97 
 
influence further. A good example is Taiwanese Patent law professor Yang Chong-sen, 
who states that,  
 
[A]rticle 19 (is now article 21) of the Patent Act says, ‘the term “invention” as 
used herein refers to any creation of technical concepts by utilizing the rules of 
nature’. This definition follows Joseph Kohler’s definition of invention.240  
 
Taiwanese scholars began to widely accept the Japanese quasi-possession theory at the 
second half of the twentieth century. A scholar, Zhen Yu-po,
241
 kicked off this 
hypothesis by claiming that copyrights have room in the law of things. Textbooks 
writers such as Yao Rui-guang
242
 and Xu Wen-chang
243
 make the same statement. Xu 
Wen-chang further extends this idea to trade marks.
244
  
 
The new generation took a more aggressive step. In 1964, textbook writer Hu 
Chang-qing began to classify copyrights, patent rights and trade marks as absolute 
rights.
245
 Shieh Zai-quan followed Hu Chang-qing, asserting that the concept of ‘things’ 
in Taiwanese Civil Code should be further extended to trade marks and patents.
246
 
Intellectual property law professor, Shieh Ming-yang, began to write commentaries 
using real rights protection to explain the nature of intellectual property.
247
 Furthermore, 
Rui Mu put copyrights and patent rights directly into the law of things, classifying these 
                                                 
240
 This passage is translated by the author. Original wordings see Yang (n 102) 51. In his footnote, he 
sites Joseph Kohler’s definition in German. 
241
 Zhen (n 106) 414. 
242
See Yao Rui-guang(姚瑞光), Minfa Wuquan Lun(民法物權論)=On The Law of Things (Dazhongguo 
1999) 428. 
243
See Xu Wen-chang(許文昌), Minfa Wuquan Gaiyao(民法物權概要)=Guidelines to The Law of 
Things (Wen Sheng 文笙 1995 reprint) 70. 
244
 ibid 70. 
245
 Hu Chang-qing(胡長清), Zhongguo Minfa Zonglun (中國民法總論)=The Civil Code of China (Da 
Xin 1964) 41, 43. 
246
 Shieh, Minfa Wuquan Lun-shang(民法物權論：上)=On The Law of Things vol I (n 68)25. 
247
 Shieh Ming-yan, Zhihui Caicanquan zhi Jichi Lilun (智慧財產權之基礎理論)=A Fundamental 
Theory of The Intellectual Property Law (National Taiwan University 1995) 20-23. 
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rights as rights with moral integrities.
248
 Tsai Ming-cheng equated the ‘belonging’ 
status of a thing to a person, with the ‘belonging’ status of patent rights to the 
patentee.
249
  
 
Taiwanese scholars began to overstate the ‘right to exclude’ in the law of patent as 
highly similar to having ownership of a thing. Professor Shieh Ming-yang further 
developed this equation in his commentary and textbook writing.
250
 Inconsistencies can 
be sometime found in the same writer’s work. Shieh objects to quasi-possession theory 
being applied to intellectual property law but agreed with the extending of this equation 
to licensing activities.
251
 No one can be sure whether there is a room for patents or not, 
but what they did do was using the ready-made rules from physical things to justify the 
property status of a patent. This popular view quickly swept the court and Taiwanese 
Intellectual Property Office, as shown in 2.3.3. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The misconception was triggered by a natural structural defect in the progress of 
transplanting too many laws from diverse resources. The academic community found 
flaws and tried to redress any voids by forming a common scholarly consensus using 
the quasi-possession theory. This hypothesis was selectively mirrored in Joseph 
Kohler’s scholarship, whereby Japanese and Taiwanese scholars could find their 
positions. This paradoxical view was further strengthened by court decisions. The patent 
                                                 
248
 Rui (n 68) 7. 
249
 Shieh, Zhihui Caicanquan zhi Jichi Lilun(智慧財產權之基礎理論)=A Fundamental Theory of The 
Intellectual Property Law ( n 247) 6. 
250
 As for Shieh Ming-yan’s commentary, see Shieh, ‘Cong Xiangguan Anli Tantao ZhihuiCaichanquan 
yu Minfa zhi Guanxi (從相關案例探討智慧財產權與民法之關係)=A Discussion on the Relationship of 
Intellectual Property Rights with the Civil Law through Relevant Cases’ (n 83) 209-214 Also in his 
textbook Shieh, Zhihui Caicanquan Fa (智慧財產權法)=Intellectual Property Law (n 68) 43-60. 
251
 Shieh, Zhihui Caicanquan Fa(智慧財產權法)=Intellectual Property Law (n 68) 274, 275. 
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seems to find its place in the law of things, ostensibly, the rules and principles arising 
from a physical thing transaction works equally well for a patent transaction. It only, 
however, exposes the slackness of Taiwanese academia and courts for favouring the use 
of ready-made rules rather than conducting a comparative study from scratch. 
 
The next chapter starts with a comparative study from historical perspective. The 
popular view will be challenged by showing that a patent cannot be easily placed in the 
structure of Taiwanese civil law like it is in the common law property concept. There is 
no room for a patent in such a rigid structure in the law of things. Patents need to find a 
place elsewhere, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
A HISTORY OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS AND THE DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEEN THE COMMON LAW ESTATE AND CIVIL LAW REAL 
RIGHTS 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Summary Page 
4.1 Franchises vis-à-vis the doctrine of estates and seisin 103 
4.2 Clarification of some paradoxical terms 130 
4.3The differences between English common law and Taiwanese 
statutory law 
143 
4.4 Conclusion 151 
 
The last chapter concerns the historical reasons why the rules in real rights are used for 
patents, as well as the neglectfulness of Taiwanese academia and the courts for using 
ready-made rules in the law of things to explain jural relations in a patent transaction. 
Following the hierarchy of interpretation in laws (intra-laws, customary law, and foreign 
jurisprudence) set forth in Article 1 of Taiwanese Civil Code, this research discussed 
intra-law explanations. Before moving onto to discuss Taiwanese customary law, 
English common law, as a foreign jurisprudence, will serve as the comparative basis for 
the discussion of Taiwanese customary law. This chapter thus sets out the goal of 
exploring the history and evolution of how patents have been categorised as property, 
whilst also aiming to answer the third question set out in Chapter 1—what are the 
substantial differences of real rights between English common law and Taiwanese civil 
law? This chapter begins by exploring the history of a patent in common law,
252
 and 
seeing how a patent, which was originally a franchise, evolved into a property law as we 
                                                 
252
 Common law of England in this thesis is refined to the common law of England and Wales, not 
including Scotland and Northern Ireland. Common law of America (if mentioned) in this thesis refers to 
the states where common law is implemented and does not include the state of Louisiana. 
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know it now. 
 
This chapter starts with franchises. Franchises were assimilated in land law by applying 
the doctrine of seisin and doctrines of estates to incorporeal hereditaments during 
medieval times.
253
 In the sixteenth century, choses of action extended from personal 
debt
254
 to real estate, and franchises were absorbed into extending choses of action by 
the late sixteenth century. Franchises were then merged into an even bigger property 
concept in the seventeenth century by English jurist Holdsworth.
255
 He extended the 
narrow concept of property from personal property
256
 to include land and tenements. 
Due to these extensions, patents were eventually classified as choses in action or even 
under the personal property category as we see it today.  
 
During the eighteenth century, natural law lawyers found Grotius and Pufendorf’s 
theory an awkward fit in the aforementioned scheme. By using John Locke’s labour 
appropriation theory, natural law lawyers explained that the nature of exclusive rights 
originated with occupancy.
257
 Henceforward, the philosophical stands justifying the 
property status of patents was established. This conjunction was then consolidated by 
Blackstone’s extension, 258  from things physical to copyrights in the theory of 
                                                 
253
 Keith Michael Lupton, ‘The Medieval Franchise and the Nature of Property in Letters Patent for 
Inventions and Copyright in Published Books’ (DPhil thesis, University of London 2001) 107 ‘We have 
seen already that franchises were assimilated to land in the thirteenth century by applying to franchises 
the doctrines of seisin and estates’. 
254
 ibid 248-249. The origin of a chose in action has always been a debt, but by the mid-sixteenth century, 
this concept expanded to include rights arising under real actions. 
255
 ibid 133. 
256
 In the fourteenth century, the word ‘property’ originally only referred to goods and personal property. 
ibid 120. ‘As the early Year Book cases of replevin and trespass de bonis asportatis suggest, the subject 
matter of property was nearly always goods or cattle’. In ibid 123. ‘In the common law, only goods and 
chattels personal were the subject of “absolute ownership”’. 
257
 ibid 199. 
258
 Holdsworth, A History of English Law vol VII (n 209) 480 ‘Acquisition by occupatio was extended by 
Blackstone to cover a case like copyright in which the acquirer has himself created a new incorporeal 
thing… Probably chief justice Vaughan’s view, that occupatio was only possible of corporeal objects, was 
in accordance with the Roman ideal for according to Roman law, occupatio, being founded on possessio, 
and only corporeal things being capable of possessio, it was corporeal things which could be thus 
acquired’. 
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possession. Roman law terminologies were widely adopted to explain the nature of a 
patent. Although the use of Roman terminology was not a modern fashion, it started 
with Bracton
259
 and was followed by many English writers,
260
 who often used Roman 
law ownership as a synonym for English fee simple.
261
 As this chapter will show, 
ownership cannot be completely juxtaposed with the notion of fee simple because 
fundamentally, there are still many nuances between these two.  
 
The above analysis offers a basis to answer the substantial differences of real rights in 
English common law and Taiwanese civil law. This chapter further makes a detailed 
comparison of real rights arising from ownership in Taiwanese civil law and the estate 
notion in common law. This chapter concludes that physical things in Taiwanese civil 
law cannot explain the property nature of a patent, because civil law ownership lacks 
two significant features. The first feature concerns Taiwanese civil law where the 
unitary notion restricts ownership from segmentation by different duration. Unlike an 
estate notion in English common law that can be divided by various durations, to own a 
patent under Taiwanese civil law means having it perpetually. To own a perpetual patent 
contradicts the current notion that we have now, therefore rights in rem under Taiwanese 
                                                 
259
 Henry de Bracton, Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England, vol 2 (Samuel E Thorne ed, 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1968) 122-123.‘There is also possession that has much of 
possession and much of right, as where in some things one has the mere right and the and the property, 
the fee and the free tenement with seisin’. And in F W Maitland, ‘The Mystery of Seisin’ (1886) 2 Law 
Quarterly Review 481,494. ‘…for even to negative franchises, such as the right to be quit of toll, does 
Bracton apply notion of seisin or possession’. 
260
 Example like Burn and Cartwright (n 11) 48 ‘English law, in analyzing the relation of the tenant to the 
land, has directed its attention not to ownership, but to possession, or, as it is called in the case of land, 
seisin’. And also Holdsworth in William Searle Holdsworth, A History of English Law vol III (3rd edn, 
Methuen & Co 1923) 88,89 said, ‘seisin means possession’. Noyes commented Blackstone for equating 
property as dominium. ‘When Blackstone defines property he seems to be thinking of dominium, calling it 
“that sole and despotic things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
universe.” Today this seems to us so extravagant as to be laughable’. See Noyes (n 42) 297. 
261
 ‘English land law has made no contribution to the legal theory of ownership more striking, more 
brilliant and of more permanent value than the separation of the land from the estate in the land…..What 
seems to be less appreciated is that this separation necessarily implies a penetrating analysis of the 
fundamental concept of ownership itself—of dominium and of the fee simple as the nearest equivalent to 
dominium in English land law’. A D Hargreaves, ‘Modern Real Property’ (1956) 19(1) MLR 14, 17. ‘Fee 
simple’ means ‘tenure of a heritable estate in land for ever and without restriction to any particular class 
of heirs; and estate so held; equivalent to freehold’. See Christopher Corèdon and Ann Williams, A 
Dictionary of Medieval Terms and Phrases (D S Brewer 2004) 121. 
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civil law cannot explain the property nature of a patent.  
 
The second feature is that Taiwanese civil law lacks the characteristics that common law 
has: everyone is free to use land in principle, with the law vesting the right to exclude 
with the owner(s). In shape contrast to the common law model, under the Taiwanese 
civil law legal structure, no one is free to use the land in the first place, with only the 
owner granted real rights to use the land. The prerequisite is precisely the converse. This 
nuance has a significant impact on the definition of what sorts of right patent owners 
have for their patents and that will be further addressed in Chapter 5.  
 
As the following passages will show, the key factor is a different technique of 
classification. Civil law classification begins with the ‘thing itself’ instead of the 
‘interests’ in things, whilst the common law classification starts with interests in things, 
with jural relations dealing with intangible objects. Therefore, civil law cannot explain 
the property nature of a patent because ‘ownership’ means to ‘perpetually own a thing’ 
and that contradicts the current notion we have now. Before venturing into a 
comparative study on the notion of estate and ownership, an overall understanding of 
how a patent becomes property is necessary. The following presents a brief history of 
how a patent becomes a property under the common law system.  
 
4.1 Franchises vis-à-vis the doctrine of estates and seisin 
 
4.1.1 What are franchises? 
 
The word ‘franchise’ was adapted from the French word fraunchise.262 In medieval 
                                                 
262
 Lupton (n 253) 12. Lupton cited from RE Latham, Revised Medieval Latin word-list from British and 
Irish sources (Published for the British Academy by Oxford U.P 1965) 275. 
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times it was spelled the same as the aforementioned French word
263
 and indicated 
valuable economic rights.
264
 According to Sir Henry Finch, a franchise is a royal 
privilege in the hands of a common person; the categories of franchises were almost 
infinite and diverse.
265
 By the end of the feudal period, it was customary to grant open 
letters, or a so-called letters patent, to ‘churches, bishops, public servants, eleemosynary 
institutions, and municipalities, as well as to explorers, artisans, manufacturers, and the 
like’.266 These letters patent could grant rights to a wreck at sea, treasure trove, toll, 
warren, market or fair.
267
  
 
In 1565, the first monopoly granted for industrial purposes was issued to a foreign 
craftsman.
268
 In 1766, Sir William Blackstone adopted Sir Henry Finch’s definition and 
reassured that a franchise was ‘a royal privilege or branch of the king’s prerogative, 
subsisting in the hands of a subject’.269 It is substantiated both Finch and Blackstone 
understood franchises in the wider sense, in that franchises were diverse and infinite.
270
 
Blackstone further grouped and classified franchises as the seventh species of 
incorporeal hereditament.
271
 This type of incorporeal hereditament was categorised 
                                                 
263
 Hans Kurath and Sherman M Kuhn, Middle English Dictionary (University of Michigan Press 1952) 
866. According to the definition in the dictionary, the word ‘fraunchise’ has the legal meaning of ‘a 
special right or privilege: (a) the right to land, property, rent, income, etc.; exemption from a tax, a service, 
etc.; jurisdiction over courts of law, etc.; (b) the right to buy or sell; also, the right to exclude others from 
buying or selling, a monopoly; (c) the privilege of living in a place; right of sanctuary; also, a place where 
criminals may not be arrested;(d) any of the privileges(e.g. that of electing a mayor) granted to a city or 
town; (e) a spiritual privilege or benefit; (f) day of ~, a day on which no legal action may be taken against 
a person, day of immunity’. 
264
 Lupton (n 253) 23. 
265
 ibid 13 cited from Henry Finch, Law; or A Discourse Thereof (London: printed for the Societie of 
Stationers 1627) bk2 ch14, 164-167, ‘a royall priviledge in the hands of a common person: so we call 
every subject; and is forfeited by misusing of it…The kinds of franchises are divers and almost infinite. 
Of such sort are the libertie of having a Court of ones owne… Also warrens… Markets, fayres, tolle of 
everie buyer for things he buyeth there, not being for his own expences…And whatsoever liberties and 
commodities else that (created by the kings special grant, or of their own nature belonging to him) are 
giver to common persons to have any manner of estate in’. 
266
 E Burke Inlow, The Patent Grant (Johns Hopkins Press 1950) 12. 
267
 Lupton (n 253) 12. Lupton cited from Bracton bk1 ch20 fol 30, and bk2 ch2 fol 85b. 
268
 Inlow (n 266) 18. 
269
 William Blackstone, Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England: Volume II (Wayne Morrison 
ed, first published 1765-1769 Cavendish Publishing 2001) 29 (original page no 37) 
270
 Lupton (n 253) 16. 
271
 Blackstone (n 269) 29 (original page no 37). Also in Lupton (n 253) 15. 
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under real estate rather than personal goods or chattels. How franchises were classified 
under incorporeal hereditaments and further listed under the category of estate will be 
presented in 4.1.3and 4.1.4. 
 
4.1.2 What is the doctrine of estates and seisin 
 
Simply speaking, the doctrine of estates is a land-holding mechanism
272
 that originated 
from an old English rule that a person cannot own ‘land per se’, but merely owns the 
‘estate in the land’ for a period of time. The word ‘estate’ under the doctrine of estates 
does not mean the land itself but refers to an interest that a tenant holds inside the 
land.
273
 The main classification of estates depends upon the quantification that 
‘depends upon their duration’;274 put simply, the estates were classified by time. 
Littleton describes that the word estate ‘comes into use by 1285 to describe the tenant’s 
interest in land and tenements’.275 In other words, from the thirteenth century onwards, 
an estate meant the duration that the land interest was hold.  
 
The distinguishing characteristic of the English doctrine of estates is the capacity for 
simultaneous coexistence of estates in the land.
 276
 Various interests might coexist on 
the same piece of land under the operation of the tenure system. In medieval society, 
‘feudal law and local customary law intermingled or coexisted with Roman law 
survivals and ecclesiastical law’.277 This feudal system was formed in the ninth and 
                                                 
272
 Clarke and Kohler (n 31) 213. 
273
 CT Onions and G W S Friedrichsen, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles: 
on historical principles (Clarendon 1973) 683 ‘The interest which any one has inlands, tenements, or 
other effects’. Also in Lupton cited 1573 Walsingham’s Case, ‘…the land itself is one thing, and the estate 
in the land is another thing, for an estate in the land is a time in the land, or land for a time, and there are 
diversities of estates, which are no more than diversities of time, for he who has a fee-simple in land has a 
time in the land without end’. See Lupton (n 253) 100. 
274
 Burn and Cartwright (n 11) 52. 
275
 Lupton cited from the Statute of Westminster II 1285 and 1292 Year Books. See Lupton (n 253) 98. 
276
 Holdsworth, A History of English Law vol VII (n 209) 468, 469. 
277
 Brian Z Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press 2004) 16. 
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tenth centuries. With little active markets or either land and labour, a social order came 
into being that revolved around a complex set of relationship tied to who owned or had 
rights over the land and who worked the land. The society was constituted by three 
difference classes: the nobility, clergy and serfs. The nobility and their vassals, or 
knights, possessed substantial land holdings that were divided up and allocated in 
various way. Through the practice of sub-infeudation, the vassals ‘further divided up the 
land among subordinate vassals, and so forth’. 278  A multi-layered network of 
relationship was created. At the pinnacle was the leading noble, with everyone linked in 
a descending hierarchy of obligations. The lower level provided services including 
manual labour or military service, or tributes including produce or monetary rent to 
their immediate superior in exchange for the use or control of the land. The lords 
distribute the land this way: some land (demesnes) the lords held themselves, with their 
own serfs doing the cultivation, with some others distributed to vassals in exchange for 
armed soldiers in times of need. The lord and the vassals had the responsibility of 
defending the serfs from outside attack, presiding over the resolution of disputes and 
providing for them during times of drought or calamity.
279
 
 
Following the decline of the old Roman Empire, the vacuum was filled by the creation 
of a feudal hierarchy. At the top of this hierarchy was the king, with the lowest level of 
this hierarchy being the serf; a peasant protected by the lord of the manor. The lord of 
the manor was protected by a higher overlord. Seeking protection, the lower lord 
provided money, food and labour to the overlord, whilst in return, the overlords granted 
the fief to their vassals.
280
 The higher provides the army, the middle provides the 
money and necessity, whilst the bottom serf and peasant tilled the land. 
                                                 
278
 ibid 16. 
279
 ibid. 
280
 E K Hunt, Property and Prophets: the evolution of economic institutions and ideologies (7th edn, M E 
Sharpe 2003) 5. 
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As Palmer summarises, 
 
〔T〕he initial situation was that of the “truly feudal world”, characterized by 
obligations, legal simplicity of title to land, discretion, and almost absolute 
seigniorial control. The truly feudal society knew nothing of property rights, only 
of mutual obligations. Land was held―not owned—in return for services. If the 
services were not performed, the tenants would be evicted: the land would 
escheat. If the tenant was threatened from outside, it was the lord’s obligation―
not the state’s—to maintain him. The tenant’s right was thus a right against an 
individual, not a property right good against the whole world. The tenant’s “title” 
to the land, if it can be called that, flowed only from the lord’s acceptance. That 
acceptance was shown by the lord taking the man’s homage and then seising him 
of the land. Thereafter they were strictly bound to each other; no normal outsider 
could break that bond. Since that bond was a relationship, however, there was 
always discretion in the initial determination of who would become the lord’s 
man.
 281
 
 
Therefore, the law of real property was formed by being based on multiple forms of 
ownership: there might be ‘a tenant in fee simple holding of the crown; there might be a 
copyhold
282
 tenant holding of such tenant in fee simple; and if the custom of the manor 
allowed, there might be a tenant for years holding of the copyhold tenant’.283 Even 
though such a tenant was not entitled to possession in the Roman law sense or seisin, 
                                                 
281
 Robert C Palmer, ‘Recent Books: the feudal framework of English law’ (1981) 79(4) Mich L Rev  
1130,1134-35. 
282
 ‘Copyhold’ here means those unfree tenures were protected by feudal court, originally held by 
common serfs, and the common form was known as the villeinage. For the transaction of this type of 
unfree tenure was recorded on the court rolls and the transferee was given a copy to prove his title, unfree 
tenures were also known as ‘copyhold’, in contrast with free tenures’ freehold who were protected by the 
royal courts. See Oakley (n 11) 25-26. 
283
 Holdsworth, A History of English Law vol VII (n 209) 468. 
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they could be regarded as the ‘owner’ of an actually existing interest, with the ‘estates’ 
that all these simultaneous co-existing owners owned only ‘deferred in point of time’.284 
Moreover, the doctrine of estates in feudal society knew ‘nothing of property right, only 
of mutual obligation’.285 The tenant’s right was a right against another individual, but 
not a property right against the world as we understand it now. 
 
The word ‘seisin’ used in the doctrine of seisin was a term representing being in 
possession of, like the above stated feudal tenant notion, and was originally associated 
with ‘the act of homage which clinched the lord’s acceptance of his man’.286 Pollock 
and Maitland cited by Holdsworth, stated ‘The man who is seised is the man who is 
sitting on land; when he was put on seisin he was set there and made to sit there’.287 
During the thirteenth century in England, ‘seisin’ and ‘possession’ were synonymous 
terms,
288
 and it was not until the mid-fifteenth century that the custom developed to 
separate these two apart. ‘Seisin’ was used in relation to land and ‘possession’ in 
relation to goods and chattels.
289
 However, it was impossible to physically possess 
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feudal society knew nothing of property right, only of mutual obligation. Land was held-not owned-in 
return for services…..The tenant’s right was thus a right against an individual, not a property right good 
against the whole world’. 
286
 John H Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2007) 229. 
Simpson cited Milsom’s explanation of ‘seisin’, as the noun, it ‘denotes a condition rather than an event, a 
relationship between person and land’. See AWB Simpson, A History of The Land Law (2nd edn, 
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writing his Tenures that the term “seisin” was appropriated to describe the possession of freehold estates 
in land, while the term “possession” was appropriated to chattels. This separation shows that the seisin of 
freehold estates in land, which was protected by the real actions, had come to differ from the possession 
of chattels, protected only by personal actions’. Also in Holdsworth, A History of English Law vol VII (n 
209) 465, 467. 
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incorporeal things such as a franchise, or transfer a franchise by livery like the mode of 
freehold land.  
 
To solve this dilemma, Bracton began to speak of ‘quasi-possession’ in the thirteenth 
century.
290
 For Bracton, when a franchise was granted, the granted franchise was at 
once quasi-possessed.
291
 The user will lose the franchises by non-use.
292
 As Maitland 
further states, Bracton did not seek to contrast the notion of seisin and possession.
293
 
Subsequent writers like Holdsworth linked seisin directly with possession,
294
 with the 
seisin of a franchise thus maintained by use through constant possession
295
 and lost by 
non-use resulting in non-possession. In other words, the owner enjoys temporary 
possession of his/her franchise when he/she uses it but loses that enjoyment to the 
public if he/she leaves it unused. 
 
The shaping of English seisin was closely related to the method of cultivation. In the 
past, the method of cultivation that prevailed over the greater part of England was 
known as ‘the common or open-field system’.296 All the land of a township was divided 
up into ‘two or three open and enclosed fields, which was cultivated in a certain rotation. 
Each of these fields was divided up into a number of strips. The average strip was often 
about the size of an acre’.297 Sir Holdsworth further described it as follows: 
                                                 
290
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297
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Attached to the holdings were certain common rights. (1) If there were three open 
fields, one, and sometimes two, remained fallow in each year. After the crop was 
cut, and while the field was fallow, the cattle of the villagers could pasture over 
the common field. In many places we get what are called Lammas meadows. 
They are meadows upon which hay is grown, which are divided into strips and 
subject to individual ownership while the hay crop is growing, but common to 
the township after the crop has been gathered in.
298
  
 
[W]e can trace its presence at all periods of our history almost up to the present 
day.
299
 
 
The land was common owned by villagers, with everyone free to use the land. The 
‘owner’ meant the person who ‘has the right to…keep all others off it, holds the land of 
the King either immediately or mediately’.300 When the crop growing season arrived, 
one of the stripes would be used to grow crops, with the owner of the stripe having the 
right to exclude other villagers from entering the field with the crop. Unlike the absolute, 
central all-embracing notion of ownership that only the owner exclusively enjoys all the 
rights and interests of this crop field, under this open-field system, meant that the owner 
was not granted authority with any positive rights. The owner merely had the negative 
right to ask the trespasser to leave the field. In other words, the field was seised
301
 for a 
certain period of time but not owned in an absolute sense.
302
 The whole mechanism 
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was built on an exclusionary norm. 
 
After the Norman Conquest (1066), tillers continued to follow those habits customary 
from generation to generation; they were gradually absorbed into the above stated 
feudal system.
303
 An overlord appeared and the basic unit of that society was called the 
manor. It was a new concept by imperceptible degrees that even ‘the humble tillers 
found themselves part of the manorial organization, no longer free owners, but instead 
subservient to an overlord’.304 The granting of benefices led to the creation of ‘great 
estates or manors vested in the grantees from the Crown’, 305  and therefore, 
topographically, a manor denoted a certain area of land ‘consisting of a number of 
houses, strips of arable and pasture land and waste lands, all of which were within the 
domain of the lord of the manor’. 306  Only one type has survived from feudal 
tenures—the freehold tenure. As far as estates are concerned, there are still two types 
that have survived: the fee simple estate (sometimes called the freehold estate) and the 
life estate.
307
 The freehold estate in the olden days can be further subcategorised into a 
fee simple (for as long as the tenant or any of his heir lives), a fee tail (for as long as the 
tenant or any of his descendants lives, which remained possible until 1996) and a life 
estate (for as long as the tenant lives).
308
 In fact, the modern expression of the word 
‘freehold’ (sometimes used to express the quality of the tenure and sometimes the 
quantity of the estate
309) originated from ‘free tenures’,310 in contrast with unfree tenure 
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like villeinage.
311
 All land, because of a dramatic simplification in tenure, is now held 
by freehold tenure.
312
 Because of this long history of tenure, a landowner today does 
not ‘own’ the land but ‘holds the land of the Crown by freehold tenure’ yet ‘does not 
have to make any payments or perform any services to the Crown’ anymore.313 
 
The character of English feudalism was that every person with an interest in land was a 
mere holder of it, and that the holder was a tenant but not an absolute owner.
314
 The 
doctrine of estates involves a recognition not simply that ‘the sum of possible 
interest—the fee simple—may be cut up into slices like a cake and distributed amongst 
a number of people by different durations, but that all of them will obtain present 
existing interests in the land, through their right to actual enjoyment’.315 English tenure 
somehow differed from its European counterpart. In England, this doctrine applied to 
‘every holder’, no matter who holds the land by military service or not, or whatever the 
nature of the duties that he had agreed to perform might be, 
316
 but on the European 
Continent, tenure applied ‘only to those who held lands in return for military 
services’.317 The doctrine of estates reached deeper into English society (England and 
Wales)
318
 than its European counterpart in this regard. 
 
4.1.3 Franchises and fee simple  
                                                 
311
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Substantiated by Lupton, of all of the thirteenth century granting of franchises, nearly 
all the franchises were granted in fee simple, with most of them granted in fee simple 
for life and a few granted in fee tail.
319
 The franchises were classified in incorporeal 
hereditaments,
320
 under the category of things real.
321
 The reason why franchises were 
so categorised will be further addressed in 4.1.4. By any means, franchises had been 
assimilated into land law from the thirteenth century and were ‘still treated as land in 
the eighteenth century’.322 Just as Lupton described, ‘the thirteenth century franchises 
had effectively become frozen in time as things real, and remained as medieval 
anachronisms, in much the same way that the concept of an estate in fee simple persists 
as a medieval anachronism in modern land law’.323  
 
Below (Figure 4-1) is a summary chart of the above stated categorisation, which is 
convenient to understand the following section that considers the connection between 
franchises and the doctrine of estate.  
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 ‘Of all the thirteenth century grants of franchises that I have seen, nearly all of the grants were made 
in fee simple to “A and his heirs”, and the rest were life estates’. See Lupton (n 253) 101. 
320
 Baker (n 286) 380. Also in Richard Preston, An Elementary Treatise on Estates: with preliminary 
observation of the quality of estates (J & W T Clarke 1820) 10,11. ‘An hereditament extends to 
everything corporeal and incorporeal, whether real, personal, or mixed, which may be taken in hereditary 
succession….In this sense, the term is understood to include all lands and tenements, and all personal 
duties (as an annuity, corrody, and personal privileges…) in which there is an estate of 
inheritance…Lands, in their own nature, are the subject of hereditary succession; but rents, and personal 
duties and privileges are of that description only, when, from the nature of the estate for which they are 
granted’. 
321
 Lupton (n 253) 111. ‘The classification of franchises as incorporeal hereditaments, and of incorporeal 
hereditaments as things real, has endured’. The basis of this connection is that ‘franchises were classified 
as incorporeal hereditaments’ in Coke’s Commentary upon Littleton, and incorporeal hereditaments were 
classified as things real in the works of Finch, Wood, and Blackstone’. A similar statement can be found 
in Simpson, A History of The Land Law (n 286) 106. ‘Bracton thought of all incorporeal rights as rights in 
the nature of servitudes…it is true that of the incorporeal hereditaments which the common law came to 
recognize in its developed form (listed by Blackstone as advowsons, tithes, commons, ways, office, 
dignities, franchises, corrodies, annuities, and rents) all are in some respects analogous to servitudes, 
whilst of course most of them are servitudes’. 
322
 Lupton (n 253) 111. 
323
 ibid 111-112. 
 114 
 
 
Reproduced from John H Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (4th edn Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2007) 246, and amended based on Richard Preston, An Elementary Treatise on Estates: 
with preliminary observation of the quality of estates (J & W T Clarke 1820) 7-19. 
 
4.1.4 The connection between franchises, patents for inventions and the doctrine of 
estates 
 
The linkage between franchises and patents for inventions was first found in English 
common law literature in the case Darcy v Allin, the Case of Monopolies, in 1602.
324
 
As mentioned in 4.1.1, the types of franchises were infinite, with the range of franchises 
covering franchises for a ‘treasure trove, waifs, strays, wreck of the sea, royal fish, the 
game franchises of chase and warren’325 to many others that had economic interests. 
Among all franchises, the letters patent for inventions has proved to be one of those 
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infinite types of franchises.
326
 This practice in granting monopolies by letters patent 
was ‘entirely consistent with what had been the practice in granting franchises since the 
eleventh century’.327 It is said the remnants of these feudal franchises were still known 
in common law until Blackstone’s time in the eighteenth century.328 
 
As stated in 4.1.3, throughout medieval times to the eighteenth century, despite 
franchises not being subject to tenure, franchises were categorised as real property. The 
reason why franchises were so categorised (under real, rather than personal property) 
has a close connection to rules of succession.
329
 From the thirteenth century onwards, 
the goods and chattels of the deceased were established to be vested by law in the 
executor, while land and tenements descended by law to the heir directly, without the 
interference of an executor. We have already seen that from the thirteenth century 
onwards, franchises were assimilated as land, and granting franchises under fee simple 
or for life being used. Bracton stated, ‘there is another causa for acquiring dominion 
called succession, which entitles every heir to everything of which his ancestors die 
seised as of fee’.330 Franchises fit in what Bracton described as ‘those things of which a 
man could die seised as of fee’, and thus franchises descended to the heir without an 
executor or administrator until 1897 when this descent of real estate directly to the heir 
was abolished.
331
 The way franchises descend to the heirs strengthened their position 
on the real estate side. 
 
Another reason why franchises were treated as things real rather than personal goods or 
                                                 
326
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chattels, was that the estate in land was sustainable, whereas the goods and chattels ‘can 
be destroyed, consumed or can perish’.332 The Statute of Monopolies enacted in 1624 
maintained this old practice and did not create any new statutory rights for a patent but 
merely restricted the patent term to fourteen years.
333
 If we understand franchises from 
their historical roots that they had always been associated with seisin closely, it is not 
difficult to understand why the patent term was limit to a fix term, with modern writers 
constantly using real property as metaphors. 
 
4.1.5 An extension of choses in action in the sixteenth century 
 
The previous paragraph discussed franchises being classified as real property during 
medieval times, but today we see patents are often categorised either under personal 
property,
334
 or as choses in action
335
 in commentaries. This classification of patents as 
choses in action was ‘in fact, only a development of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries’.336 Before that, it was a slow process of expansion of choses in 
action, from a purely personal action, to a real right action. Simply speaking, franchises, 
which were originally on the real property side, were then absorbed into this newly 
enlarged category because of the extension of personal property from the other side. 
 
During medieval times, the division of actions into real and personal property was 
fundamentally clear.
337
 The rights that fell within the sphere of one class of actions 
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would be treated somewhat differently from the rights that fell into another category. 
Originally, chose in action ‘was applied to a right to bring a personal action’.338 
According to Holdsworth cited in the Book of Assizes and Year Books,
339
 the phrase 
‘chose in action’ is used mainly ‘in connection with rights arising under some one of the 
personal actions, such as debt, detinue, or trespass’.340 It was not until the sixteenth 
century that a chose in action was extended to cover rights arising from real actions.
341
 
Before that, not much had changed and this phrase was regarded as ‘primarily 
connected with the personal actions’.342 It was intended to concern a relationship 
between two individuals. 
 
The ‘choses in action’ category, according to Holdsworth, reaches ‘enormously wide’ in 
the sixteenth century.
343
 It is a known legal expression used to describe ‘all personal 
rights of property which can only be claimed or enforced by action, and not by taking 
physical possession’.344 A chose in action is basically a legal action filed by a person 
against another person, with the compliant implying ‘a corresponding duty in another to 
perform an agreement or to make reparation for a tort’.345 A chose in action ‘always 
presupposes a personal relation between two individuals’346 and includes all rights 
‘which are enforceable by action—rights to debts of all kinds, and rights of action on a 
contract or a right to damages for its breach… and rights to recover the ownership or 
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possession of property real or personal’.347 Hence, as Holdsworth noted, ‘it was not 
difficult to include in this category things which were even more obviously property of 
an incorporeal type, such as patent rights and copyrights’.348 In other words, for those 
rights which can only be claimed by action, filed by the complainant against another 
person, they are all covered by the wide ranging chose in action concept.  
 
Choses in action had such wide coverage due to the tendency of treating any intangible 
right as a chose in action if this right did not clearly belong to incorporeal 
hereditaments.
349
 Patents for inventions, which were new to old franchises such as 
treasure troves, were naturally drawn into the chose in action category by this trend. If 
patents for inventions ‘had arisen at an earlier stage in the history of the law they would 
have been regarded as franchises, and therefore as incorporeal hereditaments’.350 There 
was no doubt that patents for inventions were not precisely one of those old incorporeal 
hereditaments, like advowsons where the grantee could hold a lordship paramount,
351
 
patents for inventions, however, still keep the real right characteristics in their substance 
that make them closer to franchises rather than chose in action. 
352
  
 
It was an awkward fit to put invention patents into the chose in action concept because 
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during medieval times, the protection of seisin, like a writ of right, had always been 
asserted by a person against another person, as was a chose in action. Exercising the 
right was not an exercise of a ‘right in rem’ in the civil law sense, but rather a ‘right in 
personam’ in the Roman law sense. It was a remarkable two way movement: on one 
side, choses in action extended to real estate,
 353
 while and on the other, franchises 
extended to monopolies for industrial purposes. The watershed for real and personal 
property during medieval times began to blur from the sixteenth century onwards.  
 
Franchises changing from the real property category to choses in action are particularly 
important to a comparative law lawyer because without understanding the history, as 
stated above, a civil law lawyer can make a mistake by grasping the literal meaning of 
choses in action and further understand it as an action in relation to movable things in 
the civil law sense.
354
 Many scholars have made this mistake.
355
 As a matter of fact, 
franchises and patents remain, sharing many similar characteristics with estates; 
however, they are dissimilar to personal goods. Another confusing category is ‘property’. 
The following section concerns the development of property and patents after choses in 
action, which will also be helpful for a comparative lawyer to understand how a patent 
                                                 
353
 ‘Here I wish to point out another of its effects—its contribution to the making of a common-law 
conception of a chose in action. It seems to me that it was the influence of this idea which led to the 
extension of the conception of a chose in action to cover rights to being not only personal but real actions, 
and therefore to include in this conception not only rights which depended on a contractual or delictual 
obligation, but also rights which depended upon a claim to the ownership of property’. See ibid 1009. 
354
 An example: like Matthew Fisher said, ‘As already noted, it is now universally accepted that the 
patent right, as other categories of intangible rights falling under the umbrella of intellectual property 
creates a form of personal property’. That personal property claim could be misunderstood as movable 
things in the eye of civil law lawyers. See Matthew Fisher, Fundamentals of Patent Law: Interpretation 
and Scope of Protection (Hart 2007) 64. 
355
 A typical example is Professor Zheng classifying patents as intangible movables, by stating the reason 
that ‘the common law jurisdiction normally named intangible movables as being “Choses in Action”’. See 
Zheng Chengsi(鄭成思), Zhishi Chanquan Lun(知識產權論)=On Intellectual Property (3rd edn, Law 
Press 2003) 32-33. A similar statement is found in Wu Hangdong(吳漢東)and Hu Kaizong(胡開忠), 
Wuxing Caichanquan Yanjiu(無形財產權研究)=A Study on Intangible Property Rights (Law Press 2005) 
19-20, 38. Professor Wu and Hu suggest that in considering that common law jurisdiction classifies 
patents as intangible personal property, an intellectual property should be understood in a broader sense of 
things. They state, ‘Apparently, intellectual property and intangible property are law created intellectual 
products, the same as [civil law] rights in rem, with ownership being absolute and exclusive.’ [translation 
by this author] 
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becomes property. 
 
4.1.6 A further extension of the word ‘property’ in the seventeenth century 
 
The definition of ‘property’ emerged very late in English legal history. The first 
appearance was in Rastell’s 1624 edition, renamed Les termes de la ley: or Certaine 
Diffucult and Obscure Words and Terms of the Common Laws of this Realme Newly 
Printed,
356
 which provided a definition for ‘propertie’ as ‘the highest right that a man 
hath or can have to any thing, which no way dependeth upon another mans courtesie’.357 
Sir Henry Finch only divided possessions into estates and chattels, saying nothing about 
property in an absolute sense in his book Law published in 1613.
358
 Law professor 
William Welwood at that time even avoided defining property.
359
 William Noy, a 
leading critic of the court in the 1620s, applied the word ‘property’ only to movable 
things.
360
 David Seipp points out that the word ‘property’ referred to ‘interests in 
domestic animals and goods and on a few occasions to interests in less tangible entities 
assimilated to those paradigm categories’ prior to the seventeenth century.361 People did 
not say ‘this is my property’ as we use it now, and instead said ‘I have property in it’ 
during medieval times.
362
 Although English lawyers made increasingly frequent use of 
                                                 
356
 G E Aylmer, ‘The Meaning and Definition of "Property" in Seventeenth-Century England’ (1980) 
86(1) Past and Present 87 at 90. 
357
 ibid 90. 
358
 ibid 91. ‘Sir Henry Finch’s Law (1627), first published in French in 1613, defines “possessions” much 
as Rastell had already done, as being divided into “Estates” (or, in modern terminology, real estate) and 
“Chattels” (more or less corresponding to movables); but there is nothing about property, or—in our 
sense—absolute individual ownership’. Aylmer cited from Finch (n 265) bk2 chs 2-3, 15. 
359
 Aylmer (n 356) 91. 
360
 ibid 92. 
361
 See David J Seipp, ‘The Concept of Property in the Early Common Law’ (1994) 12(1) Law & Hist 
Rev 29 at 33. Also in Lupton (n 253) 118 and Baker (n 286) 389. 
362
 Seipp (n 361) 33. Seipp said, ‘When lawyers did speak of “property” in the Year Books-and in the 
first hundred years of these reports the term was genuinely scare-“property” referred to interests in 
domestic animals and goods and on a few occasions to interests in less tangible entities assimilated to 
those paradigm categories. One did not say “this is my property,” as we use the terms now. Rather, one 
said “I have property in it” or “the property of it is to (or with) me.” Property was thus a characteristic or 
attribute (or “property” of a cow or a jewel or a sum of money, not a shorthand referent to the thing 
itself’. 
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the term ‘property’ in the fifteenth century, they still referred to this word as personal 
goods and animals only, and not to land.
363
 Therefore, whether the absolute concept of 
ownership of the word ‘property’ had fully extended to land and widely accepted by 
seventeenth century English lawyers remains disputed.
364
 Holdsworth supported that 
English law had been infiltrated by the absolute ownership concept that emerged in real 
property litigation, such as actions of trover and ejectment, whereas the parties in 
dispute were not only restricted to proving who had a better right, but also, when there 
was a third party who had an even better right, the defendant was open to attack the 
plaintiff’s claim.365 However, this assertion was challenged by Reeve. By stating the 
defendant could plead jus tertii the plaintiff might be required to show that his title was 
stronger than that person other than the defendant himself, does not mean that the court 
has established an absolute concept of ownership for the defendant.
366
 This author 
agrees with Reeve. 
 
Aylmer, on the other hand, states that the word ‘property’ appears earliest in John 
Cowell’s law dictionary, The Interpreter, published in 1607, which initiated the ‘highest 
right’ to the concept of property.367 How many authors then cited and made use of his 
definition, leading to it becoming a standard term from the 1650s onwards remains a 
mystery. ‘If he (note: refers to John Cowell) is correctly portrayed here as the originator 
of the definition of absolute individual ownership, then his Roman-law training made 
him in a curious way a bourgeois Whig before his time, as well as a would-be absolutist 
                                                 
363
 ibid 33. 
364
 The support opinion see Aylmer (n 356) 88-89, the opposition see Andrew Reeve, ‘Debate: the 
meaning and definition of "property" in seventeenth-century England’ (1980) 89(1) Past and Present 139. 
365
 Reeve (n 364) at 139. 
366
 ibid 140. 
367
 Aylmer (n 356) 88-89. ‘… the earliest explicit definition seems to be that given in John Cowell’s law 
dictionary, The Interpreter (first edition, 1607). Cowell had already published a treatise in Latin on the 
relationship between English law and Roman or civil law, in which he discussed the nature of dominium’. 
And he goes on, ‘our concern here is with what happened to Cowell’s definition of property. This read as 
follows: Propertie signifieth the highest right that a man hath or can have to any thing; which is in no way 
depending upon any other means courtesie’. 
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out of his time’.368 Hence, who was the first author to define ‘property’ as an absolute 
or highest right remains an issue of intriguing speculation, even though one thing is 
clear, that the phenomenon of property being extended from goods to real estate 
emerged in the seventeenth century.  
 
Lupton substantiated that licenced stationers began to speak of ‘property’ in the 
mid-seventeenth century. In the past, the stationers only thought of ‘privilege’, but for 
this new trend, they began to speak of property for their patent grants. Comparing the 
Stationers’ petition of 1586 with the 1643 petition, the former shows no sign of linking 
privilege with property, while in the seventeenth century the word ‘property’ emerged in 
the 1643 petition in an absolute sense.
369
 It is apparently influenced by the enlargement 
phenomena where not only can personal goods and estates be owned in an absolute 
sense but the intangible things such as patents and copyrights can also be owned in an 
absolute sense.  
 
Henceforward, patents started being treated as property in an absolute sense. However, 
this ‘absolute sense’ has been equated with a right to exclude for a long time and is 
distinct from the civil law meaning of ‘right to exclude’ under Taiwanese civil law. 
Many jurists have made this mistake.
370
 This issue will be returned to in 4.3.1. 
 
                                                 
368
 ibid 97. 
369
 In the 1586 petition, the stationers regarded themselves as the recipients of privileges rather than as 
the owners of intangible property. However, when it comes to the Stationers’ petition to Parliament in 
April 1643, entitled The Humble Remonstrance of the Company of Stationers, London, the stationers 
began to argue that grants were their property. See Lupton (n 253) 173, 179, 180. 
370
 Examples include Taipei Civil District Court stating, ‘Section 1 of Article 56 of the Patent Act…is the 
same with Article 765 of the Civil Code, and regulates the scope of ownership. The legislative purpose of 
these two laws is to create, to set the boundaries of ownership and the scope of patent rights.’ See [2007] 
Difang Fayuan Zhizi number 28 (地方法院智字第 28號). Jurists like Rui Mu (芮沐) see intellectual 
property rights as absolute rights, like real rights. See Rui(n 68)7-8. Also in Wu and Hu (n 355) 38. 
‘Apparently, intellectual property and intangible property are law created intellectual products, just the 
same as [civil law] rights in rem, with ownership being absolute and exclusive.’ [translation by this 
author] 
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4.1.7 An extension of Roman law possession to intangible property in the 
eighteenth century 
 
A further extension was made by the paradoxical use of applying Roman law 
terminologies to copyright in the eighteenth century. Using Roman law terminologies to 
express the common law concept was not a modern appearance in English legal history. 
It can be traced back to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries when the legal renaissance 
of the Roman law arrived in England.
371
  
 
In fact, Roman law was never completely acclimatised into common law. Between 1290 
and 1490, the written language of the professional advocates in England was 
Anglo-Norman French,
372
 with many Roman terms thus captured during this period of 
time.
 373
 However, some common law concepts were simply unable to fit well into 
Roman law vocabulary. An example, like the Roman term dominium, expresses the 
nuance of the original Roman meaning and the translation of that in the common law 
scheme. English writers like William Blackstone
374
 and Hargreaves
375
 favoured the 
                                                 
371
 See Holdsworth, A History of English Law vol VII (n 209) 510. On page 510, ‘The Roman conception 
of ownership, as an abstract right, was made familiar to English lawyers by the legal renaissance of the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries; and though, as we have seen, that conception has never been completely 
acclimatized in the common law, yet the common law has acquired a conception of ownership which is 
different from that better right to possess which as the dominant theory in the Middle Ages’. Maitland, 
however, has a different opinion about the Roman ownership concept that arrived in England. Maitland 
cites Dr. Murray and says the word ‘ownership’ is not known to have occurred before 1583 in England, 
with the earliest known use of the word ‘owner’ being in 1340. See Pollock and Maitland, The History of 
English Law Before the Time of Edward I (n 300) 153 note 1. However, the usage of possession is very 
ancient. As Maitland points out, the usage of possessions runs through the middle ages. Concerning 
property, Maitland and Pollock believed that until the eighteenth century it was ‘far less frequent than 
would be supposed by those who have not looked for it in the statute book’. Instead of the word property, 
Englishmen used possessions and estate more often.  
372
 Seipp (n 361) 33. 
373
 Tamanaha (n 277) 18. The rediscovery of Aristotle’s work and Justinian Code, coincided with a 
substantial rise in the number of educated men and the beginnings of Oxford and Cambridge Universities, 
when Roman terms begins to adopted in the common law concept by English lawyers. 
374
 An example, such as Noyes, commented on Blackstone for equating property as dominium. ‘When 
Blackstone defines property he seems to be thinking of dominium, for he calls it “that sole and despotic 
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.” Today this 
seems to us so extravagant as to be laughable’. See Noyes (n 42) 297.  
375
 ‘English land law has made no contribution to the legal theory of ownership more striking, more 
brilliant and of more permanent value than the separation of the land from the estate in the land…..What 
seems to be less appreciated is that this separation necessarily implies a penetrating analysis of the 
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equivalent modern concept of ‘ownership’ to the ancient concept of ‘fee simple’ when 
using the Roman term dominium in context. It was however an anachronism to use 
ownership to explain fee simple because civil law ownership is attached to physical 
things, while common law fee simple is attached to something intangible like an ‘estate’ 
that is basically a leasehold. Leasehold, however, in the civil law concept, is a personal 
commitment but not a real right. Under the civil law scheme, a freehold to a personal 
commitment is far from a physical owning of a ‘physical thing’ because the fee simple 
owner cannot claim rei vindicatio (a claim that requires the illicit possessor to return the 
thing one possessed by the true owner) like any other civilian owner. Therefore, to 
equate civil law ownership to fee simple is an inappropriate representation. As shown 
by Maitland, the use of the word ‘ownership’ came fairly late into English history when 
compared to the term ‘fee simple’. The first recorded instance of the word ‘ownership’ 
in medieval England was in 1583.
376
 Before this time, there is no record of referring to 
fee simple in relation to the ownership concept as we know it now. 
 
There is no supporting literature that medieval people used ownership and fee simple 
interchangeably. However, today, it is commonly seen in modern literature because 
English writers craved for similarity between these two concepts by overstating the 
function and superordinate norm of dominium. The word and function of dominium, as 
Ankun points out, was wrongfully overstated by many English writers as a specialized 
term from the Romans.
377
 In his opinion, ‘Roman law certainly did not inhere in 
                                                                                                                                               
fundamental concept of ownership itself—of dominium and of the fee simple as the nearest equivalent to 
dominium in English land law’. Hargreaves (n 261) 17. 
376
 See Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I (n 300) 153 note 1. 
‘As to the words owner and ownership: –Dr Murray has kindly informed us that the earliest known 
example of the former occurs in 1340’. They continues, ‘The verb to own, can be traced much further 
back and, says Dr Murray, “there is no etymological reason why owner, should not have been formed 
from it and used in Old English, but no examples appear to be known.” After 1340, it is increasingly 
common.’ And then they continues citing Murray and say, ‘Of ownership, which might, etymologically, 
have been formed so soon as owner existed, had there been a want felt for it (since –ship has been a living 
movable suffix for a thousand years or more), we have no instance before 1583’. Also in J W Cecil Turner, 
‘Some Reflections on Ownership in English Law’ (1941) 19 Can Bar Rev 342,344.  
377
 ‘Scholars, in particular British Romanists, seem to have overrated the significance of the words 
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them’.378 Dominium was used to refer to situations where a possessor’s contemporary 
title became a full title because of the lapse of a certain period of time in possession.
379
 
It is distinct from the modern meaning of unitary ownership in civil law and certainly 
cannot be equated with the medieval concept of ‘fee simple’ in English law. Dominium 
is however, widely used and cited by English writers in many textbooks and 
commentaries, like Blackstone using Roman law terminology that defined ‘ownership’ 
as ‘that sole and despotic dominium which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
universe’.380Another example is the Roman term ‘possessio’ (possession in English). 
How English lawyers view it is different from the Romans, which can be seen in an 
example like the bailee-bailor relationship. Strictly speaking, a bailee was not a 
possessor in Roman law. However, in English law, a bailee is a possessor and 
sometimes the owner of the property.
381
 Many aspects demonstrate that English law 
persisted more with in its native traditions, rather than being penetrated by Roman 
law,
382
 even though practitioners in medieval England were Anglo-Norman French. 
                                                                                                                                               
dominus and dominium as specialized term of the ius civile….It should be remembered that both words, 
and in particular dominium, developed as legal terms for ownership at a time at which the division 
between a praetorian and a civil ownership had already begun’. See Ankum and Pool (n 37) 37. 
378
 ibid. According to Pollock’s note on Maine, Blackstone did not understand the meaning of occupation 
but intended to impose it on his readers by playing with verbal ambiguity. See Maine (n 35) 324. 
‘Blackstone’s account of the origin of property is loose enough to deserve nearly all of Maine’s criticism. 
He wholly fails to distinguish between physical control or “detention”, possession in law, and 
ownership…Blackstone either did not understand the technical meaning of Occupation or intended to 
impose on his reader by playing with a verbal ambiguity. The word occupare is, after all, not purely 
technical in Latin; it certainly has no technical meaning in the passage of Cicero which Blackstone 
quotes’.  
379
 Ankum and Pool (n 37) 37. ‘We should not be surprised to find dominus and dominium used by Gaius 
(and by later jurists) to refer to bonitary ownership’. In the same page, in note 182, ‘dominus…embraces 
both the full owner and the bonitary owner but certainly not the bare owner at law. This inference is 
inescapable after the foregoing…dominium used for bonitary ownership in Ulp.D.37.1.1’. 
380
 Blackstone (n 269) Book II, Chapter 1, 2. Also in Clarke and Kohler (n 31) 183 cited by Clarke. 
381
 Holdsworth, A History of English Law vol VII (n 209) 450. On page 450, ‘…in the thirteenth century, 
under the influence, partly of Roman doctrines of ownership and possession, and partly of Roman 
doctrines as to the basis of liability, both parts of the older doctrine came to look a little anomalous. A 
bailee’s position was different from that of a taker or a finder in that he acknowledges the better title of 
his bailor - was it reasonable therefore to allow him the rights of an owner by virtue of his possession? He 
was not even a possessor according to the rules of Roman law’. 
382
 It is said that English law was more influenced by Germanic customary law than by Roman law in the 
medieval period. See Tamanaha (n 277) 23. ‘Germanic customary law influenced broad swaths of Europe 
beyond the native German-speaking lands, including substantial parts of modern England, France, and 
Spain, owing to the spread of the expansionary and settling German tribes, though its actual degree of 
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The slippery relationship between language and conceptual structure gave English 
jurists interpretative flexibility, with the Roman law concept of ‘possession’ being a 
good example. In Roman law, possession denotes a possessor gaining possession of an 
un-owned thing by occupying (occupatio, occupation) this thing for long time. The 
object that Roman law possession refers to is always tangible,
383
 for the fair reason that 
an intangible thing is impossible to acquire by delivery or by an expiration of a given 
time.
384
 English jurists Blackstone
385
 and Epstein
386
 grasped the meaning of 
possession and enlarged it to include intangible things. By connecting natural law 
philosopher John Locke’s labour theory with occupation,387 Blackstone extended the 
original meaning of the Roman term occupatio (occupation)—an attachment of a person 
to a physical thing only—to labour. When occupying his labour for a long time,388 this 
person eventually possesses this labour as his own. Blackstone successfully explained 
why copyrights can be owned by individuals. 
                                                                                                                                               
penetration varied, weakest in the Latinate (Romance language) regions. The bulk of law during the 
medieval period was customary law, not statutory or positive law’. 
383
 Ankum and Pool (n 37) 11 ‘….the only specific assets that are found in combination with i.b.(meis) 
esse and i.b. habere are corporeal things. The jurists do not use these expressions in combination with say, 
ususfructus, actio, nomen’. Although Ankum and Eric drew a fine line between ‘a thing in my possession’ 
and ‘a thing is among my possession’, both of them refer to a corporeal thing possession only. See also 
ibid 13 ‘Could this (meaning ‘things among my bona’) be any entitlement at all, including even restricted 
real rights or the rights implicit in bona fide possession? Again the answer is No’. 
384
 Nicholas (n 50) 106-107. ‘Gaius expresses the distinction in the terms res corporals and res 
incorporales. It is practically important for only one reason. Incorporeal things cannot be possessed, since 
possession requires essentially a physical holding, and they cannot therefore be acquired or transferred by 
any method which involves the transfer or acquisition of possession. In short, incorporeal things can 
neither be acquired by usucapio nor conveyed by traditio’. For the definition of usucapio, see 
Terminology. 
385
 See Holdsworth, A History of English Law vol VII (n 209) 480. ‘Acquisition by occupatio was 
extended by Blackstone to cover a case like copyright in which the acquirer has himself created a new 
incorporeal thing’. See also Becker, ‘The Moral Basis of Property Rights’ 122. ‘The common law with 
respect to literary property was a matter of uncertainty and growth in Blackstone’s time; he himself 
served as an advocate on behalf of property in copyright in an important case’. 
386
 Justin Hughes, ‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property’ (1988) 77(2) Geo L J 298. 
387
 See Blackstone (n 269) 331-332(original page number 406-407) ‘There is still another species of 
property, which (if it subsists by the common law) being grounded on labour and invention, is more 
properly reducible to the head of occupancy than any other; since the right of occupancy itself is supposed 
by Mr. Locke, and many others, to be founded on the personal labour of the occupant’. Also in Henry 
Winthrop Ballantine, Modern American Law: Blackstone's Commentaries volume XV (Blackstone 
Institute 1915) 156. 
388
 See Holdsworth, A History of English Law vol VII (n 209) 480. ‘Acquisition by occupatio was 
extended by Blackstone to cover a case like copyright in which the acquirer has himself created a new 
incorporeal thing. Blackstone held that he became the owner of it by occupatio’. 
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Blackstone’s enlargement has two significant meanings in law. Firstly, the meaning of 
occupation was extended from the acquisition of an existing thing, to the acquisition of 
a thing that previously had no existence.
389
 Secondly, in Roman law, occupation is 
founded on possession, where only physical things were capable of being possessio, but 
now it has been extended to intangible things like copyrights.
390
 Successors can thus 
analogize a patented idea and even other types of intellectual property. These two 
extensions, just as Holdsworth observed, has made modern English law a wide 
departure from Roman law. 
 
4.1.8 Fill in John Locke’s theoretical gap from the eighteenth century onwards 
 
John Locke, as Whelan points out, ‘offers virtually no guidance concerning the status of 
property as regulated in civil society’ and ‘left a very large theoretical gap for his 
eighteenth-century successors to fill’.391 Locke used the phrase ‘right of use’ to express 
that nothing can be taken from a man without his consent, even though he was almost 
completely silent on the details of what ‘rights’ people thereby get.392 Locke did not 
expressly indicate one’s possession of one’s body as the basis of one’s property in one’s 
body either.
393
 The gap remains left for David Hume, William Blackstone and many 
other theorists to fill in.  
 
When progressing to the eighteenth century, the natural law lawyers found that ‘by 
                                                 
389
 ibid. 
390
 ibid. 
391
 Frederick G Whelan, ‘Property as Artiface: Hume and Blackstone’ in J Roland Pennock (ed), Nomos 
XXII: Property (New York University Press 1980) 103. 
392
 Gopal Sreenivasan, The Limits of Lockean Rights in Property (Oxford University Press 1995) 97. 
393
 Hughes, ‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property’ (n 386) 298. ‘It is unclear why Epstein should reach 
this conclusion. Locke never mentions one’s possession of one’s body as the basis for one’s property in 
one’s body; he begins simply by asserting one’s body is one’s property. Yet Epstein connects property to 
possession by saying, “the obvious line for justification is that each person is in possession of himself, if 
not by choice or conscious act, then by a kind of natural necessity”’. 
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showing such proprietary rights originated in occupancy, and that concept was 
understood by Grotius and Pufendorf’,394 the gaps in patent and copyright grants can 
then be filled by John Locke’s labour theory. By connecting John Locke’s labour 
appropriation theory with Grotius and Pufendorf’s philosophy,395 Roman terms can 
then be used for explanation. Although it was not very welcomed by the Scottish Court, 
the Scottish Court was in favour of the franchise model of property in published works 
more than the above stated natural law model,
396
 with attitude being in a minority. 
There being a trend for court decisions in favour of the natural law model of property in 
the eighteenth century.
397
 The natural law model was eventually supported by the 
majority of advisory opinions in Donaldson v Beckett.
398
  
 
Property theory under this setting then had an historical antecedent, with the natural 
right to property being traced back to Aristotle, Hugo Grotius and Pufendorf, with 
writers beginning to discuss natural law theory widely in relation to the intellectual 
property field. Examples like, Henry Mitchell’s The Intellectual Commons,399 Abraham 
Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky’s A Theory of Property400 and Karl Olivecrona’s 
                                                 
394
 Lupton (n 253) 199. 
395
 ‘Philosophers throughout history, particularly the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century natural-law 
theorists, have had a great deal to say about appropriation as a source of property rights’. See Mitchell (n 
41) 2. 
396
 Lupton (n 253) 214-219. ‘We have seen that printing patents, comprising the sole right to print and 
publish named literary works, had been granted by the Crown since 1518. The prerogative of the Crown 
to make such grants was expressly saved in the Statute of Monopolies, and in the Licensing Act 1662’. He 
continues, ‘The relevance of authors’ patents in a line of reasoning was taken up by each of Lord Coalston, 
Lord Kennet, Lord Hailes, Lord Kames, and the Lord Justice-Clerk in the judgment of the Scottish Court 
of Session in Hinton v Donaldson’.‘However, the Court of Session rejected the concept of perpetual 
literary property by a majority of eleven judges to one’. ‘The obvious conclusion was that such rights 
could only be derived from the Crown. The point was made repeatedly in all of the majority judgments in 
Hinton v Donaldson, which represented an emphatic re-assertion of the franchise model of property in 
published works’. 
397
 ibid 214. ‘As the judgments in Millar v Taylor, Donaldson v Beckett and Jeffreys v Boosey all show, 
opinion was almost unanimously in favour of the natural law model of property in the case of unpublished 
works’. 
398
 ibid 225. ‘Nevertheless, all of the reports are consistent in showing that an overall majority of the 
judges favoured the existence of perpetual literary property at common law, apart from the Statute of 
Anne, both before and after publication’. 
399
 Mitchell (n 41) 72. 
400
 Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, ‘A Theory of Property’ (2005) 90(3) Cornell L Rev 531. 
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Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on the Origin of Property
401
 all follow this 
setting. No matter how the time scale stretches ahead, the writers returned to Locke’s 
justification at the end. 
 
Locke’s justification is closely linked to the land-holding mechanism stated in 4.1.2. 
Locke talks about the world and its resources being given to mankind ‘in common’. 
Although what exactly he meant by ‘in common’ remains in dispute, currently there are 
two ways of interpreting it: one is that he meant that the unallocated natural resources 
are open access communal property, and the other is that he meant the unallocated 
natural resources are no-property and that everyone has a Hohfeldian privilege to use 
them and no right to be excluded from it.
402
 No matter which way it is interpreted, 
using unallocated natural resources is not a grant from the government. What Locke 
exactly meant is not an issue in need of exploration here, but as Clarke suggests, we can 
assume that ‘what requires justification is an appropriation of a thing which removes 
everyone else’s right not to be excluded from that thing or their privilege to use and 
enjoy it for their owner self-preservation’.403 This study will return to this in a deeper 
comparative study with the real rights notion in the civil law of Taiwan in 4.3.1. 
 
Natural law theory itself is less related to the issues in dispute, so discussion will be 
stopped here by pointing out the linkage of the natural law model and the development 
of the property concept of a patent. The consequence of this development is worth 
attention. Common law jurists began to allocate the rights by using civil law terms, such 
as rights in rem. However, the way the common law writer uses these terms are 
sometimes not the same as civil law lawyers understand them. The following section is 
                                                 
401
 Karl Olivecrona, ‘Appropriation in the State of Nature:Locke on the Origin of Property’ (1974) 35(2) 
Journal of the History of Ideas 211. 
402
 Clarke and Kohler (n 31) 84. 
403
 ibid. 
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a clarification of ‘rights in rem’ that has puzzled civil law lawyers for many years. 
 
4.2 Clarification of some paradoxical terms 
 
4.2.1 The ‘rights in rem’ 
 
Except for natural law theory, the nature of a patent is often associated with the ‘bundle 
of rights’ theory and also ‘rights in rem’. This linkage is attributed to Hohfeld who was 
the first person to analyse common law jural relationship, using the Roman law concept 
rights in rem to explain the common law property structure.  
 
It is paradoxical because Hohfeld’s analysis is primarily based on bilateral legal 
relationships between two individuals,
404
 rather than on the unilateral relationship of a 
person with a thing like the original setting under the civil law system. According to 
Hohfeld, a right in rem is defined as ‘a multital right’, which is one of a large class of 
fundamentally similar but separate rights. It resides in ‘a single person but availing 
respectively against persons’ whom are ‘constituting a very large and indefinite class of 
people’.405  Hohfeld illustrates an example that clearly states his opinion towards 
property. 
 
Suppose that A is the owner of Blackacre and X is the owner of Whiteacre. Let 
it be assumed, further, that in consideration of $100 actually paid by A to B, 
the latter agrees with A never to enter on X’s land, Whiteacre. It is clear that 
A’s right against B concerning Whiteacre is a right in personam, or paucital 
                                                 
404
 See ibid 19. Further explanation on Hohfeld’s system, see Suri Ratnapala, Jurisprudence (Cambridge 
University Press 2009) 300-317. 
405
 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ 26(8) 
Yale L J 710,718. 
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right; for A has no similar and separate rights concerning Whiteacre availing 
against other persons in general. On the other hand, A’s right against B 
concerning Blackacre is obviously a right in rem, or multital right; for it is but 
one of a very large number of fundamentally similar (though separate) rights 
which A has respectively against B, C, D, E, F, and a great many other persons. 
It must now be evident, also, that A’s Blackacre right against B is, intrinsically 
considered, of the same general character as A’s Whiteacre right against B. 
The Blackacre right differs, so to say, only extrinsically, that is, in having 
many fundamentally similar, though distinct, rights as its ‘companions’. So, in 
general, we might say that a right in personam is one having few, if any, 
‘companions’; whereas a right in rem always has many such ‘companions’.406 
 
For Hohfeld, the classification is simple. A right in personam means a right against only 
one person (in the above example it is A against B), with a right in rem meaning a right 
against many people (in the above example it is A against B, C, D, E and F). He said a 
right in rem ‘is not a right against a thing’,407 but rather a right against many individuals. 
A right in rem should not be distinguished from a right in personam by being thought of 
as rights over things because every legal conception must be reduced to combinations of 
bilateral relations.
408
 Hohfeld’s analysis of rights has been widely accepted by most 
commentators, such as Honoré’s analysis of ownership, 409  Waldron’s analysis of 
property,
410
 Penner’s comments on Honoré411 and Becker’s comments on Munzer and 
                                                 
406
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 See Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Clarendon 1988) 68-73. 
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 J E Penner, ‘The " Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property’ (1996) 43(3) UCLA Law R 711. 
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Waldron.
412
 ‘Bundle of rights’ has become the most popular content in relation to 
property rights that most common law commentators subscribe to. As Justin Hughes 
described, even without debates, intellectual property, like all property, ‘remains an 
amorphous bundle of rights’.413 
 
4.2.2 Different understanding of rights in rem 
 
In Taiwanese statutory laws, rights in rem signify real rights an owner has to his/her 
thing
414
 and is a term that can be used interchangeable with real rights.
415
 It is a 
relationship axis, with at one end being a person and the other end a thing. The concept 
of rights in rem is different from an action in rem. Rights in rem refer to a person-thing 
relationship, whereas an action in rem means ‘an action for the recovery of a thing 
itself’.416 Put simply, an action in rem is an action by which a person, based on a right 
in rem (a person-thing relationship) (s)he has, asserts to another or many other 
individuals. An action in rem is an axis from a person to another person, whilst a right in 
rem is an axis from the owner to his/her thing. Hohfeld said a right in rem is a right 
against many individuals, even though he apparently misplaced rights in rem with an 
action in rem. 
 
This is due to common law lawyers being encouraged to think of ‘no action in rem’ in 
their legal system.
417
 One crucial piece of evidence supports the action that in rem does 
                                                 
412
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413
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414
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417
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not exist in the common law system and is a recovery action asserted directly to a thing 
called rei vindicatio that cannot be found in English law.
418
 Therefore, when civil law 
lawyers went through Hohfeld, Honoré, Waldron and Penner’s work, one should not be 
confused by the term ‘rights in rem’ they used in their representations.  
 
Whether an object is tangible or intangible is not important in Hohfeld’s model because 
this model structures the rules based on a person to person relationship, even though it 
is extremely significant in the civil law system. In the civil law concept, all the rules are 
founded on a thing, with any alienation of such a thing being a movement of the thing. 
Sales, for example, remove the thing away from its personal connection.
419
 Eventually, 
alienation is the denial of a personal link.
420
 When this alienation happens, the nuance 
in common law and civil law are significant: common law deals with the changing of 
relationship, whilst civil law denies a personal link and deals with the movement of a 
thing. The person-person model, apparently, favours patents because it deals with a 
change of relationship, whereas the person-thing model deals with the ‘movement’ of an 
object. Unlike a physical thing, it is beyond imagination to move a patent, because a 
patent is intangible. Therefore, whether this civil law person-thing model remains 
feasible for patent transactions is an open issue. This issue will be returned to in Chapter 
6. 
 
4.2.3 Fee simple is not equivalent to absolute ownership in real rights 
 
                                                                                                                                               
ownership’. ‘…for dealing with complaints about infringements of property rights is the law of tort’.  
418
 Andreas Rahmatian, ‘A Comparison of German Moveable Property Law and English Personal 
Property Law’ (2008) 3 Journal of Comparative Law 204. The advantage of having rei vindicatio is, when 
the property fails on the hand of someone who has no right to have it (like a thief), the owner can file 
his/her rei vindicatio against the thief, and also to the thief’s heir if the thief is dead; unlike the delictual 
action, the owner is permissible to assert his/her claim to the wrong doer only. 
419
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420
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Another confusing term is the word ‘ownership’. Bracton 421  and others 422  used 
possession and seisin interchangeably but left fee simple and ownership in doubt 
because the underlying concept of fee simple is very different from the Roman law of 
ownership. The notion of seisin
423
 has no concentrated, absolute ownership at the top 
and above the seisin, while in Roman law, there was a clear separation between 
possession and ownership. At the level of seisin, it may be equivalent to possession, but 
at the level of fee simple, it cannot be equivalent to ownership because in the realm of 
seisin, there was no legal action like the Roman vindicatio,
424
 as this author has stated 
in 4.1.7. 
 
Substantiated by Holdsworth
425
  and Maitland
426, English law ‘knows no dominium’ 
and only acknowledged ‘various rights to seisin’ or ‘hold the land of the king’. In the 
realm of seisin, it was a comparison of recent, more recent or less recent accounts. 
Seisin can be compared with another seisin, but it cannot be compared with possessio 
because Roman law has the concept of ownership on top of possessio, which seisin did 
not. The writ of right under the common law of England, the mechanism that protects 
seisin later developed during the reign of Henry II and onwards,
427
 simply decided the 
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 Holdsworth, A History of English Law vol III (n 260) 89. Maitland said even the negative franchises 
like the right to be quit of toll ‘does Bracton apply the notion of seisin or possession’. See Maitland (n 
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 Started by Henry II, the writ of right brought about a substantial change of legal thought. A right to 
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question of who had the better right to possess between the complainant and the 
tenant.
428
 The writ of right, apparently, cannot be equated with the Roman concept of 
vindicatio, simply because the writ of right in England was designed for settling 
disputes between two litigants,
429
 it ‘did not decide the abstract question of 
ownership’.430 The Roman law vindicatio was to establish and certify the ownership of 
the complainant, so the teleology of the law was different.
 431
 In the old English court, 
it was the seisin protected by the writ of right fighting against the seisin protected by the 
writ of entry, or the seisin protected by the writ of entry compared with that of novel 
disseisin.
432
 It was a horizontal design in English law jurisprudence, contrary to the 
Roman law and the vertical relationship between possessio and ownership. 
 
Therefore, it is conceptually wrong to use Roman law ownership to explain the nature 
of a patent. Despite Bracton and many others using the notion of seisin and possession 
interchangeably, it is improper to refer to fee simple as Roman law ownership because 
the structure stated above is different in essence. 
 
4.2.4 Vast expansion of the property notion to patents in the common law of the 
USA 
 
Despite Hohfeld’s rights in rem as well as the word ownership used by the common law 
writers being different from civil law lawyers’ understanding, Hohfeld’s term rights in 
rem swept through contemporary property theory. Moreover, the bundle of rights theory 
                                                                                                                                               
232. 
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currently predominates in the courts of the United States of America.
433
 It has already 
become a paradigm in today’s property law in the common law system, 434 with the 
only difference being that U.S. writers focus more on the in rem nature of property,
435
 
whereas as British writers focus more on the analysis of this theory. The U.S. courts, 
whose decisions have had a significant impact on Taiwanese academia since 1945, have 
frequently treated patents as property in many significant patent case decisions.  
 
The emphasis of a patent as property in an absolute sense by U.S. courts is due to its 
social and economic history. The U.S. Supreme Court were conservative, and ‘found the 
old assumption that the “right” of the patentee was more in the nature of the franchise 
than of a full substantive right’.436 However, after Millar v Taylor and Donaldson v 
Beckett, the idea of ‘incorporeal possession’ in the English courts’ decision, went to U.S. 
and changed the previous conservative view. In the mid-nineteenth century, American 
society had a more favourable business climate for lifting the concept of intangible 
property to its logical culmination.
437
 Commercial and manufacturing enterprises were 
dealing with more abstract things than physical things and it was no longer enough to 
talk about land and urge continuous acceptance of Justice Yates attitude that ‘all 
property must be founded upon occupancy’.438 Gayler v Wilder in 1850 was the first 
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case that where the U.S. Supreme Court seriously considered the property basis when 
granting a patent.
439
 Gayler v Wilder was a case disputing whether an invention could 
be assigned before the patent right was granted. Chief Justice Taney agreed with the 
validity of such an assignment by stating,  
 
The act of 1836 declares that every patent shall be assignable in law, and that 
the assignment must be in writing and recorded within the time specified. But 
the thing to be assigned is not the mere parchment on which the grant is written. 
It is the monopoly which the grant confers—the right of property which it 
creates. And when the party has acquired an inchoate right to it, and the power 
to make that right perfect and absolute at his pleasure, the assignment of his 
whole interest, whether executed before or after the patent issued, is equally 
within the provisions of the act of Congress.
440… Fitzgerald sets up no claim 
against the assignment, and to require another to complete the transfer would be 
mere form. We do not think the act of Congress requires it, but that when the 
patent issued to him, the legal right to the monopoly and property is created was, 
by operation of the assignment then on record, vested in Enos Wilder.
441
 
(Underlined emphasis added by this author) 
 
Justice Daniel disagreed that an invention could be assigned before the patent right was 
granted, based on the aforesaid property assumption, and dissented Justice Taney’s 
opinion stating, 
 
                                                 
439
 Gayler v Wilder [1850] 51 US 477 at 477 ‘An assignment of a patent right, made and recorded in the 
Patent Office before the patent issued, which purported to convey to the assignee all the inchoate right 
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To hold that the single circumstance of invention creates an estate or property at 
law and an estate and legal title transmissible by assignment appears to me a 
doctrine not merely subversive of the common law, but one which contravenes 
the origin and course of legislation in England in relation to patent rights…I 
hold it, then, to be true, that the circumstance of invention invests no such 
perfect estate or right of property as can be claimed and enforced at law or in 
equity against the user of the same invention… It is the patent alone which 
creates an estate or interest in the invention known to the law, and which can be 
enforced either at law or in equity… Down to the Act of Congress of 1837, 
nothing but the estate, interest, or property created or invested by the patent 
itself was made assignable.
442
 (Underlined emphasis added by this author) 
 
Both judges recognised that when a patent is granted, the rights of property are 
henceforth created, despite them both having different opinions on the validity of 
assignment before the patent right was granted. This case was the first time the Supreme 
Court of America turned to the rights of property, rather than the claim of equity, in 
establishing the basis for the intangible right.
443
 Henceforward, the Supreme Court’s 
attitude split wide open. In 1869, in the case of Simpson v Woodman,
444
 dissenting 
Justice Clifford expressly supported ‘inventions secured by letters patent are 
property’,445 which was a turning point in Clifford’s career on the bench. In order to 
prove his ability to face the challenge, Clifford never again lost control of the Court 
between 1870 and 1876 in relation to the concept of property when granting a patent.
446
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443
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In the case of Seymour v Osborne,
447
 Clifford even refers patents to public franchises 
by stating,  
 
Letters patent are not to be regarded as monopolies, created by the executive 
authority at the expense and to the prejudice of all the community except the 
persons therein named as patentees, but as public franchises granted to the 
inventors of new and useful improvements for the purpose of securing to 
them…448 
 
Inlow commented that Clifford’s ‘patents as public franchises’ was clearly an anomaly 
of Clifford’s past opinion. Another interpretation is possible though. From an historical 
perspective, a letter patent closely originated from the concept of franchises and treated 
as real rights under the category of incorporeal hereditaments. Clifford seems to be 
aware that his property allegation does not refer to property in the sense of personal 
goods, but to franchises arising from the doctrine of estates. From 1870 onwards, 
Clifford never stopped emphasising that a letter patent is property,
449
 even before being 
patented.  
 
In 1897, Justice Brewer further made the patent for land and patent for invention 
distinct in the United States v American Bell Tel. Co.
450
 Concerning an immovable 
property, he stated, 
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448
 ibid at 533. 
449
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The patent for land is a conveyance to an individual of that which is the absolute 
property of the government, and to which, but for the conveyance, the individual 
would have no right of title. It is a transfer of tangible property; of property in 
existence before the right is conveyed; of property which the government has the 
full right to dispose of as it sees fit, and may retain to itself or convey to one 
individual or another, and it creates a title which lasts for all time.
451
 
 
With respect to the patent for invention, he continued,  
   
On the other hand, the patent for an invention is not a conveyance of something 
which the government owns. It does not convey that which, but for the 
conveyance, the government could use and dispose of as it sees fit, and to which 
no one save the government has any right or title except for the conveyance. But 
for the patent, the thing patented is open to the use of anyone. Were it not for this 
patent, anyone would have the right to manufacture and use the Berliner 
transmitter. It was not something which belonged to the government before 
Berliner invented it….After his invention, he could have kept the discovery 
secret to himself….But in order to induce him to make that invention public, to 
give all a share in the benefits resulting from such an invention, Congress, by its 
legislation made in pursuance of the Constitution, has guarantied to him as 
exclusive right to it for a limited time, and the purpose of the patent is to protect 
him in this monopoly, not to give him a use which, save for the patent, he did not 
have before, but only to separate to him an exclusive use. The government parted 
with nothing by the patent. It lost no property. Its possessions were not 
diminished. The patentee, so far as a personal use is concerned, received nothing 
which he did not have without the patent, and the monopoly which he did receive 
                                                 
451
 ibid 238. 
 141 
 
was only for a few years.
452
 (Underlined emphasis added by this author) 
 
Justice Brewer correctly caught the fundamental concept of patents for invention. He 
developed the statement according to assimilation under the doctrine of estate and 
doctrine of seisin, as stated in 4.1.2 and 4.1.3. Patents are like those ‘estates’ or 
‘interests’ with time limits on commonly owned land. According to Justice Brewer, the 
idea of invention is commonly owned by a society, with the granting of a patent not the 
granting of a positive right to use, but a negative right to exclude. As Hall points out, the 
patent owner can enjoy ‘only the debarment in fact of making using and vending the 
invention without his authority, throughout the patent territory, during any momentary 
time’.453 The patent system ensures the patent owner has the right to exclude others 
from entering into his patent claims, like the farmer excluding other villagers from 
entering into his crop field without his permission. Contrary to the inclusion rules 
regulating the use of physical things, the patent system is governed by exclusion rules. 
A patent owner was not granted with any positive right to use by the authority, but 
merely had the negative right to ask the trespasser to leave the field that the owner 
preserves for their own exclusive use.
454
  
 
Concerning exclusive use, when a manufacturing factor was involved, the 
Anglo-American law moved towards a more aggressive ‘absolute’ property allegation 
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by the end of the nineteenth century. In 1896, Justice Lurton ‘found himself unable to 
accept any limitation upon the rights of the patentee in this particular case’,455 and 
began to equalise the patent right with general property rights. Lurton stated, 
 
This exclusive right of use is a true and absolute monopoly, and is granted in 
derogation of the common right, and this right to monopolize the use of the 
invention or discovery is the substantial property right conferred by law, and 
which the public is under obligation to respect and protect…456 The property 
right of a patentee is, after all, but a property right, and subject, as is all other 
property, to the general law of the land.
457
 (Underlined emphasis added by this 
author) 
 
Henceforward, the common law jurisdiction of the United States of America inclined 
more towards absolute property associated with rights in rem (a thing in possession) 
than its English counterpart, which prefers a lesser absolute chose in action (a right of 
action for possession).
458
 The U.S. courts in the twentieth and twenty first centuries 
continually strengthened intellectual property and now characterise a patent as a type of 
property.
459
  
 
However, the term ‘property’ that the Americans use today is not necessarily the same 
meaning as before and may ‘very well not be the same type of property tomorrow’ as 
Inlow highlights.
460
 Nevertheless, the above history makes us realise that the literary 
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meaning of the word ‘property’ used in the patent concept is not helpful to clarify the 
concept, but when thinking historically, we can understand the nature of the patent 
better. The passage below shows the fundamental difference of a ‘property’ concept in 
the common law of England and Taiwanese statutory law. The next section further 
explains why real rights in Taiwanese statutory law are not feasible for patents, and why 
legal society in both Taiwan and Japan understand it wrongly. 
 
4.3 The differences between English common law and Taiwanese statutory law 
 
4.3.1 Allocating rights 
 
The first issue that troubles a comparatist is no matter what a patent is called, whether a 
monopoly, a franchise, a right in rem, a chose in action, or even a property, what sorts of 
rights does that the owner have on his patent? Is there, however, any difference in the 
understanding real rights between the common law of England and civil law of Taiwan? 
 
In fact, there is. As stated in 4.1.2, the common law of England builds a concept of 
estate on exclusionary rules. The significant characteristic of exclusionary rules is, in 
principle, that everyone is free to use the property. This right to use is not a positive 
right granted by the authority (government), it naturally exists in a society. Locke’s 
theory reflects the same notion.
461
 The law of property is a set of rules stating, ‘what 
other people may or may not prevent the owner from doing to the thing, and what the 
owner may or may not prevent them from doing to the thing’.462 The law of property 
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common. An appropriation to a thing removes everyone else’s right not to be excluded from that thing, or 
removes everyone else’s privilege to use and enjoy that thing. To use and enjoy a thing naturally exist in a 
society. 
462
 Turner (n 376) 343. Also in Wendy J Gordon, ‘A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property’ (1993) 102 Yale L J 1533,1552. ‘A property 
owner ordinarily has a claim right to have others refrain from entering or otherwise interfering with the 
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under exclusionary rules is a set of rules that the social anthropologist calls ‘negative 
etiquette’, meaning that it is a set of rules concerned with other people’s need not to be 
intruded or imposed upon.
463
 In sharp contrast to exclusionary rules, inclusionary rules 
are sets of rules where every positive right (right to use, capital and disposition) is 
granted by the authority and the law of property is a set of rules stating what the owner 
may or may not do to a thing, only the owner has the right to use that thing. No one else 
has the same use right like the owner has in this set of inclusionary rules.  
 
The rights that an owner has in their patents can be analogized to the above stated 
notion. Everyone is free to use the idea in the patent in principle but the law vesting the 
right to exclude only resides with the owner(s) who has exclusivity. In a way, the law 
does not grant the owner positive rights to use, but instead, the law grants a right to 
exclude other people’s use, or a right to remove others’ right not to be excluded. It is 
fundamentally different from the civil law of Taiwan where only the owner is granted 
positive rights to use, with no one else capable of using. This is the reason why there is 
no common owned land in Taiwanese statutory law: the land is either privately or 
government owned. Therefore, the concept that ‘everyone is free to use except for those 
things which belong to the owners who have a right to exclude’ does not exist in the 
statutory law of Taiwan. 
 
This nuance is demonstrated in two figures below. The left hand side of Figure 4-2 
shows the common law of England, with the civil law of Taiwan is on the right hand 
side. The right (some would say privilege) to use in the common law of England is 
vested to everyone, with the right to exclude granted to the owner on the left hand side. 
                                                                                                                                               
property’. ‘It is often argued that the “essence” of property is “the right to exclude others”’. ‘For 
intangibles, the parallel entitlement to the right to exclude physically is the right to forbid others’ use of 
one’s product’. 
463
 Kate Fox, Watching the English: the hidden rules of English behaviour (Hodder 2005) 147,407. 
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In sharp contrast to the left hand side, on the right hand side, there is no right to use 
granted to everyone in the first place, with both the rights to use and exclude vested in 
the owner after the law and government recognize ownership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
                                
 
This nuance has a great impact on the definition of what sorts of right a patent owner 
has over his patent in the Taiwanese Patent Act. Without knowing the above differences, 
the legislators copied and borrowed the wordings from Anglo-American law,
464
 with a 
negative tone stating the owner has the right to exclude others from using. With a 
further extension by scholars and judges already stated in Chapter’s 2 and 3, the patent 
                                                 
464
 Legislative Yuan, Lifayuan Gongbao 立法院公報(Legislation Communique):Weiyuanhui Jilu 委員會
紀錄 (Committee Meeting Minutes) (Folio 82, Issue 42, Number 2641, 1993) 329. Convener Su 
Huan-chih (蘇煥智)briefed the proposed bill. When mentioning Article 56, he stated, ‘[This clause] was 
proposed in accord with the draft Article 28 of the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights…many jurisdictions formed their clauses this way, for example Article 154 of the U.S. 
Patent Act.’ The original Patent Office’s version was, ‘The patentee of a patented article shall have the 
exclusive right of manufacture, sale and use of the innovation.’ [translation by this author] After this 
discussion in the committee, the Patent Office agreed to adopt Legislator Su Huan-chih’s version. See 
Legislative Yuan, Lifayuan Gongbao立法院公報(Legislation Communique):Weiyuanhui Jilu委員會紀錄
(Committee Meeting Minutes) (Folio 82, Issue 48, Number 2647, vol.2, 1993) 401-403. Eventually, 
section 1 of Article 56 in the Patent Act became, ‘Unless otherwise provided for in this Act, the patentee 
of a patented article shall have the exclusive right to preclude other persons from manufacturing, selling, 
using, or importing for above purposes the patented article without his/her prior consent’. [translation by 
Lawbank] The wording was changed from ‘the exclusive right’ to ‘the exclusive right to preclude’, with 
the legislators, however, only explaining that it was to be confined to TRIPS and Anglo-American law, 
and mentioning the exerting of U.S. pressure on many occasions.  
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owner’s rights are misconnected with physical things. They allege that the patent owner 
has the same positive rights (right to use, capital and disposition) like a physical thing 
owner, creating those rights for a patent owner that he/she did not have before.  
 
These newly created rights have had a negative impact on patent licensing because the 
licensee then has a legal basis to claim once they obtain the licence they have a positive 
right to use. With these positive rights being created, the licensees naturally claim they 
have a right to exclude others because a right to exclude is the other side of the coin of 
positive rights. It is completely untrue under a non-exclusive licence because the 
non-exclusive licensee does not have a right to exclude others. This is the reason why 
this author challenges the decision made by the Japanese Supreme Court that uses 
surface rights to understand an exclusive licence (as in 3.2.4), and the Taiwanese 
Intellectual Property Office and Civil High Court from using physical things to 
understand patents (as in 2.3.3). All the misconceptions arise from the creation of the 
positive rights that a patent owner shall not have, due to mistaking those rights under 
physical things as being the same ‘rights’ as those for patents. 
 
4.3.2 The concept of ownership 
 
The object of an ownership, in the common law of England and the common law 
jurisdiction of the United States of America, has a wider range than the civil law of 
Taiwan. The common law’s objects cover material objects and sometimes rights. This 
wider range is attributed to the history of real estate developed earlier in England. As 
addressed in 4.1.2, the estate concept in the common law of England sees two strong 
characteristics differ from the civil law system. The first characteristic is the 
segmentation of ownership by different durations among various individuals. The 
second characteristic is that, in principle, everyone is free to use under these 
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exclusionary rules, with the law vesting the right to exclude only to the owner(s) who 
has exclusivity.  
 
At large, real property under common law is divided into two classes, estates and 
interests. This classification is, from first sight, very similar to the civil law separation 
of ownership and usufruct, with the devil being in the details. Common law estate 
covers leaseholds and tenancy,
465
 whilst under the civil law of Taiwan, leaseholds and 
tenancy are excluded out of the law of things (they belong to the law of obligations). 
Fee simple, which most writers call ownership,
466
 can further be segmented by 
durations or conditions like a spectrum, such as a fee simple absolute, a fee tail,
467
 a fee 
simple for life,
468
 and upon condition or as a determinable fee.
469
 Ownership in the 
civil law of Taiwan is a unitary concept that cannot be further segmented by different 
durations and conditions. This ‘segmentation by time or condition’ concept has no 
equivalence in the civil law of Taiwan.  
 
Figure 4-3 shows the structure of proprietary rights and interests in the common law of 
England, with Figure 4-4 manifesting rights in rem arising from physical things in the 
civil law of Taiwan. The co-ordinates for fee simple and forever in the time axis are the 
                                                 
465
 By the sixteenth century, terms of years has become recognised as legal estates. Like freehold estates, 
leasehold estates may be held in possession, in reversion or in remainder. See Oakley (n 11) 34. 
466
 An example is Oakley, who states, ‘The fee simple is the most ample estate which can exist in land. 
Although in theory it still fall shorts of absolute ownership, in practice it amounts to this, for nearly all 
traces of the old feudal burdens have disappeared’. See ibid 40. Cheshire and Burn did the same in their 
chapter on the legal position of a tenant under fee simple, with ownership equated with fee simple being 
absolute. See Burn and Cartwright (n 11) 158. 
467
 A fee tail lasts for as long as the tenant or any of his descendants lives, which remained possible until 
1996, but is now moved to equity and called an entailed interest. See Burn and Cartwright (n 11) 151. 
468
 Since 1925 a fee simple for life has been unable to do so, and therefore it has to take effort as an 
equitable interest. See Oakley (n 11) 47. 
469
 ibid 41-42. A determinable fee is a fee simple ‘which will automatically determine on the occurrence 
of some specified event which many never occur’. An example is ‘A grant to X and his heirs as long as 
such a tree stands’. If the tree falls, then the land reverted to the original grantor. A fee simple upon 
condition is a grant of a fee simple when a clause is added, providing that ‘the fee simple is not to 
commence until some event occurs’. An example of the fee simple is not to commence until some event 
occurs is, ‘A grant to X in fee simple if he attains 21’. This determinable fee form a limitation and a fee 
simple upon condition merely form a condition. Therefore, the former marks the bounds or compass of 
the estate, while the latter defeats the estate before it attains its boundary. 
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fee simple absolute in Figure 4-3, reflecting the co-ordinate of the same kind in Figure 
4-4, the ownership. Comparing these two diagrams, two details in Figure 4-4 are 
missing: the scale points in the time axis that marks different durations is absent, and the 
term of years absolute which represents a fix term of leasehold or tenancy is not in the 
real rights of Taiwanese civil law. The two missing scale points manifest the limitations 
of analogizing civil law ownership to a patent. A detailed analysis is presented in the 
next passage. 
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Figure 4-3: Estates in the common law of England 
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As stated in 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, throughout medieval times to the eighteenth century, 
franchises were categorised under real property, with nearly all grants of franchises 
made in fee simple. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that if a patent is regarded as 
property, the interests that a patentee holds must be proprietary.  
 
Figure 4-5 shows the theoretical position that a patentee has to his/her patent, with 
Figure 4-6 manifesting that this idea is not mirrored in the civil law of Taiwan. 
Comparing these two diagrams, there is a missing scale point in Figure 4-6—a fixed 
term for fee simple in Figure 4-5 is not mirrored in Figure 4-6. Unlike the common law 
real rights structure allowing a duration spectrum on the time axis, civil law ownership 
is restricted by the unitary concept, so it is impossible to segment ownership using 
different terms. Therefore, we cannot use Taiwanese civil law ownership to explain the 
property nature of a patent. 
 
If the ownership notion in the civil law of Taiwan cannot explain the nature of a patent, 
could rights in rem less than ownership (like usufruct) explain the property nature of a 
patent? If the answer is positive, then we have to further assume that the government 
holds the patent under fee simple and that the patentee holds proprietary interests with 
time limitation just like a tenant holds a leasehold or tenancy.  
 
In Figure 4-5, the co-ordinate for proprietary interests in land likewise explains the 
estate status that a patentee holds in his/her patent. However, the same concept cannot 
be mirrored in Figure 4-6 because, proprietary interests with time limitation like a 
leasehold or tenancy, is not regarded as being a right in rem in the civil law of Taiwan. It 
belongs to the law of obligations (like a personal debt or liability). Again, there is a 
missing scale point in the real rights axis in Figure 4-6. We cannot use civil law 
leasehold or tenancy to explain the property status that a patentee holds to a patent in the 
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civil law structure. 
 
From the above analysis we learn that because of these two missing points, no matter 
whether common law writers classified a patent as quasi-property, property, or right in 
rem, the property character cannot be equally mirrored in the civil law of Taiwan. This 
analysis further proves that those Taiwanese jurists and judges who think that physical 
things’ notion works well in explaining the nature of a patent (as presented in Chapter 2) 
are fundamentally mistaken. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
William Martin stated that ‘The English Patent System is no sudden growth; its roots lie 
hidden beneath the tickets of medievalism’.470 Early in the thirteenth century, franchises 
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 William Martin, The English Patent System (J M Dent & Co 1904) 9. 
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were already assimilated as land by applying them to the doctrine of estate.
471
 
Concerning the rule of succession, franchises were stuck in the real rights category 
throughout medieval times.
472
 Coke and Blackstone
473
 classifying franchises as 
incorporeal hereditaments, medieval lawyers treated incorporeal hereditaments equally 
to real rights through the analogy of the doctrine of estate.
474
 Franchise classification in 
real rights stayed in the real rights category before the extension movement of choses of 
action emerged in the late sixteenth century. As Lupton highlights, it was ‘no longer 
necessary for the common law to assimilate these things with land in the same way’ 
because franchises ‘had been assimilated with land in the thirteenth century’.475 
 
A patent for inventions was re-categorised twice by two diving forces: the expanding 
choses in action in the late sixteenth century and the enlarged property meaning in the 
seventeenth century. A patent for inventions was firstly classified in choses in action 
because there was a tendency to treat any intangible right as a chose in action, as long as 
this right did not clearly belong to old types of incorporeal hereditaments. A patent for 
inventions, which was new to the old type of incorporeal hereditaments, was placed into 
the category of chose in action, despite in substance, its character being closer to real 
estate than personal goods. A patent for inventions was then again re-categorised as 
‘property’ during the seventeenth century, because the ‘property’ notion began to 
expand from personal goods to real estate and covered a patent into this category. In the 
                                                 
471
 Lupton (n 253) 97. 
472
 ibid 3. 
473
 Coke classified franchises as incorporeal hereditaments, while Blackstone listed them as incorporeal 
hereditaments as well. See Simpson, A History of The Land Law (n 286) 106, cited from William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (15th edn, London 1809) II 21. ‘Incorporeal 
hereditaments’ here means interests that are ‘incorporeal, or intangible, heritable in land that were 
recognized historically by the common law’. See Burn and Cartwright (n 11) 633. Unlike the freehold or 
leasehold estate, ‘they do not constitute rights to the land itself, but only rights over or in respect of the 
land’. 
474
 Simpson, A History of The Land Law (n 286) 115. Simpson accepts there is some connection between 
the development of a doctrine of estates in the fourteenth century and the treatment of incorporeal 
hereditaments by early medieval lawyers, but he objects to those modern writers using ownership to 
overstate the medieval fee simple by concluding Englishman owned an incorporeal thing called an estate. 
See ibid 115-116. 
475
 Lupton (n 253) 138. 
 153 
 
past, stationers in the sixteenth century showed no sign of using property as their 
defence base, but from the seventeenth century onwards, such a use largely emerged.  
 
Blackstone, in the eighteenth century, enlarged the meaning of possession from physical 
things to copyrights. Meanwhile, natural law lawyers found that Grotius and Pufendorf 
awkwardly fit this scheme by showing the nature of a grant originated in occupancy. 
The gap between a patent grant and philosophy was then redressed by the eighteenth 
century natural law lawyers, using John Locke’s labour theory. Roman law 
terminologies were henceforward widely adopted for explanation, in spite of many 
Roman law terminologies understood by the English writers not being the same as civil 
law lawyers. The phrase ‘rights in rem’ is a good example.  
 
Before the nineteenth century, courts in the United States of America mainly followed 
the principle established by English courts. Things started to change from the 
mid-nineteenth century onwards. American commercial and manufacturing enterprises 
were dealing with more abstract things than physical things than its English counterpart, 
and it was no longer enough to talk about land. Before the nineteenth century they also 
held the conservative attitude that all property must be founded upon occupancy. By the 
end of the nineteenth century, U.S. courts moved towards a more aggressive step to 
recognise the absolute property status for a patent grant when a manufacturer was 
involved. Compared to its English counterpart, U.S. courts inclined more towards rights 
in rem when justifying the property nature of a patent grant. The bundle of rights theory 
currently dominates the courts’ significant decisions for patent cases. 
 
Taiwanese jurists and judges were, however, confused by the term ‘rights in rem’ and 
‘property’ used by common law writers. Without a complete understanding of the 
nuances in the usage of terms in the common law and civil law system, they believe that 
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real rights and a civil law ownership concept airing from physical things explain the 
nature of a patent well, but in fact, they are wrong. The common law estate notion can 
be segmented by different durations, whilst ownership in Taiwanese civil law cannot. 
The lesser rights of ownership—civil law real rights cannot explain the nature of a 
patent either because of the corresponding concept in the common law—leaseholds or 
tenancy are not regarded as real rights in the civil law of Taiwan. 
 
The right to exclude has a different understanding in an exclusionary law system like 
English common law and an inclusionary law system like Taiwanese civil law. The 
former welcomes all commoners to use a property, while the latter enjoys the right to 
use a property only when (s)he is granted to do so by the government. The right to 
exclude in the former system empowers the owner with a negative right to evict the 
infringer, while the right to exclude in the latter system is the other side of the coin of 
positive use rights. In the civil law of Taiwan, only when the owner obtains ownership 
granted by the government do they enjoy the right to exclude the infringer. In other 
words, if the patentee does not obtain recognition of his/her positive rights (ownership) 
from the government, (s)he cannot enjoy the right to exclude the infringer. This civil 
law ownership notion, however, as stated above, cannot be granted by different 
durations of time. It is either owned perpetually or not at all. The perpetually ownership 
of a patent does, nevertheless, contradict the current concept of patents fixed to a 
specific term. 
 
Taiwanese jurists and judges, as stated in Chapter 2, inappropriately applied the direct 
analogy of civil law real rights to patents without acknowledging the nuance in both 
common and civil law. This chapter has substantiated this assumption—real rights work 
well in explaining the nature of a patent, is mistaken. The next chapter explores the 
traditional Taiwanese tenure system. This traditional real rights notion was founded on 
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exclusionary rules and survives in today’s flat leasehold practice. A part of Taiwanese 
tradition remains and has survived many reforms. 
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Rules and regulation in land law are valuable sources of reference for patent law. Harris 
states that intellectual property law ‘takes an intangible thing and builds around it a 
property structure modelled on the structure which social and legal systems have always 
applied to some tangible things’.476 His comment echoes one barrister’s testimony in an 
1851 House of Lords report, that if the patentee of a reinvention and the patentee of the 
original invention cannot agree on the licence terms, let them ‘apply the Lands Clauses 
Act, and follow a similar process to that which is in use when lands are taken for public 
purposes’.477 Patent cases often largely resemble land law. 
                                                 
476
 Harris (n 408) 44. Not only does Harris makes this comment, David Vaver cites House of Commons 
reports and states the same. ‘A 1985 parliamentary sub-committee report on copyright reform took as its 
lodestar the assertion “that ‘ownership is ownership is ownership’: the copyright owner owns the 
intellectual works in the same sense as a landowner owns land”’. See David Vaver, Intellectual Property 
Law: Copyright, Patents,Trade-marks (2nd edn, Irwin Law 2011) 6-7. 
477
 Select Committee of The House of Lords, Report and Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Select 
Committe of The House of Lords Appointed to Consider of The Bill Intituled,"An Act Further to Amend 
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This chapter answers two questions. Firstly, insofar as the statutory laws do not solve 
the problem completely, is there any customary law in Taiwan that can help replenish 
the gap? Secondly, how similar is this customary law to that in English common law? 
Section 5.1 explores the classification of property in Taiwanese customary law, with 5.2 
demonstrating the rules of conveyance, and a clear distinction between Taiwanese 
customary law and Chinese customary law provided in 5.3. These three sections 
demonstrate that there is customary law in Taiwan that can replenish the gap. Section 
5.4 presents a comparative study on property taxonomy in English common law and 
Taiwanese customary law. Using the results of the comparison, section 5.5 rebuilds a 
property model for patents to explain the position of patents in Taiwanese customary 
law taxonomy. Section 5.6 further explores the meaning of assignment and licence in 
the map of such taxonomy, with 5.7 demonstrating that such customary law can 
successfully explain the nature of patents and the meaning of non-exclusive and 
exclusive licences in real practice. This chapter concludes that Taiwanese customary 
law is an ideal analogy that can overcome the structural flaws and substance 
imperfection of civil law in 5.8. 
 
This chapter commences with an overall review of the traditional Taiwanese 
landholding system. By comparing Taiwanese tenure with English tenure,
478
 this 
chapter highlights the similarities and differences of landholding in Taiwan and England. 
The similarities in both tenure systems will help establish a new model for patents by 
the end of this chapter. No literature has yet conducted a thorough comparative study of 
                                                                                                                                               
the Law Touching Letters Patent for Inventions;" and also of The Bill Intituled,"An Act for the Further 
Amendment of the Law Touching Letters Patent for Inventions;" and to report Thereon to the House (HC 
1851, 278) paras 1994.  
478
 The customary practice is limited to customs that were practiced in Taiwan in the Qing dynasty. Qing 
dynasty (1684-1895) was the period when Taiwan was connected to the Qing dynasty of mainland China. 
Before that, Taiwan was neglected by the Asian political powers prior to 1684. The spotted deers trade 
attracted the Dutch East India Company, with this company running a deerskin export business for 38 
years (1624-62) in Taiwan. After 1895 was the period when Taiwan was ruled by Japan until 1945. 
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Taiwanese and English tenure in relation to building a property structure that suits 
patents,
479
 therefore this chapter provides an original contribution to this research area. 
 
5.1 The traditional landholding system in Taiwan 
 
5.1.1 Reason for choosing the landholding system 
 
This study chooses the landholding system because customary Taiwanese practice treats 
real property and personal goods differently. Holding personal goods in Taiwan was an 
outright, absolute and perpetual holding without any conditions or restrictions. In Qing 
dynasty (1644-1911) when all land belonged to the emperor, no one else could own land. 
All tenants held ‘rights to manage’ the land, with the rights they held varying by 
different gradations.
480
 Concerning holding a right to manage the land, traditionally 
people used the phrase yeh-zhu-quan (業主權)to show a non-categorical holding of the 
land. But for personal goods, people used the phrase wu-zhu-quan (物主權)481 to show 
an outright ownership of personal goods. Unlike civil law ownership that uses the word 
‘ownership’ to describe personal goods and real property, customary law clearly 
differentiates land from personal goods, so the first word yeh (業) is only used in 
association with real property, including the premises. This key word ‘yeh’ (業), 
                                                 
479
 Japanese scholars focus more on an introduction and historical explanation of the multi-tiered tenure 
system in Taiwan, with Taiwanese professors focusing more on the impact of this tenure system for land 
development. However, none of them stretching out to the intellectual property field. For an example of 
Japanese scholars, see Yoshiro Matsuda(松田吉郎), Meiseizidai Kanan Chiikitekishi Kenkyuu (明清時代
華南地域史研究)=A Regional History of Southern China (Kyuko 2002), and for Taiwanese researchers 
see Chen Qiu-kun(陳秋坤), Qingdai Taiwan Tuzhu Diquan: Guanliao Handian yu Anlisheren de 
Tudibianqian 1700-1895(清代臺灣土著地權：官僚、漢佃與岸裡社人的土地變遷 1700-1895)=The 
Land Rights of Taiwanese Aborigines in Qing Dynasty: the impact and change of rights among the 
bureaucrat, Han Chinese tenants and aborigines in Anli area (Institute of Modern History Academia 
Sinica 1994). Taiwanese law professors concentrated more on understanding traditional terms by means 
of civil law terminologies, but it is only limited to the land law field. See Wang, Taiwan Falushi 
Gailun(台灣法律史概論)=Concise Taiwanese Legal History (n 189) 83. 
480
 Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 3 (臺灣私法第三
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 3 (Historical Records Committee of Taiwan Provincial Government 
1993) 11. 
481
 ibid 11-12. 
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substantiated by Japanese government survey findings, was ‘closed to the English estate 
concept, represents any and all rights a person has to a real property’.482  
 
The property nature of patents originated from holding an estate in England but not 
from owning personal goods. For this reason, this chapter excludes a discussion of 
owning personal goods. Another reason for not discussing owning personal goods is 
because Chapter 2 has already proven that outright perpetual ownership is unsuitable for 
patents, therefore wu-zhu-quan, which is also a perpetual, absolute and outright owning, 
is no longer needed for further discussion. This chapter focuses on yeh-zhu-quan (業主
權)holdings that are close to the English estate concept. 
 
5.1.2 The concept of yeh 
 
The word yeh (業) originally means ‘to manage a business or a parcel of land’.483 Like 
the English concept of estate,
484
 yeh (業)detaches the concept of ownership from land 
itself, and attaches it to an imaginary object called yeh(業). It is an intangible real 
right,
485
 and it has been majorly used in this abstract sense indicating ‘the power of 
management’ of the land. Hence, the combination of for ever (yong永) and yeh (業) as 
yong-yeh (永業) means ‘the power to manage a real property for ever’.486 Yeh (業) is a 
concept substantially intangible and ethereal. 
                                                 
482
 Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第一
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1 (Historical Records Committee of Taiwan Provincial Government 
1990 reprint) 141 [translation by this author] 
483
ibid 139 [translation by this author] Also in Wang, Taiwan Falushi Gailun(台灣法律史概論)=Concise 
Taiwanese Legal History (n 189) 83. 
484
 ‘The English lawyer….first detaches the ownership from the land itself, and then attaches it to an 
imaginary thing which he calls an estate’. Simpson, Land Law and Registration (n 58) 30. Simpson cited 
it from William Markby, Elements of Law Considered with Reference to Principles of General 
Jurisprudence (6th edn, Clarendon 1905) 166 para 330. 
485
Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第一
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1 (n 482) 139, also in Wei (n 228) 77. Sometimes yeh 業, as a verb, is 
used as a noun and refers to the land itself, or a business in relation to the land. 
486
 Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第一
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1 (n482) 139 [translation by this author] 
 160 
 
 
5.1.3 The concept of yeh-zhu (業主)and yeh-zhu-quan(業主權) 
 
‘Yeh-zhu’ (業主)means an ‘owner’.487 A compound noun to express the rights an owner 
has over his real property is yeh-zhu-quan(業主權). Yeh-zhu-quan(業主權)was a 
combination of three words: yeh(業)that signified an estate, zhu(主)that referred to a 
master, and quan(權)that denoted a right to seise. Literally speaking, it means all 
proprietary rights an owner holds in relation to managing his real property.  
 
The definition of yeh-zhu (業主)varies in both the state’s and people’s eyes. A Japanese 
government survey report pointed out, for the purpose of taxation, that the Qing Code 
only recognised ‘one owner’ of a piece of land, and expressly forbid ‘one land with two 
owners’.488 From a state authority perspective, an owner means ‘the person who has the 
substantial and largest rights to a specific real property’.489 To be more specific, owner 
refers to the ‘large-rent landlord’ (da-zu-hu大租戶), whilst others who are not large-rent 
landlords do not count as an owner under the Qing Code. A person like a ‘small-rent 
landlord’ (xiao-zu-hu 小租戶) who controls the power to manage the land is not 
regarded as a true owner under this definition.
490
 This concept is very different from 
                                                 
487For the definition of this term ‘yeh-zhu’(業主), see Hsu Hsueh-chi (許雪姬), Taiwan Lishi Cidian (臺
灣歷史辭典)=Dictionary of Taiwan History (Yuan-liou Publishing 2004) 961. Yeh-zhu (業主)refers to 
the person who acquired a reclamation permit from the government and reclaimed land with hired labour. 
When the land was converted into a paddy, this reclaiming person acquired ownership and in return 
provided reports about the land back to the state authorities ready for taxation within a certain number of 
years (3 years for a paddy, 6 years for dry land). This person then acquired owner status in law by having 
his/her name registered in the book kept by the local authority. See also John R Shepherd, ‘Rethinking 
Tenancy: explaining spatial and temporal variation in late imperial and Republican China’ (1988) 30(3) 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 403 at 415. 
488
Qing Code expressly states one piece of land can only exist under one owner; for those who have yeh 
(estates) less than yeh-zhu-quan they were not recognised as an owner under Qing Code. See Commission 
for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1 (臺灣私法第一卷)=Taiwanese 
Private Law vol 1 (n 482) 141. 
489
ibid 141,142 [translation by this author] Also in Wang, Taiwan Falushi Gailun (台灣法律史概論) 
=Concise Taiwanese Legal History (n 189) 84. 
490
 Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1 (臺灣私法第一
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1 (n 482) 142. 
 161 
 
people’s perception of an owner though, with both large-rent and small-rent landlords 
seen as owners, so the scope of yeh-zhu (業主)is larger than the strict definition set forth 
in the Qing Code where the state authorities had taxation interests. To most people, 
small-rent landlords are more like owners than large-rent owners most of the time.
491
 
 
The above stated yeh (業), yeh-zhu (業主) and yeh-zhu-quan (業主權)in Taiwanese 
customary law originated from a multi-tiered landholding structure. This multi-tiered 
landholding ranged from two to four tiers,
492
 with the most commonly seen being a 
three-tiered landholding. According to Professor Dai, this structure emerged from 1723 
onwards.
493
 Although this multi-tiered landholding system was not officially 
recognised by the Qing Code
494
 because it caused confusion in taxation and was not 
favoured by the emperor, the three-tiered landholding system and multiple owners and 
ownerships, nevertheless, remains strong in Taiwanese customary practice.
495
 
 
The power to control and manage land gradually shifted from large-rent landlords 
                                                 
491
 A person holding a large-rental was named a large-rent landlord and the right held was known as 
da-zu-yeh (大租業, large-rent estate). A small-rent owner was also viewed as a landlord (but was in fact a 
tenant) and held the right called xiao-zu-yeh (小租業,small-rent estate). Dai Yan-hui(戴炎輝), ‘Qing Dai 
Taiwan Zhi Da Xiao Zu Ye (清代台灣之大小租業)=The Large and Small Rent Landholdings in the Qing 
Dynasty Taiwan’ (1963) 4 Taipei Wen Hsien(台北文獻)=Journal of Local Historical Research of Taipei 
City 467, 488. 
492
 The three-tiered structure was also named yi-tian-er-zhu (一田二主 one field with two owners) and 
the four-tiered structure was named yi-tian-san-zhu (一田三主 one field with three owners). See Hsu (n 
487) 41-42. 
493
 Dai (n 491) 470. But according to Allee, ‘a three-tier system of landlord-tenant relations had evolved’ 
by the nineteenth century. See Mark A Allee, Law and Local Society in Late Imperial China: northern 
Taiwan in the nineteenth century (Stanford University Press 1994) 52-53. This author thinks Professor 
Dai is more correct than Allee because according to an official record in Japanese research report Taiwan 
Shiho(臺灣私法), the power to control and manage the land gradually shifted from the large-rent 
landlord towards the small-rent tenant from 1800 onwards. The emergence of a three-tier system could 
not have been later than when the shifting phenomenon started; therefore, this author thinks Allee’s 
assertion that a ‘three-tier system emerged in the nineteenth century’ is inaccurate. 
494
 The Qing Code, also known as da-qing-lu-li (大清律例), was applied to western Taiwan for 211 
years (1684-1895). During 1624-62, it was the ‘Poster for Formosa’ (Plakaatboek Formosa) that ruled the 
southern part of Taiwan, with the multi-tiered system not having evolved yet. The Zhen Shi Empire won 
the battle against the Dutch company and ruled Taiwan for 21 years (1662-83) afterwards. During this 
period of time, the troops tilled most of the land themselves, so the two-tiered system emerged. Also in 
Dai (n 491) 470. 
495
 Why the state authorities eventually allowed and even encouraged a split of ownership to occur in 
Taiwan will be discussed in detail in Section 5.3. 
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towards small-rent tenants from the 1800 onwards.
496
 During this shift, two owners sat 
on the same parcel of land with their rights to collect rent from actual tillers 
xian-geng-diàn-ren (現耕佃人 primary cultivator). These two owners were a large-rent 
owner and a small-rent owner. In some areas, when land belonged to an aboriginal 
community,
497
 this three-tiered system even grew to a four-tiered structure, with the 
aboriginal community having the right to collect rent. As per a large-rent landlord, the 
aboriginal landlord (番業主 fan-yeh-zhu) also held a right to collect rent (番大租
fan-da-zu) from his lower tenants. The landholding structures are set out in the 
following figure for the convenience of further discussion. 
  
                                                 
496
 Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第一
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1 (n 482) 161. Also in Dai (n 491) 489,492. According to Professor Dai, 
the power to control the land began to shift from large-rent landlord towards small-rent landlords because 
the system allowed them to live off rent without directly managing the estate, so large-rent landlords 
became absent owners who held a right to collect large-rent. See Ka Chih-ming(柯志明), Japanese 
Colonialism in Taiwan: Land Tenure, Development, and Dependency,1895-1945 (Westview Press 1995) 
22. Eventually, this right to collect large-rent was repealed by the Formosa government (Japanese 
government in Taiwan) on the 20
 
May, 1904, with Taiwanese tenure becoming a two tiered and three 
tiered (if there was an aborigine owner) structure. See Yeh Shu-jen(葉淑貞), ‘Taiwan Rizhishiqi Zudian 
Zhidu Zhi Yunxing (臺灣日治時期租佃制度之運行)=The Operation of Taiwan's Land Tenure System 
During the Japanese Colonial Period’ (1995) 2(2) Taiwan Historical Research (台灣史研究) 87at 92. 
497
 The reason why aborigines were willing to lease their land to the Han tribes was due to the declining 
amount of over hunted spotted deers. The aborigines needed rental income to sustain their living outside 
of hunting. See Yang Guo-zhen (楊國楨), Ming Qing Tudi Qiyue Wenshu Yanjiu (明清土地契約文書研
究)=A Study on the Land Deeds of Ming and Qing Dynasty (China Remin University Press 2004) 257. 
Figure 5-1: The doctrine of estate 
yeh-zhu 業主 
(large-rent landlord) 
yeh-zhu 業主 
(small-rent landlord) 
primary cultivator 
fan-yeh-zhu 番業主 
(aboriginal landlord) 
yeh-zhu 業主 
(large-rent landlord) 
yeh-zhu 業主 
(small-rent landlord) 
primary cultivator 
 163 
 
5.1.4 The extension of the yeh concept  
 
This yeh concept was not only used for land but also extended to fishing grounds. 
Penghu County, as an off-shore island, had an exclusive enclosed area for fishing called 
ān (垵). The owner of ān (垵) does not ‘own’ the right to use the sea and capital from the 
resources, but merely has the right to exclude others from using the ān (垵). This ‘right 
to exclude’ and occupy the exclusive fishing area was called yeh (業), 498 the same 
word as yeh (業) used for the land. Everyone is free to use and catch fish from the sea, 
with the owner needing to get permission from the state authorities to acquire yeh 
(業)—a power to manage, over the enclosure ān (垵). Anyone wanting to fish within the 
enclosed ān (垵) must pay the owner a certain amount of catch or money. The state 
authorities tax the owner of yeh (yeh-zhu 業主) but not the fishermen who use the ān 
(垵).499 From this extension of yeh (業), the substance of yeh (業) clearly reveals that 
yeh (業) is merely ‘a right to exclude’ those who have not obtained permission of use. It 
is not ‘a right to use’ the sea’s resources because everyone is eligible to use them. In 
contrast to civil law ownership, yeh shows a negative, exclusivity characteristic. 
 
5.1.5 The concept of diàn(佃) 
 
Just like ‘estate’ and ‘tenure’ sometimes being used interchangeably, yeh (業) and diàn 
(佃) are used interchangeably in literature as well. To be more concise, yeh (業) 
normally signified the superiority of holdings, with diàn (佃) implying subordination. 
The use of the term depends upon the position a person is in this hierarchical 
landholding system. Diàn (佃) means that one man is deliberately made inferior to 
another, either by way of signing a contract with or leasing the land from the owner 
                                                 
498
 Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 3(臺灣私法第三
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 3 (n 480) 18. 
499
 ibid 18. 
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yeh-zhu (業主).  
 
The origins of this landlord and tenant structure was three hundred years ago when 
Taiwan had many parcels of land that remained untilled. Wealthy individuals obtained 
either land reclamation permits (k’en-chao墾照) from the government or contracts from 
aborigines to farm the land themselves, or find someone else to farm the land instead. 
To find someone else to farm the land was more popular than farming the land 
themselves. The wealthy individuals were normally absent owners. Concerning their 
good relationships with state authorities, it was easier for them to obtain land 
reclamation permits from the government.
500
 On very few occasions did poor farmers 
obtain ownership directly from the government. However, if poor farmers occupied the 
land before the national measurement, state authorities tolerated some occupiers by 
granting reclamation permission retrospectively.
501
 
 
Late comers had to acquire permission to farm from the first owners who held 
reclamation permission (if the land was untilled) or to lease the land (if the land was 
tilled or partially tilled) from the first owners. Late comers made themselves inferior to 
yeh-zhu（業主）by calling themselves diàn-hu （佃戶）. When diàn-hu （佃戶） 
gradually accumulated their wealth by tilling the land,
502
 they further leased their land 
to even latter comers (primary cultivators) to manage the land. The primary cultivators 
                                                 
500
 Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第一
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1(n 482) 160. According to records started from 1683 onwards, the Qing 
government encouraged people to immigrate to Taiwan to farm the untilled land. The land reclamation 
procedure was not so ready, so many wealthy mainland individuals required land reclamation permits 
from the government or contracts from the aborigines to monopolise the right to till the land and in the 
future they could collect rent from the tenants. Land in the southern part of Taiwan was normally obtained 
by granted permits, while the land in the northern part was acquired from the hand of aborigines. The land 
reclamation permits only granted rights on untilled land, but sometimes the wealthy individual applied the 
permits on the tilled land and forced the poor tiller to give wealthy individuals large rental incomes. See 
ibid 168. See also Shepherd (n 487) 415. 
501
 Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第一
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1(n 482) 93. 
502
 ibid 161. 
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were tenants of their overlords diàn-hu（佃戶）, while diàn-hu （佃戶）were tenants of 
their own overlords yeh-zhu (業主). This tenure relationship was called a yeh-diàn （業
佃）relationship because landlords were, at the same time, other people’s tenants. This is 
why yeh (業) and diàn (佃) were used interchangeably. 
 
Taiwanese tenure was, however, slightly different from English tenure as we can see 
when looking into the services provided by a tenant to their overlord. Unlike English 
tenure where tenants needed to provide various services to their overlords according to 
their individual abilities (for example, one tenant had to fight, another had to look after 
a household or to provide arms), services provided by Taiwanese tenants to their 
overlords were very simple. It was purely monetary—harvest or money, in exchange for 
the use of land.
503
 All tenants were free to leave if they were incapable of paying.
504
 
Each level was the same: the first owners paid land tax and poll tax to the state 
authorities; the second owners paid large-rents to the first owners, and primary 
cultivators paid small-rents to the second owners. Usually, the second owners ‘do not 
personally deliver large-rents to the initial owners themselves, but instead, ask their 
lower tenants (meaning primary cultivators) to do that for them’.505 Hence, primary 
cultivators paid twice for his lease, to the first and second owners respectively. 
 
In this hierarchical system, the second owners benefited the most because they did not 
pay rent to their overlords, whilst in the meantime collecting rent from primary 
cultivators. The first owners could not charge the second owners too much because the 
second owner brought their own tools and supplies (oxen, tools, seeds) to farm the 
                                                 
503
 If it was rice field, the tenants can choice from harvest to money as rent. If it was not rice field, like 
vegetable garden or sugarcane farmland, then the rent had to be a fix amount of money according to the 
classification of farmland. Mainland China did not separate rice field (tien田) and non-rice field (yuan園) 
like Taiwan did. See ibid 53,177,179. 
504
 ibid 169. The tenant can simply ask to leave or give up the right to till the land if he cannot afford the 
rent, it was called tui-diàn(退佃). Also in Dai (n 491) 476. 
505
 Allee (n 493) 54. 
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untilled land,
506
 and the value of untilled land was usually low. When the second 
owners accumulated some wealth after tilling the land for a while, they could lease out 
the land, wholly or partially, to primary cultivators and become their overlords. The 
second owners could charge a higher rent because the land was more fertile than before. 
During the Qing Dynasty Dao Guang (道光) period (1821 -1850), the rents that were 
charged were two to six times more than the rents the second owners paid to the first 
owners.
507
  
 
Tenure also happened in house holdings. Before building was completed, a primary 
cultivator needed to pay an upfront amount of money (xian-xiao-yin 現銷銀) to the first 
owner (yeh-zhu 業主 ) after getting construction permission. 508  This money was 
normally lower than the market price if the building ground was sold, with the intension 
of doing so being to show that the building ground was not sold but instead leased to the 
primary cultivator. When the building structure was finished, the primary cultivator 
became cuo-zhu (戶主 the house owner). As the owner of the house he needed to pay 
ground rent (di-ji-zu地基租) per annum to the second owner (diàn-hu 佃戶).509 The 
second owner paid a large-rent to the first owner based on the size of the ground.
510
 If 
the first owner was an aboriginal, the first owner had to pay the aboriginal landlord 
another large-rent based on the size of the ground.
511
  
 
Tenure usually has a time limitation, no matter whether for house ground or land. The 
                                                 
506
 Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第一
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1 (n 482) 177. 
507
 Liu Yong-cheng(劉永成), Zhonggou Zudian Zhidu Shi(中國租佃制度史)=The History of Chinese 
Tenure System (Wen Jin 文津 1997) 287. 
508
 Wang, Taiwan Falushi Gailun (台灣法律史概論)=Concise Taiwanese Legal History (n 189) 88. 
509
 ibid 88. Also in Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 
1(臺灣私法第一卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1 (n 482) 90. 
510
 ibid 90-91. Also in Wang, Taiwan Falushi Gailun(台灣法律史概論)=Concise Taiwanese Legal 
History (n 189) 88. 
511
 See Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第
一卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1(n 482) 91. 
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terms spanned from one year to perpetual like a spectrum, with the most popular 
duration being a term between three to six years.
512
 Terms above ten years were rare 
and only happened for waste land.
513
 If overlords did not negotiate a fixed term with 
tenants, they usually had an oral agreement that the overlord had the right to change 
tenants one year after.
514
 This type of tenure was called xian-nian-pacht-geng (現年贌
耕 one year tenure).515  
 
Despite both English tenure and Taiwanese tenure having a time limitation, there are 
some differences in the details. English tenure separates estates into present and future 
estates, while Taiwanese tenure does not. As Hayes points out, in its primitive state, 
tenure was only held for a short term.
516
 Afterwards, tenure was granted for life, with 
the lord ‘resuming the land on the death of the tenant, and granting it out anew’.517 The 
son of the tenant was then permitted to succeed and thus caused indulgence followed by 
the extension of the grant—the fee-tail (to the tenant and his issue) then emerged.518 
Finally, the lord accepted the extension of the grant stretch to the tenant and his heirs, 
with the concept of fee-simple arising.
519
 The law ‘making out a course of descent, 
which enlarging by degrees, embraced his relations, lineal and collateral, male and 
female’,520 led to the duration of English estates being longer and longer, with tenure 
and ownership evolving hand in hand with the law of succession.  
 
Taiwanese tenure had no such history, so unlike England that classified tenure as 
                                                 
512
 Wang, Taiwan Rizhi Shiqi de Falu Gaige(台灣日治時期的法律改革)=Legal Reform in Taiwan 
under Japanese Colonial Rule (n 227) 322. 
513
 ibid. 
514
 ibid. 
515
 ibid. Also in Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺
灣私法第一卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1(n 482) 315. 
516
 William Hayes, An Introduction to Conveyancing and The New Statutes Concerning Real Property 
With Precedents and Practical Notes, vol I (5th edn, Sweet 1840) 7. 
517
 ibid. 
518
 ibid 7-8. 
519
 ibid 8. 
520
 ibid. 
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inheritable (fee simple, fee tail)
521
 and non-inheritable (life estate), all types of tenure in 
Taiwan were inheritable,
522
 with no discrimination to lineal or collateral heirs. As 
Taiwanese tenure was monetary oriented, the tenure relationship lasted until both parties 
agreed to terminate, with tenants in each level free to leave when they were unable or 
unwilling to pay the rent. 
 
The structure of Taiwanese tenure (from the first owner’s perspective) is presented in 
the following figures.  
                                                 
521
 Explained by Hayes, ‘…fee-simple, expressed in legal phraseology by the word fee, without more’, 
means the tenant and his heirs all have the fee (interest in land). Fee-tail, on the contrary, is a fee with a 
tail where only the tenant and his issue can have the fee. See ibid 8. Also in Simpson, Land Law and 
Registration (n 58) 30. The evolution of a short term tenure to fee simple, as stated in Hayes (n 516) 7-8, 
is that ‘In its primitive state, the possession was held at pleasure, or for a short term only; afterwards, the 
tenure was for life, the lord resuming the land on the death of the tenant, and granting it out anew. But at 
length the son of the tenant was permitted to succeed; an indulgence which was followed by the extension 
of the grant, first to the tenant and his issue (i.e. in fee-tail), and finally to him and his heirs (i.e. in 
fee-simple, expressed in legal phraseology by the word fee, without more), the law marking out a course 
of descent, which enlarging by degrees, embraced his relations, lineal and collateral, male and female’. 
522
 Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第一
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1 (n 482)150. 
Figure 5-2: Tenure in land 
Han Chinese landlord 
tenant with large-rent to pay 
tenant with large-rent to pay 
tenant with small-rent to pay  
aboriginal landlord 
Han Chinese landlord 
tenant with large-rent to pay 
tenant with small-rent to pay 
 169 
 
When the primary cultivator built the house on the farmland, the small-rent became 
ground rent (di-ji-zu 地基租): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Conveyance of landholding 
 
The flexibility of the Taiwanese tenure system provided two different kinds of 
conveyances, with it being important to make a comparison with the English concept of 
assignment, lease and licence later. One type of conveyance is gei（給）, which created 
an estate for the receiver; the closest verb to this analogy in English is to ‘grant’,523  to 
‘vest’524 or to ‘assign’ (if made between two tenants).525 Another type of conveyance is 
pacht (贌,in land) or shui (稅,in house or flat); the closest analogy in English being to 
‘lease’, but it is not the same as a civil law lease (which belongs to the law of 
obligations). Pacht (贌)and shui (稅)were not Chinese, but Taiwanese. Pacht (贌)was a 
Dutch word meaning agricultural lease
526
 that came into the Taiwanese language after 
                                                 
523
 For the definition of ‘grant’, see the Terminology section attached to this research. 
524
 Simpson provided an example that A, the fee simple owner, made a grant to B for life and then to C in 
tail. B received a life estate in possession, C took an estate in remainder for he was only entitled to enjoy 
the land when B died. ‘It should be noted that all these estates were “vested”’. See Simpson, Land Law 
and Registration (n 58) 31. 
525
 For a more detailed analysis, see 5.6.1.below. 
526
 Lin Zheng-you (林政佑), ‘Rizhishiqi Caichanfa de Quanli Jiangou yu Gaizao: Yi Weidengji de 
Pacht-gen-quan Weili(日治時期財產法的權利建構與改造：以未登記的贌耕權為例)=The Rights 
Construction and Reform in Property Law under Japanese Ruling: unregistered pacht-gen right as an 
Figure 5-3: Tenure in house 
Han Chinese landlord 
tenant with large-rent to pay 
tenant with large-rent to pay 
house owner with ground rent to 
pay (cuo-zhu 厝主) 
 
aboriginal landlord 
Han Chinese landlord 
tenant with large-rent to pay 
house owner with ground 
rent to pay (cuo-zhu厝主) 
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1624 when individuals from the Dutch East India Company leased land from local 
aborigines. The rents paid under pacht (贌)could be money or goods from the harvest. 
Shui(稅)was only used in relation to house or flat leaseholds. Rents under shui (稅)were 
purely monetary.
527
  
 
There is no clear evidence showing that pacht (贌)and shui (稅)were separated from the 
concept of licence: tenants could exclude their landlords but licensees could not. No 
literature indicates Taiwanese customary law making a clear cut distinction between 
lease and licence, but under Japanese rule, a short term pacht was treated as a licence 
and a long term pacht as a lease.
528
 It is clear though that gei (給)and pacht (贌)were 
widely used for three different types of land: tilled, waste and aboriginal land. In general, 
when the first owners established tenure relationships with their lower tenants, the 
grants were made by gei(給). The second tenants’ grants were usually called pacht (贌) 
because the second tenants normally preserved a portion of land for self-cultivation. In 
the four-tiered structure (see Figure 5-4(3) below), the second grant was still called gei, 
highlighting that this term was not only used between landlords and tenants but also 
between tenants and tenants. In contrast to gei (給), the word pacht (贌) was always 
used between landlords and tenants. This study will return to gei (給) in a further 
discussion about an analogy of assignment to gei (給) in Section 5.6. 
  
                                                                                                                                               
example’ (Research Center for Digital Humanities of National Taiwan University, Taipei, 30 July) 70. 
527
 Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第一
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1 (n 482) 108-109. 
528
 ibid 36. According to Taiwan Shiho(臺灣私法), if a lease is fixed to a term, such a lease is governed 
by a personal action; if a lease is a perpetual lease (like yong-diàn永佃, a for ever lease) it is governed by 
a real action. See ibid 309. This perpetual lease was limited to one hundred years after 1900 under the rule 
of the Japanese government. Ordinance number 2 of 1900 regulated that ‘yong-diàn shall not exceed one 
hundred years’. See further ibid 322. 
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These two types of conveyances of estate (yeh 業) are presented in Figure 5-4 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No matter whether an estate was granted in the form of gei (給) or pacht (贌), 
registration was not essential to a valid transfer. The principle of registration stated in 
2.5.1, where ownership is created by registration, did not exist in Taiwanese customary 
law. Unlike in England, the only way to transfer freehold land was the vendor handing 
over a piece of turf publicly to the purchaser in the presence of witnesses,
529
 Taiwanese 
conveyance had no such public ceremony. According to local custom, some areas might 
have had a ceremony where ‘both parties step foot on the targeted field’530 to signify 
real rights had been transferred to the receiver, but this symbolic ceremony was not an 
essential requirement of a valid transfer. There was no specific requirement for the 
formation of transfer, no matter whether it was an assignment or a lease, with oral and 
                                                 
529
 Hayes (n 516) 24. ‘The ordinary assurances were—First, a FEOFFMENT, which passed the 
immediate freehold, being a visible transfer of the possession or seisin of the feud, by the ceremony 
(technically called livery of seisin) of delivering upon the land, in the presence of witnesses, a detached 
portion of the soil, or some other symbol; a solemn investiture, which, while the art of writing was rare, 
supplied the only evidence of the transaction, and which, although written evidence was afterwards 
required by statute, still continued to be the essence of the conveyance’. 
530
 Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第一
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1(n 482) 127. 
Reproduced from Wang Tay-seng 王泰升, Taiwan Falushi Gailun 台灣法律史概論(Angle, 2004)84 
Figure 5-4: Conveyance of estate 
(2) waste land 
pacht(贌) gei(給) owner (yeh-zhu) 
(landlord with 
large rent) 
small-rent landlord 
(tenant with small 
rent) 
primary cultivator 
(3) aborigine land 
aborigine owner 
(fan-yeh-zhu) 
large-rent  
landlord 
 
primary  
cultivator 
small-rent  
tenant 
 
gei(給) gei(給) pacht(贌) 
(1) tilled land 
owner (yeh-zhu) primary cultivator 
pacht(贌) 
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written agreements both acceptable.
531
 Despite customary law accepting oral 
agreements as binding contracts,
532
 parties preferred to have agreements written down 
in their family members’ presence.533 The Qing Code did not require one ‘to deliver a 
written contract’ as an essential requirement for a valid transfer of ownership534 
because most farmers were illiterate. Besides, the subject that the farmers transferred 
was an abstract real right called yeh（業）; it was meaningless to demand that farmers 
hand over something that was purely conceptual and intangible. It was not until the 
Japanese Civil Code was enacted in Taiwan that ‘delivery as an essential requirement 
for ownership transfer’ was introduced. It needs to be noted though that the delivery 
requirement was only applied to movable things. The registering and delivery 
requirement was a later creation designed for immovable and movable things that did 
not fit into an intangible property transfer. A patent transfer should take reference from 
pacht(贌) or gei(給)as stated in this paragraph, rather than civil law doctrines. This 
study will return to this issue further in Section 5.6 (assignments and licences in a map 
of Taiwanese tenure). 
 
5.3 The similarities and differences between Taiwanese and Chinese tenure  
 
Both Taiwanese and Chinese researchers agree that split ownerships originated from 
Fujian province,
535
 but mainland Chinese and Taiwanese researchers hold contrasting 
                                                 
531
 According to Yeh Shu-jen’s (葉淑貞) research, contracts before 1930 were normally made orally, but 
after 1936, written contracts became common. Yeh Shu-jen thinks it was because of economic recession 
in the first half of 1930 that heightened the landlord and tenant’s willingness to reduce disputes by written 
contracts. And another reason why written contracts became popular was due to the encouragement of 
yeh-diàn-hui (業佃會,a mediation group that helped landlords and tenants settle disputes). See Yeh (n 
496 ) 88, 90-91, 93. 
532
 Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第一
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1(n 482) 220. 
533
 ibid 127, 225.  
534
 ibid 127. 
535
 Yang (n 497) 274-275. Also in Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, 
Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第一卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1(n 482) 160. 
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opinions about whether Taiwanese tenure is the same as Chinese tenure,
536
 or 
Taiwanese tenure is actually a sui generis type. Taiwanese researchers overall think that 
Taiwanese tenure is the sui generis type, because in Fujian, China, it was large-rent 
owners that controlled the actual power over the land, but in Taiwan, it was small-rent 
owners that controlled the power.
537
  
 
Taiwanese tenure, with a split-ownership at both landlord and tenant levels, was more 
complicated than Fujian’s. Especially, a split-ownership at the landlord level marks a 
difference between Taiwan and Fujian due to the unique historical development of 
Taiwan. The first settlers in Taiwan were not from the Chinese Han tribe. The first 
settlers were Malayo-Polynesian aborigines from Austronesia.
538
 Land, before Han 
Chinese farmers came, was either occupied by acculturated plains aborigines like the 
Pingpu (平埔) tribe, or by un-acculturated aborigines that lived in the mountains. Due to 
the lack of sophisticated large scale farming skills, many occupied lands remain untilled 
during Qing government rule. The state authorities wanted to proffer legal benefits to 
                                                 
536
 Chinese researchers think that there is no difference between Taiwanese tenure when comparing 
south-east Chinese tenure because split ownerships happened in both areas, whether at the level of 
landlords or tenants. Example like Yang Guo-zhen (楊國楨) argues that the Taiwanese tenure system 
should not be a more special tenure than in south-east China. See Yang (n 497) 279. 
537
 Ka Chih-ming (柯志明) points out that Knapp incorrectly applies the titles of land rights from South 
China, surface rights (t’ien-mien 田面) and subsoil rights (t’ien-ti 田底) to the land rights held by 
small-rent landlords and large-rent landlords in Taiwan respectively. In fact, it was the other way round. 
Since the mid-eighteenth century onwards, large-rent landlords held surface rights while the small-rent 
landlords held subsoil rights. In China, large-rent owners held the actual controlling power over the land, 
while in Taiwan, small-rent owners were those who held the actual power. See Ka (n 496) 25. Also in 
Kanako Miyahata (宮畑加奈子), ‘Rizhi Shiqi Taiwan Hanren Shehui Dui 'Yeh' de Jianchi: Yi Shouyicai 
yu Shiyongcai Guannian de Xiangke Wei Zhuzhou (日治時期台灣漢人社會對『業』的堅持：以收益財
與使用財觀念的相剋為主軸)=The Persistence of 'Yeh' by Han Chinese in Taiwan under the Era of 
Japanese Rule: on the Conflict of Property for Use and Property for Capital’ (DPhil thesis, National 
Taiwan University 2005) 25. 
538
 The details of migration route, see Peter Bellwood, ‘The Austronesian Dispersal and the Origin of 
Languages’ (1991) 265(1) Scientific American 88-93. Also in Li Jen-kuei (李壬奎 ), ‘Taiwan 
Nandaoyuyan de Fenbu Han Zuqun deqianxi(台灣南島語言的分佈和族群的遷徙)=The Language 
Distribution and Migration of the Formosan Natives’ in Chao Feng-fu and Tsai Mei-hui (eds)第一屆台灣
語言國際研討會論文集=Papers from the First International Symposium on Languages in Taiwan (Crane 
1995) 1-16. Pingpu tribe, the tribe with which sixty percent of Taiwanese people has genetic links, is a 
part of the Austronesian languages family, see Institute of Ethnology, ‘Pingpu Zu Lishu de Dajianting: 
nandaoyu zu (平埔族隸屬的大家庭：南島語族)=The Big Linguistic Family that Pingpu Tribe belongs to: 
Austronesian languages’ (Academic Sinica)  <http://www.ianthro.tw/p/46> accessed 9 Octorber 2012. 
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Han Chinese farmers in order to attract them to cultivate the untilled land.
539
 By 
granting a reclamation permit assuring yeh-zhu-quan (業主權,ownership) to Han 
Chinese farmers, it attracted many farmers who wanted to have land of their own.  
 
The creation of landlord split ownership was a carefully calculated political choice 
made by the state authorities of that time. In order to satisfy both sides, state authorities 
admitted both aborigines (番業主 fan-yah-zhu) and Chinese (yah-zhu 業主) to have 
ownership of the same piece of land.
540
 This dual recognition was sustained when the 
land was untilled and located within an aboriginal community’s domain. If the land had 
already been cultivated by the aborigines themselves, the aborigines were the sole 
owners of the land and Chinese farmers could not claim ownership. This cultivation 
model was permitted by the emperor himself in 1724 and excluded the ‘one owner to 
one piece of land’ restriction set forth in the Qing Code. 541  Henceforward, this 
split-ownership at the landlord level thrived and marked the difference of tenure in 
Fujian.  
 
As explained earlier, state authorities had a political reason to make ownership splits. 
They wanted to control the conflicts between Chinese settlers and aboriginal 
communities on one hand, whilst on the other hand, maximize revenues from the land. 
The recognition of aboriginal ownership had a pragmatic concern of the state authorities 
wanting to levy taxes on those communities. In the past, levying a tax was difficult 
because land in aboriginal communities was commonly owned. It was difficult to 
                                                 
539
 Yang (n 497) 258-259. 
540
 ibid. 
541
 The emperor announced an order in 1724: ‘Demand local authorities to make an announcement that 
those untilled lands within dear hunting fields in Taiwan are opened up for cultivation through leases 
granted by aborigines’. [translation by this author] In Qing Empire, Qinding Daqing Huidian Shili: 
Guangxu (欽定大清會典事例：光緒)=Qing Code (Chunghwa 1991 reprint) book II, roll 166, p1111. The 
following year, the emperor further demand local authorities to tax untilled land entitled to Han Chinese 
farmers when the land was cultivated. In a way, the emperor excluded the law set forth in Qing Code that 
only allows one piece of land to have one owner. In contrast, the emperor permitted one piece of land to 
have two owners that were entitled to taxation separately. 
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collect tax from every individual because the land was not entitled to an individual. 
Recognition of aboriginal ownership introduced a private property notion into these 
communities. Aborigines had to accept it because their hunting areas were shrinking due 
to the development of paddies by Chinese farmers.
542
 Accepting the private property 
concept allowed them to live off the steady rents collected from Chinese farmers. 
Meanwhile, state authorities created another ownership by granting reclamation permits 
to Chinese farmers. Through the control of granting reclamation permits, the 
government was able to levy taxes on these farmers.  
 
Ownership was not only split between aborigines and Chinese but also further between 
Chinese and Chinese. When the power to control the land largely fell into the hands of 
small-rent owners in the nineteenth century, both aboriginal landlords and Chinese 
farmers became owners in name, leaving small-rent owners as actual owners. 
Ownership was further split into three, at the landlord level, whereas Fujian had nothing 
similar. From this perspective, this study concludes that Taiwanese tenure is a sui 
generis type.  
 
For the above reason, this research does not suggest that the same result equally applies 
to China because the Taiwanese landholding system has a structure that has evolved 
from its own unique history. This research moves on to a comparative study of 
Taiwanese and English tenure and excludes a further discussion of whether China could 
use their tenure system to build a similar property structure for patents. 
 
5.4 A comparative study of English and Taiwanese tenure 
                                                 
542
 Shih Tien-fu(施添福), ‘Qingdai Taiwan 'Fanli Buan Gengzuo' de Yuanyou: yi Zhuqian Diqu Weili(清
代台灣『番黎不諳耕作』的緣由：以竹塹地區為例)=The Reason Why 'Aborigines Are Not Good at 
Farming': a case study of Hsin-chu region’ (1990) 69 Bulletin of the Institute of Ethonology, Academia 
Sinica 67 at 77. Also in Wei (n 228) 30. The historian believes that this phenomenon happened widely at 
the middle and the northern part of Taiwan. See Chen (n 479) 27. 
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5.4.1 The similarities 
 
From the discussion above in 4.1.2 (the doctrine of estates and seisin) and 5.1.5 (the 
concept of diàn), this study concludes that the first similarity between English tenure 
and Taiwanese tenure systems is that the owner did not own the land but merely held it 
as tenant of the king
543
or of the emperor (in Taiwan). English lawyers detached 
ownership from the land itself and attached it to an imaginary thing called an estate;
544
 
ownership in Taiwan was also attached to yeh（業）, not to a physical thing. Estate and 
yeh（業）were able to be segmented by different durations that allowed ownership to be 
split over the same piece of land. 
 
The second commonality is that in both English and Taiwanese tenure systems, there 
was a crown, an overlord, a state authority, or an non-individual unit like a commoner 
community that controlled the distribution of resources, with the source of the power 
not primarily vested to the land owner, but from a society, to the crown (or the emperor) 
and then to the land owner.
545
 The owner did not obtain a primary, absolute right to use, 
but merely a right to exclude.  
 
The third similarity is that the ownership of estate or yeh was not naturally perpetual, 
                                                 
543
 Japanese research report Taiwan Shiho (臺灣私法) states that, ‘[Taiwanese] people think that the 
ownership of real property belongs to the emperor, and the ownership shall not be private owned by 
individuals. Yeh-zhu-quan (業主權) is the largest right to real property, so it is different from the 
ownership concept under civil law’. See Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in 
Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第一卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1 (n 482)92. 
544
 Simpson, Land Law and Registration (n 58) 30. A similar description can be find in Onions and 
Friedrichsen 683.  
545
 It is the same with patentees. In the case of Harmar v Playne 1807, Lord Eldon states that the crown 
on behalf of the public grants patents to the patentees. He says, ‘…where the crown on behalf of the 
public grants letters patents, the grantee, entering into a contract with the crown, the benefit of which 
contract the public are to have’. See Harmar v Playne [1807] 1 CPC 257, also in Gubby (n 91) 254. 
Therefore, we can see the source of power is not primarily vested to the patentee, but from the public, to 
the crown and then to the patentee. 
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but had a time limitation. Life estate in English tenure was limited to the tenant’s life 
and leasehold estate limits to a certain term of years. Life estate also existed under 
Taiwanese tenure but was a special type of tenure. Gong-lao-zu (功勞租) was granted 
by the emperor to a grantee, for his lifetime, upon their achievement to the state 
authorities. This type of ownership dissolved along with the death of the grantee. A 
fixed term leasehold could be found in diàn（佃）—the usual term ranged from three to 
six years.
546
 
 
The fourth resemblance is, because the public or the crown (or the emperor) on behalf 
of the public controlled the source of power to use, everyone was free to use the land. 
The owners did not enjoy primary, outright ownership, but merely a right to exclude 
when ownerships were vested. The granting of an estate or yeh（業）was not a 
conveyance of something that was already there—it was not a conveyance of a usage 
right from the public to the individual, but to separate owners from others.
547
 A yeh 
（業）grant was the granting of a right to exclude. English estate was the same. As 
stated in 4.1.2, English lands were held either commonly by villagers, by an overlord or 
by the crown with ‘the right to keep all others off it’. 548 The landholding systems of 
England and Taiwan had no significant difference in its legal substance. 
 
5.4.2 The differences 
 
In spite of many similarities between these two tenure systems, there are still some 
minor differences. To present an accurate comparative study, this study will list these 
                                                 
546
 Wang, Taiwan Falushi Gailun (台灣法律史概論)=Concise Taiwanese Legal History (n 189) 88. 
547
 The similarity becomes stronger when yeh is extended to the sea, as stated in 5.1.4. The owner of 
enclosed fishery area ān (垵)does not ‘own’ the right to use the sea. Since the sea is open to everyone, the 
source of the right to use did not originate from a government or emperor. 
548
 Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I (n 300) 232-233. Also 
in Burn and Cartwright (n 11) 33-34. 
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differences below. The first difference is that the Taiwanese tenure system did not create 
yeh (業) by separating yeh into present and future interest, descendible by lineage or 
descendible by collateral. Taiwanese yeh was all inheritable. An English estate grant, in 
contrast to Taiwanese yeh (業), combines the following two sets of factors: future or 
present interests, descendible or non-descendible estate, and turns them into four results: 
future and descendible (fee-simple estate in remainder), present and descendible 
(fee-simple estate), future and non-descendible (life estate in remainder), and present 
and non-descendible (life estate). However, under the Taiwanese tenure system, all 
estates were descendible and there was no special category for future interest. All grants 
were associated with present interests
549
 and descendible to all kinds of heirs. English 
tenure, on the other hand, had the granting of future interest like a life estate in 
remainder, or even a limitation on the qualification of a grantee’s heir like estates entail.  
 
Secondly, there was no estate in fee tail and estate pur autre vie (owner holds an estate 
during another’s lifetime550) in the Taiwanese tenure system. The closest estate pur 
autre vie that one could get was yang-shan-zu（養贍租）, which was rent paid to and 
held by the owner’s elderly relative in his/her lifetime.551 However, yang-shan-zu （養
贍租）is slightly different from an estate pur autre vie because an estate pur autre vie is 
an estate that an owner holds for the life of another person, instead of being their own. 
An estate held under yang-shan-zu（養贍租）was an estate held by a clan. The rent that 
a clan collected from the lease would pay for the living expenses of their elderly 
                                                 
549
 Yeh Shu-jen (葉淑貞) summarised in the 1930s that four popular types of estate were granted by the 
landlord according to different lengths of time: 1) ten years or twenty years beyond if the land is 
uncultivated, 2) one year and automatically renew itself until the landlord terminates the tenancy (some 
called them yearly periodic tenancies), if the land or non-rice field is cultivated, 3) three to five years (this 
type was the most common one), and 4) an unlimited term with an implied renewal, unless the landlord 
expressly manifested that he/she wanted to take his/her grant back. A fix-term grant was much more 
popular than an implied, unfix term grant. These four types of grant were targeted on present interests in 
land, with no future interest grant found in the Taiwanese tenure system as it is in the English tenure 
system. See Yeh (n 496) 105. 
550
 Burn and Cartwright (n 11) 54. 
551
 See Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第
一卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1(n 482) 308.  
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relatives, since there were always elderly relatives needing to be supported in a clan, so 
yang-shan-zu （養贍租）was not always fixed to the lifetime of one specific individual 
as an estate pur autre vie. 
 
Thirdly, villain tenure did not exist in the Taiwanese tenure system. In some areas of 
China, like Anhui (安徽) and Jiangsu (江蘇) provinces during the Ming and Qing 
dynasties (Ming: 1368-1644, Qing: 1644-1911), villain tenants provided servile services 
to their overlord unwillingly because it was a descending hierarchy of obligations. If 
villain tenants tried to escape, the landlord had the right to punish them according to 
vassal law in the Qing Code.
552
  
 
Villain tenure did not exist in Taiwan as, in contrast to mainland China, land on the 
island was comparatively newly-acquired by Chinese owners. The land in Taiwan was 
not concentrated on one wealthy individual or family’s hand, on the contrary, Han 
Chinese landlords had to share ownership with the first comers—the aborigines. In 
Taiwan, overlords and tenants were parties to a business contract, not members of 
different classes based on feudal subordination.
553
 Another reason why villain tenants 
did not exist in Taiwanese society is attributed to the supply and demand for land and 
labour in Taiwan being different from Anhui and Jiangsu provinces. Han Chinese 
tenants had to risk their lives to cross the dangerous Formosa Strait (also now known as 
the Taiwan Strait) and it was impossible for them to bring their wives and children, with 
only three out of ten successfully reaching Taiwan.
554
 It was a society with land supply 
                                                 
552
 Liu (n 507) 315. 
553
 R H Tawney, Land and Labour in China (3rd edn, George Allen & Unwin 1964) 63. Tawney pointed 
out that tenure in China ‘possesses no landed aristocracy, no dominant class of junkers or squires…not 
afflicted by the manorial estates worked by corvees’. However, what Tawney says is not completely true 
because there were corvees in some areas of China. Landed aristocracy and corvees remain in existence in 
Anhui, Jiangsu, Kwangtung, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Hunan and Hubei provinces even until the Ming and Qing 
dynasty. See Liu (n 507) 217-222. This author thinks Tawney’s description that ‘landlord and tenant are 
parties to a business contract’ is more like Taiwanese society, rather than Chinese society. 
554
 See Sim Kiantek(沈建德), Taiwan Xie Tong(台灣血統)=Taiwanese Descent (Qian Wei 前衛 2003) 
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larger than demand; therefore, there were no social conditions allowing a Han Chinese 
overlord to abuse tenants in short supply. 
 
Fourthly, unlike the manor system in England where the central government required 
soldiers and money from the manor and the manor supplied a fully equipped fighting 
force in exchange for immunity from legal and administrative control of the 
government,
555
 tenure in Taiwan was not military orientated. Rent provision was not an 
exchange for immunity from the control of central government but more of a reward 
reflecting the overlord’s previous investment in the land. Although this military 
orientated rent could be found in some mountainous areas where they had guardpost 
rent,
556
 settlers needed to pay such a rent to the armed guards who would fend off 
attacks from unacculturated aborigines (sheng-fan 生番), even though this was not 
commonly seen. Despite settlers occasionally departing themselves from the control of 
central government,
557
 it was a regional phenomena but not a national practice like the 
manor system deployed in England.  
 
5.4.3 Why the similarities matter 
 
Why are the similarities stated in 5.4.1 important to a property model for patents?  
 
Firstly, franchises were assimilated in land law by applying the doctrine of seisin and 
doctrine of estates from the English tenure system.
558
 If the similarity is proven, it 
                                                                                                                                               
3-5. 
555
 Burn and Cartwright (n 11) 32. 
556
 For more detailed information about guardpost rent, see Allee (n 493) 61. 
557
 ‘The guardpost head was responsible for collecting the guardpost rent and, in the case of government 
guardposts, receiving the disbursement of government subsidies. When the remote locations of guardpost 
authorities was added to this consideration, it is unsurprising that in some instances the guardpost 
authorities came to assume a de facto governmental role in enforcing law and order’. See ibid 62-63. 
558
 See Lupton (n 253) 51. Lupton presents a profound analysis of the history of franchises being granted 
as fee simple, in association with the doctrine of seisin and doctrine of estates, due to the rules of 
succession established by the statute Qula Emptores 1290. ‘A partial solution to the problem was to 
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could be used to build a new property model for patents based on Taiwanese tenure 
system. Secondly, customary practice is a source of law. If judges cannot find a legal 
basis for a civil case in statutory laws, customary practice is their second choice. Earlier, 
Chapter 2 proved that the law of things in Taiwanese Civil Code does not work for 
patents, thus this void can only be filled by customary law. Thirdly, if it is proven that 
Taiwanese tenure is similar to English tenure, it will show Taiwanese people that it is 
easier to absorb the English property model rather than others that are dissimilar.  
 
The proving of similarities also saves a lot of effort debating whether transplanting 
foreign jurisprudence is right and genuinely good for local communities because the 
similarities explain themselves. It is a commonality in both societies and thus it is 
possible to use Taiwanese tenure system to build a property model for patents. 
 
5.5 A property model for patents based on Taiwanese tenure 
 
5.5.1 Prefatory 
 
Based on the similarities that both societies have, the following further discusses the 
possibility of using the Taiwanese tenure system to build a property model for patents. 
Earlier in 4.3.1, this research compared Taiwanese civil law and English common law, 
with two conclusions reached at the end of that section. In order to successfully build a 
property model for patents, (1) ownership over such a property has to be limited by 
duration and be able to be segmented, and (2) the law vests only a ‘right to exclude’ to 
the owner(s) with everyone free to use that property in principle.  
                                                                                                                                               
develop the idea that some franchises become “annexed” and thereby “appendant” or “appurtenant” to 
land, with the result that such franchises would pass with alienation of the land, to the extent that the land 
itself was alienable. The alienability of a tenant’s estate in fee simple in land has been established with 
qualifications by the statute Qula Emptores 1290.’ The primary source that Lupton cites is the statute 
reproduced in Harry Rothwell, English Historical Documents, 1189-1327 (Eyre and Spottiswoode 1975). 
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The first and second conclusions can be extended to another commonality: a concept of 
ownership under this exclusionary structure must not be absolute and unitary. These 
three basic conclusions indicate that the ownerships that owners hold are not primary, 
absolute, outright ownerships and that they themselves are the source of law, and there 
must be overlords, commoners communities or a crown, emperor or state authority on 
behalf of the society that controls distribution.
559
 The same rules reflect on patents 
because patentees do not obtain a primary, outright and perpetual ownership over their 
patents. It must be attributed to a paramount or theoretical human community of 
commoners that control the distribution of human intelligence where all resources are 
inherently commonly owned. State authorities, the crown or emperor, on behalf of a 
society, grant patents to patentees.  
 
Concerning these commonalities above, this research proposes six points to help rebuild 
a property model based on the Taiwanese tenure system, other than a civil law model, as 
seriatim:  
 
a. The law of yeh (業)being more feasible than the law of things (see 5.5.2 below).  
b. The yeh-zhu-quan (業主權)concept is superior to Taiwanese civil law ownership 
suo-you-quan (所有權)(see 5.5.3). 
c. The principle of registration shall not be adopted in the patent registration (see 
5.5.4) 
d. Patent ‘assignment’ should not be translated into rang-yu (讓與) to prevent any 
confusion with the existing usage of outright ownership alienation for physical 
things (see 5.5.5). 
                                                 
559
 See Harmar (n 545). Lord Eldon says the crown ‘on behalf of the public’ grants patents to the 
patentees.  
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e. ‘Patent assignment’ shall be translated as ‘zhuan-li-zhuan-rang’ (專利轉讓) rather 
than the civil law term ‘zhuan-li-rang-yu’ (專利讓與)(see 5.6.1). 
f. A licence is similar to the concept of pacht, thus licences can be envisaged as 
personal obligations made by grantors and grantees (see 5.6.4 and 5.6.5). 
 
5.5.2 The law of ‘yeh’ instead of the law of ‘things’ 
 
Firstly, the segmentation of ownership by different duration is crucial for justifying 
patents as property because a patentee does not hold a patent perpetually but for a time 
limitation. It was associated with the property model built on English tenure that 
segmented ownerships by different durations: tenant in fee simple, tenant for life and 
leaseholder with a fixed term. As Burn states, English tenure is ‘one slice of the 
perpetual time, one slice of the entire ownership’.560 If the same or similar structure can 
be found in Taiwanese tenure, then it is possible to explain a patentee’s ownership based 
on Taiwanese tenure regardless of the restricted definition in the law of things in the 
Taiwanese Civil Code. 
 
As stated earlier, Taiwanese tenure has a time limitation. Except for the limitation on a 
tenant’s heir like ‘tenant in tail’ and a granting of future interest like ‘a life estate in 
remainder’ not found in Taiwanese tenure, the other types of tenure have equivalencies 
in the Taiwanese tenure system. An aboriginal landlord (fan-yah-zhu 番業主) and Han 
Chinese landlord (yah-zhu 業主) could be equivalent to a fee simple owner561 because 
they obtained a perpetual, descendible right to manage the land from the emperor. 
                                                 
560
 Burn and Cartwright (n 11) 56. 
561
 Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1 (臺灣私法第一
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1 (n 482)175. The power to control and manage land gradually shifted 
from the large-rent landlord towards the small-rent tenant from 1800 onwards, as mentioned at 5.1.1, 
therefore the large-rent owner gradually lost the position as a tenant in fee simple, but merely held the 
right to the rent. See ibid 176-177, 183. 
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Absentee landlords could also be found in both systems: English landowners held Irish 
estates,
562
 whereas wealthy Han Chinese landlords held Taiwanese estates. Slightly 
different from English tenure where power had always been controlled by the manor, in 
Taiwanese tenure, the lower tenants’ statuses sometime preceded the aboriginal 
landlords and Han Chinese landlords’ social statuses. 
 
Tenure for life can be found in the Taiwanese tenure system as well but it only existed 
between the emperor and his grantee, thus was slightly different from English tenure 
where a fee simple owner rather than an emperor would grant a life estate to his tenant. 
Life estate in Taiwan was basically a grant from the emperor to a grantee that made a 
significant contribution to state authorities. This type of tenure was called gong-lao-zu 
（功勞租）and the estate that the grantee held was limited to his/her lifetime. This type 
of estate was not descendible to an heir.  
 
A tenant in leasehold for a fixed term mirrors in the leasehold, between a primary 
cultivator and a small-rent tenant. Like the English doctrine of estate recognising 
leasehold for a fixed number of years as the smallest proprietary interest,
563
 registered 
leasehold in Taiwan after 1905 was regarded as proprietary as well.
564
 The longer that 
the duration of this leasehold went on for, the more proprietary interest it had.
565
  
                                                 
562
 ‘This, more than anything, was perhaps the problem underlying absentee landlords, most notably in 
Ireland. An English landowner’s Irish estates were, all too often, merely a source of rental income’. See 
Tim Murphy, Simon Roberts and Tatiana Flessas, Understanding Porperty Law (4th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2004) 142. 
563
 Burn and Cartwright (n 11) 57, ‘We will now conclude with a short description of the leasehold 
interest or term of years which, quantitatively considered, is the smallest proprietary interest recognised 
by English law’. 
564
 According to Article 5 of the 1905 Registration Act, the rights arising from pacht relation shall be 
registered like yong-xiao-zuo-quan (永小作權)long term leasehold of cultivating another individual’s 
land by paying a rental). See Lin (n 526) 71-72. 
565
 Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第一
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1(n 482) 327. ‘A tenant in a relationship of yong-diàn (永佃)normally 
invests capital and labour to improve the fertility of land, with planting woods, fruit trees, building farm 
houses, water channels and dikes and thus obtain the right to manage the land. This right is not influenced 
by the change of yeh-zu (業主 initial owner), the right to manage in this tenure is assignable and leasable, 
and thus it is a proprietary right to the land rather than a personal right to the yeh-zu’. [translation by this 
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Two types of English tenure can find reflections in Taiwanese tenure: a fee simple 
owner is yeh-zhu (業主), and a leasehold for a fixed number of years found in the lease 
between primary cultivators and small-rent tenants. Like English tenure, Taiwanese 
tenure splits ownerships by different durations to various individuals, thus equipping the 
first requirement of two characteristics mentioned above. The law of yeh (業)is a more 
appropriate property law model for patents than the law of things in civil law.  
 
5.5.3  Yeh-zhu-quan ( 業主權 )instead of Taiwanese civil law ownership 
suo-you-quan（所有權） 
 
Civil law ownership under the law of things is fundamentally different from ownership 
under the law of yeh (業). Just like a metaphor illustrated by John Henry Merryman 
highlights, ‘Romanic ownership can be thought of as a box, with the word “ownership” 
written on it’.566 Under this civil law structure, whoever owns the box is the owner. The 
owner can open the box and remove one or more real rights and transfer them to others. 
As long as the owner keeps the box, the owner still maintains ownership, even if the 
box is empty. It is different under the common law system though, because there is no 
box concept at all. Under the common law structure, there are various sets of legal 
interests that constitute a bundle of rights, and when the owner conveys one or more of 
them, a part of his bundle is gone.
567
  
 
The common law bundle of rights theory originated from a historical fact that there was 
                                                                                                                                               
author] In ibid 327. The duration of yong-diàn (永佃)ranges from ten years up to perpetual, but later 
limited to a hundred years after 1900. See ibid 322. 
566
 John Henry Merryman, ‘Ownership and Estate (Variations on a Theme by Lawson)’ (1974) 48 Tulane 
Law Review 916,927. 
567
 ibid 927. 
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always a king controlling true ownership of real property,
568
 so the citizens never own a 
‘box’. The origin was that England used to have cooperative farming569 where ‘all 
villagers with land in the common fields had grazing rights over the fallow, pasturing 
rights over the commons and a share in the available meadowland’.570 It has always 
been a society with the land either community commonly-owned, owned by an overlord, 
or by the crown whom has the power to control the distribution of resources so that the 
owner does not obtain primary, outright ownership as a civil law owner does. 
571
 The 
exclusivity of land, just as Henry Smith describes, is a more economical way because ‘I 
need only know that it is not mine and to keep off’.572 English tenure history tells us 
                                                 
568
 All land was considered ‘held’ either directly or indirectly by the King after the Conquest in 1066. 
Simpson, Land Law and Registration 27. Also in John Rhys Morris, Principles of Landlord & Tenant Law 
(2nd edn, Cavendish 1999) 7 ‘…land in England and Wales is, strictly speaking, not owned, but held from 
the Crown’. 
569
 Ben Baack, ‘The Development of Exclusive Property Rights to Land in England: an exploratory essay’ 
(1979) 22(1) Economy and History 63, 65. Ben provides a good explanation about the relation of 
exclusivity in this three field system. He states, ‘Here under the three field system each field was 
subjected to a fall planting, a spring planting, and then placed in fallow. As a general rule common 
grazing rights were only available on the fallow and the remaining two cultivated fields following the 
harvest until spring planting. Moreover the rights to the meadow land reverted to common for the winter 
grazing of livestock following the last crop of hay for the season. Subject to the results obtained by a 
group decision making process, usually at the parish level, farmers adhered to a host of regulations 
concerning what crops would be grown, when and where to plant them, and when to harvest. In sum, 
upon inspection of all of the restrictions and regulations making up the English land tenure system, it 
turns out that the exclusivity of rights to common land varied from those to excluded land only by a 
matter of degree’. 
570
 Dr. Thirsk argues there is a difference between common-fields and open-fields. She argues that the 
term ‘common-fields’ should only properly be used when there is clear proof of communal control. 
However, Titow argues that it is inconceivable that a peasant in the open-fields system grows a spring 
crop on one of his strips in the middle of a furlong under a winter crop and ploughs it without the 
cooperation of his neighbours because common control is everywhere in the open-fields system. See J Z 
Titow, English Rural Society 1200-1350 (George Allen & Unwin 1969) 20-21. 
571
As Ben Baack suggests, the history of English exclusive property rights to land merely varied by 
degree from Tudor times until now. Even in Tudor times, common rights ‘were in essence partially 
exclusive rights’. See Baack (n 569) 65. ‘….what has been traditionally termed “common rights” were in 
essence partially exclusive rights. Entry was restricted. Rights of common to a given area were claimed 
by a limited number of people and not the general public. Furthermore the exclusivity of these rights 
varies by degree. In the pastoral areas of England common rights to land were generally in effect the year 
round. In the arable region on the other hand common rights to the cultivated fields were restricted to 
certain portion of the year’. ibid 65. 
572
 Henry E Smith, ‘Community and Custom in Property’ (2009) 10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 5 at 17. 
Henry Smith raises a good point that using an exclusion strategy reduces the information cost more than 
an inclusion strategy. This author thinks Henry Smith’s inclusion strategy implies the civil law of things 
where the source of power to own the thing is important. Civil law of things concerns who is the true 
owner, where the legitimate power from and what right you own, etc., and these sort of ‘internal 
governance rules’ consume a great deal of communication costs. Exclusionary rules on the contrary, 
consider only whether you have more rights than others, then this thing belongs to you. He states, ‘We 
can hypothesize that in most cases it is easier to communicate an exception to the right to exclude rather 
than a norm of proper use, since the latter typically depends on contextual information. Using exceptions 
to the right to exclude to solve problems across community boundaries is easier than trying to 
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that if the common-owned element can be found in the Taiwanese tenure system there 
will be little difficulty concluding that Taiwanese society is equipped with the same or 
similar institutions to the English one. This would make ownership building based on 
the Taiwanese concept of ownership yeh-zhu-quan (業主權) easier. 
 
Prior to the modern Taiwanese state, imperial Japan intervened systematically in the 
lives of Taiwan’s native societies along with importing modern civil law outright 
ownership that further shaped Taiwanese people’s self-perceptions, with Taiwan filled 
with communities applying a commonly-owned base, a hunter gatherer economy where 
aboriginal commoners relied on deers and wild boar hunting, fowling and small scale 
farming for living.
573
 Before the Han Chinese farmers largely arrived in the eighteenth 
century, which brought in the private property notion, these plains aborigines worked as 
part of a joint enterprise for farming and lived in nucleated villages.
574
 The land was 
divided into three rings in the shape of concentric circles: the nearest ring was village 
farm land, the next outlying ring was the public common hunting and gathering area and 
the farthest ring was an open field that the village was forced to share with other tribes 
and neighbouring villages.
575
 The inner ward was the premises with a farming area. 
They burned down the trees and weeds around their premises and used hoes and digging 
sticks to grow millet, rice, taro and yams.
576
 ‘A larger area of shifting fields rotated 
                                                                                                                                               
communicate rules of proper use’. See ibid 22. 
573
 For more detailed about the deformation of the tribal common property right to private property right, 
see Lin Chiung-hua (林瓊華), ‘Taiwan Yuanzhumin Tudichanquan Zhi Yanbian (臺灣原住民土地產權之
演變 1624-1945)=The Change of Property Right on the Land of Taiwanese Aborigines 1624-1945’ (DPhil, 
Soochow University 1996). 
574
 John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800 (Stanford 
University Press 1993) 241. 
575
 ibid 241. Also in Tsai Jui-lung (蔡瑞龍), ‘Qingdai Taiwan Pingpuzu Diquan de Bianqian: yi tianliao 
diqu weili(清代台灣平埔族地權的變遷：以田寮地區為例)=Changes in the Land Rights of Pingpu 
People in Ching Dynasty Taiwan: a case study in Tianliao area’ (MPhil thesis, National University of 
Tainan 2008) 10. 
576
 Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800 (n 574) 29. There 
were no primitive large mammals on this island. Draft oxen were imported by Dutch traders from Java, 
Indonesia. It was recorded on 6 December, 1640 in De Dagregisters van het Kasteel Zeelandia (Diary of 
City Batavia) that over 1200 cattle were imported into Taiwan for sugar cane farming. Draft oxen were 
rare and precious power on the land that not every farmer could afford. See Chen Rou-jin(陳柔縉), 
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around the village according to a fallowing cycle. At the beginning of a new rotation, 
the men of the village would mark off a large sector and do the preliminary clearing. 
Then each kin group/domestic would delineate, physically and ritually, a smaller plot 
within the cleared sector, do more intensive preparation of the land, and plant corps’.577 
The tribes were small
578
 and the land available for each was unlimited. This 
slash-and-burn cultivation allowed them to break fresh ground yearly and took the 
maximum advantage of stored-up fertility. John Robert Shepherd clearly points this out, 
‘Households in villages practicing shifting cultivation generally gained exclusive rights 
to the crops they planted and the fields they cleared only as long as they tilled them; 
more permanent allocations of land rights were unnecessary so long as uncleared land 
remained in plentiful supply’. 579  Since there was no need to acquire continuous 
occupation of the same parcel of farmland, the concept of permanent ownership and 
inheritance did not apply in Taiwanese society during this period.
580
 
 
The notion of private property was first brought into this aboriginal Taiwan when Han 
Chinese farmers largely emigrated from China in the 1730s, with the enclosure idea 
emerging. The aborigines’ native tenure system recognised temporary ownership claims 
established by the investment of labour reclaiming land,
581
 provided that the tiller was 
also a member of the village, attracted Han Chinese farmers to obtain land ownership by 
marrying aboriginal village women. Despite land not deemed strictly to be the personal 
property of the owner but rather the heritage of the village community in China,
582
 
                                                                                                                                               
Taiwan Xifang Wenming Chutiyan (台灣西方文明初體驗)=Taiwan's First Contact with Western 
Civilization (Mai-tian 麥田 2005) 37. 
577
 Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800 (n 574) 241. 
578
 In 1650, the Dutch village census reported that fewer than 50,000 aborigines in the plains area were 
under Dutch control, so population density was low. See ibid 29. 
579
 ibid 33. 
580
 ibid 241. 
581
 ibid 242. 
582
 According to Edward Kroker, the exclusion of the neighbour was not complete or absolute in China. 
The land is ‘not deemed strictly to be the personal property of the owner or of his family but rather the 
heritage of the village’. Kroker illustrates many examples where property rights suffer many restrictions 
because fields belonged to a village community. Therefore, the owner’s power of domination over his 
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farmers arriving in Taiwan were all bachelors who had already disconnected their bonds 
and who were inclined towards privately owned rather than commonly owned land.
583
 
Arguments about ownership increased when the Han Chinese tillers largely turned the 
woods into paddies, with the shrinking of deer fields directly endangering the survival 
of a tribal community.
584
  
 
This tension reached the governors who were under pressure to collect taxes from both 
sides. The shrinking deer fields reduced government income from taxing the deer fields. 
Aboriginal rotation farming with its unclear boundaries was not able to offset the 
shortage of taxation from deer fields. On the other hand, although Han Chinese farmer’s 
permanent cultivation with a clear enclosure boundary made taxation easier, Han 
Chinese farmers were not title holders of the land. The state authorities struggled to 
manage Taiwan at the lowest administrative cost, whilst at the same time considering 
getting the best revenues out of land, they decided to admit both plains aborigines and 
Han Chinese farmers to have ownership of land. Ownership was then split at the 
landlord level. As most of these Han Chinese farmers were from Fukien, split 
ownerships at the tenant level was widely practiced by small-rent tenants. It thus created 
an extraordinarily complex system of split ownerships at the landlord level (aboriginal 
landlords and large-rent landlords) and also at the tenant level (large-rent landlords and 
small-rent landlords, but in fact they were all tenants of aboriginal landlords and state 
                                                                                                                                               
fields could therefore ‘hardly be called limitless or absolute’, but limited to the discretion of the village 
community. See Edward Kroker, ‘The Concept of Property in Chinese Customary Law’ in R 
Ampalavanar Brown (ed), Chinese Business Enterprise, vol IV (Routledge 1996) 375, 377, 381, 383-384. 
China’s rural areas had a common-owned property system as well. Substantiated by Professor Dai, 
virtually every village had a common-owned paddy, pond, road, passage or temple. Like a Taiwanese 
tribal village, which has a community owned farmland and hunting area, a Chinese common-owned 
paddy, pond and passage ‘was a common-owned property of the villagers; every member in this village 
has an equal right to this property. Residents from other villages do not have this right. Every member in 
this village can collect the produce or game from this property, and the produce and game that (s)he 
collects becomes his/her exclusive property’. See Dai Yan-hui(戴炎輝), Ch'ingdai Taiwan Zhi Xiangzhi 
(清代台灣之鄉治)=The Governence of rural area in Taiwan during Ch'ing Dynasty (5th edn, Linking 
Books 1998) 154-155.  
583
 Wei (n 228) 28-30. 
584
 Chen (n 479) 22. 
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authorities). No matter whether one views this system from the landlord or tenant 
perspective, except for the lowest level of primary cultivator who tilled other’s land, 
split ownerships yeh-zhu-quan（業主權）penetrated throughout all levels and reshaped 
the common ownership in this native society henceforward.
585
  
 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that Taiwanese society had a similar 
characteristic to English society where the land was co-owned by a society, with the 
owner being vested with an exclusivity concept—yah(業), to manage the land by 
evicting unwelcome people out of his territory. The holding of yah (業) had a time 
limitation, just like the holding of English estate, with the owner not obtaining primary, 
absolute and outright ownership of the land. Yeh-zhu-quan (業主權), as a relative 
exclusionary concept, played a significant role in harmonising interests among 
aborigines, large-rent owners and small-rent owners. Yeh-zhu-quan (業主權) enabled 
aborigines to collect ground rent from Han Chinese farmers which offset the aborigines’ 
lost deer fields, while at the same time, Han Chinese’s yeh-zhu-quan (業主權) enabled 
the state authorities to collect taxes from Han Chinese farmers. This customary-law split 
                                                 
585
 Regarding the topic why plains aborigines lost their land to Han Chinese farmers, local researchers 
provide different explanations than western researchers. Shepherd, who focused on aborigines in the 
northern region of Taiwan, suggests that state authorities used policy making to reshape the tribal 
relationships between plains aborigines and Han Chinese farmers in order to lower the cost of 
management and levy more taxes. The plains aborigines were beneficiaries rather than victims, thus 
disagreeing with Shih Tien-fu’s ‘displacement scenario’ and the ‘neglect hypothesis’. See Shepherd, 
Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800 (n 574) 2-3, 8, 12-14, 239-243, 256, 
295. Shih Tien-fu (施添福), however, reached his conclusion based on different regional research than 
Shepherd. Shih deployed his research in the Hsin-chu (新竹) region where he concluded that in this area, 
aborigines were deprived by heavy levies and villain services that forced them to abandon their land and 
migrate to other regions. They were the victims of ruling policies. See Shih (n 542) 67-92. As Shih and 
Shepherd looked into different areas, it is unfair to judge whether Shepherd was right and Shih was wrong. 
Ka Chih-ming (柯志明) combined these two opinions and took a different approach. He suggests that 
Qing authorities deployed the plains aborigines between Han Chinese farmers and uncultivated mountain 
aborigines, was a sophisticated arrangement by the state authorities. Plains aborigines played a role as a 
buffer between mountain aborigines and Han Chinese farmers, with recognition of aborigines’ ownership 
of the land allowing them to charge ground rents from Han Chinese farmers that was a reward from the 
authorities for reducing the cost of military deployment for solving conflicts. See Ka Chih-ming柯志明, 
Fantoujia: Qingdai Taiwan Zuqun Zhengzhi yu Shufan Diquan (番頭家：清代臺灣族群政治與熟番地
權)=The Aboriginal Landlord: ethnic politics and aboriginal land rights in Qing Taiwan (Institute of 
Sociology, Academia Sinica 2001) 25, 61. Neither were plains aborigines simple beneficiaries like 
Shepherd says, nor simply as victims like Shih says, but were beneficiaries and at the same time victims 
in this trial politics. 
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ownership model was perfect for state authorities in frontier management, with no one 
actually owning the land in an absolute sense but everyone was obligated to pay tax.
586
 
Yeh-zhu-quan (業主權) did not exclude the legal inheritance that some properties in the 
village were community owned. An example like a village owned pond
587
 remains 
commonly-owned. The Taiwanese tenure system was an institution with exclusionary 
rules. These all show the compatibility of the English tenure and Taiwanese tenure 
systems, with relative ownership yeh-zhu-quan (業主權) no doubt being more suitable 
for patents than the outright, absolute ownership suo-you-quan (所有權) in civil law. 
 
5.5.4 Patent registration without the principle of registration 
 
Registration serves a significant function in public and private, in both land and patent 
registration. The public function relates to the welfare of the state and community as a 
whole, whilst the private function relates to the advantage of the individual citizen, 
including establishing proof of ownership. It solves the problem of who is the creator, 
especially in patent cases, and also the boundaries of the property that to be 
determined.
588
 The idea of registering for a land title came of age with the Royal 
Commission on Registration of Title in 1857,
589
 which initially outlined the problems 
of the current title deeds system and proposed a central registry in London. The 1857 
Report recommended three fundamental principles of registration: 1) showing a 
                                                 
586
 Shepherd pointed out that this policy used by the Qing authorities was associated with control and 
revenues, and that the solutions adopted by the locals were not distinct from American colonial 
experience. Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-180 (n 574) 398. 
587
 Dai, Ch'ingdai Taiwan Zhi Xiangzhi(清代台灣之鄉治)=The Governence of rural area in Taiwan 
during Ch'ing Dynasty (n 582) 155. 
588
 Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law: the British 
Experience,1760-1911 (Cambridge University Press 1999) 185. 
589
 Simpson, Land Law and Registration (n 58) 42. ‘…when a bill for the registration of assurances (i.e. 
deeds) was submitted to the House of Commons in1853, the Select Committee, to which it was referred, 
recommended instead “the immediate Appointment of a Commission for the Purpose of considering the 
subject of Registration of Title with reference to the Sale and Transfer of Land.” The new Commission 
produced the celebrated Report of 1857 which has been called “the classic on which the system of 
registration which obtains in England today is founded’.  
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marketable title, 2) defining boundaries, and 3) registering partial interests.
590
 
Eventually, Lord Chancellor Westbury got land registering onto the statute book through 
the Land Registry Act 1862.
591
  
 
As with patents, there is no evidence showing that the emergence of patent registering 
was directly influenced by the land register development stated above. The patent 
register was developed independently from the land register, originating from a 
uniformity of the index system after 1852 when the Patent Law Amendment Act was 
enacted and the first official index system for patents was established.
592
 Today’s index 
and registering ideas all came from Bennet Woodcroft after he demonstrated his index at 
the select committee of the House of Lords,
593
 with his index bought in by the nation 
and the chronological and alphabetical or patentee index published later in 1854, with 
the subject volume following in 1857.
594
 Woodcroft’s diligent clerks extended the 
printed series back to 1617. By the time when this task was completed in 1858, he had a 
series of abridgements of specifications chronologically arranged from 1617 
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 ibid 43. 
591
 ibid 43. ‘The recommendation of the 1857 Commission that registration of title should be introduced 
was accepted by Parliament, and in 1862 an Act (later named the Land Registry Act) was enacted “to give 
certainty to the title to real estates and to facilitate the proof thereof and also to render the dealing in land 
more simple and economical”’. But this Act was not going to be successful. The Commissioners reported 
in 1870 that the failure is attributed to the fact that the 1862 Act departed from the three fundamental 
recommendations of the 1857 report. 
592
 HI Dutton, The Patent System and Inventive Activity: during the industrial revolution 1750-1852 
(Manchester University Press 1984) 61. The 1852 Patent Law Amendment Act had the following changes: 
‘to lessen the delay and expenses of patenting, to vary the duration of patents... and to provide an 
accessible index of patents together with a register of proprietors which was to enumerate names of 
assignees, shareholders of patents, licensees, and the districts in which the licences were enforceable’.  
593
 Lords Professor Bennet Woodcroft, 20th May 1851, 222-224. Also in John Hewish, Rooms Near 
Chancery Lane: The Patent Office Under The Commissioners, 1852-1883 (The British Library 2000) 12 
says Woodcroft demonstrated his indexing system and was eloquent in the cause of inventors generally in 
his testimony to the House of Lords select committee who heard evidence from April to June, 1851. An 
overall introduction to how the English government prepared the bill on parallel lines (Lord Brougham’s 
Bill and Lord Granville’s Bill), see H Harding, Patent Office Centenary: a story of 100 years in the life 
and work of the patent office (Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1953) 7-9. 
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 John Hewish, The Indefatigable Mr Woodcroft: the Legacy of Invention (The British Library 1980) 23. 
‘Woodcroft’s indexes to the specifications were bought for the nation in 1853, for £1000. The first two 
parts, the chronological and alphabetical or patentee index, were published the following year; the subject 
volume followed in 1857’. ‘Before glancing at the fulfilment of his early aim of publication of all the 
specifications, he should be given credit as the architect of patent publications in the general form that has 
existed until the present, such as the annual volumes of “new law” specifications, the indexes, library 
catalogues, and special-subject works’. 
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onwards.
595
 
 
Early in the 1851 House of Lords’ report, the 1850 resolution of the Committee for 
Legislative Recognition of the Rights of Inventors, suggested that the function of 
registering should be merely a record rather a creation of rights.
 It declared ‘That the 
registration should be considered merely as a record of claims, and not as any 
determination of rights between parties’.596 Supported by Section 32(9) of the Patents 
Act 1977, the UK register ‘shall be prima facie evidence of anything required or 
authorised by this Act’.597 To be registered as an applicant or a proprietor was not proof 
that the person registered was entitled to such a patent or in fact the proprietor of the 
patent,
598
 it only demonstrated a person’s interest or estate in a patent or application as 
what it was.
599
  
 
The register was not even absolute evidence proving one’s title. ‘Recitals, statements, 
and descriptions of facts, matters, and parties contained in deeds, instruments, Act of 
Parliament, or statutory declarations, twenty years old at the date of the contract, shall 
be taken to be sufficient evidence of the truth of such facts, matters and descriptions’.600 
The register overall was not absolute and overriding evidence proving one’s proprietary 
status, and ‘does not prejudice the enforcement of any right, estate or interest adverse to 
or in derogation of the title subsisting or capable of arising at the time of such 
registration’.601 In fact, it was just one of many ways to prove an owner’s security of 
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 Jones and Cole (n 54) 466. Also in Marcus Smith, The Law of Assignment (Oxford New York 2007) 
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 Smith, The Law of Assignment (n 597) 69. 
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 See Richard Miller and others, Terrell on the Law of Patents (17th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 577 
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 Ernest Dowson and VLO Sheppard, 'Part II A comparative analysis of the salient features of 
registration of title to land under various jurisdictions' in Registration of Title to Land With Special 
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holdings.  
 
A question can then be asked: why would the principle of registration in land law be 
involved in Taiwanese patents registration since land registry history is not involved in 
patent registry development? English patent registry history manifests that the patentee 
cannot create ownership by means of registration, with there being many ways to prove 
one’s proprietary status. The connection between the land register and patent register (as 
in 2.5.2) is obviously a misconnection with no historical grounds. Therefore, this 
research concludes that the principle of registration shall not be involved in patent 
registration, preventing a further misleading thought that the creation of land ownership 
by register equally applies to patents. The patent register should stay as a record of 
claims, and a propose amendment to the Taiwanese Patent Act as presented in 6.3.2. 
 
5.5.5 Different understanding of ‘assignment’ in English common law and 
Taiwanese civil law and a better translation of patent assignment 
 
Various misconceptions stated earlier also involve a paradoxical understanding of the 
term ‘assignment’. Assignment is understood differently in English common law and 
Taiwanese civil law. The English word ‘assignment’ originated from the Latin assignare, 
meaning to appoint, distribute or assign.
602
 It was first brought into use in England for 
illegitimate children because they could not inherit their father’s real property under the 
                                                                                                                                               
Reference to Its Introduction on the Gold Coast (British government, 1946) 4. The whole sentence is 
‘England: Initial Registration is optional over the whole country but it is compulsory “on sale” in the 
countries of Middlesex, London, Surrey, and in the towns of Eastbourne and Hastings. Upon an 
application for initial registration being received, a final and authoritative examination of the title is 
carried out by a body of examiners of title, on behalf of the State. They report to the Chief Land Registrar, 
who decides whether the application shall be accepted or rejected, and if accepted, whether the title 
admitted shall be “absolute”, “qualified” or “possessory”’. ‘Thus “qualified” title is issued when it 
appears to the Chief Land Registrar that the title can be established only for a limited period... while 
“possessory” title is nothing more than the registration of title of the person in possession whatever that 
may be and as it were for what it is worth. Such registration does not prejudice the enforcement of any 
right, estate or interest adverse to or in derogation of the title subsisting or capable of arising at the time of 
such registration’. 
602
 Ross (n 2) 177. 
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name of their heirs, therefore they were provided under the name of assignees.
603
 Under 
the structure of English feudal tenure, the king and the lords kept the resumption if 
tenants failed to produce heirs; any right conveyed by the tenants was a lesser interest 
than the lord’s freehold and thus conformed to the meaning of assignment. 604 
Substantiated by Blackstone, assignment in England usually meant a transfer of a lesser 
interest for life or for years.
605
 It could mean a transfer of ‘any other interest less than 
freehold, already created’ to a stranger.606 In other words, it is a transfer that happens to 
the real rights’ owner and assignee, not a transfer between the true freeholder and 
assignee. 
 
This understanding of assignment is very different in Taiwanese civil law. An 
assignment in civil law means the owner, who has complete unitary ownership, 
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 ibid 177-178. ‘Britton (one of the oldest English writers) mentions that this word was first brought 
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604
 Hudson criticised that modern scholars generally take assignment as substitution, even though it is not 
true because a father can assign a certain part of his land to his son and gives his son seisin in his son’s 
lifetime. It did not require the Lord’s participation, and it is clear that it is not substitution. See John 
Hudson, Land, Law, and Lordship in Anglo-Norman England (Clarendon 1994) 226. ‘Modern scholars 
generally take assignment to refer to substitution, in which case the lord’s participation was needed, but it 
is uncertain that early mentions of “assigns” necessarily had such a particular meaning. Glanvill wrote 
that “a son can be ‘forisfamiliated’ by his father in his father’s lifetime if the father assigns a certain part 
of his land to the son and gives him seisin of it in his lifetime.” This clearly is not substitution. Early 
grants mentioning assigns could, therefore, simply be advance confirmations of a man’s gifts’. 
605
 Blackstone says assignment is ‘usually applied to an estate for life or years’. See Blackstone, 
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England: Volume II 269 (original 326). Also in Alexander M 
Burrill, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Voluntary Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors: 
adapted to the laws of the various states; with an appendix of forms (James L Bishop ed, 3rd edn, Baker, 
Voorhis & Co 1877) 2 (note 1). 
606
 Hayes (n 516) 25. Burrill provides a better explanation about this. He states, ‘As applied to real estate, 
an assignment is properly a transfer, or making over to another, of one’s whole interest in lands or 
tenements, whatever that interest may be, but in England it is usually applied to express the transfer of an 
estate for life or years’. See Burrill (n 605) 1-2. However, the law of Scotland has another different 
definition of assignment. ‘The conveyance amongst the living, of personal rights, is by assignment, of 
real rights by disposition, and promiscuously of both by confiscation. Conveyance of right from the dead 
is by succession; in movables by executry; in heritable rights, by the succession of heirs and other like 
successors’. See John S More, The Institutions of The Law of Scotland, Deduced From Its Originals, and 
Collated With The Civil, Canon, and Feudal Laws, and With The Customs of Neighbouring Nations by 
James, Viscount of Stair, Lord President of The College of Justice: a new ddition, with notes and 
illustrations vol II (Bell & Bradfute 1832) 518 (original page 380). In Scottish law, ‘assignment’ means a 
conveyance of personal rights, while real rights conveyance uses the word ‘disposition’, although 
sometimes assignment extended to the disposal of real rights. See ibid 539 (original 396-397). In contrast 
to Scottish law, English law uses assignment to indicate real rights conveyance. 
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alienates their real rights to an assignee. ‘Ownership assignment’ in the Chinese term 
‘suo-you-quan rang-yu’ (所有權讓與) is outright alienation of whole and complete 
ownership. The Chinese translation of assignment as rang-yu （讓與）is used for both 
real and personal property
607
 and refers to an alienation of real rights including an 
alienation of ownership as a whole. This alienation has to be the ownership owner to 
assignee and not a real rights holder who transfers an estate that has being created and 
carved out from the ownership, to the assignee. The difference is presented in Figure 
5-5 and Figure 5-6. 
 
 
  
                                                 
607
 Despite what a conscientious usage would be, the word ‘disposition’ is applied to the alienation of real 
rights and ‘assignation’ is to the alienation of personal rights. The term assignment is occasionally 
extended to the disposal of real rights and refers to both real property and personal property alienation. 
The same phenomena can be found in Scottish law, see More (n 606) 539 (original page 396-397). 
Figure 5-6: Assignment in 
Taiwanese civil law 
Ownership owner 
Assignee 
 
assignment 
(rang-yu讓與) 
Figure 5-5: Assignment in 
English common law 
Real rights owner 
Ownership owner 
Assignee 
 
assignment 
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The nuance is clearer if John Henry Merryman’s box metaphor is imported into this 
discussion. Earlier in 5.5.3, we understood from this metaphor that civil law ownership 
can be envisaged as a box where the owner can open up a box called ownership and 
remove some real rights for transfer. As long as the owner keeps the box, even if the box 
is empty, the owner retains ownership. Assignment refers to a transfer of this box and 
means that the owner loses his ownership as a whole, no matter whether it is empty or 
full. However, under the common law system, there is no box at all. The owner keeps a 
bundle of proprietary interests whereby transferring each of them counts as assignment. 
Assignment does not necessary mean the owner loses his whole bundle of rights after 
assignment and whether the assignee owns this property depends on how much real 
rights have been transferred. 
 
The diagrams above answer another question: does a patentee hold patent rights as 
being a physical thing owner? It is clear in Figure 5-5 that a patentee is not an 
‘ownership owner’ who has perpetual, unlimited and complete ownership over a 
physical thing in the civil law conception. A patentee is like a surface right holder who 
holds a surface right for a limited time and condition, and within this limited time and 
condition, the surface right holder holds their real rights as a freeholder, so that they can 
alienate their real rights to any third party. This alienation is proprietary. 
 
Apparently, the loanword rang-yu (讓與 ) is not an ideal translation for patent 
assignment. It not only mixes patent assignment with physical things alienation, but also 
leads Taiwanese lawyers astray to an improper connection of the law of things. By 
understanding the difference between civil law assignment and patent assignment from 
the above analysis, this study now moves onto a further discussion of what word a 
patent assignment should use to highlight a transfer of holding. 
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5.6 Assignments and licences in a map of Taiwanese tenure 
 
5.6.1 Assignments in a map of Taiwanese tenure 
 
An assignment in Article 761(1) of the Taiwanese Civil Code,
608
 is the movement of an 
object. The subject (person) who has the right to exercise that assignment has to be the 
owner. The object this assignment moves is a physical thing; therefore the law says the 
transfer will not be effective unless the thing has been delivered. It is however, very 
different from a patent assignment because an assignment is a change of relationship 
rather than a movement of a thing. The patentee is the holder of a bundle of rights, just 
like an estate holder who does not actually ‘own’ the land, but instead, holds a right to 
manage the land for the king. An assignment is a change of that holding, no matter 
whether the transferred object is proprietary or not because it is insignificant in the 
conveyance rules. A patent assignment is similar to an estate assignment, with the 
transfer of a patent being like the transfer of an estate: it is a transfer of the right to hold, 
not from the owner, but from the right holder. The patent assignment is distinct from the 
civil law assignment where the source of the right comes directly from the thing owner. 
 
In many ways, a patent assignment is more similar to a stock/option assignment. 
Taiwanese Company Act 2012 uses a neutral word ‘zhuan-rang’ (轉讓) to indicate a 
stock/option assignment.
609
 This study believes that this word ‘zhuan-rang’ (轉讓) is 
better than the civil law assignment ‘rang-yu’ (讓與). The changing of the word makes a 
significant difference to the underlying meaning of the patent assignment. It not only 
                                                 
608
 Article 761(1), ‘The transfer of rights in rem of personal property will not effect until the personal 
property has been delivered’. [translation by Lawbank] This research thinks a better translation would 
change ‘personal property’ to ‘movable thing’. 
609
 For example, Article 163 of Taiwanese Company Act 2012 uses the word ‘zhuan-rang’ (轉讓) to 
express the meaning of stock assignment: ‘Assignment of shares of a company shall not be prohibited or 
restricted by any provision in the Articles of Incorporation of the issuing company.’  [translation by 
Lawbank] 
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disconnects patent assignment from civil law assignment but also avoids confusion 
about the peculiar delivery requirements in the law of things.  
 
5.6.2 Leases and licences in a map of English common law classification 
 
To accurately place licences in the map of English common law requires a clear 
separation of leases and licences. Leases are involved in this discussion because 
Taiwanese practitioners often use leases to explain licences.
610
 However, using leases to 
explain licences is a misconception because under English common law classification, 
leases and licences are two separate concepts, even though the line is sometimes 
blurred.
611
  
 
Apart from the traditional distinction by looking at the nature of the occupancy 
(exclusive possession), there are some other characteristics that mark the differences 
between licences and leases. Firstly, ‘leases’ have a hybrid nature that is partly property 
and partly contract,
612
 whilst ‘licences’ are purely contractual.613 Prior to the thirteenth 
                                                 
610
 For example, Qin Hong-ji says in principle that a licensee who has general licences, restricted licences 
or sole exclusive licences cannot ‘sublease’ their rights to any third party. See Qin (n 68) 97. The same 
description can be found in the oral history of the only surviving patent agent when Taiwan was under 
Japanese rule. Mr. Sun Jiang-huai(孫江淮)states in his memoir that ‘Taiwanese people preferred to lease 
the designs to others rather than to assign to them’. See Wang and Lin, ‘Daishubi Shangrenfeng: Baisui 
Renrui Sun Jiang-huai Xiansheng Fangwen Jilu (代書筆、商人風：百歲人瑞孫江淮先生訪問紀
錄)=Escrow Agent in Business: an oral history of Mr. Sun Jiang-huai in his age of 100’ (n 231) 63. 
611
 This is because following both First and Second World Wars, there was a shortage of housing due to 
bomb damage in England. Limited housing contracture was due to a shortage of building materials, whilst 
at the same time the population increased. The protective statutory provisions was created to protect 
leasehold tenants from landlord’s taking advantage by charging excessive rents and by moving tenants out 
arbitrarily. The landlords therefore sought to create licences rather than leases so that they would be 
unfettered by statutory rent regulation. The blurred line of licences or leases gradually became a source of 
tension between landlords and tenants when landlords thought they had licenced their properties but 
tenants thought they had leased them. The courts gradually adopted the subjective approach in addition to 
the traditional objective approach, taking into account the intention of the parties rather than just looking 
at the nature of the occupancy (exclusive possession) alone. See Morris (n 568) 27-29. Also in Garner S 
and Frith A, A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (5th edn, Oxford University Press: New York 
2008) 23 para 2.01. 
612
 Susan Bright, Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (Hart 2007) 27. Also in Burn and Cartwright (n 11) 
182. ‘A lease is a hybrid, part contract, part property’. Burn cited from Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v 
Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 at 108. 
613
 ‘…a lessee has a wide range of property remedies available as well as contractual remedies such as 
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century, leases were ‘generally given by landowners as security for borrowing, in order 
to circumvent the church’s prohibition on usury’.614 The rights given to the lessee were 
contractual. Over time, the lease increasingly became proprietary because the lease was 
used to ‘grant rights over agricultural land for farming purposes’ and it became 
necessary to provide remedies to protect the tenant’s possession of land.615 During the 
fifteenth century, the action of ejectment became available to tenants allowed leases to 
be recognised as real rights.
616
  Because of this history, leases are classified as ‘chattels 
real’ and have ‘an unusual classification in law’. 617 In law, the word ‘chattel’ means 
personal property, and the word ‘real’ reflects their connection with land.618 The leases 
concept in common law thus became a mixture of proprietary and contractual. 
 
The second difference is that leases are private property interests. Leases are assignable 
and enforceable against third parties,
619
 whilst licences are non-assignable.
620
 If 
landlords sell their interests in land, the lease they made with others will be fully 
effective and enforceable against the buyers.
621
 This will not happen under licences. 
Licences are not enforceable against any third party but only to the licensor,
622
 so 
licensees cannot assert their licences against new buyers.
623
 Leases involve ‘a split of 
ownership’,624 whilst licences do not.  
                                                                                                                                               
damages, whereas a licencee can reply only on contractual remedies’. ‘…licence is a broad term covering 
any permission to make any kind of use of any thing. When used in relation to land as opposed to other 
things, it covers not only the grant of a personal right to occupy the land but also the grant of any right to 
make use of the land in any other way which is purely personal and not proprietary’. See Clarke and 
Kohler (n 31)273.  
614
 Bright (n 612) 27. 
615
 ibid 27. 
616
 ibid 27-28. 
617
 ibid 28. 
618
 ibid 28. 
619
 Clarke and Kohler (n 31) 271. 
620
 ‘A licence is a personal right granted to the licencee, and cannot, therefore, be assigned or transferred 
by him, unless a power of assignment or transfer is specifically granted in the instrument. Neither can 
sub-licences be granted by a licencee, unless the power to do so is expressly conferred’. See David Fulton, 
A Practical Treatise on Patents, Trade Marks and Designs (Jordan & Sons 1894) 73. 
621
 Clarke and Kohler (n 31) 272. 
622
 ibid 272. 
623
 Bright (n 612) 49. 
624
 ibid 49. 
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The third difference is that a licence is a broad term covering ‘any permission to make 
any kind of use of any thing’.625 When used in relation to land, it covers both the 
granting of a personal right to occupy land and the granting of any right to make use of 
the land that is purely personal but not proprietary.
626
 Thus, a licence is a permission 
that entitles one person to enter the land of another, with the granting of the licence not 
being transferred any estate or interest in the land to the licensee.
627
 The classification 
of licences and leases is that licences belongs to the side of choses in action, whereas 
leases belongs to choses in action real where a tenant can assert his or her right to 
exclude upon the landlord and any third parties, whilst a licensee can do so only to his 
or her landlord. 
 
The classification of leases and licences is presented in the following figure on next 
page. 
 
  
                                                 
625
 Clarke and Kohler (n 31) 273. A similar description can be found in Morris (n 568) 23, ‘A licence is a 
mere permission to enter or use land. Most importantly, it does not give an interest in land, but merely 
prevents a person’s entry or use of the land from being a trespass’. 
626
 Clarke and Kohler (n 31) 273. 
627
 Paul Coughlan, Property Law (2nd edn, Gill & Macmillan 1998) 291. 
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5.6.3 Leases in a map of Taiwanese civil law 
 
There is nothing like an English licence in the map of Taiwanese civil law. The reason 
why there is not is because the civil law classification is totally unlike the English 
classification. The biggest difference in the beginning of the classification is that civil 
law begins with the classification from the ‘thing itself’ instead of the ‘interests’ in 
things, whilst the common law classification is precisely the converse.
628
 The 
difference is even more obvious when the remedy of infringement is involved. In view 
of the civil law classification being designed around the ‘thing’ itself, the remedy of 
infringement of ownership is rei vindicatio (to return my thing back to me), and no 
matter whether it is real property or personal property, the rule of rei vindicatio equally 
applies. But it is not the same under common law because in the field of real property, 
                                                 
628
 Smith, The Law of Assignment (n 597)16. 
Reproduced partially from Marcus Smith, The Law of Assignment (Oxford University Press, 2007) 15 
All interests in property 
Real property Personal property 
Chattels personal Chattels real 
Tangible: 
Choses in 
possession 
Intangible: 
Choses in 
action 
leases 
licences 
Figure 5-7: The classification of leases and licences in English common law  
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the concept of estate is intangible, so nothing can be returned and thus the remedy is 
governed by trespass rules.
629
 The civil law classification is presented in Figure 5-8 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The scope of English personal property is seemingly larger than civil law personal 
obligations at first sight when comparing Figure 5-7 with 5-8. English personal property 
contains personal debts, rights to personal or real property, physical personal goods, and 
lease rights; it has both tangible and intangible things. Contrasted with English personal 
property, the ambit of civil law personal obligations covers only personal debts. 
However, the scope changes when one sees this classification from a different point of 
view. Personal property in the civil law concept covers both land and personal goods, 
and there is rarely something that does not belong to individuals with even personal 
                                                 
629
 Holdsworth provides a detailed comparison of Roman law and English law remedies. He says, ‘…as 
we have seen, he has no real action—no vindicatio—in which he can demand the specific restitution of 
“his” chattel. He can only demand damages for its detention in an action of trover and conversion’. See 
Holdsworth, A History of English Law vol VII (n 209) 503. Trespass rules not only used in personal goods 
but also in land infringement. See ibid 58, ‘Both the actions of trespass quare clausum fregit and 
ejectment were general actions-that is any tenant, whether freeholder, copyholder, or lessee for years, and 
whatever his estate, could get relief by their means, if he proved he necessary facts’. It is because both 
‘trespass to goods and trespass to land involve an unlawful direct physical interference with someone 
else’s possession’. See Clarke and Kohler (n 31) 285. It is however, only conversion that is used in 
personal goods. ‘[I]t is only the possessor of goods, or the person with an immediate right to possession, 
who can sue in conversion’. See ibid 284.  
All things 
Personal 
obligations 
Tangibles 
Things 
Movable Immovable 
Law of things Law of obligations 
leases 
Figure 5-8: Leases in the Taiwanese civil law classification 
Intangibles 
like electricity 
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debts belonging to personal property if we define personal property as individual 
tangible and intangible belongings. From this angle, the range of civil law personal 
property is wider than English personal property because English personal property 
does not cover real property per se.  
 
This difference is caused by a different line drawing. English law draws the line 
between land and personal goods because land belonged to the king in the past. Civil 
law is however different. In civil law, the line is drawn between movable and 
immovable. All things belong to citizens including land, real rights and personal goods, 
with the line drawn purely by the substance of the thing itself. This different perception 
results in distinctive understandings of ownership. Comparing Figure 5-7 with Figure 
5-8, the difference is clear. Ownership in English law, especially in real property, means 
various rights held by the tenants ‘for the kings’, while in civil law, it means holding a 
unitary ownership for ‘one’s own land’. This technical distinction also has the effect of 
classifying leases and licences. Put simply, when leases are treated as real rights in the 
English law structure, in the civil law classification, especially in Taiwan and Japan, 
leases are personal rights against the grantor only. The reason is stated in the following 
passage. 
 
Leases under the Taiwanese civil law structure are placed into the law of obligations 
because the agreements made by grantors and grantees are purely contractual
630
 and it 
is neither like a disposition of land nor movable goods like vehicles. The history shows 
that it is so arranged because civil law does not encourage the owner to gain profit from 
a thing, with the law encouraging more self-use.
631
 The reason why leases are put into 
                                                 
630
 It is the same in Italian law. ‘In Italian law, the lease is a contract…No real rights—no part of the 
ownership of the land—are conveyed to him. The law governing leases is found in that part of the Civil 
Code dealing with obligations, rather than in the part dealing with property’. See Merryman (n 566) 
936-937. 
631
 Miyahata has a deeper analysis of the history in this regard, see Miyahata (n 537) 4-7. 
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the category of obligations is because they consequently weaken tenants’ rights because 
the tenant has no real rights in the lease. Despite Taiwanese society favouring a profit 
orientated mechanism because of its long history of the yeh concept,
632
 after being 
ruled by Japan, leases have ultimately been classified into personal obligations until the 
present day.  
 
Under the civil law of obligations, a lease is a covenant made by a grantor and a grantee. 
The remedy of breach is a right to bring a personal action. Leases are already in the 
personal rights category and there is no room for ‘licences’ to be placed in the same 
category. Some Taiwanese practitioners use ‘leases’ to explain ‘licences’ because leases 
are placed in the law of obligations just like a ‘licence’ in choses in action. It is 
substantially wrong because English leases are placed in proprietary and licences in 
contractual, unless we move leases to the law of things and make a space for licences in 
the law of obligations, otherwise it is impossible to create a new definition for licences 
as long as leases stay in the same old category.  
 
5.6.4 Placing licences in Taiwanese tenure 
 
Before this research explores the similarity of a licence concept in Taiwanese customary 
law, it is necessary to understand where a patent is positioned in the classification of 
English property law. The position is an original coordinate in the map of this study.  
 
The original ontology classified patents as real property. As 4.1.3 in this research 
                                                 
632
 ibid 2. Miyahata compares Japanese society with Taiwanese society, with Japanese society more 
inclined to use the property themselves [she calls it ‘property for use’], while Taiwanese society tends to 
gain revenue from property [she calls it ‘property for capital’] due to the legacy of the yeh concept. She 
further analyses the conflicting relations of self-use and the right to capital in relation to the favour of 
ruling authorities. Japanese society favours self-use rather than generating profits from the premises, 
therefore the law was designed to protect the owner better than the tenants before the War. Taiwan was 
affected by this design because of Japanese rule. 
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manifests, franchises, the origin of modern patents, were classified as incorporeal 
hereditaments in medieval England. For the extension of personal property in the 
sixteenth century, patents were gradually pushed into the personal property category, 
and now patents are expressly placed into the personal property category by section 
30(1) of Patents Act 1977, which states that ‘Any patent or application for a patent is 
personal property (without being a thing in action).’633 Concerning why English law 
does not classify patents as choses in action, Cornish expresses his puzzlement, 
commenting that it ‘is a mystery’.634 Smith does not provide a further answer and does 
not think otherwise because he is sure that ‘patents are certainly not choses in 
possession’.635  
 
Smith classifies patents as choses in action,
636
 but there are writers who doubt why 
patents are classified as personal property.
637
 Not only is the choses in action category 
challenged, the problem of whether licences are personal or proprietary is also subject to 
debate. Some think that patent licences are purely personal
638
 and that even an 
                                                 
633
 Jones and Cole (n 54) 454 (para 30.01). 
634
 Willian Cornish, David Llewelyn and Tanya Aplin, Intellectual Property: patents, copyright, trade 
marks and allied rights (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 301n 66: ‘They are not however, things in 
action; though why not, is a mystery’. 
635
 Smith, The Law of Assignment (n 597) 69. Smith states, ‘A granted patent is a form of personal 
property, but not a chose in action. A patent application is also a form of personal property, but again not a 
chose in action. It is not clear why the Patent Act 1977 should hold that a patent and an application for a 
patent, whilst amounting to personal property, should not be choses in action. Given the English law 
classification of interests in things, it is difficult to see what other classification can be accorded to a 
patent other than “chose in action”: patents are certainly not choses in possession’. 
636
 He proposed four approaches to identify patent positions in property law: from intellectual property 
rights itself, rights of action for infringement, validity challenges and licensing respectively. ibid 66-71. 
637
 An example is Gubby (n 91) 291, ‘However, categorising the patent as a form of personal property 
was also problematic. There were judges who rejected the patent as a form of property recognised at 
common law’. She cites Lord Camden’s opinion in Donaldson v Beckett, stating ‘If there be such a right 
at common law, the crown is an usurper; but there is no such right at common law’. See ibid 274. She 
further cites Judge Yates’ opinion in Millar v Taylor 1769, stating ‘This kind of property has always the 
additional distinction of prerogative property. The right is ground upon another foundation; and is 
founded on a distinction that can not exist in common law property’. Gubby also thinks a patent for a new 
invention ‘was also a grant of the royal prerogative’, therefore patents ‘equally could not be seen as 
having the common law as its source’. However, this research believes this too arbitrary to reach a 
conclusion by judging a court’s opinion on copyright equally applying to patents.  
638
 Smith, The Law of Assignment (n 597) 71. He states, ‘The licensing of rights to a patent is essentially 
a matter of contract law; and the rights arising under a licence will be rights under a contract’. Even an 
exclusive licence, did not create a proprietary interest. See Allen & Hanburys Ltd v Generics (UK) Ltd 
[1986] RPC 203 (HL), CBS United Kingdom Ltd v Charmdale Record Distributors Ltd [1981] Ch 91, 
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exclusive licence does not create a proprietary interest, whilst others think a licence 
could be proprietary
639
 and that an exclusive licence is virtually a proprietary interest. 
 
Such diverse opinions highlight the controversy of classifying patents into choses in 
action. The term chose in action, however, should not be understood in a narrow way. 
Holdsworth points out that a chose in action is ‘a known legal expression used to 
describe all personal rights of property which can only be claimed or enforced by 
action’.640 In its primary sense, the term chose in action includes ‘all rights which are 
enforceable by action’, including but not limited to rights to debts and rights to recover 
the ownership of real property or personal property.
641
 Therefore, in its origin, choses in 
action cover not only personal rights to debts but also real rights to real property. Choses 
in action could have indicated that patents have a proprietary nature. In view of choses 
in action covering real actions, it thus opens up another possibility that patents can be 
categorised as chattels real.  
 
As a matter of fact, there are three good reasons for classifying patents as chattels real 
instead of chattels personal. Firstly, from an historical perspective, franchises were in 
the incorporeal hereditaments category, which belonged to real property. Originally, 
                                                                                                                                               
Sport International Bussum BV v Inter-Footwear Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 776, Crittall Windows Ltd v 
Stormseal (UPVC) Window Systems Ltd [1991] RPC 265, and trade mark licence case Northern & Shell 
plc v Condè Nast & National Magazine Distributors Ltd [1995] RPC 117. 
639
 Noel Byrne and Amanda McBratney, Licensing Technology (3rd edn, Jordan 2005) 22. ‘An exclusive 
licence is virtually a proprietary interest’. Supporting court opinions including British Nylon Spinners Ltd 
v Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd [1952] 2 All ER 780 (CA) ‘An English patent is a species of English 
property of the nature of chose in action…A person who has an enforceable right to a licence under an 
English patent appears, therefore to me to have, at least, some kind of proprietary interest which it is the 
duty of the Courts to protect’. 
And also Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2006] FSR 17 (Ch) ‘…an exclusive licence of design right was 
a “non-cash” asset within the meaning of s. 320 of the Companies Act 1985’.  
640
 Holdsworth, A History of English Law vol VII (n 209)516. 
641
 ibid. ‘In fact the list of choses in action known to English law includes a large number of things, 
which differ widely from one another in their essential characteristics. In its primary sense the term chose 
in action includes all rights which are enforceable by action—rights to debts of all kinds, and rights of 
action on a contract or a right to damages for its breach; rights arising by reason of the commission of tort 
or other wrong; and rights to recover the ownership or possession of property real or personal’. ‘Hence it 
was not difficult to include in this category things which were even more obviously property of an 
incorporeal type, such as patent rights and copyrights’. 
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patents were proprietary like real estate and to categorise it as personal property was a 
fairly recent development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They were 
so classified because of the slow process of expansion of chose in action in the sixteenth 
century. Eventually, patents were re-categorised into the category of chose in action. In 
substance, patents, just like estates, are proprietary in nature. Secondly, in the personal 
property category, it is only chattels real that have half proprietary and half personal 
characteristics. Other categories, like choses in action, have already been expressly 
excluded by the Patents Act 1977 and choses in possession made for physical things but 
not for intangible things; these two sub-categories have smaller chances than chattels 
real. Thirdly, once patents are categorised as chattels real, it is easier to explain why 
patentees have rights against many people, like real property rights; meanwhile, it is 
also possible to explain why an exclusive licence is at times proprietary and a 
non-exclusive licence is not. This study will turn back to this in detail in following 
sections. For the above three reasons, this research maps patents in the chattels real 
category and presents this idea in Figure 5-9 below. 
 
  Figure 5-9: Proposed classification of patents 
in the English common law structure 
All property interests 
Real property Personal property 
Chattels personal Chattels real 
Tangible: 
Choses in possession 
Intangible: 
Choses in action 
Corporeal 
Hereditaments 
Incorporeal 
Hereditaments 
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Figure 5-9 is helpful in pinpointing patents in the Taiwanese tenure structure. As Taiwan 
customary law has no such history like England, it is sufficient to use its original real 
property structure to envisage patents in a tenure map. The real property structure in 
Figure 5-10 below can be envisaged as the right hand side of Figure 5-9 because the 
sub-category yeh-zhu-quan (業主權) in Figure 5-10 belongs to individual citizens and 
not to the emperor. In other words, yeh-zhu-quan (業主權) is personal property that can 
be equated to the English classification. Thus, yeh-zhu-quan (業主權) in Figure 5-10 
below can be envisaged as chattels real in Figure 5-9 above. It is not too strange to use 
holding a lease or yeh-diàn（業佃）to explain a patentee’s status because in the past 
everyone was the emperor’s tenant and the right an individual held was always a 
leasehold.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In modern times, the overlord does not have to be the crown or the emperor and can be 
all commoners in human society that hold the ownership of freehold patents. The 
government or crown, on behalf of all citizens, grants patentees leaseholds to patents 
with time limitations. In this duration, patentees are freeholders of his patent just like 
owners of flats holding their leaseholds as freeholds. Leaseholds held by patentees as 
Figure 5-10: Proposed classification of a patent licence 
in the Taiwanese tenure structure 
Interests in real property 
Land: belongs 
to the emperor 
yeh-zhu-quan 
（業主權） 
gei（給） pacht(贌) 
partial whole short 
term 
licence 
assign 
for 
ever 
 210 
 
freeholds are eligible to be assigned or licenced. 
 
A patent’s position in Taiwanese tenure, a proposed property model, is thus established 
as in Figure 5-10. Like the English tenure structure, the Taiwanese tenure system dealt 
with proprietary interests in land. England and Taiwan shared the same factor that all 
physical land belongs to the king/emperor. Estates can resemble yeh (業) in Taiwanese 
tenure, whilst the ownership of an estate is yeh-zhu-quan (業主權). Patents were estates 
in medieval England, therefore, like other estates they can be equally fitted into this 
concept of yeh (業). Ownership of estate (yeh-zhu-quan業主權) thus equally resembled 
patents as zhuan-li (專利,patent) yeh-zhu-quan (業主權). Like proprietary interests in 
land that can be assigned and licenced, proprietary interests in patents can be equally 
assigned by gei (給) and licenced by pacht (贌). Gei (給), as stated in 5.6.1, is a real 
right transfer similar to the English word ‘assign’.  
 
Licences are placed under pacht (贌), especially in the sub-category of short term pacht 
(贌) for two reasons. Firstly, pacht (贌) represents the ‘ongoing commitment’ of the 
parties.
642
 As will be further explained in 5.6.5, pacht (贌) as an ‘ongoing commitment’ 
means a lease of real rights, or to lease an estate with actual possession.
643
 This actual 
possession, as in the ‘for ever box’ in Figure 5-10, was partially abandoned after 1900644 
and was totally repealed after 2010. Therefore, pacht (贌) shall belong to the right hand 
side box in the ‘short term’ category. Another reason why the pacht (贌) notion we use 
is a pacht (贌) in the short term category rather than the same in the long term category 
is substantiated by Taiwan Shiho (臺灣私法,Taiwanese Private Law) because if a pacht 
                                                 
642
 Miyahata (n 537) 24. Also in Ka, Fantoujia: Qingdai Taiwan Zuqun Zhengzhi yu Shufan Diquan (番
頭家：清代臺灣族群政治與熟番地權)=The Aboriginal Landlord: ethnic politics and aboriginal land 
rights in Qing Taiwan (n 585)21. 
643
 Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第一
卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1 (n 482)309. 
644
 ibid 322. 
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(贌) was made for the short term, then it was governed by a personal action.645 In other 
words, a ‘short term’ pacht (贌) represented a contractual commitment of transfer, but a 
long term pacht (贌 ) was not. Licences in the English concept are contractual 
commitments; therefore, using a short term pacht (贌) as an English licence is taken 
under fair and reasonable consideration.  
 
A pacht (贌) also has another characteristic that is similar to a licence, with both of 
them having a vague legal meaning that refers to an ‘ongoing commitment’ of the 
parties.
646
 Like the English ‘licence’ covering ‘any permission to make any kind of use 
of any thing’ in a broad term,647 sometimes, licences are difficult to distinguish from 
assignments or leases, with a pacht (贌) having the same problem. A pacht (贌) is 
difficult to distinguish from a gei (給,assign) when commitments in a pacht (贌) 
amount to the granting of a full right of occupation, thus in the eye of Japanese 
researchers, a pacht (贌) covers a contractual commitment, sometimes without a 
granting of proprietary interests like shiyakuchi (a lease for a surface right in Japan), 
and sometime with a granting of estate with an actual possession.
648
 The commitments 
in a pacht (贌) rely heavily on the content of the agreement and are not restricted by the 
wording used,
649
 which is the same as a licence.  
 
                                                 
645
 ibid 309. 
646
 Miyahata (n 537) 24. Also in Ka, Fantoujia: Qingdai Taiwan Zuqun Zhengzhi yu Shufan Diquan (番
頭家：清代臺灣族群政治與熟番地權)=The Aboriginal Landlord: ethnic politics and aboriginal land 
rights in Qing Taiwan (n 585) 21. 
647
 Clarke and Kohler (n 31) 273. 
648
 Miyahata (n 537) 4-5, 24. She says pacht (贌) has many types including but not limited to those 
similar to ‘Japanese eikosaku (永小作)[note: perpetual or indefinite lease, similar to yong-diàn (永佃)in 
Chinese], kosaku (小作) [lease with definite duration] or shiyakuchi (借地) [a lease to surface right]’. 
[This sentence is translated by this author] 
649
 In general, pacht (贌) is contractual, but on some occasions, like aboriginal landlords granting estates 
to Han Chinese farmers, are normally proprietary. The judgement of a pacht (贌) contract as contractual 
or proprietary relies on the content of the agreement, if the grantor reserves no right, or little right to 
himself, such a grant is proprietary like an assignment; if the grantor reserves many rights to himself it is 
regarded as a purely contractual lease. See Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in 
Taiwan, Taiwan Shiho 1(臺灣私法第一卷)=Taiwanese Private Law vol 1 (n 482) 320-321. 
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By combining the analogies in Sections 5.5.3 and 5.6.1 above with Figure 5-10, an 
overall map of patents in Taiwanese tenure is clearly presented in Figure 5-11 below. 
 
  
The intellectual commons 
Patent ownership: a bundle of negative rights 
(yeh-zhu-quan業主權) 
Assignment 
(gei 給) 
Licence 
(pacht 贌) 
Exclusive 
licence without 
any reserve 
Non-exclusive 
Sole 
Exclusive 
Real rights 
Figure 5-11: Ownership, licence and assignment 
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With an assignment and licence being discussed above, this diagram concludes and 
highlights that patents in a map of Taiwanese tenure are the following: those rights that 
a patentee holds are negative rights that contain a right to stop others from using and a 
right to stop others from manufacturing and such. Patentees hold these negative rights 
as freeholds where these rights are eligible to be assigned and licenced within a given 
time. A licence is consent for a patentee’s waiver of the right to sue; on the other hand, it 
is a relief of the restriction to use.
650
 The whole mechanism is designed in a passive 
way so that no positive granting of usage right is involved. In view of this way of 
thinking being grounded on a negative concept, it is especially difficult for civil law 
lawyers because they have to think about the granting of a licence as an agreement ‘not 
to do certain actions by the patentee’,651 rather, in the normal case, it is an agreement 
where the licensee can do what he/she likes to his/her thing. Although licences are 
classified in the law of obligations above, the actual consensus is different from the 
normal setting in the civil law of obligations.
652
  
 
5.6.5 Exclusive licences and non-exclusive licences in the classification 
 
Given the conclusion stated above, this research does not stop by the fulfilment of such 
a classification. Earlier in Chapter 2, this author mentioned that Japanese and Taiwanese 
judges both made misleading decisions in licence cases, which cannot be a coincidence. 
There must be something special in licences—apart from the classification above, that a 
traditional civil law classification cannot clearly explain. This section aims to find out 
                                                 
650
 ‘In the US, as in the UK, a non-exclusive licence is, in its simplest form, a waiver by the licensor of 
the right to exclude the licensee doing one or some of the forbidden activities which the grant of the 
patent provides’. See David de Vall and Petter McL Colley, L W Melville Forms and Agreements on 
Intellectual Property and International Licensing, vol 1 (3rd revised edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 3-32. 
651
 A licence ‘is a consent under which a person precluded from the monopoly is allowed such access to it 
as the owner of the monopoly is prepared to allow’. See ibid 3-24. 
652
 An overall picture for patents is, everyone is free to use in the first step, and a grant of patent is a 
restriction of that use. A licence is a release of that restriction. In contrast to the common law concept, the 
original setting of civil law is that everyone cannot use, unless he/she obtain a grant of permission to use. 
A licence is thus a further grant of a permission to use. 
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which part the civil law classification cannot explain. As a foundation, we need to 
understand the original classification in the common law system (limited to the UK and 
US). 
 
Common law of England and common law of the United States of America have 
different answers to ‘what licences are’. UK courts are inclined to view licences as a 
creation of personal obligations,
653
 with an exclusive licence not creating a proprietary 
interest,
654
 even though sometimes an exclusive licence may be considered as property 
under other statutory purposes, such as in the Insolvency Act, Partnership Act or 
Companies Act.
655
 US courts, however, are more flexible in this matter. Where courts 
have reason to believe an exclusive licensee possesses sufficient proprietary interest in a 
patent (for example when the licensee does not reserve any rights),
656
 a non-exclusive 
licence may have the same effect as an exclusive licence so long as the licensor is 
                                                 
653
 Vall and Colley (n 650) 3-34. Also in Allen (n 638) 246. ‘A licence passes no proprietary interest in 
anything, it only makes an action lawful that would otherwise have been unlawful. In the context of the 
royal grant of patents for inventions it was a consent given by the proprietor of the patent to another 
person, the licensee, to do something that the patent entitled the proprietor of it to prevent anyone from 
doing except with his consent. This is the meaning which “licence” has borne throughout the UK patent 
legislation up to and including the Act of 1977’. 
654
 ‘There was clear authority that a licence of an intellectual property right, even an exclusive licence, 
did not create a proprietary interest’. See Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638(Ch) [294] 
Cited Allen & Hanburys Ltd v Generics (UK) Ltd, CBS United Kingdom Ltd v Charmdale Record 
Distributors Ltd, Sport International Bussum BV v Inter-Footwear Ltd, Crittall Windows Ltd v Stormseal 
(UPVC) Window Systems Ltd, Northern & Shell plc v Condè Nast & National Magazine Distributors Ltd. 
Justice Lewison also named other justices who take the same position as him, including 
Browne-Wilkinson in CBS United Kingdom Ltd v Charmdale Record Distributors Ltd, Justice Oliver in 
Sport International Bussum BV v Inter-Footwear Ltd, Justice Scott in Crittall Windows Ltd v Stormseal 
(UPVC) Window Systems Ltd, and Justice Jacob in Northern & Shell plc v Condè Nast & National 
Magazine Distributors Ltd. Also in Vall and Colley (n 650) 3-32, ‘A licence of an intellectual property 
right, even an exclusive licence, doe not create a proprietary interest’. 
655
 Examples like an exclusive licence of design right is a ‘non-cash’ asset within the meaning of s.320 of 
the Companies Act 1985. See Ultraframe (UK) Ltd (n 654). A waste management licence is a property 
under the Insolvency Act. See Official Receiver (as Liquidator of Celtic Extraction Ltd and Bluestone 
Chemicals Ltd) v Environment Agency [2001] Ch 475 (CA), and a milk quota licence is treated as 
property in the Insolvency Act by citing the Celtic Extraction case above. See Swift v Dairywise [2000] 1 
All ER 320. A personal licence granted to one of the partners was a partnership property under 
Partnership Act no matter whether it was assignable or not. See Don King Promotions Inc v Warren [2000] 
Ch 291. 
656
 ‘A person having an exclusive license to a patent possesses a sufficient proprietary interest in the 
patent to have standing to sue infringers. To be an exclusive license for standing purposes, the licensee 
must have received not only the right to practice the patented invention within a particular territory, but 
also the patentee’s express or implied promise that all others shall be excluded and prevented from 
making, using, selling, and practising the invention within the same territory as well’. See Arcade Inc v 
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co [1997] 43 USPQ2d 1511 at 1513.  
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unlikely to licence the same technology to others, or to utilise this technology.
657
  
 
UK courts in general do not think that proprietary or personal should be judged by 
whether a licensee can sue for infringement. The law enabling an exclusive licensee to 
sue for infringement is ‘purely procedural’.658 It is not recognition of a proprietary 
grant. US courts, however, judge licences as a proprietary grant or personal consent by 
whether a licensee can sue his/her grantor for infringement. When an exclusive licence 
contains the right to exclude the grantor, there is no significant difference between 
assignment and exclusive licence.
659
 In other words, if a US exclusive licensee obtains 
the right to exclude others, including the right to exclude the patentee (and sue for 
infringement if the patentee uses it), it is a proprietary grant like an assignment. In the 
eyes of US courts, the range of how a licensee can sue for infringement determines 
whether the grant is proprietary or contractual; it is not a purely procedural matter.  
 
Given the fact that UK and US judges have different opinions on what happens after a 
licence commitment amounts to an assignment, one thing is clear, that licences 
themselves are basically contractual. In contrast to the common law judges, Japanese 
judges have a different point of view. They think an exclusive licence is proprietary.   
The Japanese Supreme Court stated (as in 3.2.4),  
 
〔T〕he issue of this case is like a real property owner granting his surface right to 
                                                 
657
 Vall and Colley (n 650) 3-35. 
658
 Browne-Wilkinson J states, ‘Under section 19 of the Act an exclusive licensee is given a procedural 
right of action to sue for infringement. But the section is purely procedural’. ‘Therefore in my judgement 
the scheme of the Act preserves the normal distinction between assignees who have proprietary rights and 
licensees whose substantive rights are contractual’. See CBS United Kingdom Ltd (n 638) at 98-99. [this 
is a copyright case] Also in Ultraframe (UK) Ltd (n 654) [300]-[301]. ‘In addition it is clear that the world 
of intellectual property operates commercially on the basis that there is a clear distinction between an 
assignment (proprietary) and a licence (non-proprietary).’ 
659
 ‘[w]e agree with the precedent that when the transfer includes all substantial patent rights including 
the right to exclude the transferor, there is no significant difference between the rights transferred by 
assignment and those transferred by exclusive license’. See Arcade (n 656) at 1513. 
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others. The superficiary has the right to exclude intruders, generally speaking, and the 
owner’s in-rem rights (to the intruders) are not limited by the granting of the surface 
right.
660
 
 
Japanese judges conceived exclusive licence as a proprietary granting of a surface right. 
This grant is imagined as a grant made by a land owner to a surface right holder (Figure 
5-12). However, this is inappropriate. From the above analysis, a licence in general is 
not a proprietary grant; it is a waiver of the patentee’s right to sue, a relief of the 
restriction to use on the licensee’s side. If we use a civil law classification when 
thinking about this question, a licence is a contractual commitment. This could happen 
to a surface right holder and his/her lessee, where a surface right holder grants his/her 
surface right to his lessee with a contractual commitment. This cannot happen to a land 
owner who grants a proprietary surface right. This idea is presented in Figure 5-13 
below, showing that Japanese judges incorrectly see an exclusive licence as a 
proprietary grant of a surface right.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
660
 [2005] June 17 precedent number 997(n 224) [translation by the author] 
Land owner 
Surface right holder 
Figure 5-12: An analogy of an 
exclusive licence in the civil law 
classification 
exclusive licence 
Surface right holder 
Lessee 
Figure 5-13: How an exclusive 
licence should be in the civil law 
classification 
exclusive licence 
Land owner 
 217 
 
The Taiwanese Intellectual Property Office makes the same mistake. As stated earlier in 
2.3.3, the Intellectual Property Office believes that an exclusive licence is an act relating 
to things, while a non-exclusive licence is an act relating to obligations.
661
 The Civil 
High Court supports the opinion of the Intellectual Property Office.
662
 The court 
classifies a patent licence as an exclusive licence and non-exclusive licence
 
with two 
separate arrangements. When an exclusive licence issue is involved, the law of things is 
applied to the issue; when a non-exclusive licence issue is involved, the law of 
obligations is employed. This is a misconception though because Taiwanese 
practitioners envisage an exclusive licence as a grant for proprietary rights, and a 
non-exclusive licence as consent of use. This classification leads to confusion about the 
nature of a licence (a proprietary grant or a contractual commitment). This is all due to 
Taiwanese judges and practitioners misconceiving an exclusive licence as the granting 
of a surface right. It is actually more like a contractual lease of a surface right.  
 
Although, an exclusive licence can be envisaged as a lease to a surface right, this 
analogy will not go far because it still does not explain who owns the full ownership in 
the first place. One cannot further use this example to explain why in the case of a bare 
licence that they merely obtain negative rights not being sued while leasing surface 
rights obtain positive rights to use and capitalise. The Taiwanese tenure system explains 
licences better than the civil law concept in this respect. 
 
5.6.6 Licences should be translated as xu-ke (許可) instead of shou-quan（授權）in 
the Taiwanese Patent Act 2011 
 
The legal term ‘licences’ has long been mistranslated as ‘shou-quan’, meaning rights 
                                                 
661
 [1999] Zhifazi number 88007117 (n 166). 
662
 [2006] Difang Fayuan Zhi Shangyizi number18 (n 167). 
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(quan權) have been granted (shou 授). It is a misconception though because in the 
substance of the meaning of licences, neither real rights nor positive covenant have been 
granted to licensees. A patent ‘licence’ is a negative covenant where a patentee will 
waive their right to assert exclusion against the licensee only if the licensee gets this 
permission called ‘licence’ from the patentee. The patentee merely renounces their right 
against the licensee and does not positively grant his proprietary rights (which is 
basically a bundle of rights of exclusion), nor positively commits that the licensee has a 
right to use his patent. Therefore, it is misleadingly translated as shou-quan (授權) 
when no positive rights have actually been given. 
 
This misleading translation has led to significant difficulty in real practice. Licensees 
misconceive that they have obtained the right to use and manufacture from the patentees 
and question why they cannot ‘sublicence’ to whomever they want, just like subleasing, 
which happens often in non-exclusive licence cases when manufacturers want to protect 
their subcontractors. The majority of Taiwanese practitioners do not know that the 
substance of a patent licence is similar to a non-action commitment, where the licensee 
pays for the patentee’s non-action. Therefore, this term ‘licence’ should be translated as 
‘xu-ke’（許可）, meaning ‘permission’, which is closer to original meaning of a licence. 
Articles 57, 59, 62, 63, 64, 69, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 96, 97, 138 and 140 in relation to 
the terms ‘licences’, ‘licensees’ and ‘compulsory licences’ all need to be changed 
accordingly. 
 
5.7 The law of yeh (業) in solving contemporary problems 
 
As this study presented in the first two chapters, the contemporary problems in 
Taiwanese real practice are: 
a) The position of patents in property taxonomy being unclear.  
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b) Such an unclear position influencing law applications in patent transactions; if 
a patent is proprietary in nature, then the delivery requirement under principles 
of separation and abstraction is inevitably encountered. 
c) Civil law rights in rem cannot explain how a patent licence works: the extent 
that the rights a patentee owns and a licencee holds, are not well elaborated in 
civil law. 
 
The law of yeh (業) solves the above problems. The law of yeh constructs its jural 
relations from one person to another person. With these assertions classified as 
assertions to one person only, and many others, the cluster of claims can be seen as a 
bundle of rights. For the reason that the law of yeh does not construct its jural relations 
by assertions to a thing and claims to a person, the law of yeh does not separate objects 
into things and claims. The transfer of assertions is not a movement of objects (things or 
claims) but a change of subjects (persons). Whether the object is proprietary or not is 
unimportant in the law of yeh. Since an assertion transfer is a change of subjects 
(persons), the principle of freedom of contract governs the transaction. As such, patent 
rights, whether proprietary or not, can be transferred under this structure. 
 
Under this structure of whether patent rights are proprietary is unimportant, with the 
object being transferred being intangible rights most of the time in the law of yeh (like a 
right to manage the land), with ‘delivery’ never being an essential requirement for a 
valid transfer. Under the law of yeh, a patentee no longer needs to exercise the absurd 
delivery requirement that has been considered impossible to implement under the law of 
things. Within the regime of customary law, a patent rights transfer does not obey the 
principles of separation and abstraction. In the case of buying patents from a potential 
insolvency seller, the buyer has the right to terminate the contract when insolvency 
occurs. The buyer and seller no longer abide by the rigid legal structure in the code, 
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without the negative influence of the principles of separation and abstraction, leading to 
the ownership transfer contract not being sustained independently. As ownership is not 
transferred, the buyer need not worry about the purchased patents being a part of the 
seller’s insolvency estate. The negative influence of the law of things is eliminated.  
 
Under the law of yeh, the position of patents in property taxonomy becomes clear. The 
authority, on behalf of the commons, grants a patentee the rights to exclude others in 
order to encourage or preserve his/her investment/efforts for such an innovation, just 
like the authority does to the estate holder. This grant is not the conferring of positive 
rights; it is the granting of negative rights, a bundle of rights that include the right not to 
be used, manufactured and sold. In other words, a positive right, such as the right to use, 
already exists in society—under the state of nature, everyone is free to use. The granting 
of a patent only embargoes many others from using and is the manual creation of 
monopoly status for the patentee. For the reason that the patentee does not obtain any 
positive rights from the authority, ‘to licence’ means giving relief for such an embargo. 
As mentioned above, patent rights being proprietary or not are insignificant in a transfer, 
with the object being give out potentially being non-proprietary relief. Once a licence is 
granted, the licencee reverts back to the state of freedom to use. This reverting is 
targeted, so in the case of a non-exclusive licence, the non-exclusive licencee cannot 
grant his/her particular relief further down to anyone else unless otherwise agreed. 
However, in the case of an exclusive licence, the content of the grant is different. Just 
like an absent land owner, the owner/patentee grants the whole bundle of rights to the 
exclusive licencee who stands in the shoes of the patentee. In a case like this, rights that 
have been given out by the patentee are proprietary. The exclusive licencee can grant 
his/her proprietary rights further down, or may choose to grant non-proprietary relief to 
any non-exclusive licencee. The law of yeh provides answers to what extent the rights a 
patentee owns and a licencee holds, satisfactorily explaining the unelaborated part of 
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civil law. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presents a property model that can be built on Taiwanese customary 
practice. These customary property rules are not only similar to those rules in the 
common law system but also feasible for patents. This property modularity not only 
fixes the flaw of the civil law module but also provides a better paradigm for intellectual 
property. 
 
Several suggestions emerge from this comparison of civil law ownership, common law 
estate and the Taiwanese customary rule yeh（業）. The first is that the concept of yeh 
（業）is a better solution for a patent’s property status than the concept of things in civil 
law. The idea of yeh （業）embraces a bundle of rights just like estate norm in common 
law; it is grounded on the exclusionary rules that patent rights are supposed to be. 
Unlike civil law property rules that communicate internal rules concerning positive use 
and disposition, the idea of yeh （業）contains only negative rights. It is perfect for 
explaining the nature of patents whereby patent rights are bundles of negative rights as 
well. For the strong similarity between real rights holdings in both systems, this chapter 
suggests that ownership of patents should be translated as zhuan-li yeh-zhu-quan (專利
業主權) to replace the civil law phrase zhuan-li suo-you-quan (專利所有權) which has 
been misused for a long time. 
 
Secondly, from an historical perspective, registration rules for land have had no direct 
impact on English patent registration, with Taiwanese justice making a misconnection 
between these two irrelevant systems. The principle of registration in land registration is 
a revolution, rather than an evolution in Taiwanese estate history. Traditionally, a 
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creation or assignment of yeh （業）is not required to be registered. This chapter 
suggests rules under the land registry shall not be involved in patent cases because there 
is no historical or legal ground to do so.  
 
Lastly, licences cannot be explained under the classification of civil law property at 
present, so it is necessary to explain patent licences by means of customary law 
classification. This chapter advises that the pacht (贌) concept under Taiwanese 
customary estate law can be used in patent licence cases. In view of pacht (贌) being a 
personal contractual commitment of the parties, it shares the same characteristic with 
common law licence. This study further point out the mistake that the Japanese Supreme 
Court and Taiwanese Civil High Court have made in decisions.   
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This chapter aims to answer the last question—is the similarity between Taiwanese 
customary law and English common law on property taxonomy applicable to work 
under the framework of Article 1 in the Taiwanese Civil Code, as a supplement in the 
interpretation in laws? Before the analysis begins, section 6.1 provides a brief overview 
of the conclusions from previous chapters. Section 6.2 deeply analyses the hierarchy in 
the law interpretation set forth in Article 1, with 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 substantiating that using 
analogical skills by looking into rules in customary law to supplement the 
insufficiencies of statutory law is applicable under the framework of such hierarchy. As 
this study mentioned initially, the reason why patent status cannot be positioned in civil 
law property taxonomy is because the gap is structural and substantial. This substantial 
imperfection has been overcome by adopting customary law interpretation, as stated in 
5.5, 5.6 and 5.7, with section 6.3 focusing on structural issues in this chapter. With the 
recommendations stated in 6.3 and the interpretation taken from 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7, this 
study concludes that the position of patents in property taxonomy and the meaning of 
licence that has puzzled Taiwanese law practitioners for over a century will be answered 
by this research. 
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6.1 Conclusions 
 
Patents have been miscategorised into the civil law of things for nearly a century in 
Taiwan. This research sets out to find out why and how this misconception originated 
and spread, and offers a scheme whereby using a classification under customary law, a 
property model for patents, can be established.  
 
In Chapter 1 this study reviews all paradoxical sayings pervading present-day 
Taiwanese academia and the judicial system. Majority jurists believe that real rights in 
Taiwanese statutory laws explain the nature of a patent well, so there is no need for 
further discussion. In fact, court decisions that have adopted jurists’ opinions sometimes 
successfully explain the law, but sometimes they do not. This study postulates that the 
problem is due to a different understanding of ‘property’ in civil law and common law 
systems. Previous research is neither sufficient nor deep enough to propose an 
applicable model under Taiwanese law. Therefore, this chapter set out six questions that 
is be answered: Why does popular opinion explain patents using the law of things? 
What has happened in the past? What are the substantial differences of English common 
law taxonomy and Taiwanese civil law taxonomy on property? Insofar as the statutory 
laws do not solve the problem completely, is there any customary law in Taiwan that 
can help replenish the abovementioned gap? How similar is this customary law to that 
in English common law? Is this similarity applicable to work under the framework of 
Article 1 in the Taiwanese Civil Code? 
 
In Chapter 2, this study answered the first question—what has gone wrong in Taiwanese 
jurists’ and courts’ opinions? The legislative record was examined and analysed, with 
this research discovering the source of misconception was the vague meaning of the 
word ‘things’, which was ‘deliberately’ not clearly defined in the code. This vagueness 
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has provided interpretative room for patents in the civil law property structure. To those 
who believe that patents resemble physical things, they believe that both the principle of 
separation and abstraction equally apply to patent assignment. The reasons they hold are 
seemingly reasonable (the word ‘things’ does not exclude intellectual property) but they 
neglect a significant fact that the principles of separation and abstraction were designed 
for transaction involving physical things, not transaction for intangible objects.  
 
The second misconception is delivery. This chapter presented the bizarre misconception 
carried by some intellectual property professors and judges that ownership of copyright 
is only transferred at the time when the work is ‘delivered’ to the assignee. This study 
challenges this view by pointing out that a methodology patent cannot possibly be 
delivered because it is ethereal in nature, intangible and without a corporeal existence. 
Although theoretically it is possible to replace delivery requirement with registration, it 
is however still problematic in explaining the law because the court misuses the 
principle of registration in patent cases. The principle of registration, a creation of 
absolute ownership by the registry, applies well in relation to real property but badly 
concerning intellectual property. This study also challenges this myth by pointing out 
that copyright does not have a registry system, with the existence of ownership of 
copyright unaffected by whether it has a registry system or not. This chapter concludes 
that the origin of the misconception arose from an insufficient definition of the word 
‘things’ because to consider patents as physical things is a slippery slope. Therefore, the 
principle of separation, abstraction, registration and even delivery should not be adopted 
in patent transactions because the patent is then forced to be confined to a civil law 
classification which was design for physical things. 
 
In Chapter 3, this study answer the second question—what has happened in the past that 
has led jurists and judges to use principles arising from civil law real rights to explain 
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the nature of a patent? This study concludes that this mistake was triggered by a natural 
structural defect in the progress of transplanting too many laws from diverse resources. 
In Japan, the problem was that patent law meant clinging to the French style of Civil 
Code, with the code changing to the German style after patent law was enacted. In 
Taiwan, the problem was that Taiwanese Civil Code was heavily influenced by Japanese 
scholarship, so the flaws remained the same. Academia tried to redress any voids by 
forming a common scholarly consensus using the quasi-possession hypothesis. This 
hypothesis was selectively mirrored in Joseph Kohler’s scholarship, where the majority 
of Taiwanese scholars view it as their legal grounds. However, this paradoxical view 
only exposes the slackness of Taiwanese academia and courts for favouring the use of 
ready-made rules, rather than conducting a comparative study from scratch.  
 
Chapter 4 explored the history and evolution of how patents have been categorised as 
personal property. Patents, like franchises, were assimilated in land law as incorporeal 
hereditaments in the thirteenth century. The doctrines of seisin and estates were equally 
applied to patents in medieval times. Today, patents in choses in action were a 
development of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was attributed to a 
slowly expansion of choses in action from personal to real property in the sixteenth 
century. Moreover, in the seventeenth century, patents as choses in action were 
re-categorised into a larger property concept, whereby later in the eighteenth century, 
Roman possession was used to support this enlargement. Philosophers strengthen this 
idea by citing John Locke, Aristotle, Hugo Grotius and Pufendorf’s works, with patents 
eventually becoming personal property in the sub-category of choses in action as we see 
it now. 
 
With the above analysis as a foundation, this study can now answer the third 
question—what are the substantial differences of real rights in English common law and 
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Taiwanese civil law? This chapter concludes that physical things in Taiwanese civil law 
cannot explain the property nature of a patent because civil law ownership lacks two 
significant features. Firstly, ownership in civil law cannot be segmented. Secondly, no 
one is free to use land in the first place, whilst in common law everyone is free to use 
land in principle. The prerequisite is precisely the converse. As Chapter 5 further 
explained, the differences are caused by different classification techniques. Civil law 
classification begins with the ‘thing itself’, instead of the ‘interests’ in things, whilst the 
common law classification starts with interest in things and jural relations dealing with 
intangible objects. Therefore, movable or immovable things, or rights in rem in 
Taiwanese civil law, cannot explain the property nature of a patent because ownership 
means to own ‘a thing’ perpetually. To own a perpetual patent contradicts the current 
notion that we have now. In contrast to civil law classification, common law classified 
‘interests’ rather than things, with ownership meaning to own ‘interests’ for a certain 
period of time. This classification is similar to the classification in Taiwanese customary 
law whereby ownership refers to a holding of interests, rather than a holding of physical 
things. This chapter concludes that Taiwanese customary law can proffer a better 
property model for patents than civil law. 
 
Chapter 5 answered two questions—is there any customary law in Taiwan that can help 
replenish the abovementioned gap, and how similar is this customary practice to that in 
common law? This chapter commenced with an overview of real rights classification 
under Taiwanese customary law, and through a comparative study of both systems, 
reached five concise conclusions, as seriatim:  
 
(1) The law of yeh (業)under customary law is more feasible than law of things under 
civil law. 
(2) Yeh-zhu-quan (業主權)is similar to common law estate holding. 
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(3) There is no historical or legal grounds for adopting rules in land registration in 
patent registration, therefore the principle of registration in land registration shall 
not be involved in patent cases. 
(4) ‘Patent assignment’ shall be translated as ‘zhuan-li-zhuan-rang’ (專利轉讓). 
(5) Licences can resemble pacht (贌), thus licences can be envisaged as personal 
obligations made by the grantors and grantees, just like a lease to a surface right.  
 
This study has proven that, in many aspects, real rights classification in Taiwanese 
customary law is very similar to common law classification, with these similarities able 
to help replenish the abovementioned gap in statutory law. The position of patents in a 
property structure can then be explained through Figure 5-11. Moreover, this figure 
easily points out where mistakes are made in decisions made by the Japanese Supreme 
Court and Taiwanese Civil High Court. Patent assignments and patent licences can then 
be further explained by way resembling legal terms and norms set forth in Taiwanese 
customary law.  
 
The law of yeh (業) explains what rights a patentee owns and a licencee holds. As stated 
in 5.7, the law of yeh (業)does not require delivery as an essential requirement of a valid 
transfer, so a patent transfer does not adhere to the absurd requirements of the law of 
things anymore. Under the law of yeh (業), a transfer is a change of subjects rather than 
objects, so whether patent rights are proprietary or not, patent rights can be transferred 
freely. The law of yeh (業) provides a path for patent transactions in real practice, with 
this path avoiding the dilemma arising from civil law legal structure by obeying the 
principles of separation and abstraction.  
 
The law of yeh (業) also explains what a non-exclusive licence and an exclusive licence 
are. The rights a patentee owns are a bundle of negative rights that include the right not 
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to be used, manufactured and sold. To ‘licence’ means giving a relief of embargo. A 
non-exclusive licence is a grant for non-proprietary relief. This relief is targeted, so a 
non-exclusive licencee cannot grant his/her personal relief further down to others unless 
otherwise agreed. In the case of an exclusive licence, the owner/patentee grants the 
whole bundle of rights to the exclusive licencee, with the exclusive licencee standing in 
the shoes of the patentee. Patent rights on such occasions are proprietary. The exclusive 
licencee can grant his/her proprietary rights further down, or (s)he may choose to grant 
non-proprietary relief to any non-exclusive licencee. The law of yeh (業) explains the 
substance of patent rights and the meaning of licence, leading to the unelaborated part 
contained within civil law being fulfilled. 
 
Finally, the following sections aim to answer the last question—whether the 
abovementioned scheme is applicable to work under the framework of Article 1 in the 
Taiwanese Civil Code. The following sections will prove that this scheme is workable 
under the Civil Code and that the results of this study can be adopted into every civil 
case when patents are involved. 
 
6.2 Property model built on customary law is applicable and enforceable under the 
scheme of Article 1 
 
6.2.1 Hierarchy in the interpretation of law 
 
Article 1 of the Taiwanese Civil Code is the most important of all civil law rules in this 
code. It states, 
 
If there is no applicable act for a civil case, the case shall be decided according 
to customs. If there is no such custom, the case shall be decided according to 
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the jurisprudence. 
 
This clause sets out the hierarchical order; statutory laws are the first priority, followed 
by local customs and then jurisprudence. The structure of this clause has been copied 
from Article 1 of Swiss Civil Code 1907 because it has similar wordings that express 
the spirit of hierarchy.
663
 It reads, 
 
The Law must be applied in all cases which come within the letter or the spirit of 
any of its provisions. Where no provision is applicable, the judge shall decide 
according to the existing Customary Law and, in default thereof, according to the 
rules which he would lay down if he had himself to act as legislator. Herein he 
must be guided by approved legal doctrine and case-law.
 664
  
 
This legal order is not presented in every civil code though. For example, the two most 
influential codes to the Taiwanese Civil Code (Japanese and German Civil Codes) have 
                                                 
663
 Wu Chung-Jau(吳從周), ‘Lun Minfa Diyitiao 'Fa Li':Zuigao Fayuan Xiang Guan Minshi Panjue Panli 
Zonghe Zhengli Fenxi(論民法第一條『法理』：最高法院相關民事判決判例綜合整理分析)=On 
'Jurisprudence' in §1 Civil Code: an analysis of decisions and precedents made by the Supreme Court’ 
(2003) 15(2) Soochow Law Journal 9. Justice Wu Chung-Jau stated, ‘Article 1 of our Civil Code… is 
copied from Article 1 of Swiss Civil Code 1907 made by Eugen Huber.’ He noted that his first learning of 
Article 1 of Swiss Civil Code 1907 was from Professor Yang Ri-ran’s class on Jurisprudence at National 
Taiwan University. Justice Wu Chung-Jau further cited the original clause of Article 1 of Swiss Civil 
Code 1907 in the footnote, ‘Das Gesetx findet auf alle Rechtfrangen Anwendung, für die es nach Wortlaut 
oder Auslegung eine Bestimmung enthält. Kann dem Gesetz Keine Vorschrift entnommen warden, so soll 
der Richter nach Gewohnheitscrecht entscheiden, und, wo solches fehlt, nach der Regel, die er als 
Gesetzgeber aufstellen würde. Er folgt dabei bewährter Lehre und Ü berlieferung.’ The same statement of 
Article 1 is copied from the Swiss Code and also found in Wang Ze-jian(王澤鑑), Minfa Shili 
Yanxi:Minfa Zongze(民法實例研習：民法總則)=A Study on the Cases of Civil Law: General Principle 
(San Min 1996) 27-28 and Yang (n 69) 248. Professor Yang cited Professor Wang Ze-jian’s analysis and 
complimented him by stating, ‘Wang Ze-jian has a penetrating statement with this regards, “Article 1 of 
our Civil Code is copied from Article 1 of Swiss Civil Code, the so called local customs, equals to 
Gewohnheitsrecht in Swiss Civil Code.”’ The primary source however, did not explicitly make this 
connection, see Judicial Yuan (Ministry of Justice) Department of Judicial Administration, Zhonghua 
Minkuo Minfa Zhiding Shiliao Huibian-Xia Ce (中華民國民法制定史料彙編-下冊)=The Compilation 
of the Legislative Archives of the Civil Code of Republic of China-Final Volume (Judicial Yuan 1976) 
377-378. There is no direct evidence of this connection because this compilation is not a complete 
collection due to the war leading to many primary sources going missing as the curator later explains on 
page 987 and 988. 
664
 See Ivy Williams, The Swiss Civil Code: English version vol I (Siegfried Wyler and Barbara Wyler 
eds, reprint edn, Hans Schellenberg 1987) 1. This translation is based on the Swiss Civil Code 1907 and 
revised, inserted and annulled articles from 1907 to 1984. Article 1 has stayed the same since 1907. 
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no such hierarchy applicable in law in their civil codes.
665
 That means that this study, 
which follows this order, may only be suitable for the Taiwanese civil law system and 
may not be equally applied to other civil law jurisdictions.
666
  
 
Taiwanese Civil Code expresses this hierarchical legal order, so this research follows 
the order from the beginning to the end. The order shall be that this research needs to 
prove that there is no applicable statutory law for patent transactions in the beginning. 
As long as this condition is proven, research carries on with local customs and 
jurisprudential discussions. Chapters 2 and 3 proved that there is no applicable statutory 
law for patents, whilst Chapters 4 and 5 looked into the general principle in the common 
law system and similarities in Taiwanese local customs. This study follows the above 
stated order. The final question this study needs to ask is: do the customs and 
jurisprudence conform to the definition in Article 1? What do ‘customs’ and 
‘jurisprudence’ exactly mean in Article 1? 
 
6.2.2 Customs under Taiwanese Civil Code 
 
The word ‘customs’ has many interpretations. Divided doctrinal sayings have shown 
two diverse trends for the definition of customs: either stringent or loose standards. The 
stringent standard says that customs must be widely accepted as a general practice in 
subject matter and be accepted as law.
667
 The loose standard, on the contrary, does not 
                                                 
665
 German Civil Code had a similar dogma in the first draft, but deleted in the second draft. Japan puts 
that dogma in the guidelines issued to judges, but not in its civil code. See Wu (n 663) 10. 
666
 Countries who have this dogma are Switzerland (Article 1), Austria (Article 7), Thailand (Article 14) 
and Turkey (Article 1). Not every civil law jurisdiction sets priority in the application of laws. See ibid 9 
at note 8. 
667
 An example is international law professor Cheng Chia-jui who talked about the sources of internal 
legal order, where the first one must be constitutional law, legislation and delegated legislation; the 
second one is customary law, followed by judicial decisions and general principles of law—principle of 
fair and equitable treatment that belongs to the jurisprudence area. Professor Cheng takes the strict 
standard on the definition of customary law, stating that ‘Customary law in the internal legal order has, as 
a supplementary source of customs law, been used as no less binding than ordinary law when such laws 
are in conformity with some very stringent conditions: (1) they must be widely accepted as a general 
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think that customs must be accepted as law. Since Article 1 uses the word ‘customs’ not 
‘customary law’, Article 1 does not require customs to be accepted as a law, such as in 
general practice. Under this loose standard, customs only mean local social practices 
that local communities consistently practice and accept as facts; customs do not have to 
be in written texts, or accepted as law by communities.
668
 ‘Customs’ is not only used in 
Article 1 but also in Article 776, 778, 779, 781, 784, 785, 786, 790, 793, 800, 836, 838, 
850 and 915 in relation to land usage,
669
 which use this word ‘customs’ in context as 
well. Not only does academia have diverse opinions but legislators have also used this 
word inconsistently in these clauses. Sometimes it loosely means social practices
670
 and 
sometimes it means stringent general principles that have to comply with the principle 
of generality and the principle of consistency followed by communities for some 
considerable time.
671
 The true meaning of customs in the legislators’ minds remains a 
mystery. 
 
No matter whether the word ‘customs’ is defined broadly or narrowly, this study passes 
                                                                                                                                               
practice in customs matters; and (2) they must be accepted as law…. Customary law in the East Asian 
legal system has only been included in the code of civil law, not in the administrative law’. See Cheng 
Chia-jui, ‘The Sources of National Customs Law in East Asian Countries’ in Cheng Chia-jui (ed), 
Customs Law of East Asia (Wolters Kluwer 2010) 33. For a deeper analysis of strict and loose standards 
and various definition of customs across different periods of time in history, see Huang Yuan-sheng (黃源
盛), ‘Ming Guo Chuqi De Mingshi Shenpan Yu Mingjian Xiguan: yi daliyuan caipan shilliao wei 
zhongxin de kaocha (民國初期的民事審判與民間習慣：以大理院裁判史料為中心的考察)=On The 
Customs and Civil Judgments at The Primary Stage of Ming Gou: focus on daliyuan decisions’ in Liu 
Zeng-gui (劉增貴) (ed), Fazhi Yu Lisu: disanjie guoji Hanxue huiyi lunwenji lishizu (法制與禮俗：第三
屆國際漢學會議論文集歷史組)=Law and Customs: third Hanxue conference: history division (The 
Institute of History & Philology, Academia Sinica 2002). 
668
 Tsai Ming-Cheng (蔡明誠), ‘Xiguan Yu Wuquan Fading Yuanze (習慣與物權法定原則)=Customs 
and the Numerus Clausus Principle’ in Lin Jing-miao (ed), Sifaxue Zhi Chuantong Yu Xiandai (私法學之
傳統與現代下冊)=The Traditional and Modern Private Law vol II (Xue Lin學林 2004) 324-325. 
669
 Wu (n 663) 82-85. 
670
 For example, Article 776, 778(2), 790 (1) (ii), 793, 836(1) and 850 means as long as local social 
practice differs from these clauses, local customs precede statutory laws. See Chang Yun-chien (張永健), 
‘Wuquanfa zhong zhi Xiguan: zixun chengben lilun zhi guandian (物權法中之習慣：資訊成本理論之觀
點)=Property Customs in Taiwan: an Information cost perspective’ (2011) 188 The Taiwan Law Review 
月旦法學 83-84. 
671
 For example, Article 779(3), 781, 784(3), 785(3) and 786(3) have a proviso that ‘if it is otherwise 
provided by statutes or customs, such statutes or customs shall be followed’. Article 800, 838(1), 850-3(1) 
and 915(1) have different provisos like ‘unless it is otherwise provided by a particular agreement or 
custom which shall apply’.  
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both standards because the traditional landholding system, as presented in Chapter 5, is 
no longer an oral tradition; it has already been put down to written texts by Japanese 
researchers in Taiwan Shiho. The concept of yeh has been widely discussed by 
academia;
672
 both Taiwanese and Japanese researchers have made significant 
contributions to this area of law. The owner has remained being called yeh-zhu until now, 
with pacht often heard in rural areas. This customary practice has even transformed 
itself into flat leasehold. Leaseholders constantly treat themselves as freeholders and 
lease the whole flat to another tenants, with the leaseholders calling themselves 
‘er-fang-dong’ (二房東,the second owner) and naming their landlords ‘da-fang-dong’ 
(大房東,the first owner).673 Leaseholders see themselves as landlords just as small-rent 
landlords did to their primary cultivators. This social practice has been widely accepted 
as a general practice and Taiwanese people consider it as obligatory; even the 
transformation from land to a flat does not destroy the uniformity of this underlying 
concept. This custom has the consistency, uniformity and generality that the strictest 
standards require. Therefore, customary practice proposed by this study suffices for the 
requirement that customs in Article 1 should have. 
 
As with the tension of customs and numerus clausus,
674
 before 2009 it was very 
difficult to create a real right by means of customs because of the strict restriction of 
numerus clausus. After 2009, the law of things was significantly amended, with this 
                                                 
672
 The concept of yeh has already been a part of the History of Law and Society and Taiwan History 
curriculum including, but not limited to National Taiwan University, National Chengchi University, 
National Taiwan Normal University, Feng Chia University and Tamkang University. This author was a 
participant on the History of Law and Society curriculum at National Taiwan University. The concept of 
yeh can be found in law and history books, theses, journals and conference papers. Taking the journal 
Taiwan Shi Yanjiu (臺灣史研究,Taiwan Historical Research) as an example, if one types in the word yeh 
(業) in the catalogue search, it will present 80 results from various types of research concerning the 
concept of yeh.  
673
 This customary practice has been supported by Miyahata’s thesis. As a native Japanese, she spoke 
about her own experience, stating that when she stayed in Taiwan, she was very surprised by the 
generality of er-fang-dong (二房東) in Taiwan, with many of her Taiwanese friends being so earnest to 
be er-fang-dong (二房東) and some of them even invested in making more rooms with their own money, 
in order to collect more rent from sub-lessees. See Miyahata (n 537) 2. 
674
 For the definition of numerus clausus, see the Terminology section. 
 234 
 
restriction being removed. Real rights can be created by means of customs as long as 
the court recognizes it.
675
 Judges can, by ways of the next step, application to 
jurisprudence, adopt customary law and concepts in a patent case. Below is how this 
resemblance works under the scheme of civil law jurisprudence. 
 
6.2.3 Jurisprudence and this research 
 
Although Article 1 of Taiwanese Civil Code is derived from Article 1 of the Swiss Civil 
Code 1907, there is a slight difference in the meaning of jurisprudence. The Swiss 
definition of jurisprudence is more accurate and narrow than Taiwanese 
jurisprudence.
676
 It limits judges to applying jurisprudence that has been approved as 
legal doctrine and case-law, and according to the rules that the judge would lay down if 
(s)he had himself/herself to act as legislator. In contrast to the precise Swiss requirement, 
the Taiwanese definition to jurisprudence is far looser than the Swiss counterpart—there 
is no restriction at all. Although the loose definition causes Taiwanese judges to use 
jurisprudence frequently, it does indeed provide some benefits to the judicial system, 
making the system more like case law.
677
 The loose definition also provides benefits to 
researchers; for example, this study does not need to prove that the proposed model has 
been accepted as a legal doctrine in intellectual property law society because Taiwanese 
law does not require it. The lesser the restriction on jurisprudence is, the better it is 
                                                 
675
 See comments by Chang (n 670) 83. Also a deeper monograph regarding the trend of weakening the 
restriction of numerus clausus in Asia, see Su Yeong-chin (蘇永欽), ‘Wuquan Fadingzhuyi Songdongxia 
de Minshi Caichanquan Tixi: zaitan dalu minfadian de kenengxing (物權法定主義鬆動下的民事財產權
體系)=The Structure of Civil Law Property Rights after Weaken numerus clausus: re-exploring the 
possibility of Chinese Civil Code’ in Cheng Chia-jui (程家瑞), Pan Wei-ta (潘維大)and Hung Chia-yin 
(洪家殷 ) (eds), Essays On Comparative Studies of Chinese Legal Systems:Proceedings of the 
Cross-Strait Conference on Civil Law Studies, Taipei, November 27-28, 2004 (Soochow University 
School of Law 2005). Similar comments can also be found in Smith, ‘Community and Custom in 
Property’ at page 36 ‘current debates over the numerus clausus in China, Japan, and Taiwan center on the 
role of custom. Those who would like to weaken or abolish the civil-law-style custom into property law’.  
676
 Wu (n 663) 11. 
677
 ibid 11. Wu Chung-Jau (吳從周)was a judge in Taiwan before he published this monograph as a PhD 
student at the University of Cologne in Germany. Therefore, his comment on Taiwanese judges’ abuse of 
using jurisprudence is authoritative.  
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because to solve immense human problems with limited laws, there is always something 
missing somewhere in the law. Taiwanese jurisprudence provides more trust on 
professional judgements and proffers more flexibility to the application of law. 
 
Despite Taiwanese academia having various definitions of Taiwanese jurisprudence,
678
 
there are still rules to follow regarding how far jurisprudence can be reached. At large, 
‘jurisprudence’ inherently covers two meanings. One is legal philosophy and the other is 
legal methodology.
679
 The latter is more popular than the former because judges are 
more interested in knowing how this specific problem is solved and by what 
methodology, rather than philosophical theory about subject matter.
680
 Taking this study 
as an example, a comparative study from an historical perspective and building a 
property model for patents grounded in Taiwanese customary law is more favourable to 
judges, compared with building a property model from a philosophical perspective. In 
other words, pragmatically, judges are inclined to cite a result from a reasonable 
methodology. Another reason for disfavouring citing philosophy is that a doctrinal 
theory is not the source of law
681
 and carries a potential risk of being challenged by the 
higher court if a party appeals.
682
 
                                                 
678
 There are four popular views on Taiwanese jurisprudence. Some say Taiwanese jurisprudence refers to 
a general principle arising from the local community that is guided by good will and rationale. Some say 
that it is a general principle arising from the nature of law. Some say it is the nature of things (Natur der 
Sache). Others combine the above three definitions and say it is a general principle arising from the local 
community that is based on the nature of law and nature of things. Overall, there are two trends in this 
definition, one is ‘the general rules of the local community’ and the other is ‘the nature law of all human 
beings’. Both are correct and it reveals different opinions at different stages of the development of 
jurisprudence. See ibid 12,13,15,16,19,96. Also in Yang Ren-shou (楊仁壽), ‘Chanshi Falu Zhi 
Fangfalun (闡釋法律之方法論)=The Methodology of Law Interpretation’ (1986) 6(1) Sifa Yanjiu 
Nianbao (司法研究年報)=Judicial Studies Annual 2-5. 
679
 Wu (n 663) 30. 
680
 ibid 32. See also Yang (n 69) 49-57. Yang Ren-shou (楊仁壽) who is the Supreme Court justice and 
also emphasised the importance of legal methodology in case decisions. 
681
 Wu (n 663) 36-37. The author Wu Chung-Jau (吳從周), as a judge, provides a deep analysis about 
how judges value philosophy and legal methodology differently when using jurisprudence for court 
decisions. Taiwanese practitioners favour legal methodology over philosophy because legal philosophy 
has been criticised as ‘unpractical’, or ‘too theoretical’ in solving disputes at hand for a long time. 
Therefore, this study chooses legal methodology as jurisprudence, i.e. a comparative method grounded in 
history is more favourable by practitioners at present.  
682
 Article 496(1) of the Taiwanese Civil Code, ‘Except where the party has filed an appeal to assert the 
ground for a review or has failed to assert such ground known to him/her, a rehearing action may be 
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There are three set types of undertaking for this legal methodology. The first type is 
using analogical techniques to take examples from the same area of law.
683
 The second 
type is using analogy to place the corresponding clauses in one specific law that can be 
applied in a different area of law, such as the definition of the term ‘not less than’ in 
criminal law also being applied in a civil case.
684
 The third type is using analogical 
skills, looking into rules outside the statutory law, such as local customs or foreign 
general principles, to supplement the insufficiencies of statutory law,
685
 like this study 
using a surface right owner’s and lessee’s relations to explain a patent right owner’s and 
licensee’s relations. Concerning the first and second types, the inner analogy was not 
successful for patents, as shown in Chapter 2. Chapters 4 and 5 used the last 
methodology—looking into rules outside the law from local customs in order to 
supplement the insufficiencies of statutory law. This study used the last type of 
methodology and proved that the first and second types are unworkable, so the result of 
this analysis suffices for the definition of jurisprudence. 
 
6.3 Key recommendations and proposals 
Throughout this thesis, a series of recommendations have been made. They are 
presented here in concise form.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
initiated to request a review of a final judgement with binding effect in any of the following situations: 
where the application of law is manifestly erroneous’. [translation by Lawbank] 
683
 Wu Chung-Jau ( 吳從周 ) notes this type of analogy, with German scholars calling it 
‘Gesetzesimmanente Rechtsfortbildung’. The three methodologies are analogy, limitation and 
enlargement, according to the legislative purpose, and to make proportional arrangements within the 
scope that are permissible. See Wu (n 663) 27. 
684
 Jurisprudence has a significant function of bridging different area of laws. See ibid 28. Example like 
Article 10(1) of Criminal Code states, ‘The term “not less than”, “not more than”, or “within” includes 
the given figure’. Civil Code and many ordinances do not replicate this definition because they all refer 
back to the Criminal Code by means of jurisprudence. 
685
 Wu Chung-Jau (吳從周)noted German scholars calling it ‘Gesetzesübersteigende Rechtsfortbildung’. 
The typical examples are maximum mortgage and fiduciary transferring guarantees. The court adopts 
Taiwanese customs and created these two systems outside civil law. See ibid. 
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6.3.1 Recommendations 
This study recommends a clear cut of free patents from the law of things. It can be done 
by changing misleading civil law terms used in Taiwanese Patent Act 2011 and filling 
statutory law insufficiencies by way of interpretation that is conferred by Taiwanese 
customary law in accord with English common law.  
 
I. The law of yeh is more feasible than the law of things because yeh-zhu-quan can 
successfully explain patent ownership, while civil law suo-you-quan cannot 
 
Physical things are the coded theme in the law of things. All legal relations are designed 
around them where a concept of ownership develops arising from this main theme. 
Ownership (suo-you-quan 所有權) under this theme denotes a perpetual holding. Due to 
a holding being perpetual, the alienation of ownership is a significant alternation of the 
status quo, so any alienation is governed by the principle of separation and abstraction. 
The original setting of these two principles was to protect inferior buyers. However, in 
the case of patent assignment, the buyers have no need to be protected because 
ownership has already passed to the buyer when the contract is signed. The principle of 
separation and abstraction, opposing, create unfairness to the seller when the buyer goes 
bankrupt—since ownership has been transferred to the buyer, the seller cannot ask for a 
return. It is all due to the principle of abstraction that makes the transfer of ownership 
independent from a contractual agreement, with the validity of the sales agreement not 
influencing the legal effect of the ownership transfer. Under this situation, the principle 
of abstraction creates unfairness to the seller, so the principle does not aid the 
stabilisation to patent transactions, adding more risk to it. For this reason, the whole set 
of rules, including ownership in a perpetual sense, are unfeasible for patent transactions. 
Moreover, the compulsory requirement of delivery is virtually impossible to implement 
when assigning patents, therefore in every aspect, the civil law concept is unsuitable for 
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patents.  
 
The law of yeh(業), on the other hand, is a better law for patents and patent transactions. 
The law of yeh (業)is a law particularly designed for intangible things, with all rules 
arising from the law of yeh(業) circuiting around a person and his/her real rights. 
Ownership (yeh-zhu-quan 業主權) under this law refers to a holding for a limited 
duration, with owning a right for a certain period of confined time. There is no principle 
of separation and abstraction involved in alienation of ownership under this law, with 
the best of all being that there is no compelled delivery requirement in this law. All 
deviating and contradicting parts arising from the civil law of things disappear in the 
law of yeh(業), making this law much more applicable than civil law.  
 
The law of yeh(業) has another irreplaceable advantage. The law of yeh admits leases as 
real rights, whilst the law of things denies them. It is important for the later resemblance 
of patentees and licensees with leaseholders and licensees. As the law of yeh(業) 
classify leases as real rights, patentees own their patents just like leaseholders hold their 
leases, with both of them being proprietary. The law of things does not have the same 
resemblance because civil law classifies leases as non-proprietary personal obligations. 
It stops the further development of licences as parties’ contractual obligations in this 
structure. 
 
In contrast to civil law, under Taiwanese traditional real rights classification where 
leases are proprietary, licences are allowed to occupy the place of contractual 
obligations. Leaseholders hold their leases proprietarily, whereas licensees hold their 
licences contractually, and it is fairly easy to apply real rights rules into a patent case. 
Patentees hold their patents proprietarily and their licensees hold the patent 
contractually; there is no deviating and contradicting in view of analogy. However, for 
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the law of things, leases are contractual in the civil law classification; it is extremely 
bizarre to carry on with patentees holding patents contractually and licensees hold 
patents contractually as well. From a legal science perspective, this customary law 
classification is in an ascendant position when compared to civil law. 
 
II. The principle of registration from land registration shall not be adopted in patent 
registration 
 
The principle of registration arising from land registration has been misaligned with 
patent registration for a long time, starting with the Taiwanese academia and then spread 
to the juridical system. The misconnection of land registration and patent registration 
arose from civil law ownership being applied to patent rights. In fact, court decisions 
that have adopted this misconception sometimes successfully explain the law, but 
sometimes do not. The Civil High Court in Taiwan has used this misconception firstly in 
trade mark cases, whilst in the same year not using this misconception in copyright 
cases. Judicial Yuan, where all the justices unify their disagreements through a voting 
system, agree to further adopt this misconception in patent cases. Henceforward, this 
misconnection was officially admitted by the court in trade mark and patent cases. The 
inconsistency in adopting legal rules only invites deeper investigation into why Judicial 
Yuan tolerates such an inconsistency in the same area of laws. 
 
This study suggests that the principle of registration originating from land registry is 
irrelevant to patent registration. From an historical perspective, these two registries 
developed independently. Taking English history as an example, the official index 
system was only introduced to patents after 1852 because before that there was none. It 
was specifically stated in an 1851 House of Lords’ report that registration should be 
considered merely as a record of claims and not as any determination of rights between 
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parties. This opinion is further supported by Section 32(9) of the Patents Act 1977, 
where registry is prima facie evidence of anything required or authorised by the law and 
definitively not the creation of any right. Patent registration is irrelevant to recognition 
of ownership, thus it is evident that it is superfluous for Taiwanese justice to link land 
registration with patent registration.  
 
Moreover, from a Taiwanese historical perspective, there was no requirement for land 
registration. Ownership transfer in Taiwan does not even have a public ceremony like its 
English counterpart where the vendors were required to hand over a piece of turf 
publicly to the purchasers in the presence of witnesses, with an oral agreement in 
secrecy in Taiwan having the same transfer effect. The principle of registration in the 
land registry that exists now was a later revolution starting during Japanese rule and not 
an evolution developed by Taiwanese society. Therefore, the misconnection of land and 
patent registry’s is purely a legal abstraction created by civil law trained judges. The 
principle of registration is not suggested to be applied in patent cases for this reason. 
 
III. Patent ‘assignment’ should not be translated into rang-yu (讓與) to prevent any 
confusion with the existing usage of outright ownership alienation for physical 
things 
 
Under the law of things, ‘assignment’ is a synonym for ‘alienation’. It refers to outright 
alienation of ownership as a whole, translated as rang-yu (讓與). As mentioned above, 
physical things are the code for the law of things; an assignment means a transfer of 
physical things with all proprietary rights therein. Also, the prerequisite of this transfer 
is that this thing is mine, therefore assignment is an alienation of ownership between the 
owner and the assignee. This understanding differs from common law. In the past when 
England was under the feudal tenure system, no one owned the King’s land. Everyone 
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was his tenant and held the land for him. The land was not owned by citizens who held 
leaseholds instead, so the ‘objects’ they assigned were leaseholds which were lesser 
than true freeholds, with ‘assignment’ meaning a transfer of lesser interest. This is a 
significant difference in the usage of the same legal terminology, with this nuance 
having a significant impact on patent assignment activities. 
 
This study took John Henry Merryman’s box metaphor and further developed it. Civil 
law ownership can be envisaged as a box where the owner can open up the box and 
remove some real rights for transfer. As long as the owner keeps the box, even if the box 
is empty, the owner retains ownership. In the civil law concept, assignment refers to a 
transfer of this box; it means the owner loses ownership as a whole, no matter whether 
the box is empty or full of real rights. However, under the common law system, there is 
no box at all. The owner keeps a bundle of real rights whereby transfer each one counts 
as assignment. Assignment does not necessary mean the owner loses his whole bundle 
of rights after assignment because whether the assignee owns the property depends on 
the quantity of the real rights being transferred. 
 
‘Assignment’ in the common law consensus makes perfect sense in patent assignment 
because if patentees are envisaged as leaseholders, assignment refers to a conveyance of 
lesser interests to assignees. ‘Assignment’ in the civil law sense, however, does not offer 
the same explanation to patent assignment because if a patentee can make an outright 
ownership transfer like a physical thing owner, why can’t the patentee own that patent 
perpetually just like a physical thing owner? The civil law explanation leads to a 
contradiction, therefore this study suggests that patent assignment should use another 
translation rather than adopting the concept directly from civil law ownership 
disposition. Patent ‘assignment’ should not be translated into rang-yu （讓與） to 
prevent confusion with the existing usage of outright ownership disposition for physical 
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things. 
 
IV. ‘Patent assignment’ should be translated as ‘zhuan-li-zhuan-rang’ (專利轉讓) 
rather than a civil law term ‘zhuan-li-rang-yu’（專利讓與） 
 
Patent assignment is not a disposition of a physical thing as stated earlier in 5.6.1. This 
study suggests that in order to highlight that a patent assignment is a change in the 
holding to intangible claims rather than a disposition of a physical thing, patent law 
should use the neutral word ‘zhuan-rang’ (轉讓) used in a stock/option assignment, 
instead of the civil law term ‘rang-yu’ (讓與). Apart for the word ‘zhuan-rang’ (轉讓) 
being closer to the substance of the meaning of assignment, another worthwhile 
reference is proffered by the Department of Justice of Hong Kong, where the English 
word ‘assignment’ has been translated as ‘zhuan-rang’ (轉讓) when Hong Kong was 
under British rule.
686
 This adjustment avoids a misconnection with the law of things in 
the Civil Code. As such, this study suggests that the terminology used in the Patent Act 
in relation to assignment should be changed from ‘zhuan-li-rang-yu’ (專利讓與) to 
‘zhuan-li-zhuan-rang’ (專利轉讓). 
 
This change could serve as a model reference for copyright law and trademark law in 
relation to the use of the word ‘assignment’. This discussion will cease here though by 
pointing out the harmonisation of the term ‘assignment’ in intellectual property law and 
other areas of law is another challenging topic. This is due to the Chinese word ‘rang-yu’ 
(讓與) only being used in the Patent Act 2011 and Copyright Act 2000, with the Trade 
Mark Act 2011 using another word ‘yi-zhuan’(移轉,transfer) to represent the meaning 
                                                 
686
 Department of Justice of Hong Kong Bilingual Laws Information System, ‘The English-Chinese 
Glossary of Legal Terms’ <http://www.legislation.gov.hk/eng/glossary/homeglos.htm> accessed 2 April 
2013 
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‘assignment’.687 How the word ‘assignment’ should be used in other laws is less related 
to the issues in dispute, so this study will now move onto the term ‘licence’ in the next 
paragraph. 
 
V. Licences are similar to the concept of pacht (贌), thus licences can be envisaged as 
personal obligations made by grantors and grantees in relation to real rights 
 
In view of licences not being placed in the civil law classification, this research 
searched customary law for an answer. Pacht (贌), which represents a purely contractual 
obligation made by the parties, provides a good translation ground for the concept of a 
licence. Pacht (贌) follows a crescendo that gradates by the quantity of covenants that 
have being given, as does a licence. Both pacht (贌) and licence denote that the source 
comes from a bundle of real rights in a negative sense, with following this string 
allowing the status of the patentee to be clearly explained. The intellectual product 
underneath a patent belongs to human society who may use this intellectual product 
freely. The patent law system is a mechanism that allows the inventor, who attributes 
this product to the public, a limited time of exclusivity. The law does not grant the 
patentee a usage right but a right to exclude others from using, with this exclusivity 
concept showing a typical characteristic like owning an estate.  
 
Patentee status can be analogised by means of the Taiwanese tenure system. A patentee 
can be envisaged as yeh-zhu (業主) who holds a patent for the public for a limited time. 
Within this given time, this patentee is free to use and gain capital from the patent as a 
freeholder. The patentee may grant their bundle of exclusivity rights to others by means 
                                                 
687
 For example, section 1 of Article 28 of the Trade Mark Act 2011 reads, ‘Any transfer of the right 
derived from an application for registration of a jointly owned trademark or the share of a joint applicant 
in such trademark shall have the consent of all joint applicants…’ [translation by Lawbank] Article 42 
reads, ‘A transfer of trademark right shall have no locus standi against any third party unless it is entered 
in the Register by the Registrar Office.’ [translation by Lawbank] 
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of gei (給) as assignments, or they may grant their rights by means of a pacht (贌) as 
licences. Those who obtain patents by way of assignment can, just like small-rent 
landlords, grant their rights further and collect royalties like rent. Those who obtain 
patents by way of licences, similar to primary cultivators, are subject to the covenants 
they obtained.  
 
The resemblance of pacht (贌) and licences also explains where Taiwanese and 
Japanese judges have gone wrong with exclusive licences. Judges have misused the 
civil law concept, stating that an exclusive licence grant is the granting of a surface right, 
making the exclusive licence grant proprietary. This judgement is contradicted by 
current general practice in common law where a licence is contractual. This research 
suggests that a better analogy should be that since leases in the Taiwanese and Japanese 
Civil Codes have been classified as contractual rights, holding patents by way of 
licences, is like holding surface rights by means of leases. However, an analogy under 
civil law classification will not go far because it still does not explain why patent 
licensees under a bare licence merely obtain the right not to be sued by the proprietor, 
whilst leaseholders obtain positive rights for using and generating profits from surface 
rights. The Taiwanese customary concept explains what a licence means better than the 
civil law concept. 
 
VI. Licences should be translated as xu-ke (許可) instead of shou-quan (授權)in the 
Taiwanese Patent Act 
 
In view of a licence not be the granting of real rights or positive rights, a patent ‘licence’ 
should not be translated as ‘shou-quan’ (授權), which means that rights (quan 權) have 
been granted (shou 授). A patent ‘licence’ should be a creation of a contractual covenant 
from a negative perspective where patentees waive their rights to assert exclusion 
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against licensees only if the licensees obtain the patentee’s permission; it is similar to 
non-action covenants in the civil law concept. The licensee pays royalties in exchange 
for a patentee’s non-action, therefore the term ‘licence’ should be translated as ‘xu-ke’ 
(許可) meaning ‘permission’, which is closer to its original meaning. Articles 57, 59, 62, 
63, 64, 69, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 96, 97, 138 and 140 in relation to the terms ‘licences’, 
‘licensees’ and ‘compulsory licences’ all need to be changed accordingly. 
 
This change could be a model reference for copyright law and trademark law in relation 
to the use of the word ‘licence’. This discussion however, will be stopped here by 
pointing out that the harmonisation between the term ‘licence’ in intellectual property 
law and other areas of law is another challenging topic. This is due to the Copyright Act 
providing a definition clause whilst the Patent Act does not. The complete solution for 
the harmonisation of the term ‘licence’ in intellectual property law is to put a definition 
clause of ‘licence’ in Article 3 of the Copyright Act so that other intellectual property 
law can use it by analogy. However, this study is not about copyright law amendments, 
with how the word ‘licence’ should be harmonised being less related to the issues in 
dispute, and as such will not be discussed further. 
 
6.3.2 Proposed Provisions 
 
A successful cure for all the misconceptions requires a simultaneous amendment of two 
laws: the Civil Code and the Patent Act. Therefore, this study proposes two-fold 
amendment provisions. The first is to the Taiwanese Civil Code 2010 (herein under the 
‘Civil Code’) and the second to the Taiwanese Patent Act 2011 (herein under the ‘Patent 
Act’). This work may form the groundwork for amendments to the Civil Code 
concerning the intersection between ‘things’ and ‘intangibles’. However, further work is 
required before any concrete suggestion can be made. 
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I. The Civil Code 
 
a) A clause needs to be added: Article 66 needs a new sentence stating the definition 
of ‘things’ 
 
The root of confusion originates from the ambiguity of the word ‘things’ in Chapter III 
of the code. The misconception of the law of things applied in patent case arises from 
two causes. The first is that the definition of ‘things’ was deleted in the third draft of the 
civil code in 1929. In the first draft, there was a clear definition of ‘things’ in Article 
166.
688
 The second reason is that the legislator of the third draft, Hu Han-min’s 
inadequate illustration in the legislative report regarding the general principles of the 
law of things, stated that ‘no rights in rem can be created by other means, unless they 
are otherwise stated in special laws, like mining rights in the Mining Act, and 
copyrights in the Copyright Act’.689 This draft provided the misleading direction that 
the legislators recognised copyrights as property in the law of things, as did patents. 
This misconception needs to be remedied by putting a definition back in this code.  
 
The original clause of Section 1 of Article 66 is,  
 
An immovable thing is land and things which are constantly affixed thereto. 
 
As in the beginning of ‘Chapter III Things’, once further work is developed on patents 
                                                 
688
 Concerning the legislative record of the first draft, see Hu Han-min (胡漢民), ‘Minfa Wuquan Yuanze 
(民法物權原則)=The Principles of The Law of Things in Civil Code’ in Judicial Yuan (Ministry of 
Justice) Department of Judicial Administration (ed), Zhonghua Minquo Minfa Zhiding Shiliao Huibian 
(中華民國民法制定史料彙編)=Compilation of Legislative Reports in Relation to The Civil Code of The 
Republic of China (Department of Judicial Administration 1976) 307. Article 166 was the original 
definition clause, states, ‘“Things” means “physical things”’.[translation by this author] 
689
 ibid 41 [translation by the author]. 
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vis-à-vis other intangibles, this clause might be reconsidered to limit the definition of 
‘things’ to physical things. Once it is clear that ‘things’ refers to physical things, it 
would then be clear that this clause is insufficient. There shall be a definition clause 
added before Section 1. 
 
‘Things’ means things that are physical, including movable and immovable 
things.  
(Added words underlined and a synopsis presented in the Appendix One) 
 
Once it is crystal clear that ‘things’ refers to physical things, it will then be clear that 
‘ownership’ from Article 765690 onwards refers to owning physical things. With this 
precise definition, the three inclusive positive rights—the right to use, the right to 
capital, and the right to disposition—merely refers to the rights that an owner has, 
simply in relation to his/her physical thing. These three positive real rights (under the 
civil law concept
691
) no longer have relations with patent rights that are basically 
comprised of negative rights.  
 
With this clear definition, quasi-possession stated in Article 966
692
 only relates to those 
real rights attached to physical things, such as surface rights or usufructs. It will not be 
further misinterpreted by jurists
693
 that civil law quasi-possession theory equally 
applies to patents, and will also reduce the muddling of Romanic possession with 
                                                 
690
 Article 765, ‘The owner of a thing has the right, within the limits of the Acts and regulations, to use it, 
to profit from it, and to disposed of it freely, and to exclude the interference from others’.[translation by 
Lawbank] 
691
 See the ‘real right’ definition in the Terminology section. 
692
 Article 966, ‘A quasi-possessor is a person who exercises such property rights over a thing as are 
established without having taken possession of the said thing. The provisions of the present chapter 
concerning possession shall apply mutatis mutandis to the quasi-possession as specified in the preceding 
paragraph’. [translation by Lawbank] 
693
 A typical example is civil law jurist Wang Ze-jian (王澤鑑) stating, ‘The object of quasi-possession 
limits to property rights…and property rights included real rights, personal debts and rights over 
intellectual property’. See Wang, Minfa Wuquan (民法物權)=The Law of Things in The Civil Code (n 43) 
696-697. 
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common law possession.
694
 
 
b) A clause needs to be amended: Article 67 needs to limit movable things to physical 
things other than immovable things 
 
Again, once further work is developed on patents vis-à-vis other intangibles, this clause 
might be reconsidered to limit the definition of ‘movable things’ to any physical thing 
except for immovable things mentioned in the preceding article. Such a consideration of 
limitation is due to the word ‘movable things’ in civil law has a different understanding 
to ‘personal property’ in the common law system. As this study pointed out earlier, 
English law draws the line between land and personal goods because land belonged to 
the king in the past. Civil law draws the line between movable and immovable because 
all things belong to citizens. The items referred to by ‘movable things’ are different 
from those in ‘personal property’. To prevent patents from being miscategorised as 
movable things, Article 67 requires a definite scope of application. 
 
The original clause of Article 67 in the Civil Code states,  
 
A moveable thing is any thing except for immovable things mentioned in the 
preceding article. 
 
This study suggests that this clause should be amended to, 
 
A movable thing is any physical thing except for immovable things 
                                                 
694
 By using John Henry Merryman’s box metaphor, the difference of possession in these two systems is 
revealed. If civil law ownership is envisaged as a box, possession is another box which is held by a 
possessor. This box, however, lacks ‘the right to dispose or alienation’ that reside in the owner. Possessors 
by and large, have lesser rights than the true owners. But in common law, there is no box at all, with every 
owner also being a possessor.  
 249 
 
mentioned in the preceding article.  
(Added words underlined and a synopsis presented in the Appendix One) 
 
This modification has another advantage. Article 761
695
 and Article 946
696
 require 
‘delivery’ as an effective condition for a transfer. Before this modification, it is always 
an argument whether patent transfer is governed by them and whether it is possible to 
‘deliver’ a patent in practice. After this modification, they no longer apply to patent 
transfer. The delivery requirement is only limited to personal goods, such as a car or a 
mobile phone, where delivery is imaginable. Moreover, a subsequent clause, such as 
‘bona fide acquisition’ (Article 768, 768-1)697, will not be applied into patent cases. This 
modification reduces the argument about whether a patentee recorded in error is 
applicable to claim his/her bona fide acquisition under the Civil Code.
698
 This change 
offers a certain rejection to that inquiry. 
 
II. The Patent Act 2011 
 
New transaction rules are needed to rebuild the Patent Act 2011 in compliance with the 
amendment in the Civil Code above. This research suggests certain clauses in the Patent 
Act need to either be added or amended accordingly.  
                                                 
695
 Article 761(1), ‘The transfer of rights in rem of personal property will not effect until the personal 
property has been delivered’. [translation by Lawbank] This study suggests that a better translation should 
change ‘personal property’ to ‘movable thing’. 
696
 Article 946, ‘The transfer of possession becomes effective by the delivery of the thing possessed’. 
[translation by Lawbank] 
697
 Article 768, ‘A person, who has peacefully, publicly and continually possessed another’s personal 
property with the intent of being an owner for ten years, acquires the ownership of such personal 
property’. Article 768-1, ‘A person, who has peacefully, publicly and continually possessed another 
personal property with the intent of being an owner for five years, and was in good faith and not of 
negligence at the beginning of his possession, acquire the ownership of such personal 
property’.[translation by Lawbank] This study suggest that a better translation should change ‘personal 
property’ to ‘movable thing’. 
698
 A discussion of bona fide acquisition applies to patent cases, see Shieh, ‘Cong Xiangguan Anli Tantao 
ZhihuiCaichanquan yu Minfa zhi Guanxi (從相關案例探討智慧財產權與民法之關係)=A Discussion 
on the Relationship of Intellectual Property Rights with the Civil Law through Relevant Cases’ (n 83) 
234,235. 
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a) Clauses that need to be added 
 
i. Article 6 (1) of the Patent Act needs a new sentence stating the legal 
consequence of assignment 
 
In view of ‘things’ in the Civil Code being limited to physical things, Article 373 in the 
Civil Code is limited to legal consequence in relation to the transfer of physical things, 
with patent assignment no longer applied to Article 373
699
 or Article 377 in the Civil 
Code.
700
 It then becomes a gap for patent assignment. When a patent assignment deal is 
made, the assignor and assignee have no idea at what time the interests and risks pass to 
the assignee if the parties have not considered it in a contract. It could be at the time 
when the contract is signed, or at the time when registration occurs. To avoid 
uncertainty, this study suggests that there should be a default time for patent ownership 
transfer. This default time should be the same as the sale law in Section 2 of Article 345 
of the Civil Code,
701
 when the sale of rights is established when the parties agree on the 
object and the price; and also the same as the succession law in Article 1147 of the Civil 
Code,
702
 where succession is effective upon the death of the deceased. 
                                                 
699
 Article 373 of the Civil Code, ‘The profits and dangers of the object sold pass to the buyer at the time 
of delivery, unless otherwise provided by contract’. [translation by Lawbank] 
700
 Article 377 of the Civil Code, ‘When the object of a sale is a right, by virtue of which the seller may 
possess a certain thing, the provisions of the four preceding articles shall be mutandis applied’. 
[translation by Lawbank] This article only provides instruction on a transfer of right attached to a physical 
thing but does not answer what happens when the right is purely intangible. 
701
 Article 345 (2) of the Civil Code, ‘The contract of sale is completed when the parties have mutually 
agreed on the object and the price’. [translation by Lawbank] The original design of the sale law is that 
Article 345 is in charge of the establishment of a sales contract (upon agreement of object and price), and 
Article 348 is in charge of effective ownership transfer (upon delivery). For the ‘thing’, as this study has 
suggested, is limited to a physical thing, therefore Article 348 is limited to a physical thing ownership 
transfer, with patents no longer covered. Section 1 of Article 348 states, ‘The seller of a thing is bound to 
deliver the thing to the buyer and to make him acquire its ownership’. Section 2 of Article 348 states, 
‘The seller of a right is bound to make the buyer acquire the right sold. If, by virtue of such right, the 
seller can possess a certain thing, he is also bound to deliver the thing’. [This article is translated by 
Lawbank] 
702
 Article 1147, ‘Succession opens with the death of the deceased’. [translation by Lawbank] This author 
thinks a better translation should be ‘Succession starts with…’ because the original Chinese wording uses 
‘starts’. 
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The original sentence in Article 6 (1) is,  
 
The right to apply for a patent and the patent right are both assignable and 
inheritable. 
 
The following sentence needs to be added after this section:  
 
The interests and risks of a patent pass to the assignee at the time when the 
transaction, instrument, or event is made. In the case of inter vivos assignment, 
the above given time can be agreed otherwise by contract. 
 (Added words underlined and a synopsis presented in the Appendix One) 
 
It is then clear that proprietary interests and potential risk pass to the assignee upon the 
death of the deceased if the patent is passed through the law of succession. In the case of 
inter vivos assignment, the interests and risks are passed to the assignee when the parties 
agree on the object and the price. An inter vivos patent assignment allows the parties to 
alter the time by consent, such as ‘at the time when the registration is done’ (according 
to the requirement stated in Article 84 (1) of the Patent Act), as long as the time is 
expressly stated in the contract.  
 
ii. Article 84 of the Patent Act with a new Section 2 
 
Throughout the whole Patent Act there is no clause clearly stating the nature of 
registration, with this ambiguity causing many judges to misconnect rules in the land 
register with the patent register. This misconnection is due to the Civil Code governing 
the general principle. Therefore, Article 758 of the Civil Code, in principle, is applied to 
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patent law as long as the Patent Act has no provision excluding this application. Article 
758 reads, ‘The acquirement, creation, loss and alternation of rights in rem of real 
property through the juridical act will not take effect until the recordation has been 
made’.703 It thus makes the registering of patents a statutory obligation in the creation 
of patent rights. In other words, it misleads the public that a successful publication of a 
patent is an official recognition of a creation of patent rights. In order to prevent this 
misleading from happening, it is necessary to have a clear statement that patent register 
is not an official recognition of a patentee’s property right but merely a prima facie 
record of the law’s requirement. 
 
The original sentence in Article 84(1) is,  
 
The grant, alteration, extension, prolongation, assignment, trust, licensing, 
compulsory licensing, revocation, extinguishments or pledging of an 
invention patent right as well as other matters which should be published, the 
Patent Authority shall effect such publication in the Patent Gazette. 
 
This Article needs an addition to Section 2, further stating, 
 
The above publication shall be prima facie evidence of anything required by 
this Act.  
(Added words underlined and a synopsis presented in the Appendix One) 
 
This clause takes reference from Section 32 (9) of the Patents Act 1977 of the United 
                                                 
703
 This sentence is translated by Lawbank. This study suggests a better translation would be ‘The 
acquirement, creation, loss and alternation of rights in rem of an immovable thing through the juridical 
act will not effect until the recordation has been made’. 
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Kingdom.
704
 The advantage of this modification is that this clause expressly excludes 
the application of Article 759-1,
705
 which implied a linkage with the principle of 
registration. Patents, henceforward, will have a clear rule on the own without being 
misconnected to the civil law notion of property. 
 
b) Clauses that need to be amended and terms that need to be changed 
 
i. Article 62 (1) 
 
The original Article 62(1) is, 
 
An assignment, trust, or licence made by the patentee to another person to 
practice the invention, or the mortgage created on the patent by the patentee 
shall not be asserted against any third party, unless it has been registered with 
the Patent Authority. 
 
This clause has two problems. Firstly, patent rights have been treated as positive rights 
that can be granted to a third party to ‘practice the invention’. It deviates from the 
original spirit where the whole patent law system was designed based on the exclusion 
strategy. The illustration stated in the Patent Act Amendment Bill 2011 provided by the 
Taiwanese Intellectual Property Office worsens this situation by explaining that ‘the 
word “practice” includes to make, offer to sell, sell, use or import, and all these rights 
                                                 
704
 Section 32(9) of The Patents Act 1977 states, ‘The register shall be prima facie evidence of anything 
required or authorised by this Act or rules to be registered and in Scotland shall be sufficient evidence of 
any such thing’. See Jones and Cole (n 54) 466. 
705
 Section 1 of Article 759-1 of the Civil Code states, ‘If a right in rem of real property has been 
recorded, the right-holder recorded in the register is presumed to own the rights legitimately’. Section 2 
states, ‘If a bona fide third party in reliance of the real property recordation has recorded an alternation to 
the right in rem of real property pursuant to a juridical act, the validity of the alternation shall not be 
affected by the original false recordation of a right in rem’. [translation by Lawbank] This study thinks a 
better translation should be ‘immovable thing’ instead of ‘real property’ because civil law has a different 
classification of things than that in the common law system. 
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belongs to a superordinate concept of “use”’.706 This study placed emphasis earlier on 
the common law patent system adopting an exclusion property module using exceptions 
rather than creating rules for proper use, so the Patent Act should be prevented from 
being used to grant positive rights that depict assignment, trust and licences. No one 
explicitly states this point better than Justice Brewer in the United States v American 
Bell Tel. Co., stating that ‘the patent is not a conveyance of something which the 
government owns’.707 The purpose of the patent is to protect the patentee or propitiator 
in a monopoly, not to give him/her a usage right that they did not have before. The thing 
patented is open to use by anyone and the patent system is only to separate the inventor 
from having exclusive use. Since the patentee or proprietor has no positive rights in the 
source, how can they ‘grant patent rights to third party to practice the invention’ later? 
This research concludes that the Intellectual Property Office’s opinion is apparently 
wrong and deviates from the spirit of the patent system, thus the wordings in this Article 
‘to practice the invention’ should be deleted accordingly.  
 
Secondly, the original design of this clause was heavily influenced by the civil law with 
that any alienation of real rights being required to be registered. As this study has 
suggested, the register shall be prima facie evidence of the claims but not recognition of 
any rights governed by the principle of registration. Especially in the case of a licence, 
as a personal contractual covenant made by parties, it is bizarre to require every licence 
contract to be recorded in the register. Even in the Civil Code itself, there is no 
compulsory requirement to register contractual leases. The only concern of licence 
registration is exclusive licence. Exclusive licensee is entitled to sue for infringement, 
so it can be a problem if the public is not well-informed. However, on the other hand, an 
                                                 
706
 See paragraph 3 of the Intellectual Property Office, ‘Zhuanlifa Xiuzheng Caoan (專利法修正草案) 
=Reason for Patent Act Amendment Bill’ (Intellectual Property Office, 3rd of December 2009)  
<http://www.tipo.gov.tw/ch/AllInOne_Show.aspx?path=2769&guid=45f2e9ed-6a50-488e-8514-47a78e3c
c320&lang=zh-tw> accessed 16 May 2012 [translation by the author] 
707
 United States (n 450) at 238-239. 
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exclusive licensee’s entitlement to sue does not depend upon registration of the 
licence.
708
 A lack of registration only leads to the loss of entitlement to costs or 
expenses in litigation.
709
 This article shall have another sentence stating ‘the right to 
sue for infringement’ is not within the scope of being forbidden from asserting against 
‘any third party’. This ‘any third party’ majorly refers to the subsequent buyer, 
subsequent trustee or exclusive licensee who will be directly influenced by the 
unregistered transaction. 
 
This study suggests that Article 62(1) should be amended as, 
 
An assignment, trust, or exclusive licence made by the patentee to another 
person to practice the invention, or the mortgage created on the patent by the 
patentee shall not be asserted against any third party, unless it has been 
registered with the Patent Authority. The assignee or exclusive licensee’s 
entitlement to sue for infringement is not affected by a lack of registration or 
delayed registration but the assignee or exclusive licensee cannot recover 
damages if the registration exceeds six (6) months from the date of such a 
transaction.  
(Added parts are underlined and the deleted part marked in grey. For a 
synopsis see the Appendix One) 
 
This clause takes reference from Section 68 of the Patents Act 1977 of the United 
                                                 
708
 See Dendron GmbH v University of California [2004] EWHC 1163(Ch), [2004] FSR 43 Patents Court 
865. ‘There is no requirement that an exclusive licensee be registered as such as a condition of 
commencing proceedings for infringement. Rather, the Act imposes (in s.68) a restriction on the exclusive 
licensee’s right to recover damages in the event that the “transaction, instrument or event” by which he 
becomes exclusive licensee is not registered within six months of its date. Non-registration does not affect 
his rights to recover costs or his right to an injunction. Thus, the register is inconclusive, and identifying 
an exclusive licensee depends entirely upon a proper construction of the document or documents by 
which he claims to be exclusive licensee’. 
709
 Jones and Cole (n 54) 771. 
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Kingdom,
710
 where in Dendron GmbH v University of California,
711
 the court further 
explained that non-registration does not affect the exclusive licensee’s rights to recover 
costs or his right to an injunction. This amendment also makes things clearer that 
non-registration does not affect the assignee or exclusive licensee’s right to an 
injunction in Taiwanese law.  
 
ii. The term ‘assignment’ shall be changed to ‘zhuan-rang’ (轉讓) throughout the 
Patent Act 
 
As this study suggested earlier, assignment in a patent is not an alienation of tangible 
property. In order to cease the misconnection between patents and the law of things, this 
study suggests that the terminology used in the Patent Act in relation to assignment 
should be changed from ‘zhuan-li-rang-yu’ (專利讓與) to ‘zhuan-li-zhuan-rang’ (專利
轉讓). The term ‘rang-yu’ (讓與) used in Article 6(1), 13 (1) and (2), 62(1), 64, 65(1), 
84, 88 and 138 of the Patent Act needs to be amended accordingly. 
 
iii. The term ‘shou-quan’（授權）should be amended to ‘xu-ke’ (許可) throughout 
the Patent Act 
 
The term ‘licences’ has been mistranslated for a long time as ‘shou-quan’(授權), which 
implies that there are positive rights (quan權) being granted (shou 授) in a licence. It is 
                                                 
710
 Section 68 of the Patent Act 1977, 
Where by virtue of a transaction, instrument or event to which section 33 above applies a person becomes 
the proprietor or one of the proprietors or an exclusive licensee of a patent and the patent is subsequently 
infringed before the transaction, instrument or event is registered, in proceedings for such an infringement, 
the court or comptroller shall not award him costs or expenses unless— 
(a) the transaction, instrument or event is registered within the period of six months beginning with its 
date; or 
(b) the court or the comptroller is satisfied that it was not practicable to register the transaction, 
instrument or event before the end of that period and that is registered as soon as practicable 
thereafter 
711
 Dendron GmbH (n 709) 865. 
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a misconception because ‘a licence passes no proprietary interest in anything, it only 
makes an action lawful that would otherwise have been unlawful’.712 As this study 
suggests earlier, the term ‘licence’ should be translated as ‘xu-ke’ (許可), meaning 
‘permission’, which is closer to its original meaning. Articles 57, 59, 62, 63, 64, 69, 84, 
87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 96, 97, 138 and 140 in relation to terms ‘licences’, ‘licensees’ and 
‘compulsory licences’ require amendment accordingly. 
 
6.3.3 Proposed recommendations and amendment procedures  
 
The Legal Affairs Division of the Intellectual Property Office is responsible for 
proposing an amendment bill to Legislative Yuan.
713
 The amendment motion could also 
be brought by a member of Legislative Yuan with 10 other members’ endorsements after 
a second consultative discussion.
714
 Prior to the discussion in Legislative Yuan, the 
Intellectual Property Office would hold public hearings and conferences inviting 
intellectual property scholars, industry representatives, representatives of patent lawyers 
and any third party who is interested in the amendment. The proposed suggestions 
would be discussed and opened up for debate. Any amendment or proposed suggestion 
would be discussed by way of public hearings and conferences by the Intellectual 
Property Office, as well as further debated during many consultative discussions in 
Legislative Yuan.  
 
The call for change can be achieved via journals or book publications. An explanative 
                                                 
712
 Allen (n 638) 246. 
713
 According to Article 13 of the Administrative Regulations for the Intellectual Property Office of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Legal Affairs Division is responsible for the amendment of intellectual 
property laws ‘other than Trade Mark and Copyright Act.’ This is due to the Trade Mark Act being taken 
care by the Trade Mark Division and the Copyright Act being the Copyright Division’s affair.  
714
 According to Article 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Yuan, ‘The motion of amendment 
can be brought out by a convener after the second consultative discussion, with 10 other legislative 
member’s endorsement.’  
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doctrinal work, and especially a comparative study like this,
715
 could be a reference 
source for the court.
716
 Once adopted by the Supreme Court, the decision would have a 
chance of becoming a precedent that all tiers of court follow. The proposed suggestion 
would fully communicate with all jurists in Taiwan if this approach is used. 
  
                                                 
715
 Substantiated by Professor Yang, an explanative doctrinal work, and especially a comparative study, 
has an increasingly significant impact on court decisions. Yang (n 69) 263 stating, ‘In our jurisdiction, the 
same as Japan, especially works with a comparative study, doctrinal works have an increasingly 
significant influence on court decisions since Shi Shang-kuan and Wang Ze-jian.’ [translation by this 
author] Professor Yao Rui-guang (姚瑞光) believes that a doctrinal work could be jurisprudence in the 
hierarchy of Article 1 of the Civil Code. ‘The general principle of the law, foreign laws, unimplemented 
laws in our jurisdiction, precedents, and doctrinal works could be the major basis of jurisprudence.’ 
[translation by this author] Yao, Minfa Zongze Lun(民法總則論)=On the General Principles of the Civil 
Code (n 127) 24. 
716
 Yang (n 69) 253-254. Professor Yang cites the Supreme Court precedent, ‘When the statutory law is 
not sufficient, or is not applicable, the court can supplement the law by interpretation. If the court finds no 
basis for its interpretation, the court may consider the nation’s condition and take references from 
doctrinal works and make them precedents.’ [translation by this author] See Daliyuan 大理院 (The 
Supreme Court), Daliyuan Panjue Yaozhi Huilan Zhengji (大理院判決要旨匯覽正集)=The Restatement 
of the Supreme Court Precedents (Daliyuan 1919) 1.  
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6.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The position of patents in property taxonomy is now clear. The authority grants a 
patentee the right to exclude others, just like the authority does to an estate holder. This 
grant is not the conferring of positive rights but merely an embargo on many others 
from use. ‘Licence’ means the relief of such an embargo on a licencee. Once a licence is 
granted, the licencee reverts back to the state of freedom to use. In the case of a 
non-exclusive licence, the non-exclusive licencee cannot grant his/her relief further 
down because the relief is a one to one relationship. In the case of an exclusive licence, 
the owner/patentee grants the whole bundle of rights to the exclusive licencee, with the 
exclusive licencee standing in the shoes of the patentee. The rights that have been 
granted are proprietary. The law of yeh provides answers to what rights a patentee owns 
and a licencee holds, thus satisfactorily explaining the unelaborated part in civil law. 
 
The property model built on Taiwanese customary law proposed in this research is 
applicable and enforceable under the scheme of Article 1 of the Civil Code. The legal 
methodology, also named ‘jurisprudence’ used in this research in previous chapters, is 
confined to the definition of jurisprudence in this code. By conducting a three stage 
analysis, this study proves that using an analogical technique of taking examples from 
the same area of civil law and using analogies taken from corresponding clauses in one 
specific civil law and applying them to a different areas of law, like patent law, cannot 
be achieved successfully because many civil law concepts do not explain the common 
law concept well. Only Taiwanese customary law can solve this dilemma. The 
conclusion proffered by this author satisfies the three step analysis required by the 
notion of jurisprudence, with the customary law and concept proposed by this study 
being applicable for adoption in each individual patent case. 
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In view of the applicability of a customary legal concept being adopted in patent cases, 
this study proffers solutions to current statutory laws in two aspects. Firstly, Articles 66 
and 67 of the Civil Code and Articles 6(1), 62(1) and 84 of the Patent Act need a major 
change. Secondly, customary legal terms and concepts need to be adopted in the Patent 
Act. Articles 57, 59, 62, 63, 64, 69, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 96, 97, 138 and 140 in 
relation to the terms ‘licences’, ‘licensees’ and ‘compulsory licences’ need to be 
changed to ‘xu-ke’ (許可)accordingly.  
 
As with the first solution, this study sets the groundwork for further development 
elsewhere to consider limiting ‘things’ and ‘movable things’ to physical things. New 
patent transaction rules are suggested to be established separately in the Patent Act, 
where the interest and risk transfer, the legal consequences of registration or 
non-registration of such transactions, and the nature of the register in granting patents 
and patent transactions, are clearly described. The second solution solves the misuse of 
civil law legal terms in patent transactions (assignment and licence), whereby adopting 
customary legal terms and concepts into patent law terminology that will allow this 
Patent Act to give judges a better, more correct direction to interpret the law.  
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APPENDIX ONE   
AMENDMENT CHART 
The suggested amendment clauses of the Civil Code and the Patent Act are presented in 
the synopses below. 
 
Civil Code 
While this work may form the groundwork for amendments to the Civil Code 
concerning the intersection between ‘things’ and ‘intangibles’, the following 
suggestions may be considered in such amendments. 
 
Article Original clauses Suggested clauses 
66 An immovable thing is land and things 
which are constantly affixed thereto. 
 
The products of the immovable thing, 
if they are not separated therefrom, 
constitute a part of the immovable 
thing. 
‘Things’ means things that are 
physical, including movable and 
immovable things. 
 
An immovable thing is land and things 
which are constantly affixed thereto. 
 
The products of the immovable thing, 
if they are not separated therefrom, 
constitute a part of the immovable 
thing. 
67 A moveable thing is any thing except 
for immovable things mentioned in the 
preceding article. 
A movable thing is any physical thing 
except for immovable things 
mentioned in the preceding article. 
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Patent Act 
Article Original clauses Suggested clauses 
6 (1) The right to apply for a patent and the 
patent right are both assignable and 
inheritable. 
 
The right to apply for a patent and the 
patent right are both assignable and 
inheritable. The interests and risks of a 
patent pass to the assignee at the time 
when the transaction, instrument or 
event is made. In the case of inter vivos 
assignment, the above given time can 
be agreed otherwise by contract. 
62 (1) An assignment, trust or licence made 
by the patentee to another person, or 
the mortgage created on the patent by 
the patentee, shall not be asserted 
against any third party, unless it has 
been registered with the Patent 
Authority. 
An assignment, trust or exclusive 
licence made by the patentee to another 
person, or the mortgage created on the 
patent by the patentee, shall not be 
asserted against any third party, unless 
it has been registered with the Patent 
Authority. The assignee or exclusive 
licensee’s entitlement to sue for 
infringement is not affected by lack of 
registration or delayed registration but 
the assignee or exclusive licensee 
cannot recover damages if the 
registration exceeds six (6) months 
from the date of such a transaction. 
84 The grant, alteration, extension, The grant, alteration, extension, 
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prolongation, assignment, trust, 
licensing, compulsory licensing, 
revocation, extinguishments or 
pledging of an invention patent right as 
well as other matters which should be 
published, the Patent Authority shall 
effect such publication in the Patent 
Gazette. 
prolongation, assignment, trust, 
licensing, compulsory licensing, 
revocation, extinguishments or 
pledging of an invention patent right as 
well as other matters which should be 
published, the Patent Authority shall 
effect such publication in the Patent 
Gazette. 
The above publication shall be prima 
facie evidence of anything required by 
this Act. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
CHARACTER LIST 
 
ān 垵 an exclusive fishing ground 
gong-lao-zu 功勞租 a rent paid for the grantee’s 
achievements during his lifetime 
da-zu-hu 大租戶 a large-rent landlord 
da-zu-yeh 大租業 a large-rent estate  
diăn 典 real mortgage 
diàn 佃    tenure 
diàn-hu 佃戶 tenant 
di-ji-zu 地基租  ground rent 
eikosaku 永小作 (Japanese) a perpetual or indefinite 
lease for land 
fan-da-zu 番大租 aborigine rent for the land 
gei 給 assign 
k’en-chao 墾照 reclamation permit 
kosaku 小作 (Japanese) a lease to land with a 
definite duration 
sheng-fan 生番 unacculturated aborigine 
shiyakuchi 借地 (Japanese) a lease for land without a 
grant for proprietary interests, like a 
lease of a surface right 
suo-you-quan 所有權 ownership 
pacht 贌 (Taiwanese) to let (a parcel of land) 
tien-hu 佃戶 tenant 
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tien 田 rice fields 
shui 稅 (Taiwanese) to let (a house or flat) 
shixingcelin 施行敕令 an ordinance of a direct enactment of 
laws 
wu-zhu-quan 物主權 ownership of personal goods 
yang-shan-zu 養贍租 rent paid to the clan’s elderly 
relatives during their lifetime 
yeh 業 Estates 
yeh-zhu 業主 owner 
yeh-zhu-quan 業主權 estate ownership 
yi-tian-er-zhu 一田二主 one (rice) field with two owners 
yi-tian-san-zhu 一田三主 one (rice) field with three owners 
yong-diàn 永佃 perpetual leasehold for cultivating 
another individual’s land by paying 
rent 
yong-xiao-zuo-quan 永小作權 long term leasehold (a definite term) 
for cultivating another individual’s 
land by paying rent 
yuan 園 non-rice fields 
xiao-zu-hu 小租戶 small-rent landlord 
xiao-zu-yeh 小租業 small-rent estate 
xian-geng-diàn-ren 現耕佃人 primary cultivator 
xian-nian-pacht-geng 現年贌耕 one year tenure 
xian-xiao-yin 
 
現銷銀 
 
upfront payment for the rent of the 
land that a house was build on  
zhuan-li-zhuan-rang 專利轉讓 patent assignment (recommended 
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translation) 
zhuan-li-rang-yu 專利讓與 patent assignment (current use) 
zhuan-li yeh-zhu-quan 專利業主權 patent ownership 
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